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Case Law

Court Denies Defendant’s Motion to Overrule Plaintiff’s Objections to Discovery Requests

In a Second Case, Judge Specifies Search Terms for Parties to Use: eDiscovery Case Law

In Abbott v. Wyoming Cty. Sheriff’s Office, No. 15-CV-531W (W.D.N.Y. May 16, 2017), New York Magistrate Judge Hugh B. Scott granted the plaintiff’s motion to compel and defendant’s cross-motion in part, ordering the defendant to perform additional production over a disputed time period, based on a list of search terms ordered by Judge Scott.

Case Background

In this case concerning allegations that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of promotions and work shifts or assignments that she was otherwise eligible to receive, for no reason other than her medical condition of epilepsy, the plaintiff (in February 2016) requested all emails sent and received by three key custodians “from September 2009 through the present, in native, electronic format, subject to an agreement of the parties regarding search terms.”  The defendant responded in September 2016, producing approximately 1,004 pages of responsive email messages and a privilege log containing 369 separate entries.

That request appeared to be fulfilled until the plaintiff’s deposition in February 2017, during which the plaintiff described discrimination and retaliation occurring through the present time. The description of ongoing improper conduct prompted the suspension of her deposition and different protests from each side. The defendant protested that the plaintiff did not describe ongoing conduct in her responses to its interrogatories, while the plaintiff protested that the defendant’s response to the plaintiff’s request did not include any email messages dated after February 2016. The pending cross-motions soon followed.

Judge’s Ruling

In looking at the complaint and the plaintiff’s second supplemental response, prepared after the start of the plaintiff’s deposition, Judge Scott noted that the plaintiff “mentions only two specific events that occurred after any produced email messages dated from February 2016”: “a denial of transport duties that occurred as recently as February 9, 2017; and an inability to apply for a sergeant’s position in July 2016”, along with a few written warnings.

Observing that the request “does not have to be revisited for any other topics”, Judge Scott stated that “[o]n at least one prior occasion, the Court has crafted discovery production based on specific search terms” – Armstrong Pump, Inc. v. Hartman, No. 10-CV-446S (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2014), which we covered here.  As a result, Judge Scott ordered the defendant to “supplement its response to Request 15 by searching for email messages dated between March 1, 2016 and May 1, 2017 that contain Abbott’s name, or any name mentioned in her second supplemental response, plus any of the following search terms:

  • sergeant
  • cell phone
  • control room
  • booking
  • transport
  • court hours
  • late OR lateness
  • surveillance OR camera”

Judge Scott denied the plaintiff’s motion “to the extent that it seeks any other relief”, observing that “[e]ven with allegations of ongoing retaliation, defendants at some point need to have some finality about what they are facing.”

So, what do you think?  Should courts craft search terms for parties to use in litigation?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Denies Defendant’s Motion to Overrule Plaintiff’s Objections to Discovery Requests

Court Grants Motion for Terminating Sanctions Against Defendants for Intentional Spoliation: eDiscovery Case Law

In Omnigen Research et. al. v. Wang et. al., No. 16-00268 (D. Oregon, May 23, 2017), Oregon District Judge Michael J. McShane granted the plaintiffs’ Motion for Terminating Spoliation Sanctions and agreed to issue an Order of Default Judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (while dismissing the defendants’ counterclaims) due to the defendants’ intentional destruction of evidence on several occasions.

Case Background

In this case (for breach of contract, intentional interference with economic relations, misappropriation of trade secrets, copyright infringement, false advertising and unfair competition, and breach of fiduciary duty filed against a former employee of the plaintiff, Yongqiang Wang), the plaintiffs alleged that in 2012, while still employed by the plaintiff, he stole trade secrets and created two rival businesses, including the defendant company Bioshen.  The plaintiffs, concerned in part about the possible destruction of evidence early in the case, filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, which was granted in May 2016, to force the defendants to “immediately produce to Plaintiffs all electronic media in their custody, possession or control for purposes of verifying that they do not contain Plaintiff’s confidential and/or copyrighted material.”

Eleven days later, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause because Wang had left for China without producing his laptop as required by the Preliminary Injunction. A hearing on the issue was held and, in addition to other requirements, the defendants were ordered to “download all of the contents of the computer in China on a portable hard drive and have it mailed to defense counsel within 7 days, and deliver any computers or portable storage data to defense counsel by 5/27/2016.”

The plaintiffs were required to seek court intervention regarding discovery on multiple occasions because of the failure of the defense to adequately respond to their requests for production.  Ultimately, the plaintiffs filed their Motion for Terminating Spoliation Sanctions on 3/3/2017, with oral arguments heard on the motion on 4/18/2017.

Judge’s Ruling

Before detailing all of the instances where the defendants “intentionally” deleted or destroyed evidence, Judge McShane stated:

“As stated during oral arguments on 4/18/2017, the Court finds the destruction of evidence by the defendants was intentional. The plaintiffs’ Motion for Terminating Spoliation Sanctions describes in full detail the many ways the defendants intentionally hid or destroyed evidence in this case. In summary, Plaintiffs allege that the defendants made their desktop computer unavailable by “donating” it to Goodwill, that the defendants intentionally deleted thousands of documents from Wang’s personal Lenovo computer, that the defendants intentionally deleted and refused to produce relevant emails from multiple email accounts, and that the defendants intentionally destroyed metadata. These actions have deprived the Plaintiffs of evidence central to their case and undermined the Court’s ability to enter a judgment based on the evidence. For these reasons, default judgment and terminating sanctions for the spoliation of evidence is warranted FRCP 37(b)(2), Rule 37(e), and the Court’s inherent authority to sanction abusive litigation practices.”

As a result, Judge McShane granted the plaintiffs’ Motion for Terminating Spoliation Sanctions and agreed to issue an Order of Default Judgment in favor of the plaintiffs while dismissing the defendants’ counterclaims.

So, what do you think?  With the new Rule 37(e) (since December 2015), do you think it takes this level of intent to obtain significant sanctions?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Denies Defendant’s Motion to Overrule Plaintiff’s Objections to Discovery Requests

Court Grants Summary Judgment After Plaintiff’s Spoliation Motion Denied: eDiscovery Case Law

In Taylor v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., d/b/a Rite-Aid, No. 16-00474 (D. Oregon, May 12, 2017), Oregon District Judge Marco A. Hernandez granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment after denying the plaintiff’s request for spoliation sanctions against the defendant for failing to preserve store videos that were taken on the day of her slip and fall in the defendant’s store.

Case Background

In this slip and fall case in a defendant store, the plaintiff sued the defendant after she slipped and fell in a large puddle, eventually claiming “significant pain” to her hand and wrist.  As a result, the plaintiff filed suit, alleging that the defendant “a) failed to make the premises reasonably safe; b) failed to take reasonable steps to promptly remove the puddle of liquid from the Rite-Aid store floor; c) failed to adequately warn Plaintiff by placing cones around the area of the liquid on the floor; and d) failed to properly secure the area, knowing that the puddle of liquid could pose additional risks to patrons of the store.”  After discovery, the defendant moved for summary judgment.

On the day of the spill, the store manager reviewed the security tapes from the time of the incident, and did so again a day or two later with the defendant’s Risk Management group, and found that the cameras did not cover the area of the spill.  As a result, the defendant did not keep the footage of that day’s events, adhering to its policy of deleting video footage every thirty-seven days.  The plaintiff argued that the defendant’s failure to preserve was the reason for her lack of evidence and asked the court to deny summary judgment as a sanction for the defendant’s destruction of the security video.  The defendant argued it had no obligation to preserve the video because the video did not show the spill itself and, therefore, would not have contained any relevant evidence.

Judge’s Ruling

In considering the facts associated with deletion of the video footage, Judge Hernandez stated: “Defendant did not destroy the videos in response to this litigation. Cases make clear that ‘in response to litigation’ means after a complaint has been filed, a discovery request has been made, a letter openly threatens litigations, or some other reason indicating that litigation is likely… Plaintiff herself points out that the surveillance footage is erased from Defendant’s hard drive every thirty-seven days…The erasure occurred when Defendant knew only that Plaintiff had fallen and hurt her wrist. There was no basis for Defendant to conclude that litigation was likely.”  As a result, Judge Hernandez concluded that “Sanctions for spoliation are inappropriate here.”

Therefore, in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Judge Hernandez stated: “Plaintiff’s arguments are not supported by direct evidence or logical inference. Instead, she relies on speculation and conjecture which is insufficient to create an issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.”

So, what do you think?  Do plaintiffs in “slip and fall” cases face an uphill battle in obtaining sanctions for deletion of video at the site of an accident?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Denies Defendant’s Motion to Overrule Plaintiff’s Objections to Discovery Requests

Despite Parties’ “Significant Animosity”, Court Orders Them to Meet and Confer: eDiscovery Case Law

In Elhannon LLC v. F.A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co., No. 2:14-cv-262 (D. Vermont, Apr. 18, 2017), Vermont District Judge William K. Sessions, III granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff’s renewed motion to compel, denied motions for sanction by each party against the other, and ordered the parties to engage in further meet-and-confer efforts to narrow their differences on the appropriate scope of discovery.

Case Background

In a breach of contract and consumer fraud dispute over pest infestation in the plaintiff’s tree nursery, the parties had numerous disputes over whether the defendant had met its discovery obligations.  In February 2016, the plaintiff filed a motion to compel several categories of documents, including printouts of all screens from the defendant’s Electronic Landscape Manager (“ELM”) program, internal correspondence and emails pertaining to the plaintiff, internal financial and other analysis documents pertaining to the plaintiff, compensation and personnel file materials for the two key defendant employees on the plaintiff’s contracts, and documents from the defendant’s other electronic systems.

In most categories, the defendant’s arguments primarily related to either a contention that all responsive documents had already been produced, the documents requested were either irrelevant or not specific to the plaintiff or were already produced via another electronic system.  As for the internal correspondence and emails, the plaintiff contended that the defendant’s email searches were “haphazard, overly narrow, devoid of proper guidance by counsel, and unreliable to say the least”, noting that several custodians were either not provided with search terms, or the terms were too limited or may have not performed any searches at all.  The defendant did acknowledge that it “recently recovered a number of emails previously not produced due to a gap in the technology used to perform its earlier email searches” and did supplement the production with those.

The plaintiff renewed its motion on the ground that recent deposition testimony demonstrates that Defendant’s prior representations to this Court asserting complete discovery responses were false.  In addition, both parties cross-moved for discovery sanctions, the plaintiff’s request was against the defendant failing to satisfy their discovery obligations and the defendant’s request was against the plaintiff for failing to meet and confer.

Judge’s Ruling

Judge Sessions noted that “the parties’ filings indicate that counsel have approached each other with significant animosity, and that substantial challenges exist to narrowing discovery disputes.”  Taking several of the document categories in consideration, Judge Sessions ordered the defendant to produce additional relevant, responsive data and documents from those sources.

With regard to the email search terms, Judge Sessions stated:

“Given the parties’ failure to engage in a comprehensive meet and confer or to reach agreement on the scope of email search terms, the Court will require the parties to do so now, rather than grant Elhannon’s motion on this ground. If necessary, the parties may request the Court to approve a list of appropriate email search terms after their meet-and-confer.”

Judge Sessions did not find that the plaintiff’s failure to meet and confer prior to filing the instant motion warranted the imposition of sanctions, nor did he find that “either party has provided sufficient reasons to justify sanctions against the other for failing to produce documents.”

So, what do you think?  Should parties face sanctions for failing to meet and confer?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Denies Defendant’s Motion to Overrule Plaintiff’s Objections to Discovery Requests

Google Again Ordered to Produce Internationally Stored Data: eDiscovery Case Law

In the case In re: Search of Content that is Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, Case No. 16-80263 (N.D. Cali., Apr. 19, 2017), California Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler, noting that the “SCA regulates disclosure of data in a service provider’s possession” ordered Google to “produce all content responsive to the search warrant that is retrievable from the United States, regardless of the data’s actual location”.

Case Background

A search warrant was issued in June 2016 that authorized production of information from specific Google email accounts regarding subscriber information, evidence of specified crimes, and information about the account holders’ true identities, locations, and assets.   Google did produce data “confirmed to be stored in the United States” including emails, but did not include the attachments for emails because they were not “confirmed” to be stored in the United States.  Google also moved to quash or amend the search warrant, which the government opposed, countering that the SCA authorizes production of data retrievable from the United States.

The court held a hearing in February 2017 and directed (1) the parties to submit a joint stipulation of undisputed facts relevant to the extraterritoriality analysis and (2) Google to provide information about its current ability to identify whether information is stored in the United States, given its representation at the hearing that it was finalizing a tool to identify whether or not content was stored in the United States.  The parties provided additional information in March.

Judge’s Ruling

As in the previous ruling against Google, Judge Beeler reviewed the Second Circuit ruling (Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016)), where the Second Circuit denied the government’s efforts to compel Microsoft to provide emails in that case.  However, Judge Beeler noted that “the parties stipulate that the only place to access the information is in the United States” and stated that “the conduct relevant to the focus — and what the SCA seeks to regulate — is disclosure of the data in the service provider’s possession…The service provider — Google — is in the district and is subject to the court’s jurisdiction; the warrant is directed to it in the only place where it can access and deliver the information that the government seeks.”

Judge Beeler, in denying Google’s motion to quash the warrant for content that it stores outside the United States and ordering it to produce all content responsive to the search warrant that is retrievable from the United States, regardless of the data’s actual location, concluded that “the disclosure is a domestic application of the SCA”.

So, what do you think?  Should the location of the data or the location of the searches for the data determine whether it is subject to foreign data privacy considerations?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Denies Defendant’s Motion to Overrule Plaintiff’s Objections to Discovery Requests

Texas Supreme Court Denies Request for Mandamus Relief without Prejudice Over Native File Production: eDiscovery Case Law

In the case In Re State Farm Lloyds, Relator, Nos. 15-0903, 15-0905 (Tex. Sup. Ct. May 26, 2017), the Texas Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Eva M. Guzman, denied the petitions for writ of mandamus without prejudice, “affording the relator an opportunity to reurge its discovery objections” (regarding the requesting party’s request for a native file production) to the trial court in light of its opinion.

Case Background

In this case which involved a homeowner’s insurance claim after hail storm damage, the parties met repeatedly and unsuccessfully to attempt to negotiate a protocol for the production of ESI, with format of production being among the primary issues as the requesting party (the homeowners) requested native file production from the producing party (State Farm) in this case.  The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the discovery issues, after which it granted the motion to compel native production of the ESI.  The court of appeals denied mandamus relief (we covered that ruling here), which led to State Farm’s appeal to the Texas Supreme Court.

Court Opinion

In the opinion delivered by Justice Guzman, the Court noted that “Under our discovery rules, neither party may dictate the form of electronic discovery. The requesting party must specify the desired form of production, but all discovery is subject to the proportionality overlay embedded in our discovery rules and inherent in the reasonableness standard to which our electronic-discovery rule is tethered.”

State Farm’s position was that it processes more than 35,000 new claims each day and, in the ordinary course of business, information related to those claims is routinely converted into static format and uploaded to its Enterprise Claims System (ECS), “the system of record” for claims handling at State Farm.  Its expert contended that ESI in “static format is easier to Bates number for discovery; allows efficient management of documents as exhibits at depositions, hearings, and trials; enables redaction, which is not possible with most native forms of ESI; and avoids intentional or unintentional alteration of the information, which may be difficult to detect or propagate further disputes about data integrity”.  The expert claimed that production in native form “would require State Farm to engineer a new process that includes determining upstream sources of the data, validating the upstream sources, determining whether native files of the information still exist, and developing an extraction method for the native versions.”  The expert did not quantify the time or expense involved, but claimed that “[t]hese additional steps would be an extraordinary and burdensome undertaking for State Farm” and are unnecessary because State Farm’s proffered production form is “reasonably usable.”

In asserting that searchable static format is not a “reasonably usable form,” the homeowners supported their proposed electronic discovery protocol with expert testimony that static images have less utility compared to native format, which would allow them to see formulas in Excel spreadsheets, search and sort the information by data fields, analyze the relationship of data, and see information in color that may not translate as accurately to stored or printed static images. Referring to static-form production as “the electronic equivalent of a print out,” the homeowner’s expert explained that useful metadata would not be viewable in static form, including tracked changes and commenting in Word documents; animations, other dynamic information, and speaker notes in static printouts of PowerPoint documents; and threading information in emails that would allow construction of a reasonable timeline related to State Farm’s processing of the homeowners’ claims.  Summarizing the homeowners’ position, the expert explained, “[W]e’re not imposing any additional duties, we’re only asking that they not be allowed to dumb down, to downgrade the data for production.”

The Court’s opinion noted that “Whether production of metadata-accessible forms is required on demand engages the interplay between the discovery limits in Rule 192.4 and production of electronic discovery under Rule 196.4” and also stated that “When a reasonably usable form is readily available in the ordinary course of business, the trial court must assess whether any enhanced burden or expense associated with a requested form is justified when weighed against the proportional needs of the case.” 

The Court also discussed the following seven factors when considering proportionality of the request: 1. Likely benefit of the requested discovery, 2. The needs of the case, 3. The amount in controversy, 4. The parties’ resources, 5. Importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, 6. The importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the litigation and 7. Any other articulable factor bearing on proportionality.  The Court also considered parity with Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and noted that “Rule 34’s plain language does not permit either party to unilaterally dictate the form of production for ESI.”

The Court concluded by stating:

“Today, we elucidate the guiding principles informing the exercise of discretion over electronic-discovery disputes, emphasizing that proportionality is the polestar. In doing so, we further a guiding tenet of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure: that litigants achieve a ‘just, fair, equitable and impartial adjudication . . . with as great expedition and dispatch and at the least expense . . . as may be practicable.’ Because the trial court and the parties lacked the benefit of our views on the matter, neither granting nor denying mandamus relief on the merits is appropriate. Accordingly, we deny the request for mandamus relief without prejudice to allow the relator to seek reconsideration by the trial court in light of this opinion.”

So, what do you think?  Do you agree with State Farm’s arguments that producing native format ESI would be “extraordinary and burdensome” and that its proposed production form is “reasonably usable.”?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

One footnote (literally): This opinion actually cited one of our blog posts in the footnotes, when discussing the relevance of metadata to the request – this post regarding how metadata played a key role in a $10.8 million whistleblower lawsuit verdict.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Denies Defendant’s Motion to Overrule Plaintiff’s Objections to Discovery Requests

Court Denies Defendant’s Motion to Overrule Plaintiff’s Objections to Discovery Requests: eDiscovery Case Law

In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. et. al. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverages Commission, et. al., No. 15-00134 (W.D. Texas, Apr. 10, 2017), Texas Magistrate Judge Andrew W. Austin (no relation) denied the defendant’s motion to overrule the plaintiff’s objections to the defendant’s discovery requests, due to the fact that the plaintiff stated it was withholding documents based on each of the objections.

Case Background

In this dispute over the restriction of public companies to sell liquor in Texas, Judge Austin, after conducting a hearing to discuss the parties’ discovery dispute, noted “There was quite a bit of confusion at the hearing about precisely what relief TPSA is requesting in this motion.”  Ultimately, it was determined that the defendant was requesting the Court to overrule objections made by the plaintiff to each of the requests for production, which it assumed would mean that the plaintiff would be under “compulsion” to produce responsive documents, and any disagreements about the actual production could be addressed at that time.

Judge Austin also noted that the “cause of the confusion is not one-sided”, in that much of the confusion stemmed from the plaintiff’s “overabundance of caution” in responding under the new discovery rules, which now require that when a party makes an objection, it also state whether it is withholding any documents subject to that objection. In every one of its responses to the defendant’s requests, the plaintiff leveled one or more objection, and in each instance it stated that it is withholding documents pursuant to that objection.  As a result, the defendant was concerned that there were identified, responsive documents sitting on plaintiff’s counsel’s desk that had not been produced, any of which could be a “bombshell.”

In an exchange with plaintiff’s counsel for clarification, Judge Austin determined that the plaintiff had indicated it was withholding documents pursuant to each objection even if the plaintiff determined that the request was too broad and of such marginal relevance to even merit a search to find responsive documents and that the plaintiff expected it was likely that there were some responsive documents in its many offices and on its computer networks and that some of these documents would likely be privileged attorney client communications or work product.

Judge’s Ruling

With regard to the plaintiff’s statement that it was “withholding documents based on these objections”, Judge Austin noted that while it “may technically be accurate, it is not what the new rules were after in adding the requirement in Rule 34(b)(2)(C) that ‘an objection must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of the objection.’”   Judge Austin indicated that “A more helpful response would have been something along the lines of ‘Based on these objections, Wal-Mart has not conducted a search for responsive documents, and while it is likely that some responsive documents may exist, Wal-Mart has not identified any such document, and is not withholding any identified document as a result of these objections.’”

Judge Austin also stated: “For most of the RFPs, Wal-Mart responded that it had already collected and produced documents in response to similar requests from the TABC, based on agreed upon search parameters, and would produce the same documents to TPSA. Further, Wal-Mart stated that it would conduct an additional limited search of additional document sources, but would otherwise not search further. TPSA failed to state in its briefs, or at the hearing, what it believed was deficient with this response. In fact, when asked at the hearing, TPSA was unable to point to a single additional document that would be responsive to its requests it believed had not already been produced. Despite this, TPSA continued to maintain that overruling Plaintiffs’ objections would solve this discovery dispute.”  Disagreeing, Judge Austin denied the defendant’s motion to compel.

So, what do you think?  Was the judge’s suggestion for handling objections in this case helpful?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Denies Defendant’s Motion to Overrule Plaintiff’s Objections to Discovery Requests

Court Says Rule 37(e) Doesn’t Apply When Recording Was Intentionally Deleted: eDiscovery Case Law

In Hsueh v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Services, No. 15 Civ. 3401 (PAC) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017), New York District Judge Paul A. Crotty relied upon inherent authority to impose sanctions and determined “that an adverse inference is the appropriate remedy” for the plaintiff’s deletion of a recorded conversation with an HR representative, agreeing with the defendants that “Rule 37(e) applies only to situations where ‘a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve’ ESI; not to situations where, as here, a party intentionally deleted the recording.”

Case Background

In this case arising from claims of sexual harassment at work, the plaintiff, at an April 2016 deposition, initially stated that she did not think she had recorded any conversations with an HR representative (Allison Clavery) from the company about her allegations, but eventually explained that she thought she had recorded one meeting with Clavery in either December of 2015 or January of 2016, and that she deleted the recording in “[e]ither the course of 2016 or 2015” because “the voice recording itself. . . was not very clear, so [she] did not feel it was worth keeping.”  As a result, in June and early July 2016, the defendants filed a motion for spoliation sanctions.

On July 11, 2016 — the day the plaintiff’s opposition to the spoliation sanctions motion was due — plaintiff’s counsel submitted a letter to the Court advising that “I received an e-mail from my client at 10:16 p.m. last evening, which contained an audio recording attachment of a meeting between my client and Allison Clavery.”  Plaintiff’s counsel noted that “the e-mail indicated that the recording had been recovered with the help of Plaintiff’s husband” and that plaintiff’s counsel stated that he was “awaiting any further instructions with regard to Defendant DFS’s motion.”  As a result, discovery was reopened and the plaintiff and her husband were deposed.  Despite recovery of the recording, the defendants continued to pursue spoliation sanctions, as they had only received materials relating to the plaintiff’s mental health history “over the past few weeks, despite requesting them back in December 2015.”

The defendants stated that it was unclear as to whether Rule 37(e) applied here, arguing that the audio recording might not be ESI and also arguing that Rule 37(e) applies only to situations where “a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve” ESI; not to situations where, as here, a party intentionally deleted the recording.  The plaintiff, on the other hand, argued that, since the recording was restored, no sanctions were warranted.

Judge’s Ruling

With regard to the defendant’s argument that the recording is not ESI, Judge Crotty stated “The Court disagrees. The recording was made using a digital recorder, and was saved in a digital format.”

However, with regard to the defendant’s argument that Rule 37(e) doesn’t apply when the party intentionally deletes the recording, Judge Crotty said “This makes sense. The Committee Notes to the 2015 Amendment to Rule 37 explain that Rule 37(e) is meant to address ‘the serious problems resulting from the continued exponential growth in the volume of’ ESI as well as ‘excessive effort and money’ that litigants have had to expend to avoid potential sanctions for failure to preserve ESI…These considerations are not applicable here. It was not because Hsueh had improper systems in place to prevent the loss of the recording that the recording no longer existed on her computer; it was because she took specific action to delete it. The Court therefore concludes that Rule 37(e) does not apply.”

As a result, Judge Crotty, determining that “the Court may rely on its inherent power to control litigation in imposing spoliation sanctions”, ruled “that an adverse inference is the appropriate remedy” for the plaintiff’s deletion of the recording and granted the defendants’ motion for spoliation sanctions.

So, what do you think?  Should Rule 37(e) have applied here?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Denies Defendant’s Motion to Overrule Plaintiff’s Objections to Discovery Requests

Court Determines TAR Without Keyword Search Culling First is Preferable: eDiscovery Case Law

In FCA US, LLC v. Cummins, Inc., No. 16-12883 (E.D.  Mich., Mar. 28, 2017), Michigan District Judge Avern Cohn “rather reluctantly” decided a dispute between the plaintiff and defendant on whether the universe of electronic material subject to Technology Assisted Review (TAR) review should first be culled by the use of search terms by agreeing with the plaintiff that “[a]pplying TAR to the universe of electronic material before any keyword search reduces the universe of electronic material is the preferred method.”

Case Background

In this dispute over the allocation of the cost incurred for an auto part that became the subject of a recall, the parties agreed on many issues relating to discovery and particularly electronic discovery.  However, one issue that they couldn’t agree on was whether the universe of electronic material subject to TAR review should first be culled by the use of search terms. The plaintiff took the position that the electronic material subject to TAR review should not first be culled by the use of search terms, while the defendant took the position that a pre-TAR culling is appropriate.

Judge’s Ruling

Noting that the Court decides “rather reluctantly” to rule on the issue, Judge Cohn stated:

“Given the magnitude of the dispute and the substantial matters upon which they agree, the parties should have been able to resolve the discovery issue without the Court as decision maker. Be that as it may, having reviewed the letters and proposed orders together with some technical in-house assistance including a read of The Sedona Conference TAR Case Law Primer, 18 Sedona Con. J. ___ (forthcoming 2017), the Court is satisfied that FCA has the better postion (sic). Applying TAR to the universe of electronic material before any keyword search reduces the universe of electronic material is the preferred method. The TAR results can then be culled by the use of search terms or other methods.”

As a result, Judge Cohn agreed to enter the plaintiff’s proposed order regarding the TAR approach.

So, what do you think?  Should TAR be performed with no pre-search culling beforehand?  Should courts rule on a preferred TAR approach?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Denies Defendant’s Motion to Overrule Plaintiff’s Objections to Discovery Requests

Court Approves Defendant’s Proposed Random Sampling Production Plan: eDiscovery Case Law

In Duffy v. Lawrence Memorial Hospital, No. 14-2256 (D. Kansas, Mar. 31, 2017), Kansas Magistrate Judge Teresa J. James granted the Motion to Modify Discovery Order from the defendant (and counterclaimant), where it asked the Court to enter a protective order directing it to produce a random sampling of 252 patient records, along with five spares, in order to respond to the plaintiff/relator’s document requests.

Case Background

In this case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant submitted false information to the government to maximize reimbursement for federal medical care programs; in turn, the defendant counterclaimed for breach of contract and fraud.  In a February 2017 order, the Court ordered the defendant to produce documents responsive to certain plaintiff requests in her Second Request for Production of Documents within 14 days.  Defendant produced the most of the requested documents, except for those associated with four requests that were the subject of an instant motion.

As the defendant conducted searches for documents responsive to these requests, it determined that 15,574 unique patient records would have to be located and gathered.  In an effort to calculate the time necessary to locate and produce the relevant patient records, the defendant’s Medical Records department obtained a sample of ten patient records and determined that it would take 30 minutes per record to process and review the records to respond to the four RFP requests.  As a result, the defendant estimated that it would take 7,787 worker hours to locate and produce responsive information for 15,574 patient records, at a cost of $196,933.23.  Redaction of patients’ personal confidential information would take another ten reviewers and one quality control attorney fourteen days at a cost of $37,259.50.  So, the total cost to produce information relevant to the RFPs was estimated to be over $230,000.

Given these costs, the defendant asked the Court to modify its order by limiting the required production to a random sampling of 252 patient records plus five spares, using a statistical tool known at RAT-STATS used by the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General to randomly select the patient records.  The plaintiff objected, claiming that the defendant did not attempt to meet and confer and also because the Court had already rejected the defendant’s previous contention of undue burden.  The plaintiff also argued that redaction was unnecessary because a protective order was in place to designate the patient info as confidential information.

Judge’s Ruling

With regard to the previous rejection of undue burden, Judge James stated: “Had Defendant presented such evidence in response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel, the Court may have found the requests at issue unduly burdensome and disproportional to the needs of the case. Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, Defendant did not waive its right to seek protection once the enormity of the task became apparent.”  As for the plaintiff’s objection that the defendant did not meet and confer beforehand, Judge James noted that the “parties conferred following Defendant’s objections to the discovery requests, and that was the point at which some meeting of the minds could have produced a different response by Defendant or an alteration of the discovery request by Plaintiff. At this point, however, Defendant is seeking relief from this Court’s order rather than from a party’s discovery request.”

As a result, Judge James stated: “The Court will modify its order (ECF No. 133) to direct Defendant to utilize RAT-STATS and produce a random sampling of 252 patient records, along with five spares, to respond to RFP Nos. 40, 41, 43 and 58.”  She also directed the defendant to use RAT-STATS (as requested) to randomly select the patient records to be produced and sided with the defendant to redact personal confidential information from the patient records that “Defendant has a legal duty to safeguard.”

So, what do you think?  Is random sampling an appropriate option for cases where production of a larger set may be an undue burden?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.