Close
Enter your
text here

Case Law

Court Determines Granting Defendant’s Motion to Request Overseas Documents is ‘Futile’: eDiscovery Case Law

In Al-Ameri et. al. v. Johns Hopkins Hospital, No. GLR-15-1163 (D.Md. May 26, 2016), Maryland Magistrate Judge Stephanie A. Gallagher denied the defendant’s motion to compel on the basis that compelling the discovery sought would be futile.

Case Background

In this medical malpractice case, the defendant served the plaintiffs with its discovery requests in July 2015.  Although the plaintiffs responded to the defendant’s interrogatories and document requests in October 2015, the defendant contended that the response was insufficient, with all of the disputed discovery requests seek documents that are located in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

The plaintiffs did not challenge the relevance of the supplemental discovery sought, the defendant’s entitlement to the discovery sought, or that the plaintiffs’ heretofore-provided documents were not sufficiently responsive to the defendant’s requests. Instead, the plaintiffs indicated that they had made good faith efforts to obtain the requested documents from relevant entities in the UAE, but to no avail so far.  The plaintiffs even provided the defendant with authorizations to independently obtain the medical records from the UAE facilities, with plaintiffs’ counsel maintaining that it had “made numerous efforts” to produce itemized lien information from both the UAE hospitals and the UAE embassy.  Nonetheless, after conferring with plaintiffs’ counsel to address the purported deficiencies in the production, the defendant filed an instant motion to compel production.

Judge’s Ruling

Regarding the motion, Judge Gallagher stated:

“The so-called ‘discovery dispute’ regarding these document requests, then, is not really a dispute at all. Plaintiffs concede that they must produce the existing requested documents, but the fact remains that, for over a year, they have tried, and failed, to do so. Thus, as discussed during the status conference call, there is no reason to grant Defendant’s motion as to Requests Nos. 4, 5, 20, and 21, since doing so would be futile. Plaintiffs are not engaging in gamesmanship or withholding information. They acknowledge that the documents are crucial to the case, but are presently unable to obtain them. Compelling these documents would not suddenly change Plaintiffs’ situation or make the documents producible.”  As a result, Judge Gallagher denied the defendant’s motion because compelling the discovery would be futile.

So, what do you think?  Was the court correct to deny the motion?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Is a Blended Document Review Rate of $466 Per Hour Excessive?: Best of eDiscovery Daily

Even those of us at eDiscovery Daily have to take an occasional vacation (which, as you can see by the picture above, means taking the kids to their favorite water park); however, instead of “going dark” for a few days, we thought we would take a look back at some topics that we’ve covered in the past.  Today’s post is our all-time most viewed post ever.  I guess it struck a nerve with our readers!  Enjoy!

______________________________

Remember when we raised the question as to whether it is time to ditch the per hour model for document review?  One of the cases we highlighted for perceived overbilling was ruled upon here.

In the case In re Citigroup Inc. Securities Litigation, No. 09 MD 2070 (SHS), 07 Civ. 9901 (SHS) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2013), New York District Judge Sidney H. Stein rejected as unreasonable the plaintiffs’ lead counsel’s proffered blended rate of more than $400 for contract attorneys—more than the blended rate charged for associate attorneys—most of whom were tasked with routine document review work.

In this securities fraud matter, a class of plaintiffs claimed Citigroup understated the risks of assets backed by subprime mortgages. After the parties settled the matter for $590 million, Judge Stein had to evaluate whether the settlement was “fair, reasonable, and adequate and what a reasonable fee for plaintiffs’ attorneys should be.” The court issued a preliminary approval of the settlement and certified the class. In his opinion, Judge Stein considered the plaintiffs’ motion for final approval of the settlement and allocation and the plaintiffs’ lead counsel’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs of $97.5 million. After approving the settlement and allocation, Judge Stein decided that the plaintiffs’ counsel was entitled to a fee award and reimbursement of expenses but in an amount less than the lead counsel proposed.

One shareholder objected to the lead counsel’s billing practices, claiming the contract attorneys’ rates were exorbitant.

Judge Stein carefully scrutinized the contract attorneys’ proposed hourly rates “not only because those rates are overstated, but also because the total proposed lodestar for contract attorneys dwarfs that of the firm associates, counsel, and partners: $28.6 million for contract attorneys compared to a combined $17 million for all other attorneys.” The proposed blended hourly rate was $402 for firm associates and $632 for firm partners. However, the firm asked for contract attorney hourly rates as high as $550 with a blended rate of $466. The plaintiff explained that these “contract attorneys performed the work of, and have the qualifications of, law firm associates and so should be billed at rates commensurate with the rates of associates of similar experience levels.” In response, the complaining shareholder suggested that a more appropriate rate for contract attorneys would be significantly lower: “no reasonable paying client would accept a rate above $100 per hour.” (emphasis added)

Judge Stein rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the contract attorneys should be billed at rates comparable to firm attorneys, citing authority that “clients generally pay less for the work of contract attorneys than for that of firm associates”:

“There is little excuse in this day and age for delegating document review (particularly primary review or first pass review) to anyone other than extremely low-cost, low-overhead temporary employees (read, contract attorneys)—and there is absolutely no excuse for paying those temporary, low-overhead employees $40 or $50 an hour and then marking up their pay ten times for billing purposes.”

Furthermore, “[o]nly a very few of the scores of contract attorneys here participated in depositions or supervised others’ work, while the vast majority spent their time reviewing documents.” Accordingly, the court decided the appropriate rate would be $200, taking into account the attorneys’ qualifications, work performed, and market rates.

For this and other reasons, the court found the lead counsel’s proposed lodestar “significantly overstated” and made a number of reductions. The reductions included the following amounts:

  • $7.5 million for document review by contract attorneys that happened after the parties agreed to settle; 20 of the contract attorneys were hired on or about the day of the settlement.
  • $12 million for reducing the blended hourly rate of contract attorneys from $466 to $200 for 45,300 hours, particularly where the bills reflected that these attorneys performed document review—not higher-level work—all day.
  • 10% off the “remaining balance to account for waste and inefficiency which, the Court concludes, a reasonable hypothetical client would not accept.”

As a result, the court awarded a reduced amount of $70.8 million in attorneys’ fees, or 12% of the $590 million common fund.

So, what do you think?  Was the requested amount excessive?   Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Orders Non Party to Preserve Some, But Not All, Information Requested by Plaintiff: eDiscovery Case Law

In Swetlic Chiropractic & Rehabilitation Center, Inc. v. Foot Levelers, Inc., et. al., No. 16-236 (S.D. Ohio, Apr. 27, 2016), Ohio Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers ruled that the plaintiff had satisfied its burden to demonstrate a real danger that relevant evidence in a non-party’s possession would be destroyed absent a court order and ordered WestFax, the non-party, “to preserve any transmission report or other documents and ESI that identify fax numbers that received Defendants’ advertising faxes.”  However, noting that the requested scope of the preservation order “appears overly broad”, she permitted WestFax to file objections to the Order within 14 days if unable to extrajudicially resolve any such objection with the plaintiff.

Case Background

In this case, the plaintiff filed suit, alleging that the defendants sent advertisements to the plaintiff and others in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”).  The plaintiff determined that non-party WestFax could have transmission reports and other electronically stored information (“ESI”) that identify fax numbers that received the defendants’ advertising faxes and asserted a need for this information to establish which recipients are in the proposed class and how many violations of the TCPA occurred.

WestFax indicated to the plaintiff that transmission reports are automatically deleted within sixty to ninety days following each fax broadcast and it would only preserve the evidence with an appropriate Court Order.  As a result, the plaintiff sought an Order compelling non-party WestFax to preserve several categories of ESI related to the defendants, including email, databases, logs, application files and fragments, and all email from third party resources (e.g. Hotmail, Yahoo, Gmail, AOL, etc.), directing it to preserve the information through obtaining an “exact mirror (‘bit stream’) image” with regard to online storage, storage devices, stand-alone computers, and network workstations.

Judge’s Ruling

Noting that “Plaintiff has demonstrated that as a result of WestFax’s alleged retention policies, evidence relevant to this action may be destroyed absent a Court Order”, Judge Deavers concluded that “Plaintiff has satisfied its burden to seek a discovery order at this juncture notwithstanding that the parties have not conducted their Rule 26(f) conference.”  Given WestFax’s alleged refusal to retain information absent a court order, Judge Deavers found that there is a “lack of any other available remedy.”

However, noting that “it appears that Plaintiff failed to serve the subject Motion on WestFax such that it is unlikely that it has had an opportunity to voice any such objection”, expressing “concerns with the breadth of the information Plaintiff is requesting the Court to order WestFax to preserve” and also with the “exact mirror (‘bit stream’) image” method proposed by the plaintiff, Judge Deavers ruled that the plaintiff had “failed to demonstrate that the requested order would not be unduly burdensome and has further failed to establish that mirror imaging is necessary.”  So, Judge Deavers ordered WestFax “to preserve any transmission report or other documents and ESI that identify fax numbers that received Defendants’ advertising faxes”, but permitted WestFax to file objections to the Order within 14 days if unable to extrajudicially resolve any such objection with the plaintiff.

So, what do you think?  How far should courts go to order non-parties to preserve potentially responsive ESI?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Defendant Requests Terminating Sanctions for Plaintiff, but Court Opts for Lesser Sanctions: eDiscovery Case Law

In Applied Underwriters, Inc. v. American Employer Group, No. 14-00379 (E.D. Tenn., May 2, 2016), Tennessee Magistrate Judge C. Clifford Shirley, Jr., ruling on several motions, granted in part and denied in part the defendant’s motion for sanctions, agreeing that the plaintiff’s numerous discovery deficiencies warranted sanctions, but not the dismissal that the defendant requested, opting instead to require the plaintiff to pay attorney’s fees for filing the motion.

Case Background

In this case which involved numerous discovery disputes, the defendant asserted that the plaintiff failed to comply with the Court’s discovery Orders, failed to follow the procedures set forth in the parties’ discovery plan, failed to follow the directives of the Court’s Protective Order, failed to follow the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and failed to confer in good faith about discovery issues, arguing that the plaintiff produced a classic “document dump” when it produced its ESI.  At a hearing regarding the case, the defendant identified eleven deficiencies with the plaintiff’s production, including:

  1. failing to search for the agreed upon terms in creating the collective universe;
  2. failing to search the computer systems of several individuals that were agreed upon;
  3. failing to review the documents before producing;
  4. producing the documents out of order, without attachments, and without proper load files;
  5. failing to apply proper Bates stamps to some of the ESI;
  6. producing all four million pages with the “Attorney Eyes Only” designation;
  7. failing to produce the ESI in the format indicated in the parties agreement pursuant to the Rule 26(f) Report;
  8. submitting the document production without extracted OCR text and load files;
  9. producing ESI duplicative of that produced in previous discovery;
  10. producing “a number of folders, sub-folders, and sub-sub level folders with file names that do not make sense”; and
  11. not providing a spreadsheet to explain which documents are relevant to which request contrary to the parties’ agreement.

Other than that, the plaintiff’s document production was perfect… :o)

The defendant requested that the Court dismiss the lawsuit, or in the alternative, stay the case until the plaintiff obeyed the Court’s Orders and fully complied with its discovery obligations, also requesting an award to compensate it for the fees and costs it incurred in responding to and overcoming the Plaintiff’s discovery misconduct and its fees and costs associated with re-taking depositions.

Judge’s Ruling

Regarding the plaintiff’s production after they asked for additional time to produce the ESI requested, Judge Shirley stated that “contrary to the parties’ agreement and the Court’s Order, the Plaintiff did not perform the additional searches per the protocols discussed, i.e., performing searches on specifically named individuals’ computers. Moreover, when the March 8 discovery was produced, it was contrary to the plan set forth in the Rule 26(f) Report, it was unorganized, it failed to identify which document request it was answering, and it was all produced “Attorney’s Eyes Only.” Accordingly, the Court finds that sanctions are appropriate.”

Shirley, you can’t be serious!

However, Judge Shirley stopped short of ordering the harsh sanction of dismissal, stating “[w]hile the Court finds that sanctions are appropriate, the Court does not find that Plaintiff’s deficiencies warrant dismissal…As discussed at the hearing, instead of dismissal, the Court finds that the Plaintiff shall pay for the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs associated with the Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions, including the other Motions and filings that relate to the Plaintiff’s discovery deficiencies.”  Judge Shirley also ordered the plaintiff to pay “for the reasonable expenses, not to include attorney’s fees, for retaking” several depositions, including the plaintiff’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness’s depositions.

So, what do you think?  Were those sanctions sufficient?  How does Judge Shirley respond when somebody tells him “surely, you can’t be serious”?  (Seriously, I want to know).  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Defendant Ordered to Issue Litigation Hold, Respond to Discovery Requests: eDiscovery Case Law

In Bruner v. American Honda Motor Co., No. 1:15-00499-N (S.D.Ala. May 12, 2016), Alabama Magistrate Judge Katherine P. Nelson granted the plaintiffs’ motion to compel response to discovery requests for email, to perform additional searches, and to implement a litigation hold on the email accounts for relevant individuals to the case.

Case Background

In this case stemming from an accident involving a 2007 Honda Civic, the plaintiffs alleged a number of counts, including negligence, wantonness, loss of consortium, and manufacturer’s liability claims.  The parties had a dispute regarding the production of emails in response to the plaintiffs’ requests for production and whether Defendant or its counsel should issue a litigation hold in this action.  Counsel for the defendant claimed that any relevant e-mails were “no longer retained due to the passage of time in accordance with the relevant Document Retention Policy(ies)” and also contended that it had conducted thorough searches of customer complaints and related email in response to the requests for production and found no responsive e-mails, claiming that additional searches or implementation of a litigation hold would be unnecessarily burdensome.

The plaintiffs argued that further searches should be conducted to discover and identify any responsive e-mails, stating that the searches of one particular customer database could not be accurate since it references e-mails which it does not include or attach.  The plaintiffs also argued that the defendant’s retention policy is either “in violation of [Defendant’s] duty to preserve ESI, or [Defendant] is not conducting a thorough search.”  The plaintiffs filed a motion to compel the defendant “to conduct a thorough search of identified custodians with identified search terms and to issue a litigation hold in this case” as well as to direct the defendant to implement a litigation hold so that it is not continuously deleting any relevant e-mails.

Judge’s Ruling

Citing Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, Judge Nelson noted that “[o]nce a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine document retention/destruction policy and put in place a ‘litigation hold’ to ensure the preservation of relevant documents”.  With regard to this case, she stated:

“The deletion of potentially relevant emails since the instigation of this action is unreasonable considering their potential importance to this litigation. Additionally, the deletion of some responsive emails does not absolve Defendant of its obligation to thoroughly search for still-extant ESI.”

As a result, Judge Nelson concurred with the plaintiffs that a litigation hold is necessary to preserve ESI and ordered the defendant “to serve Plaintiffs with full and adequate responses” to disputed requests for production “utilizing Plaintiffs’ requested search terms” and also ordered the defendant “to implement a litigation hold on the email accounts of any designer, engineer, customer service representative, or other employee who may possess any responsive non-privileged email. Said litigation hold will remain in place at least until the close of discovery.”

So, what do you think?  Should parties be sanctioned for failing to implement a litigation hold?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Just a reminder that today is our webinar titled Faster, Cheaper, Better: How Automation is Revolutionizing eDiscovery hosted by the Organization of Legal Professionals (OLP)!  Click here for more information or click here to register! Hope you can make it!

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Limits Scope of Search Terms Requested by Plaintiff: eDiscovery Case Law

In AVM Technologies, LLC v. Intel Corp., No. 15-00033 (D. Delaware, May 3, 2016), Delaware Magistrate Judge Mary Pat Thynge granted in part the plaintiff’s request for the defendant to perform a database search of four terms and their synonyms, but limited the scope of that search to one specific defendant database, not the variety of sources requested by the plaintiff to be searched.

Case Background

In this patent infringement case where the plaintiff sued the defendant in connection with four of the defendant’s processors that the plaintiff alleged infringed upon its patent, a telephonic hearing was held in January 2016 to address a number of discovery issues.  One issue that they could not resolve was the plaintiff’s request for a database search by the defendant of the following terms: charge sharing, power race, contention and short circuits and their synonyms, which was opposed by the defendant.

Because the defendant indicated that circuits in its earlier products are the same as the circuits accused, the plaintiff argued it should not be limited to documents on which the defendant intended to rely, even though the plaintiff admitted its request would require a search from 1995 to the present and would include products that predate the patent-in-suit and are not accused of infringement.  The defendant indicated that it would take a “massive effort” required to complete the plaintiff’s requested search, indicating that it does not maintain a single or central document repository or index of its many different document repositories, does not have a single “standard” set of processor design documents nor a comprehensive text-searchable database for prior products.  However, the defendant did offer to search one database that “contains only the highest level documents relevant to a product”, indicating that it was transferring potentially searchable contents of this database to a search capable platform to perform the keyword searches requested and was working to complete this process shortly.

Judge’s Ruling

Judge Thynge stated that “Nothing in AVM’s arguments suggest why the production by Intel to date is inadequate, such as how or what in that production indicates that Intel has culled or selected documents that only or primarily support its position on liability.  AVM’s contention that it is only requesting that Intel conduct a text search of the locations most likely to have relevant information is unpersuasive and does not address the significant concerns identified by Intel”, indicating that the plaintiff’s request “ignores the required balancing considerations under proportionality for discovery”.  Judge Thynge also indicated that she did not “find the four identified terms narrow as suggested by AVM and likely will result in numerous irrelevant documents.”

As a result, because the defendant offered to search one database for the four terms and synonyms, Judge Thynge ordered the defendant to “perform what is reasonably necessary to enable keyword searches” of that database for the four terms “and additional, limited synonyms for these terms of up to 12 total, as agreed to by the parties. If the parties cannot agree on the synonyms, they are to advise the court.”

So, what do you think?  Was the court correct to limit the scope of the plaintiff’s searches?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Rules Lack of Bad Faith in Denying Sanctions for Defendants’ Deletion of ESI: eDiscovery Case Law

In Martin v. Stoops Buick, Inc. et. al., No. 14-00298 (S.D. Ind., Apr. 25, 2016), Indiana Chief District Judge Richard L. Young ruled that the plaintiff did not carry her burden of proving that the defendants’ deliberately destroyed evidence in bad faith; therefore, he denied her Motion for Sanctions Against Defendants for the Spoliation of Evidence.

Case Background

In this wrongful termination case, the plaintiff worked for the defendants for nearly a year as a part-time employee before being offered full time employment in February 2013. However, two weeks after her full-time work began the defendants terminated the plaintiff’s employment stating that “she [was] not a good fit for [the] position” and replaced her with a new hire.  The plaintiff claimed that immediately after she was terminated, she informed the defendant’s General Manager that she was going to file a discrimination claim against the dealership, she filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) claim within two weeks and the defendants were notified three days later.  After hearing from both sides, EEOC dismissed the charge in Novermber 2013, after which the Plaintiff filed suit in February 2014.

In December 2015, the plaintiff filed an instant motion for sanctions against the defendants for spoliation of evidence, claiming they destroyed and/or replaced the plaintiff’s work computer, which precluded her from obtaining evidence in support of her claims, and that the plaintiff’s supervisor (Debra Trauner) deleted her e-mail communications with her replacement (Lisa Goodin) that allegedly occurred before she received her resume.

The defendant’s unwritten data retention policy called for the files of terminated employees to be preserved for at least 30 days. Shortly after the plaintiff was terminated, Trauner claimed she asked the IT department to preserve all of Plaintiff’s computer data and, according to Trauner, “they said they would.”  However, she later requested the plaintiff’s email files and work documents and IT said they had been deleted. Trauner also claimed she deleted her sent e-mail as a matter of course “whenever [her] computer would tell [her] that [she] can’t send e-mails anymore”, so the emails with the new employee were no longer available.

Judge’s Ruling

Judge Young, referencing Malibu Media, LLC v. Tashiro, noted that “[t]he court’s determination of whether spoliation occurred requires a two-part inquiry… First, the court must determine whether the defendant was under a duty to preserve evidence; second, it must determine whether the defendant destroyed evidence in bad faith.”

Regarding the duty to preserve, Judge Young stated: “Although Trauner testified to placing a litigation hold on Plaintiff’s work e-mails, there is no evidence in the record to support her statement. There is no evidence of a ticket generated by the IT department regarding the request, and neither Prow, Nolan, Nelson, Jarvis, Stocking, nor Robinson could verify such a request. The court therefore finds Defendants breached their duty to preserve evidence.”

Regarding the determination as to whether the defendant destroyed the evidence in bad faith, Judge Young noted that the defendant “did produce those documents responsive to Plaintiff’s First Request for Production of Documents that were in its possession” and characterized Trautner’s testimony that she deleted the emails with Goodin to make room on the server as “credible”.  He also stated: “Lastly, and most significantly, Plaintiff’s own expert admitted that, after hearing all of the evidence, Stoops did not destroy evidence in bad faith. (Tr. at 110 (“Q: But you did not — it’s your opinion, based upon your background and experience, that what you’ve seen and heard and read and that’s been provided to you, that you do not find bad faith here? A: Right. Correct.”). Plaintiff, therefore, has failed to establish the required element of bad faith.”

As a result, Judge Young ruled that the plaintiff did not carry her burden of proving that the defendants’ deliberately destroyed evidence in bad faith and denied her Motion for Sanctions.

So, what do you think?  Was the court right to deny sanctions due to lack of bad faith?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Orders Plaintiff to Perform a “Download Your Info” From Facebook: eDiscovery Case Law

In Rhone v. Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc., No. 4:15-cv-01096-NCC, (E.D. Mo. Apr. 21, 2016), Missouri Magistrate Judge Noelle C. Collins ordered the plaintiff to disclose a complete list of her social media accounts to the defendant and also provide a “Download Your Info” report from her Facebook account from June 2, 2014 to the present within fourteen days and ordered the defendant to disclose to the plaintiff any and all posts, photos or other media from the report it intends to use in support of its defense.

Case Background

In this case, the plaintiff asserted that she sustained “severe physical injuries” as a result of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on June 2, 2014, when the vehicle driven by Third Party Defendant Charles Quinn, in which the plaintiff was a passenger, was struck from behind by Defendant Schneider National Carriers, Inc.’s (“Schneider”) vehicle driven by Defendant Dean Lilly.  The defendant requested production of any social media postings, photographs and/or videos posted by the plaintiff to any social media accounts since the date of the accident; in turn, the plaintiff objected and did not acknowledge the existence of any social media accounts.

However, according to Defendant Schneider, its own independent investigation uncovered that the plaintiff did have a Facebook account and may have also had a LinkedIn account and the information uncovered included “relevant information; specifically, comments and photos regarding physical activity such as dancing”.  The plaintiff initially objected to the defendant’s request for social media information as irrelevant, then provided a supplemental answer to the defendant’s request to indicate that no social media information was “related to this incident”.

As a result, the defendant requested that the plaintiff be required to provide a “Download Your Info” report from her Facebook account from the date of the accident, June 2, 2014, to the present. In the alternative, in the event the account or other social media content has been deleted, the defendant requested sanctions in the form of dismissal of the action with prejudice and attorney’s fees.  In response, the plaintiff indicated that the defendant had “failed to show that any evidence, whether relevant or irrelevant, has been deleted” and that the motion was moot as the defendant had already accessed the plaintiff’s Facebook account and printed at least 264 pages of Facebook postings; the defendant countered that sanctions are warranted because, although the plaintiff claimed not to have deleted any posts, its January 2016 download from the plaintiff’s Facebook account produced 441 pages of material whereas the same method in March 2016 retrieved only 226 pages of material.

Judge’s Ruling

In light of the information available, Judge Collins found that “Plaintiff has not fully and completely responded to Schneider’s production requests, even in light of her objections. Plaintiff did not initially disclose the existence of any social media accounts. However, Plaintiff does not deny that the Facebook account in question belongs to her. Furthermore, there is some indication that Plaintiff may have other social media accounts.  Accordingly, Plaintiff shall disclose to Schneider a complete list of Plaintiff’s social media accounts during the requested time periods.”

Judge Collins also ruled that “Plaintiff is directed to provide a ‘Download Your Info’ report from her Facebook account from the date of the accident, June 2, 2014 to the present. Plaintiff and Schneider shall consult regarding the process and the most effective means of disclosing this information. Thereafter, Schneider shall produce to Plaintiff, from this download, any and all posts, photographs, videos or other material that it intends to rely on for its case. However, the Court finds that, at this time, sanctions are unwarranted. Not only is it unclear whether Plaintiff has deleted any information, such a download from Facebook may afford Plaintiff the ability to recover any, even innocuous, information that may have been deleted.”

So, what do you think?  Should the court have required the plaintiff to download the info from her Facebook account?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Plaintiffs Ordered to Produce a Copy of Access Database for Forensic Analysis: eDiscovery Case Law

In Thorne Research, Inc. et. al. v. Atlantic Pro-Nutrients, Inc., No. 13-784 (D. Utah, Mar. 22, 2016), Utah Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner determined that, because the parties had competing affidavits regarding whether a Microsoft Access database created by the plaintiffs’ co-inventor stores metadata and that metadata (if present) was clearly relevant, the defendant should be allowed the opportunity to conduct a forensic analysis as to whether or not the metadata exists in the native format of the Access database.

Case Background

In this case, the plaintiffs filed suit against the defendant for patent infringement and the defendant filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment of non-infringement and invalidity of the patent.  To bolster its effort in obtaining its declaratory judgment, the defendant moved for an order compelling the plaintiffs to provide a complete copy of the Microsoft Access database that co-inventor Donald Steele utilized to input his formulas, seeking the metadata it alleged was contained in the Access database to independently determine the legitimacy of the plaintiffs’ claim that Mr. Steele and his co-inventor were the first inventors of the patent.  The defendant claimed that the plaintiffs tampered with the Access database to create a false early conception date of the invention.

The plaintiffs argued that Access databases do not maintain metadata like word processing or spreadsheet programs do and that the database was owned and maintained by a third party that kept all of its and its customers’ formulations in the Access database, not just the plaintiffs’ formulations and that giving the defendant access to the database would also be giving it access to the third party’s proprietary information. The plaintiffs also asserted that that there was no evidence of tampering with the database.  To address the concerns over third party information, the defendant indicated that the plaintiffs could provide the electronic copy of the database under the designation of “CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION — ATTORNEYS EYES ONLY” and argued that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that providing the database with the metadata intact would present an undue hardship or expense.

Judge’s Ruling

Because the parties had competing affidavits regarding whether the Microsoft Access database stores metadata, and because evidence regarding the date of the invention was clearly relevant to the case, Judge Warner ruled that “Defendant ought to be allowed the opportunity to conduct a forensic analysis as to whether or not the metadata exists in its native format.”  Regarding the plaintiffs’ concerns regarding disclosure of proprietary or confidential information, Judge Warner indicated that “an attorneys eyes only designation pursuant to the protective order should provide a sufficient safeguard against disclosure of confidential or proprietary information.”  As a result, he ordered the plaintiffs to produce a copy of the Microsoft Access database to the defendants within ten days of the date of the order.

So, what do you think?  Should the court have allowed a forensic analysis of the Access database?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Orders Defendant to Re-Produce Selected Documents in Native Format: eDiscovery Case Law

In Spring v. Board of Trustees of Cape Fear Community College et. al., No. 7:15-CV-84-BO (E.D. N.C., Apr. 7, 2016), North Carolina Magistrate Judge James E. Gates, in ruling on several discovery disputes between the parties, granted the plaintiff’s motion to compel in part, ordering the plaintiff to identify documents to be re-produced in native format and for the defendant to re-produce those documents or move for appropriate relief after conferring with plaintiff if it deemed the number of documents identified to be unjustifiably large.

Case Background

In this breach of contract case over a forced resignation, the court entered a scheduling order in August 2015, adopting the parties’ proposed discovery plan which provided that “the requesting party is entitled to have electronic files produced in `native’ format, with accompanying metadata, upon request.”  After the defendant produced documents in response to the plaintiff’s requests for production, the plaintiff sent a letter to defendants’ counsel in December 2015 addressing perceived deficiencies in the defendant’s production.  The defendant produced some supplemental documents, but the plaintiff contended that the defendant’s production was still incomplete.  The plaintiff filed a motion to compel in February 2016, seeking further production, as well as re-production of the originally produced documents in native format.

Judge’s Ruling

After addressing the various requests for further production, allowing in part and denying in part the plaintiff’s requests, Judge Gates turned to the plaintiff’s request for production of electronically stored information in its native format, as stated in the terms of the discovery plan adopted by the Scheduling Order.  While the defendant’s initial production of 2,576 pages was not in native format, the defendant noted that, at the time, the plaintiff did not object to the non-native format of the production.  Since the time plaintiff raised the issue, the defendant stated that it had produced 2,084 documents in native format with metadata and offered to re-produce in native format with metadata specific documents identified by the plaintiff, but objected to re-producing all prior non-native format production.

Judge Gates stated:

“The court agrees with the Board that re-production of all documents at this point would be unduly burdensome. If there are documents, or categories of documents, for which plaintiff requests re-production in native form with metadata, plaintiff shall provide such identification to the Board as soon as practicable, but in no event later than 15 April 2016. The Board shall re-produce in native format with metadata the documents identified as soon as practicable, but in no event later than 28 April 2016, provided that the Board may move by that date pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(c), E.D.N.C. for appropriate relief after conferring with plaintiff if it deems the number of documents identified to be unjustifiably large. The portion of plaintiff’s motion to compel seeking re-production of the documents sought is accordingly ALLOWED IN PART and DENIED IN PART on the foregoing terms.”

So, what do you think?  Considering that it was agreed to in the discovery plan, should the judge have ordered all documents to be re-produced in native format?  Or was the order to re-produce selected documents sufficient?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.