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Portions of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel eDiscovery Ruled as “Overbroad” and “Moot” Reaffirmed by District Court – eDiscovery Case Law
 

In Elkharwily v. Mayo Holding Co., 12-3062 (DSD/JJK), 2014 U.S. Dist. (D. Minn. Apr. 18, 2014), Minnesota District Judge David S. Doty overruled the plaintiff’s objection to a magistrate judge’s order that denied in part the plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery, labeling some requests as overbroad or moot, particularly after the defendant contended it had already produced the requested discovery materials.

This employment dispute was brought about when the plaintiff was terminated from the defendant’s employment. The plaintiff claims that after observing and reporting several instances of negligence and fraud in this medical setting, he was placed on administrative leave and asked to resign. When the plaintiff refused, the defendant terminated his employment. The resulting civil action filed by the plaintiff accuses the defendant of breach of contract and retaliation.

At issue here was an earlier order by a magistrate judge that denied in part the plaintiff’s Motion to Compel discovery of the defendant’s Electronically Stored Information (ESI). Specifically, the plaintiff sought to overturn the decision denying his motion to compel related to:

  • Requests for Production 9 and 12 and Interrogatories 14, 15, 16, and 20
  • Requests for Production 1, 2, and 10
  • Requests for Production 4, 5, and 6

Regarding the Requests for Production 9 and 12 and Interrogatories 14, 15, 16, and 20, which sought in part “any communications between any [defendant’s] employee and any potential employer of [plaintiff],” it was initially determined that the requests were overbroad, as they “presented the opportunity to investigate other unpleaded claims.” These requests and interrogatories were deemed “unduly expansive and seek[ing] material well outside the boundaries of permissible discovery.” Judge Doty concluded that the initial ruling on these issues was “neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law,” as the plaintiff contended.

Requests for Production 1, 2, and 10 sought discovery relevant to the case. Specifically, Production 1 sought “[a]ll documents…maintained by [defendant] or any employee or agent of [defendant], relating to [plaintiff],” Production 2 sought “[a]ll email and text messages sent or received on [plaintiff’s work assigned] email and text messaging accounts,” and Production 10 sought “[all] documents, notes, communications, emails and text messages relating to [plaintiff] or to any of the claims or defenses in this action prepared, sent or received by [defendant],” all of which were initially denied as being overbroad and moot. In response to this, the defendant noted that it had already produced responsive documents to these Requests for Production, with redactions and assertions of privilege subject to future consideration. Therefore, Judge Doty noted that the plaintiff appeared to have no persisting objection to the initial ruling.

With regard to Requests for Production 4, 5, and 6, which had initially been overruled as moot, the plaintiff cited the initial order and argued that “(1) the order does not explicitly require [defendant] to include in its log otherwise-responsive documents not produced due to an asserted privilege and (2) the order does not compel production of patient files.” The defendant responded that it had already produced all responsive and non-privileged documents, had provided the plaintiff with a privilege log which logged all withheld documents, and further that the requested documents did not “reference, rely upon or incorporate patient files.”

In this final issue, Judge Doty noted that the court “must accept, at face value, a party’s representation that it has fully produced all materials that are responsive to a discovery request,” and that Rule 26 “provides adequate protection to ensure that, if [d]efendants are found to be deficient in their document production, appropriate sanctions will be leveled and [the plaintiff] will not suffer undue prejudice.” Therefore, the plaintiff’s objection to the portion of the objection relating to those requests for production was also overruled.

So, what do you think? Should any of the plaintiff’s objections have been considered more seriously?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Denies Defendant’s Request for Deposition Regarding Plaintiff’s Discovery Search Tools – eDiscovery Case Law

In Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Hunt Control Sys., Inc., 11-3684 (DMC) (D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2014), New Jersey Magistrate Judge James B. Clark III granted the plaintiff’s protective order to prevent the defendant from proceeding with a new deposition to review whether the plaintiff had used “appropriate search tools for ESI discovery,” after the requested discovery documents had already been produced.

This instant action on an intellectual property dispute concerned the defendant’s reissuance of a Notice of Deposition pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(6) for the plaintiff’s IT representative, who had already given a deposition that had been stayed by a previous court when the defendant sought to request responses from the plaintiff to eight questions “that [defendant] alleges were not adequately answered” by the IT representative. The plaintiff objected to the reissued notice during a conference, and was granted leave to file for a protective order.

The defendant claimed that the plaintiff’s discovery production was materially deficient, and outlined seven categories of documents which it alleged were missing documents, returning low portions of requested documents, or not produced at all. In support of the 30(b)(6) deposition request, the defendant submitted declarations from its IT expert which stated in part that “due to its cloud-based IT structure, [plaintiff] has available to it some of most (sic) sophisticated and comprehensive state-of-the-art document search and location tools” and yet the plaintiff “refuses to use these tools to satisfy its obligations.”  The defendant claimed that it was “entitled to the deposition to understand why and how these sophisticated tools are somehow inappropriate in spite of their clear design to accommodate eDiscovery.”

In response, the plaintiff contended that the deposition was initially stayed pending the plaintiff’s response to the eight questions the defendant claimed were not adequately answered, and not pending the defendant’s review of the plaintiff’s discovery production. It was noted that the previous court invited the defendant to “reapply” for a deposition once both parties had “met and conferred in good faith” regarding discovery, yet the defendant had simply re-noticed the deposition. The plaintiff also submitted a declaration from its IT expert, confirming that the plaintiff had answered the eight questions adequately, and that “a custodian-based approach to collecting ESI” was its usual method of discovery production.

The plaintiff requested the protective order blocking the deposition because the ESI production approach described by the defendant would be unduly burdensome, noting that its current contract with its outsourced IT provider “neither includes, contemplates, nor currently permits the type of searching and collection that [defendant] suggest[s].” Further declarations submitted by the plaintiff attested to the reasonableness of its approach to ESI production.

Judge Clark based the ultimate ruling on this motion on legal standards set forth by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, which governs the scope of discovery in federal litigation and requires in part that discovery scope be limited where “the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive” and where “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”

In reviewing the arguments from both sides, Judge Clark found that the plaintiff had adequately represented the reasonableness of its approach to ESI discovery and production, that it had demonstrated that several categories of the defendant’s claims of deficient production were “speculative and suggestive in nature,” and that the defendant had failed to demonstrate that “the benefits of the deposition would likely outweigh the burden associated with it.” In fact, the proposed deposition had “the potential to cause tremendous burden” to the plaintiff. Therefore, the plaintiff’s motion for a protective order was granted.

So, what do you think? Was the defendant’s request unduly burdensome or should they have been granted the second deposition? Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Rules that Unilateral Predictive Coding is Not Progressive – eDiscovery Case Law

In Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Delaney, No. 2:11-cv-00678-LRH-PAL (D. Nev. May 19, 2014), Nevada Magistrate Judge Peggy A. Leen determined that the plaintiff’s unannounced shift from the agreed upon discovery methodology, to a predictive coding methodology for privilege review was not cooperative.  Therefore, the plaintiff was ordered to produce documents that met agreed-upon search terms without conducting a privilege review first.

This declaratory relief action had been plagued by delays in discovery production, which led to the defendants filing a Motion to Compel the plaintiffs to produce discovery in a timely fashion. Following a hearing, both sides were ordered to meet and confer, and hold meaningful discussions about resolving outstanding ESI issues pursuant to discovery. The plaintiff contended that the defendant’s discovery requests, as standing, would require them to produce approximately 1.8 million documents, which would be unduly burdensome. Both parties agreed to search terms that would reduce the number of potentially responsive documents to around 565,000, which the plaintiff would manually review for privileged documents before producing discovery to the defendant.

Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff determined that manual review would be too expensive and time-consuming, and therefore after consulting with a “nationally-recognized authority on eDiscovery,” elected to apply predictive coding to the identified 565,000 documents. Plaintiff selected a software program that they began using to identify relevant documents with the intention of applying a further predictive coding layer in order to determine which documents were “more likely privileged” and which were “less likely privileged.”

However, the plaintiff did not consult with either the court or the requesting party regarding their intentions to change review methodology. As a result, the defendant objected to the use of predictive coding in this case for several reasons, including the plaintiff’s lack of transparency surrounding its predictive coding methodology and its failure to cooperate, as well as the plaintiff’s failure to adhere to the best practices for the chosen software program which were recommended to them by the authority they chose. Finally, the defendants cited a likelihood of satellite disputes revolving around discovery, should the plaintiff proceed with the current predictive coding, which would further delay production discovery that had already been “stalled for many months.”

The defendant requested that either the plaintiff be required to proceed with predictive coding according to the defendant’s suggested protocol, which would include applying the predictive methodology to all of the originally collected 1.8 million documents, or that the plaintiff produce the non-privileged keyword hits without any review, but allowing them to be subject to a clawback order—which was a second option included in the originally stipulated ESI protocol that both parties had agreed to. Although this option would shift the burden of discovery to the defendant, it was noted that the defendant was “committed to devot[ing] the resources required to review the documents as expeditiously as possible” in order to allow discovery to move forward.

Judge Leen acknowledged potential support for the general methodology of predictive coding in eDiscovery, and stated that a “transparent mutually agreed upon” protocol for such a method would likely have been approved. However, Judge Leen took issue that the plaintiff had refused to “engage in the type of cooperation and transparency that its own eDiscovery consultant has so comprehensibly and persuasively explained is needed for a predictive coding protocol to be accepted by the court or opposing counsel” and instead had “elected and then abandoned the second option—to manually review and produce responsive ESI documents. It abandoned the option it selected unilaterally, without the [defendant’s] acquiescence or the court’s approval and modification of the parties’ stipulated ESI protocol.”

Therefore, Judge Leen elected to enforce the second option described in the agreed-upon ESI protocol, and required the plaintiff to produce all 565,000 documents that matched the stipulated search terms without review, with a clawback option in place for privileged documents as well as permission to apply privilege filters to the documents at issue, and withhold those documents that returned as “most likely privileged.”

So, what do you think? Should parties need to obtain approval regarding the review methodology that they plan to use?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Government Ordered to Maintain Expensive Custom Database Shared with Criminal Defendant – eDiscovery Case Law
 

In the criminal case of United States v. Shabudin, No. 11-cr-00664-JSW-1 (NJV) (N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2014), California Magistrate Judge Nandor J. Vadas ordered the Government to continue to provide access to a Relativity Database used by the parties to review documents produced by the Government, instead of discontinuing access for the defendants several weeks before trial was to begin due to budgetary issues.

The Government had voluntarily created the database to manage the vast quantities of documents being produced for discovery in this action, “because it was in its interest to do so”. An agreement had been negotiated between the parties that would allow the defendants to access the database and review discovery documents, and to employ third-party “project managers” for technical and substantive support.  Although the parties stipulated that the database has been “completed” in January of 2013, after more than 9 million documents had been uploaded, the defendants did not gain access until February of 2014.

At some point after beginning to work with the database, the defendants came to realize that not all of the documents produced in the action had been uploaded. Specifically, absent from the database were the contents of three hard drives, and 159 boxes of hard copy material amounting to nearly 1 million pages of documents. Defendants filed a motion to compel the Government to add the missing documents to the database, but, during a hearing on the motion to compel, the Government voluntarily offered to upload 2 of the 3 hard drives, and scan the hard copy materials into the database, asking that they not be ordered to do so.

Following this commitment, the Government indicated for the first time during the proceedings that “the ‘extra cost’ associated with this ‘voluntary’ commitment would draw down on the $1.8 million budget that had been allocated to Database, and ‘for this reason, we anticipate funding for the Database will end” four months from that point. Further, the Government stated that they had looked into “new – and more expensive – alternatives,” namely that they would expend resources to have the materials uploaded to the database within 2 months, and that the defendants would have 2 months to access and review the “old” documents plus the new material, at which point the database would be “transferred to a Concordance database that Defendants could maintain at their own cost.”

The defendants objected to this proposal, and Judge Vadas ordered the Government to provide more information about the effects of transferring the documents to a Concordance database. The Government declared that the cost of the transfer alone would be $118,000, and that it would take 6 to 8 weeks to complete. Further, the Government explained that due to the transfer, some user-created metadata would no longer be viewable or searchable, specifically including “(1) Database user actions (‘audit history’); (2) user searches including save search syntax; (3) image annotations; and (4) Database ‘artifacts’ such as batches, views, or layouts.” The defendants responded that they would “lose our saved searches compiled in files within the database, the very work that we have spent months and many hours putting together. These files essentially represent the virtual entirety of the defense work on the data base.”

Aside from these concerns, when asked when it first explained the possibility that the database could “wind down” before trial, the Government “could not point to a single instance where it had actually informed Defendants that this was a possibility.” Instead, the Government claimed that the “projected” two-year project duration should have been understood by the defendants to have been calculated based on the start of the project in June 2012, rather than the completion of the database as the defendants assumed.

Judge Vadas noted that if the Government had indicated that the database might be shut down prior to trial, and taken this position “when it broached the possibility of using the Database to manage discovery in this case, Defendants would have objected strenuously.” Ultimately, Judge Vadas found that since the Government had “chose to use an eDiscovery platform for this action, selected and managed the eDiscovery provider, and negotiated and agreed to Terms and Conditions for Access to the Database with the Defendants,” and that the Government had never disclosed that the database might wind down, “that winding down the Database before Defendants are ready for trial in December 2014 would prejudice Defendants' ability to prepare for trial and would offend the court's notion of fairness.” Therefore, the Government was ordered to continue to pay for the database through December 2014, and to continue providing the services agreed to in the Terms and Conditions.

So, what do you think? Should the Government have been required to continue to pay for the database, or should exporting it to a Concordance database for the defendants to use have been sufficient? Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Plaintiffs Denied Motion to Depose Defendants Regarding ESI Processes Prior to Discovery Requests – eDiscovery Case Law

In Miller v. York Risk Servs. Grp., No. 2:13-cv-1419 JWS (D. Ariz. Apr. 15, 2014), Arizona Senior District Judge John W. Sedwick denied the plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, requesting permission to conduct depositions in order to determine the defendant’s manner and methods used for storing and maintaining Electronically Stored Information (ESI) prior to submitting their discovery requests.

This action involves two claims against the defendant revolving around workers’ compensation benefits: (1) that the defendant “fraudulently denied [plaintiffs’] workers’ compensation benefits in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”),” and (2) that the defendant aided and abetted the plaintiffs’ employer or former employer with a “breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing” by denying the claims. In filing the Motion to Compel, the plaintiffs sought a wide ranging inquiry pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) that would enable them to “tailor their discovery requests to avoid potential disputes over what may be discovered” by deposing the defendant regarding their process of storing and maintaining ESI.

The plaintiffs contended that other courts have “allowed discovery of the very sort they seek” for the purpose of tailoring discovery requests, and cited several appellate decisions to reinforce the contention. While most of the decisions cited by the plaintiffs were from trial courts in other circuits, two of the district court cases cited were within the Ninth Circuit—specifically, Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Vegas Constr. Co., Inc., and Starbucks Corp. v. ADTSec. Services, Inc.

In reviewing these appellate decisions, Judge Sedwick noted that the first cited Ninth Circuit case was inapplicable, as it discussed extensively “a corporation’s duty to identify and prepare a witness for a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, but nothing in the opinion suggests that the case involved any request to conduct discovery into the manner and methods used by the defendant to store and maintain electronic data.” Regarding the second case, it was noted that the plaintiffs had in fact submitted a substantive request for discovery prior to the court ordered Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, which only attempted to conclude whether the discovery would actually be “unduly burdensome and difficult to retrieve,” as the defendants alleged.

Therefore, Judge Sedwick stated that the cited decisions were inconclusive in determining “whether starting the discovery process with a wide ranging inquiry into the manner and method by which a party stores and manages ESI is a helpful and appropriate approach to obtaining substantive information,” and therefore starting discovery with an inquiry as requested by the plaintiffs “puts the cart before the horse and likely will increase, rather than decrease, discovery disputes.” Hence, the plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel was denied.

So, what do you think? Are there circumstances under which taking depositions prior to discovery would be helpful and appropriate? Should depositions be reserved for resolving discovery disputes, rather than preventing them? Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Another Case Where Some eDiscovery Costs are Disallowed – eDiscovery Case Law

We haven’t covered a good eDiscovery cost reimbursement case in a while (here is a link to those we covered last year), so here is a case from earlier this month where, once again, the prevailing party had its awarded costs for eDiscovery reduced.

In Kwan Software Engineering v. Foray Technologies, 2014 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2014), the amount of the defendant’s previously awarded costs were significantly reduced following the partial granting of the plaintiff’s Motion for Review of Clerk’s Taxation of Costs, after California District Judge Susan Illston ruled that the majority of the costs requested were not recoverable.

In this copyright infringement and breach of contract case, the motion for review had been filed after a motion for summary judgment was granted and entered in favor of the defendant, who was awarded $88,848.13 in costs. The plaintiff disputed these costs, and filed a motion that requested to specifically disallow “(1) $453.29 in costs for service of summons and subpoena; (2) $6,818.54 in costs for printed or electronically recorded transcripts; and (3) $61,312 in costs for exemplification and the costs of making copies.”

With regard to the larger sum of $61,312, the plaintiff specifically challenged the costs related to eDiscovery, citing the defendant’s submission of a total of eight invoices which the plaintiff contended they should not have been awarded any costs for. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was “seeking a broad range of eDiscovery related costs that go well beyond the costs associated with the actual production of the documents,” and further that the defendant “failed to provide sufficient detail of its eDiscovery costs to allow the Court to determine what are actual copying costs and what are non-taxable intellectual efforts.”

Additionally, the plaintiff noted that there was a discrepancy between the invoices at issue and the actual production submitted by the defendant. During discovery, the defendant produced approximately 229,000 pages of documents, yet the invoices showed charges for producing 344,445 pages of documents, and thus the defendant was seeking to recover costs for documents that were not used in the litigation.

It was noted that with respect to eDiscovery, other courts in the same district have found recoverable copying fees to be defined as “.TIFF and OCR conversion, Bates stamping, load file and other physical media generation.” However, the invoices submitted by the defendant for cost recovery contained, in addition to costs for documents that were not produced to the plaintiff, other charges for “data storage and data management,” as well as “Project Management” fees. The information that the defendant submitted was not sufficient to show that these costs should have been recoverable.

Judge Illston stated that the court declined to award costs to the defendant for data storage, data management, project management, and copying costs for documents that were not actually produced in litigation. Therefore, of the original $61,312 in copying costs, the defendant’s awarded recoverable costs were reduced to $6,870, an amount that represented “a charge of $0.03 per document for Bates stamping and TIFF conversion for 229,000 documents.”  With regard to the lesser divided costs of $24,199.14 and $1,752.32 which the Clerk awarded to the defendant, these costs were challenged by the plaintiff on the assertion that some of the costs were not recoverable.

Broadly summarizing, the plaintiff argued that delivery invoices for subpoena and summons, and costs related to printed or electronically recorded transcripts, specifically “(1) expedited deposition transcripts; (2) multiple copies of deposition transcripts; (3) additional CDs containing deposition transcripts and exhibits; (4) synchronization of video depositions; (5) multiple copies of DVDs; (6) rough transcripts; (7) color exhibits; (8) shipping of transcripts; and (9) transcripts of proceedings” should not be recoverable.

Judge Illston accordingly reduced the amounts to disallow categories 1 and 2 above ($453.29 and $6,818.54) respectively, leaving the defendant with a total of $32,983.59 in awarded costs.

So, what do you think? Should the costs of labor or intellectual effort be considered recoverable with regard to eDiscovery? How detailed should the level of reporting be when requesting recoverable costs following a judgment? Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Defendants – and Defendants’ Counsel – Sanctioned for Delays in Producing ESI – eDiscovery Case Law
 

In Knickerbocker v Corinthian Colleges, Case No. C12-1142JLR, (WDWA, April 7, 2014), Washington District Judge James L. Robart imposed sanctions against the defendants and the defendants’ counsel for their delays in producing Electronically Stored Information (ESI) during discovery, despite the fact that spoliation of evidence was ultimately avoided.

This workplace discrimination, harassment, and retaliation action involved three plaintiffs who were former employees of the defendants, and had been terminated from their positions. The plaintiffs filed first and second motions for sanctions, alleging in the first that the defendants had failed to preserve evidence, and in the second that the defendants had shown bad faith in their subsequent delay in producing evidence.

During discovery, the plaintiffs first expressed concern over the defendants’ “meager document production,” prompting several discovery conferences and correspondences between the counsel for the plaintiffs and the counsel for the defense. Eventually, the defendants’ counsel represented that as per the defendants’ policies, the plaintiffs’ email accounts had been deleted 30 days after their termination. Further, counsel stated regarding backup sources that the relevant ESI “could not be extracted without shutting down the servers; in other words, it was not extractable.”

Owing to the defendants’ apparent failure to preserve evidence, plaintiffs filed a motion to compel responses to particular discovery requests. In response, both parties stipulated to an order requiring that the defendant conduct a “full and complete search” at its own expense for all responsive documents, including “documents on backup servers.” The defendants complied and submitted more documents with a Verification of Compliance with Stipulation and Order Compelling Further Discovery, which stated in part that the defendants had conducted a complete search “on all available electronic sources and/or servers.”

After reviewing the defendants’ production, plaintiffs continued to allege that evidence had not been adequately preserved and collected. Further questioning revealed that although the defendants had issued litigation holds in previous litigation actions against them, they had not issued a litigation hold in this particular case. While the defendants’ previous policy had been to issue a company-wide notice to halt destruction of ESI, with respect to this case, the defendants claimed to have selected certain employees and asked them to retrieve and retain relevant documents. Yet in depositions, the employees at issue stated that they “had not searched, did not recall searching, and had not been asked to search for documents relevant to the litigation.”

At this point, the defendants’ total document production had consisted of only 1,272 pages. Defendants claimed that the document search was sufficient, alleging that the plaintiffs’ email accounts had been deleted prior to notification of pending litigation, thus before the duty to preserve had been triggered. However, the defendants admitted that the emails at issue existed on its backup tapes, but argued that they were not required to produce them because “the Stipulated Order only referred to backup ‘servers’, not backup ‘tapes’, and retrieval of information on the backup tapes would require ‘unreasonable’ cost and effort.”

Facing sanctions for spoliation, the defendants counsel changed their tune and represented that they were not only able to access the backup tapes and solve the spoliation issue, but that the total expense of producing the relevant ESI would be “a thousand dollars per day of recovery time,” and that the expenses would not be as great as previously warranted. Citing the counsel for the defendants’ representation that expenses would not be burdensome, Judge Robart deferred ruling on the plaintiffs’ most recent motion in favor of issuing an order to compel production specifically from the backup tapes.

Briefly summarized, the defendants far exceeded the time limit set for discovery production over a series of delays, difficulties, and missed deadlines, as the backup tapes were alternately reviewed and documents extracted by a third party vendor and the defendants themselves. Ultimately, an additional 3,000 emails were produced from the backup tapes, with the bulk of the production delivered 7 weeks after the final deadline.

Judge Robart found that the defendants had acted in bad faith, specifically stating that “there is clear and convincing evidence showing that [defendants] and [defendants’ counsel] have refused to participate forthrightly in the discovery process and that this refusal constitutes or is tantamount to bad faith…[t]herefore, sanctions are warranted.” The defendants were sanctioned in the amount of $25,000, and the defense counsel was sanctioned another $10,000.

So, what do you think? Does this case demonstrate clear bad faith, or simply incompetence on behalf of counsel? Should sanctions be ordered in cases where spoliation of evidence has ultimately not occurred? Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Want to Immerse Yourself in eDiscovery Knowledge? There’s Still Time – eDiscovery Best Practices
 

One of our favorite blogs is the Ball in Your Court blog, by Craig Ball, a perennial thought leader interviewee on this blog.  While catching up on his latest couple of posts, I realized that it’s almost time for the Georgetown E-Discovery Training Academy.  If you’re looking for an in-depth program that not only gives you a “total immersion in the subject of eDiscovery”, but also satisfies much of your CLE requirements for the year, this program may be for you!

Georgetown Law's eDiscovery Training Academy will be held on June 1 thru June 6 this year and has been designed by experts to be a challenging experience leading to a comprehensive understanding of the discipline.  In addition to Craig, the faculty includes such noted experts as Maura Grossman, Tom O’Connor, and Mark Sidoti. Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola will also be there to provide additional judicial and pragmatic guidance.  The program provides up to 32.4 CLE credit hours (including up to 1.2 hours of ethics hours).  Topics and workshops include:

  • Meet and Confer Demonstrations, Team Meeting, Coaching Sessions and a Mock 26(f) Conference
  • Introduction to Electronically Stored Information (ESI)
  • Forms of Production
  • Mail Systems, Backup Systems, and Databases
  • Technology-Assisted Review and Enhanced Search
  • The Courts and Predictive Coding: Where Are They and Where They Are Going
  • Preservation
  • The Collections Process
  • Sanctions
  • Ethics
  • Evidence: Authentication and Admissibility
  • eDiscovery: Small Cases and Small Budgets
  • Judicial Perspectives from Judge Facciola throughout the week

With regard to how this year’s Georgetown Academy differs from past years, Craig noted to me that “The level of daily interaction with Judge Facciola will be unprecedented.  We are also calling more on other esteemed faculty in 2014, especially Maura Grossman and Mark Sidotti.  We have more judges involved than ever before and our team coaching staff is top notch and playing a larger role through the week.  The upshot is that attendees will be getting much more daily interaction with thought leaders and each other, with less burdens placed upon them in terms of reading.”

The full prospectus PDF is available here.  It includes a registration form, or you can also register online here.  Registration is $3,500 for the week long program ($3,000 if you’re a Georgetown Law alumnus and $2,500 for government employees).  Per Craig’s blog, you can use the code EDTAREFERRAL when registering and take $300.00 off the price.  Even better for a week that should be highly educational and also highly entertaining and cover a large portion of your CLE requirements for the year.

So, what do you think? Are you looking for a chance to quickly develop your knowledge of technology and electronic discovery? Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Plaintiff’s Failure to Communicate with Defendants Causes Complications in Discovery – eDiscovery Case Law
 

In Procaps S.A. v. Patheon Inc., 12-24356-CIV-GOODMAN, 2014 U.S. Dist. (S.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 2014), the defendants filed a Motion to Compel over search terms for Electronically Stored Information (ESI), after the lead counsel for the plaintiffs repeatedly demonstrated uncooperative behavior by not responding to emails sent by defendants’ counsel, or responding with brief and unclear messages.

This discovery dispute arose after Florida District Judge Jonathan Goodman granted the defendants’ motion for a forensic analysis of the plaintiffs’ electronic media. Several reasons were given for granting the motion, among them the fact that the plaintiffs’ personnel had been permitted to self-search for ESI without context – the employees had neither seen the defendants’ discovery requests, nor been given a list of search terms. Judge Goodman ordered that both parties agree to a preliminary list of search terms.

Following this order, counsel for the plaintiffs produced a list of eight search terms, in English, along with an advisory that the plaintiffs could “confer with our clients as to appropriate Spanish translation.” This was problematic because the plaintiffs’ business is headquartered in Columbia, and while some of its employees speak both English and Spanish, others speak only Spanish.

The defendants responded that the counsel’s proposal with the absence of Spanish search terms and a suggestion to translate the terms post-agreement was “patently unreasonable,” and further stressed that “perhaps most troubling is that it doesn’t appear these terms were discussed with [plaintiffs’] employees in order to determine what words and phrases they use.”

Counsel for the defendants attempted to reach the plaintiffs’ lead counsel with regards to this matter, first through a phone call, and then through an email follow-up that summarized the call, stating in part: “this confirms…[plaintiff] does not agree that it has an obligation to come up with search terms with input from [plaintiffs’] custodians about the words and abbreviations they use, and that [plaintiff] will not suggest any search terms other than the eight search terms it proposed.” The counsel for the plaintiff replied with a single-line email: “I do not believe your characterization of our position is accurate.” A response from the defendants’ counsel asking for clarification on which of the two points in the original email counsel believed to be inaccurate went unanswered.

Several further emails were sent, to which the plaintiffs’ counsel either did not respond, or responded with brief messages that did not address all the points questioned by defendants’ counsel. Due to the lack of communication regarding whether the plaintiffs’ counsel would confer with their clients regarding search terms, the defendants filed a Motion to Compel.

Judge Goodman held a multi-hour hearing with the parties, during which the plaintiffs’ counsel alleged that the defendants’ counsel had a history of “incorrectly summarize(ing) telephone conversations,” and further that the defendants were “seeking to engage in an ‘e-mail war,’ that email is being used ‘as a tool to gain an advantage’ and that [defendants’ emails] were an ‘ambush attempt’ and that he was not going to ‘get trapped into this kind of tactic’.” Additionally, counsel asserted that they had already been in communication with the plaintiffs’ ESI custodians, detailing in an affidavit that attorneys for the plaintiffs had spoken to a total of 24 custodians currently employed by the plaintiffs, as well as two former custodians, regarding search terms and ESI that was reasonably likely to contain relevant information.

Upon review of the affidavit and testimony, it was found that the plaintiffs’ counsel had first communicated with ESI custodians regarding search terms only on the day after the defendants had filed the Motion to Compel, and that the discussion outlined in the affidavit had taken place during the week after the motion had been filed. Therefore, the search terms had not in fact been discussed with the plaintiffs’ ESI custodians at the time of the email exchanges, contrary to what counsel had indicated.

Despite having ultimately arranged for the appropriate persons to provide search term input, Judge Goodman awarded attorney’s fees to the defendants in the amount of $3,750, with $1,000 of the fees to be paid personally by the lead counsel for the plaintiff due to his non-communication. It was stressed that this award was for fee-shifting purposes, and not intended as a sanction.

So, what do you think? Should apparent refusal to communicate provide grounds for sanctioning during the discovery process? Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Defendant Failure to Produce in Agreed Upon Format Leads to Dispute with Plaintiffs – eDiscovery Case Law
 

In EEOC v. SVT, LLC, 2:13-CV-245-RLM-PRC, 2014 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Ind. Apr. 10, 2014), discovery disputes arose when the plaintiffs and defendants agreed upon the file format the requested Electronically Stored Information (ESI) for discovery was to be produced in, but the defendants’ production was not in the file formats specified.

In this workplace discrimination case, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants had engaged in discriminatory hiring practices based on gender, specifically that the defendants refused to hire qualified applicants who were female, and that disproportionately more males than females were hired. The plaintiffs submitted a Request for Production that asked for documents from the defendants including “applications, screening assessments, interview guides, spreadsheets containing data about applicants and employees, and pay rate information.” Neither party disputed that this ESI constituted relevant discovery for the case.

The plaintiffs requested under the Request for Production that the ESI be furnished in specified formats. These formats included documents to be produced in “near native” TIFF format with load files, and spreadsheets and databases produced in native format. At this time, the defendants indicated compliance and agreed that the ESI would be produced in these formats.

The defendants began producing discovery responses by furnishing the plaintiffs with spreadsheets in non-native TIFF format, and with employment applications in single-page, non-unitized PDF that did not include load files. Along with these responses, the defendants claimed that that had produced all relevant data “pursuant to industry standards.” The defendants did not communicate to the plaintiffs, either during production or after serving the discovery responses, that they had any issues with the formats of production specified in the Request for Production. They simply did not follow the agreed format, with no explanation.

Upon review of the ESI, the plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel Agreed-Upon Formats of [defendants’] Discovery Responses. The plaintiffs submitted a Declaration detailing the deficiencies of the file formats the defendants had submitted, including that the printed images (TIFF) of spreadsheets and database files were not reasonably usable “because they cannot be searched or manipulated for analysis,” and further that the PDFs produced by the defendants were in “a less usable format than the original data” because they had been “bulk-scanned,” resulting in single-page files that were not logically unitized, and had been stripped of metadata such as necessary document/page relationships.

The plaintiffs contended that the defendants could have produced the ESI in the requested formats, and that it would not have been unduly burdensome, using the Kronos and Financial Management Systems, Inc. (FMS) systems that the defendants regularly store and work with data on during the course of business. It was noted by the plaintiffs that both systems “are capable of providing users with data in many forms and come with built-in functionality to query, export, and report data from databases.”

Additionally, the plaintiffs noted that two of the defendants’ human resources representatives had testified during depositions with regard to their experiences working with Kronos, and had stated that they had the ability to generate reports in either PDF or Excel formats, and that FMS can export data to Excel. Both representatives stated that Kronos could be used to sort data, enter specific queries and generate customized reports on the information the plaintiffs sought, in these requested native formats.

However, the defendants objected, stating that their use of a third party hiring program in which Kronos stores the data from applicants online meant that they were limited to producing PDF documents without log files. The defendants stated that they were unable to access the “raw data” through the third party system, which is a cloud-based application. Further, it was noted that producing ESI in the formats requested by the plaintiffs would be unduly burdensome in a financial sense, as the plaintiffs had already spent substantial amounts to produce the discovery documents served thus far.

Magistrate Judge Paul R. Cherry noted that the defendants had not objected or sought a protective order based on their purported inability to comply with the plaintiffs’ requested ESI production format, and further that the data sought was not inaccessible, and therefore duplication costs could not be viewed as unduly burdensome. However, Judge Cherry was mindful of “the apparent inequality of resources available to the parties in this case, the excessive costs that can be incurred in producing ESI, and that such costs can become so burdensome as to pressure a party to settle in order to avoid those costs.”

Therefore, it was ordered that the parties meet and confer in person to work toward resolution of the file format issues revolving around discovery in this case. Further, since the plaintiffs had stated familiarity with the systems used by the defendants, and understood how the requested discovery could be obtained “easily,” Judge Cherry ordered that the plaintiffs provide “written” communication from the [defendants’] internal forensic computer expert…setting forth the remaining specific deficiencies with [plaintiffs’]…ESI production and proposing a specific and detailed explanation for obtaining and delivering the information in a cost-efficient manner for [plaintiffs].”

So, what do you think? Given the agreement, should the judge have granted the motion to compel? Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.