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Florida Appeals Court Upholds Ruling that Non-Party Had No Duty to Preserve Evidence: eDiscovery Case Law

In Shamrock-Shamrock, Inc. v. Remark, No. 5D18-1987 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2019), the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District affirmed the summary final judgment in favor of the Appellee, holding that Florida law does not impose a duty on nonparties to litigation to preserve evidence based solely on the foreseeability of litigation.

Case Background

In the case originally involving the Appellant’s suit against the City of Daytona Beach over zoning, the Appellee was never a party to the Appellant’s action against the City, but the Appellant’s operative complaint contained two references to the Appellee in its general allegations.  During the case, the Appellant sought to take the Appellee’s deposition and served several notices of deposition and subpoenas on the Appellee, beginning in May 2011 and ending ten months later with a sixth amended notice of taking deposition in March 2012, which was the only one that included a duces tecum request for documents to be produced at the deposition.

The Appellee’s deposition was taken in April 2012, where she testified that she had obtained a new desktop computer and had destroyed her old computer in December 2011. She did not preserve any records, documents, or emails from her old computer and did not inform anybody, including the City Attorney, that she was destroying it. Her testimony established that she destroyed her old computer after receiving the first deposition notice but before receiving the sixth amended deposition notice that for the first time included a duces tecum request.

The Appellant then filed a two-count complaint against the Appellee, alleging that she either intentionally destroyed her old computer or “negligently destroyed [it] in bad faith.” In that case, the Appellee and the Appellant filed competing motions for summary judgment regarding whether the Appellee had a duty to preserve her computer or its contents.  The Appellant argued, citing League of Women Voters of Florida v. Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363 (Fla. 2015), that the Appellee therefore had a duty to preserve evidence based on the foreseeability of litigation, but the trial court denied the Appellant’s summary judgment motion and granted the Appellee’s. It found that there was no genuine issue of fact that the Appellee had no statutory or contractual duty to preserve evidence; thus, the Appellant had to rely on a duty imposed by a discovery request.

Judge’s Ruling

In the opinion authored by J. Sasso, the court, after considering several cases cited by the Appellant, concluded that “no Florida court has yet recognized a common law duty for third-party preservation of evidence based on the knowledge or foreseeability of litigation”.  As a result, the court stated:

“In this case, there was no statute, contract, or discovery request that would impose a clearly defined duty on Remark to preserve any potentially relevant evidence. Thus, a duty would arise only through Remark’s purported knowledge of Shamrock’s pending litigation and her anticipation that something in her control could potentially be of use to that litigation. As such, Shamrock would like us to announce that Remark owed a duty to it based on the foreseeability of litigation. Considering the traditional approach to defining legal duty, we decline to do so. Indeed, such a broad pronouncement would be tantamount to declaring a general legal duty on any nonparty witness to anticipate the needs of others’ lawsuits. There are innumerable circumstances in which a nonparty to litigation may have evidence relevant to a case and may know of its relevance. But that knowledge, by itself, should not give rise to a duty to safeguard the evidence in anticipation of litigation…While we do not speculate as to every circumstance under which a third party to litigation may have a legal duty to preserve evidence, we hold that the trial court properly determined here that Remark did not owe a legal duty to Shamrock. The summary judgment in favor of Remark is affirmed.”

So, what do you think?  Would the decision be different in other jurisdictions?  Should it be different?  Please let us know if any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case opinion link courtesy of eDiscovery Assistant.

Sponsor: This blog is sponsored by CloudNine, which is a data and legal discovery technology company with proven expertise in simplifying and automating the discovery of data for audits, investigations, and litigation. Used by legal and business customers worldwide including more than 50 of the top 250 Am Law firms and many of the world’s leading corporations, CloudNine’s eDiscovery automation software and services help customers gain insight and intelligence on electronic data.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Grants Motion to Compel Production of Telephone Records from Individual Plaintiff: eDiscovery Case Law

In Siemers v. BNSF Railway Co., No. 8:17-cv-360 (D. Neb. Apr. 8, 2019), Nebraska Magistrate Judge Susan M. Bazis finding that the plaintiff’s telephone records are discoverable pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, that they are not subject to a privilege claim just because plaintiff’s counsel’s telephone number may appear in the records and that privacy issues are minimal to non-existent (since the at-issue records do not contain the substance of communications), ordered the plaintiff to produce his telephone records within one week of the order.

Case Background

In this case regarding the plaintiff’s suit against his former employer for alleged violations of the Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”), the defendant requested production of the plaintiff’s cellular telephone records from November 1, 2016 (the day before the claimed injury incident that is the basis of Plaintiff’s lawsuit) to present. After the plaintiff refused to produce any records in response to the defendant’s request, a discovery dispute conference was held in October 2018, with the Court finding that the plaintiff’s communications with coworkers or others from the defendant and telephone records evidencing the same were relevant and discoverable, and ordered the parties to further confer regarding production of these items.

The plaintiff then issued a subpoena to his cellular telephone provider and received a listing of incoming and outgoing telephone calls and text messages, but not the substance of any communications. Nonetheless, the plaintiff refused to produce to the defendant the telephone records produced to him in response to his subpoena.

In the final pretrial conference, the defendant argued that the records were discoverable because whether and how often plaintiff has communicated with BNSF coworkers or management since his alleged injury could have credibility considerations, that identifying the fact that a communication occurred between the plaintiff and his attorney was not privileged or, alternatively, that it was not unduly burdensome to redact those references and that no privacy interest was implicated in the telephone records because the records do not contain the substance of any communications.  The plaintiff argued that the defendant’s request was “overbroad on its face and therefore not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant information” and also contended that the discovery sought by the defendant was “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative and could have been obtained from other sources that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.”

Judge’s Ruling

Considering the respective arguments, Judge Bazis ruled as follows:

  1. “Plaintiff’s telephone records from November 1, 2016 to present and any other records received by Plaintiff in response to his subpoena to his cellular telephone provider are discoverable pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. BNSF is entitled to discover whether and how often Plaintiff has communicated with coworkers or BNSF management since his alleged injury.
  2. The fact that Plaintiff’s counsel’s telephone number may appear in the records does not render them subject to a privilege claim. Plaintiff may redact references to communications between Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel, which the Court finds is not overly burdensome.
  3. Privacy considerations of Plaintiff or third parties not involved in this litigation are minimal to non-existent since the at-issue records do not contain the substance of communications.”

As a result, Judge Bazis ordered (in all caps, no less) the plaintiff “to produce to BNSF all records received in response to Plaintiff’s subpoena to his cellular telephone carrier” within one week of the order, noting that he could “redact references to communications between Plaintiff’s counsel and Plaintiff (but is not required to do so to maintain privilege claims regarding the substance of the communications).”

So, what do you think?  Was that appropriate or was the defendant’s request overbroad?  Please let us know if any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case opinion link courtesy of eDiscovery Assistant.

Sponsor: This blog is sponsored by CloudNine, which is a data and legal discovery technology company with proven expertise in simplifying and automating the discovery of data for audits, investigations, and litigation. Used by legal and business customers worldwide including more than 50 of the top 250 Am Law firms and many of the world’s leading corporations, CloudNine’s eDiscovery automation software and services help customers gain insight and intelligence on electronic data.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Discovery Can’t Be Stayed While Motion to Dismiss is Considered, Court Says: eDiscovery Case Law

In Udeen v. Subaru of America, Inc., No. 18-17334(RBK/JS) (D.N.J. Mar. 12, 2019), New Jersey Magistrate Judge Joel Schneider denied the defendants’ request that all discovery be stayed until their Motion to Dismiss is decided, but, with the proviso that only limited and focused discovery on core issues would be permitted.

Case Background

In this nationwide class action with allegations that the defendant’s defective infotainment system creates a safety hazard, the defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on February 28, 2019 and requested that all discovery be stayed until their motion was decided.  The plaintiffs opposed the defendants’ request, so the Court received the parties’ letter briefs and held oral argument.

Judge’s Ruling

In evaluating the defendant’s motion, Judge Schneider said: “The Court agrees that plaintiffs will be prejudiced if all discovery is stayed while waiting for defendants’ motion to be decided. Given the extensive briefing on defendants’ motion and the expected time it will take for the motion to be decided, the case will be in suspense for months if defendants’ request is granted. Having filed their complaint plaintiffs have a right to move forward… This is especially true in a case where plaintiffs claim the alleged defect in defendants’ vehicles is a safety hazard. Further, the longer the case languishes the greater chance exists that relevant evidence may be lost or destroyed.”

Judge Schneider also noted: “Defendants’ concern about ‘extremely expensive’ discovery is overblown. As is always the case, the Court expects to closely manage discovery to assure that plaintiffs’ efforts are proportional. Further, contrary to defendants’ argument, a discovery stay will not simplify the issues for trial. In fact, the opposite is true. The parties initial discovery will focus on the core issues in the case to assure that only the most relevant and important discovery is produced. This discovery will be produced no matter what claims remain in the case. The discovery will serve to educate plaintiffs concerning the most important individuals and issues in the case. In the long run the Court expects defendants to benefit from this staging so that the parties do not chase discovery ‘down a rabbit hole.’”

As a result, Judge Schneider stated: “After examining all relevant evidence, the Court finds the relevant factors weigh in plaintiffs’ favor and, therefore, the Court will deny defendants’ request to stay all discovery.”  So, Judge Schneider ordered both the defendants and plaintiffs to produce certain documents and for the parties to meet and confer regarding certain other documents, noting: “The Court also finds that defendants’ documents in Japan are not necessarily off-limits. However, the Court is concerned plaintiffs’ requests are too broad. The Court will only permit narrow and focused discovery requests asking for core information. The parties meet and confer discussions shall also address plaintiffs’ request for third-party discovery. To the extent the parties cannot agree on the discovery to be produced, simultaneous letter briefs shall be served by April 15, 2019”.

So, what do you think?  Should discovery ever be stayed because a motion to dismiss is pending?  Please let us know if any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Hat tip to Jeff Dreiling and the Complete Legal blog for the tip about the case!

Case opinion link courtesy of eDiscovery Assistant.

Sponsor: This blog is sponsored by CloudNine, which is a data and legal discovery technology company with proven expertise in simplifying and automating the discovery of data for audits, investigations, and litigation. Used by legal and business customers worldwide including more than 50 of the top 250 Am Law firms and many of the world’s leading corporations, CloudNine’s eDiscovery automation software and services help customers gain insight and intelligence on electronic data.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Simon Says Two Years After Spoliation is Discovered is Too Late for Sanctions: eDiscovery Case Law

Sorry, I couldn’t resist…  ;o)

In Wakefield v. Visalus, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-1857-SI (D. Or. Mar. 27, 2019), Oregon District Judge Michael H. Simon denied the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions against the defendant for automatic deletion of call records, ruling that since the plaintiff knew about the deletion of call records for over two years, her motion was “untimely”.

Case Background

In this class claim related to alleged violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), the defendant used an automated telephone system called the “Progressive Outreach Manager” (“POM”), which the plaintiff contended generated and maintained historical records of each calling campaign and each call attempted by the defendant.  The POM system’s ESI was programmed to be automatically deleted after three months and, even though the defendant was on notice since October 2015 that it had a duty to preserve the information contained in the POM system, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant failed to suspend the call records’ automatic deletion. The plaintiff pointed to statements made by the defendant’s corporate representative and compliance analyst, during his deposition in December 2016 as evidence that these call records had been automatically deleted.

For many of those calls, the defendant maintained contact information spreadsheets containing all of the POM system information, so that data was replaced through other sources. However, the plaintiff contended there were 1.7 million calls that were not within the contact information spreadsheets that were deleted from the POM system, asserting that the lost call records would have proven that 350,228 of those calls delivered a message using an artificial or prerecorded voice to class members. In February 2019, the plaintiff asked the Court to order sanctions against the defendant, including instructing the jury that the defendant deleted call records and that the lost information was unfavorable to defendant.  The defendant argued that the motion was untimely, among other arguments against the motion.

Judge’s Ruling

In evaluating the plaintiff’s motion, Judge Simon said: “Plaintiff learned no later than December 12, 2016 that Defendant’s system deleted POM call records every three months. Discovery closed in December of 2017, one year later, and at that point Plaintiff had in her possession all call records produced by Defendant. Plaintiff acknowledges that she was aware in late 2016 that the call record data generated by the POM system had been “destroyed,” but claims she continued to believe that the same information was available elsewhere. It was only when performing final trial preparation that Plaintiff organized her trial exhibits, compiled the evidence obtained in discovery, and realized that some of the call data ‘deleted’ from the POM system had not been produced through other sources…Only then did Plaintiff file her motion for sanctions.”

Judge Simon also observed: “Had Plaintiff timely undertaken to examine the evidence produced by Defendant, any deleted call records that could not be restored or replaced through additional discovery would have been apparent to Plaintiff at that time, and she could have sought sanctions for the alleged spoliation.”  Noting that “courts are cautioned to be ‘wary of any spoliation motion made on the eve of trial’”, Judge Simon stated in denying the plaintiff’s motion: “Plaintiff filed her spoliation motion more than a year after the close of discovery, more than two years after she first learned of the alleged destruction of call records, and less than two months before trial. Plaintiff’s motion is untimely.”

So, what do you think?  Was that the correct call or should the plaintiff have been given the time to determine what she was missing?  Please let us know if any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case opinion link courtesy of eDiscovery Assistant.

Sponsor: This blog is sponsored by CloudNine, which is a data and legal discovery technology company with proven expertise in simplifying and automating the discovery of data for audits, investigations, and litigation. Used by legal and business customers worldwide including more than 50 of the top 250 Am Law firms and many of the world’s leading corporations, CloudNine’s eDiscovery automation software and services help customers gain insight and intelligence on electronic data.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Appeals Court Reverses Jury Decision Based on Failure of Court to Issue Spoliation Sanction: eDiscovery Case Law

In Marshall v. Brown’s IA, LLC, No. 2588 EDA 2017 (Pa. Super. Mar. 27, 2019), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, ruling that the trial court “abused its discretion in refusing the charge” of an adverse inference sanction against the defendant for failing to preserve several hours of video related to a slip and fall accident, vacated the judgment issued by the jury within the trial court for the defendant and remanded the case for a new trial.

Case Background

In this case where the plaintiff slipped and fell in one of the defendant’s ShopRite stores in August 2014, the plaintiff’s counsel sent a letter two weeks after the incident requesting that the defendant retain surveillance video of the accident and area in question for six hours prior to the accident and three hours after the accident. Additionally, the letter cautioned:

“If any of the above evidence exists, and you fail to maintain same until the disposition of this claim, it will be assumed that you have intentionally destroyed and/or disposed of evidence. Please be advised that you are not permitted, and are in no position, to decide what evidence plaintiff would like to review for this case. Accordingly, discarding any of the above evidence will lead to an Adverse Inference against you in this matter.”

Nonetheless, the defendant decided to preserve only thirty-seven minutes of video prior to the plaintiff’s fall and approximately twenty minutes after, and permitted the remainder to be automatically overwritten after thirty days.  The defendant’s Risk Manager (Matthew McCaffrey) testified that it was the store’s “rule of thumb” to preserve video surveillance from twenty minutes before and twenty minutes after a fall.  The plaintiff contended that the defendant’s conscious decision not to retain the video evidence constituted spoliation, and she asked the trial court to give an adverse inference charge to the jury.  But, the trial court concluded that there was no bad faith by the defendant and refused to give the requested adverse inference charge, but did agree, that the plaintiff’s counsel could argue to the jury that it should infer from the defendant’s decision not to retain more of the video prior to her fall that the video was damaging to the defendant.  Despite that, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, finding no negligence.

The plaintiff filed timely post-trial motions alleging that she was entitled to a new trial because the trial court erred in refusing to give the requested spoliation instruction to the jury, but the trial court did not rule on the motion, so she appealed, asking if the trial court abused its discretion by declining to read a spoliation of evidence instruction to the jury at trial.

Appellate Court’s Ruling

The opinion by J. Bowes noted that “[t]he duty to retain evidence is established where a party ‘knows that litigation is pending or likely’ and “it is foreseeable that discarding the evidence would be prejudicial” to the other party.”  The court also observed: “Although Mr. McCaffery testified that ShopRite’s rule of thumb was to retain only twenty minutes of tape prior to the fall and twenty minutes after the fall, it actually preserved thirty-seven minutes of footage prior to Ms. Marshall’s fall, and twenty minutes after the fall. He offered no explanation why ShopRite deviated from its typical practice herein.”  The court also observed that “conspicuously absent was testimony from anyone at ShopRite that he or she watched the video for the six-hour-period prior to the fall before determining that it did not contain any relevant evidence.”

Finding that “counsel’s letter placed ShopRite on notice to preserve the video surveillance prior to and after the fall as it was arguably relevant to impending litigation”, the court stated “we find that the trial court took an unreasonably narrow view of ‘relevant evidence’ in concluding that no spoliation occurred in this premises liability case. Relevant evidence is any evidence that ‘has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable.’…Furthermore, its finding of no bad faith on ShopRite’s part was relevant in determining the severity of the sanction to impose for spoliation, but it did not negate or excuse the spoliation that occurred.”

As a result, the court – in vacating the judgment and remanding the case for a new trial – ruled that “Ms. Marshall asked the court for the least severe spoliation sanction, an adverse inference instruction. On the facts herein, it was warranted, and the court abused its discretion in refusing the charge.”

So, what do you think?  Should the judgment have been thrown out over the defendant’s failure to preserve the rest of the video?  Please let us know if any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case opinion link courtesy of eDiscovery Assistant.

Sponsor: This blog is sponsored by CloudNine, which is a data and legal discovery technology company with proven expertise in simplifying and automating the discovery of data for audits, investigations, and litigation. Used by legal and business customers worldwide including more than 50 of the top 250 Am Law firms and many of the world’s leading corporations, CloudNine’s eDiscovery automation software and services help customers gain insight and intelligence on electronic data.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Production of ESI Related to 34 Searches: eDiscovery Case Law

In Lareau v. Nw. Med. Ctr., No. 2:17-cv-81 (D. Vt. Mar. 27, 2019), Vermont District Judge William K. Sessions III denied the plaintiff’s motion to compel production of ESI related to 34 search terms proposed by the plaintiff during meet and confer with the defendant, based on the extrapolation from a single search term that the plaintiff’s production request would require 170 hours of attorney and paralegal time and would produce little, if any, relevant information.

Case Background

In this case related to claims of wrongful termination stemming (at least in part) from the plaintiff’s disability, the plaintiff initially asked the defendant to produce ESI using 18 search terms. Using only seven of those 18 terms, the defendant produced over 3,000 pages of documents and objected to the scope of the request. The plaintiff moved to compel, and the Court issued an order requiring the parties to confer and agree upon appropriate search terms.

The plaintiff subsequently proposed 34 search terms, some of which were in the original list to which the defendant had objected. The defendant informed plaintiff’s counsel that using just the first four of the proposed 34 terms, it had spent over 20 hours retrieving 2,912 documents totaling 5,336 pages. The plaintiff’s counsel later acknowledged in an email that the initial production was voluminous and unwieldy, and suggested that the defendant use only the newly-proposed search terms.

The defendant made another effort to comply, performing a search using the suggested term “Experian.” The process of searching, coding, and producing reportedly took five hours and identified 472 documents. the defendant represented to the plaintiff’s counsel that few of those documents were relevant. Extrapolating that work to 34 search terms, the defendant contended that the plaintiff’s production request would require 170 hours of attorney and paralegal time and would produce little, if any, relevant information.  As a result, the defendant informed opposing counsel that given the burden of production and the limited relevance of the search results, it would not expend any additional time performing the requested searches. The plaintiff’s counsel invited the defendant to offer additional suggestions as to search terms, but the defendant declined that invitation, leading to the plaintiff’s motion.

Judge’s Ruling

Judge Sessions noted that, under the FRCP, “a party is required to provide ESI unless it shows that the source of such information is ‘not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.’”  With that in mind, Judge Sessions stated:

“Here, the Court ordered cooperation among counsel, and counsel’s efforts did not produce a workable solution. NMC has tried to comply and shown that, to date, the information sought using Lareau’s proposed search terms is not reasonably accessible. Indeed, NMC has expended considerable time and expense producing documents that reportedly have little relevance to this case.”

While noting that he “could nonetheless compel discovery for good cause shown”, Judge Sessions determined that “[h]ere, there has been no such showing.”  Judge Sessions stated: “Since the Court issued its prior Order, NMC has produced 3,384 additional documents containing little relevant information. Without any showing that additional searches are likely to result in a higher rate of success, the Court will not order NMC to engage in further problem-solving.”  As a result, he denied the plaintiff’s motion to compel.

So, what do you think?  Was the defendant’s analysis of expected effort a valid representative sample?  Please let us know if any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case opinion link courtesy of eDiscovery Assistant.

Sponsor: This blog is sponsored by CloudNine, which is a data and legal discovery technology company with proven expertise in simplifying and automating the discovery of data for audits, investigations, and litigation. Used by legal and business customers worldwide including more than 50 of the top 250 Am Law firms and many of the world’s leading corporations, CloudNine’s eDiscovery automation software and services help customers gain insight and intelligence on electronic data.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Denies Sanctions Request Because Defendant Didn’t Prove the Information was Irretrievable: eDiscovery Case Law

In Envy Hawaii LLC v. Volvo Car USA LLC, No. 17-00040 HG-RT (D. Haw. Mar. 20, 2019), Hawaii District Judge Helen Gillmor denied the defendant’s motion for spoliation sanctions, stating that the defendant “has not established that spoliation sanctions are available because the information it seeks is not “lost” within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e).”

Case Background

In this case involves contract disputes and claims of improper business practices between a local automobile dealership and the national distributor of Volvo automobiles, the parties had engaged in two years of litigation, produced discovery, and conducted depositions.  The defendant claimed that the plaintiff and its sole owner and manager failed to preserve certain electronically stored information (Google e-mail accounts and electronic dealer management system records) in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e).  The plaintiff and its owner claimed no spoliation had occurred because any relevant records are available from third-parties and sanctions were not appropriate.

Judge’s Ruling

Judge Gilmor noted that “[t]he text of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) provides that evidence is ‘lost’ and subject to spoliation sanctions when a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it, and ‘it cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery’” and that “[i]nformation is ‘lost’ for purposes of Rule 37(e) only if it is irretrievable from another source, including other custodians.”  She also stated that “[s]poliation sanctions are not available pursuant to the 2015 Amendment to Rule 37(e) when information is not lost.”

With regard to that, Judge Gilmor stated:

“Volvo Car USA LLC admits that it has not sought any of the discovery from either CDK Disk or Google Enterprise. Volvo Car USA LLC’s Motion is focused on Envy Hawaii LLC’s failure to preserve the information.”

Noting that “Volvo Car USA LLC may issue subpoenas to obtain records from Google and/or CDK Drive prior to May 15, 2019”, Judge Gilmor denied the defendant’s motion for spoliation sanctions.

So, what do you think?  Should parties be required to confirm with third parties that information is not available before filing motions for spoliation sanctions?  Please let us know if any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case opinion link courtesy of eDiscovery Assistant.

Sponsor: This blog is sponsored by CloudNine, which is a data and legal discovery technology company with proven expertise in simplifying and automating the discovery of data for audits, investigations, and litigation. Used by legal and business customers worldwide including more than 50 of the top 250 Am Law firms and many of the world’s leading corporations, CloudNine’s eDiscovery automation software and services help customers gain insight and intelligence on electronic data.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Rejects Carpenter Argument for Third Party Subpoena of Google Subscriber Info: eDiscovery Case Law

In U.S. v. Therrien, No. 2:18-cr-00085 (D. Vt. Mar. 13, 2019), Vermont District Judge Christina Reiss denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained via a subpoena of Google for subscriber information, rejecting the defendant’s argument that the United States Supreme Court decision in Carpenter v. US forecloses the government’s ability to obtain this type of data without a warrant.

Case Background

In this case related to a one count Indictment against the defendant that he knowingly transported child pornography, an order for eighty-five photograph prints was placed with an online company in February 2018.  An employee of the online company’s outsource print provider informed the Federal Bureau of Investigations that it was concerned that some of the photographs may contain child pornography. Law enforcement subsequently discovered an e-mail address that was associated with the order.

A grand jury subpoena was issued in March 2018 to obtain subscriber information from Google pertaining to the account associated with the email address. In response, Google produced subscriber information, services utilized by the account, the date the account was created, the date and time of the last login, and the IP addresses associated with the account from December 6, 2017 through March 15, 2018. Asserting that law enforcement violated the Fourth Amendment in obtaining records from Google without a warrant, the defendant sought suppression of all evidence obtained pursuant to the grand jury subpoena, citing Carpenter v. US.

Judge’s Ruling

While noting that, in Carpenter, the Supreme Court held that cell-site location information (“CSLI”) was not subject to the third-party doctrine, Judge Reiss also noted that SCOTUS reasoned that “the notion that an individual has a reduced expectation of privacy in information knowingly shared with another” and that “reasoned that because there was no way for individuals possessing cell phones to avoid generating CSLI and because cell phones are now effectively a necessity of daily life, it was unreasonable to conclude that an individual voluntarily exposed CSLI information to a third party.”

Judge Reiss also observed that “Since Carpenter, courts have held that IP address information and similar information still fell ‘comfortably within the scope of the third-party doctrine’ because ‘[t]hey had no bearing on any person’s day-to-day movement’ and ‘[the defendant] lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in that information.’”  Judge Reis cited several cases, including United States v. Rosenow, 2018 WL 6064949, at * 11 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2018), which said “The Court concludes that Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the subscriber information and the IP log-in information Defendant voluntarily provided to the online service providers in order to establish and maintain his account.”

As a result, Judge Reiss ruled as follows in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained:

“In this case, law enforcement obtained information that an account holder voluntarily turned over to Google. This information is squarely within the third-party doctrine and requires a different result than in Carpenter. As a result, Defendant did not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information obtained by law enforcement.”

So, what do you think?  Should people have a reasonable expectation of privacy for their email accounts in third party subpoenas?  Please let us know if any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case opinion link courtesy of eDiscovery Assistant.

Sponsor: This blog is sponsored by CloudNine, which is a data and legal discovery technology company with proven expertise in simplifying and automating the discovery of data for audits, investigations, and litigation. Used by legal and business customers worldwide including more than 50 of the top 250 Am Law firms and many of the world’s leading corporations, CloudNine’s eDiscovery automation software and services help customers gain insight and intelligence on electronic data.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Orders Defendant to Respond to Interrogatories to Identify Number of Phone Calls it Made: eDiscovery Case Law

In Franklin v. Ocwen Loan Serv., LLC, No. 18-cv-03333-SI (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2019), California District Judge Susan Illston ordered the defendant to respond to interrogatories, “with, at minimum, information regarding the total number of phone calls defendant made during the relevant period to California residents (including any account associated with a California address and any account containing a California area code)” and ordered the parties to stipulate to a method for extrapolating the total number of recorded phone calls defendant made to California residents during the relevant period.

Case Background

In this case brought by the plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, for illegal recording of cellular phone conversations pursuant to California Penal Code § 632.7, the plaintiff requested “information related to the number of California residents whose conversations with Defendant were recorded.”  The defendant objected that the request was “unduly burdensome and disproportionate to the needs of the case because responding to them would take thousand[s] or hundreds of thousands of hours of work”, requiring them “to examine each account with a California address or area code, determine if any calls were made on that account, attempt to locate those calls and any recordings of those calls, and then listen to the recordings to determine whether the person being called answered the call and was recorded rather than a message being left on voicemail or someone else answering the call.”  Instead, the defendant proposed that the parties stipulate that it called and recorded a minimum number of persons in California, such as “over 100 persons.”

Judge’s Ruling

Referencing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), Judge Illston stated “The Court agrees with plaintiff that information regarding the number of recorded calls defendant made is relevant to his motion for class certification, going not only to numerosity but also to the question of whether ‘a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.’…It is also relevant, among other things, to the question of damages, particularly in light of the Court’s ruling that ‘plaintiff may seek a class-wide award of statutory damages in an amount up to $5,000 per class member[.]’…It will not suffice for defendant to stipulate to an arbitrary number such as ‘over 100 persons.’”

Both parties cited the case Ronquillo-Griffin v. Transunion Rental Screening Sols., Inc., No. 17-cv-129-JM (BLM), 2018 WL 325051 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2018), where the district court denied the plaintiff’s motion to compel production of the actual recordings defendant made with the potential class members.  However, Judge Illston stated: “Here, plaintiff is not seeking the recordings themselves but requests the total ‘number of California residents whose conversations with Defendant were recorded.’…This is consistent with what the Ronquillo-Griffin court ordered.”

As a result, Judge Illston ordered the defendant to respond to the plaintiff’s interrogatories, “with, at minimum, information regarding the total number of phone calls defendant made during the relevant period to California residents (including any account associated with a California address and any account containing a California area code)” and ordered the parties to stipulate to a method for extrapolating the total number of recorded phone calls defendant made to California residents during the relevant period – all by March 26, 2019.  Hey, that’s today!

So, what do you think?  Was this the right decision or should the judge have accepted the defendant’s proportionality argument?  Please let us know if any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case opinion link courtesy of eDiscovery Assistant.

Sponsor: This blog is sponsored by CloudNine, which is a data and legal discovery technology company with proven expertise in simplifying and automating the discovery of data for audits, investigations, and litigation. Used by legal and business customers worldwide including more than 50 of the top 250 Am Law firms and many of the world’s leading corporations, CloudNine’s eDiscovery automation software and services help customers gain insight and intelligence on electronic data.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Judge’s Facebook Friendship with Party Causes Decision to Be Reversed and Remanded to Different Judge: eDiscovery Case Law

In the case In Re the Paternity of B.J.M., Appeal No. 2017AP2132 (Wis. App. Feb. 20, 2019), the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, concluding that “the circuit court’s undisclosed ESM connection with a current litigant in this case {by accepting a Facebook “friend” request from the litigant} created a great risk of actual bias, resulting in the appearance of partiality”, reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings before a different judge.

Case Background

In this case where the parties entered into an order granting parties Timothy Miller and Angela Carroll joint legal custody and shared physical placement of a minor child in 2011, Carroll filed a motion to modify the court order on the basis that Miller had engaged in a pattern of domestic abuse against Carroll. After the parties had submitted their written arguments, the judge deciding the motion – Judge Michael Bitney – accepted Carroll’s friend request on Facebook. Subsequently, Carroll “liked” eighteen of Judge Bitney’s Facebook posts and commented on two of his posts – none of which related to the pending litigation.  Judge Bitney did not “like” or comment on any of Carroll’s posts, nor did he reply to any of her comments on his posts; however, Carroll’s other activities (“liking” multiple posts from other parties and “sharing” one third-party photograph) did appear on Judge Bitney’s “newsfeed.” One of these shared stories related to domestic violence.

On July 14, 2017, Judge Bitney issued a decision granting Carroll’s modification motion. After the decision, Miller learned that Judge Bitney and Carroll were Facebook friends during the period prior to making his ruling, and moved to reconsider the judge’s decision.  At a hearing on Miller’s motion, Judge Bitney confirmed that he had accepted Carroll’s friend request after the custody hearing and before rendering his written decision. However, he concluded he was not subjectively biased by accepting Carroll’s “friend” request, because he already “had decided how I was going to rule, even though it hadn’t been reduced to writing.” Further, he concluded that “[e]ven given the timing of” his and Carroll’s Facebook connection, the circumstances did not “rise[] to the level of objective bias. . . .” Consequently, he denied Miller’s motion. Miller appealed the decision.

Court’s Ruling

In an opinion written by Justice J. Seidl, he noted that “This case involves what appears to be an issue of first impression in Wisconsin: a claim of judicial bias arising from a judge’s use of electronic social media (ESM)” and stated that “we need not determine whether a bright-line rule prohibiting the judicial use of ESM is appropriate or necessary”.  He also referenced a New Mexico supreme court in Thomas as “particularly instructive”, which said:

“While we make no bright-line ban prohibiting judicial use of social media, we caution that ‘friending,’ online postings, and other activity can easily be misconstrued and create an appearance of impropriety… A judge’s online ‘friendships,’ just like a judge’s real-life friendships, must be treated with a great deal of care.”

The opinion also stated that “the time when Judge Bitney and Carroll became Facebook ‘friends’ would cause a reasonable person to question the judge’s partiality. Although Judge Bitney apparently had thousands of Facebook ‘friends,’ Carroll was not simply one of the many people who ‘friended’ him prior to this litigation. Rather, Carroll was a current litigant who reached out to Judge Bitney and requested to become his Facebook ‘friend’ after testifying at a contested hearing, at which Judge Bitney was the sole decision-maker. Judge Bitney then took the affirmative step to accept this ‘friend’ request before issuing his decision in this case…This timing creates a great risk of actual bias and a resulting appearance of partiality because, even assuming that a Facebook ‘friendship’ does not denote the type of relationship traditionally associated with the term ‘friendship,’ it is unquestionably evidence of some type of affirmative social connection…Carroll’s choice to send a ‘friend’ request to Judge Bitney, combined with Judge Bitney’s choice to accept that request before issuing his decision, conveys the impression that Carroll was in a special position to influence Judge Bitney’s ultimate decision – a position not available to individuals that he had not ‘friended,’ such as Miller.”

As a result, the court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings before a different judge.

So, what do you think?  Should judges accepting friend requests from litigants disqualify them from ruling in their cases?  Please let us know if any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Hat tip to Sharon Nelson’s Ride the Lightning blog for coverage of this case.

Case opinion link courtesy of eDiscovery Assistant.

Sponsor: This blog is sponsored by CloudNine, which is a data and legal discovery technology company with proven expertise in simplifying and automating the discovery of data for audits, investigations, and litigation. Used by legal and business customers worldwide including more than 50 of the top 250 Am Law firms and many of the world’s leading corporations, CloudNine’s eDiscovery automation software and services help customers gain insight and intelligence on electronic data.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.