Evidence

eDiscovery Case Law: Twitter Seeks to Succeed Where Defendant Failed

 

Yesterday, we discussed a case where the court denied a criminal defendant’s attempt to quash a subpoena of his Twitter account information.  Now it’s Twitter’s turn to file a motion to quash the court’s order.  Filed this past Monday (May 7), the motion seeks to quash the order based on the grounds that the order imposes an undue burden on Twitter for three reasons including the reason that it forces them to “violate federal law”.

In People v. Harris, No. 2011NY080152 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.), the social network filed to quash a subpoena that ordered it to turn over “any and all user information” for Twitter-user Malcolm Harris between Sept. 15 and Dec. 31, 2011.

Twitter’s counsel argued that the order violates the Fourth Amendment, which guards citizens against unreasonable search and seizures, and would force the company to violate federal law.

Twitter also stated that the order does not comply with the Uniform Act, a stance the information network conveyed to Assistant District Attorney Lee Langston in March. “Pursuant to the Uniform Act, a criminal litigant cannot compel an appearance by, or production of documents from, a California resident without presenting the appropriate certification to the California court, scheduling a hearing and obtaining a California subpoena for production,” Twitter’s legal team said in the email response.

In its motion, the company even argued that, based on Twitter’s terms of service around content ownership (Twitter users own their content), Harris has legal standing to challenge the original subpoena; the court previously ruled that he did not.

“This is a big deal. Law enforcement agencies — both the federal government and state and city entities — are becoming increasingly aggressive in their attempts to obtain information about what people are doing on the Internet,” ACLU senior staff attorney Aden Fine said in a statement.

“[The Internet] is, in some ways, the ultimate embodiment of the First Amendment. But one potential problem for free speech on the Internet is that, for almost all of us, we need to rely on Internet companies. And while the government is bound by the First Amendment, the First Amendment may not always prevent private companies from restricting our free speech rights,” Fine said. “That is why it is so important that the public — and other companies — know when a company actually stands up for its users’ rights. Twitter did so here, and Twitter should be applauded for that.”

So, what do you think?  Does Twitter make some valid arguments and will they succeed where the defendant failed?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case Summary Source: VentureBeat.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Court Denies Criminal Defendant’s Attempt to Quash Twitter Subpoena

 

In People v. Harris, 2011NY080152 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Apr. 20, 2012), Criminal Court Judge Matthew A. Sciarrino, Jr. ruled that the defendant lacked standing to move to quash the prosecution’s subpoena served upon Twitter, a third-party in the case, for records of the defendant’s Twitter account. The defendant was a protester arrested during a march on the Brooklyn Bridge as part of the Occupy Wall Street movement, and in prosecuting the case, the prosecution sought his Twitter records for the time period relevant to the defendant’s involvement in the march.

In denying the defendant’s motion to quash, Judge Sciarrino analogized a subpoena issued to a third-party online social networking service like Twitter to one issued against a bank for a bank customer’s account information. The judge noted that in such bank cases a customer has “no proprietary or possessory interests” in his bank records, as they are the business records of the bank. Similarly, here, when the defendant signed up for Twitter, he agreed to certain terms, including a license that he granted to Twitter to “use, display and distribute” his Tweets. “Twitter’s license to use the defendant’s Tweets means that the Tweets the defendant posted were not his,” and therefore he had no proprietary interest in the Tweets.

Judge Sciarrino also acknowledged that although the defendant’s belief that he had a privacy interest in his own Tweets was “understandable,” it was “without merit.” The court pointed out that the “very nature and purpose” of Twitter is to help its users share information instantaneously with the world. Although a user may believe the Fourth Amendment should provide him online the same protection he would receive in his physical home, he is mistaken: Twitter users "may think that the same 'home' principle may be applied to their Twitter account. When in reality the user is sending information to the third party, Twitter. At the same time the user is also granting a license for Twitter to distribute that information to anyone, any way and for any reason it chooses."

Judge Sciarrino also denied the defendant’s motion to intervene in proceedings to quash the prosecution’s subpoena. It also found that the court is “compelled to evaluate the subpoena under federal laws governing internet communications,” that is, the Stored Communications Act; as such, the subpoena was proper because the defendant had a required hearing and notice, the information sought was relevant and material to the case, and the subpoena was not overly broad in its request.

So, what do you think?  Did the judge make the right call or should the defendant have been able to quash the subpoena?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case Summary Source: Applied Discovery (free subscription required).

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Court Grants Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Mirror-Imaging of Defendant’s Computers

 

In approving a motion for expedited discovery in United Factory Furniture Corp. v. Alterwitz, No. 2:12-cv-00059-KJD-VCF, (D. Nev. Apr. 6, 2012), Magistrate Judge Cam Ferenbach granted the plaintiff’s motion for a mirror-imaging order after determining the benefit outweighed the burden of the discovery, and it denied as unnecessary the plaintiff’s motion for an order to preserve evidence and a preliminary injunction from spoliation of evidence.

The plaintiff filed this motion after discovering that the defendants appeared to be tampering with the plaintiff’s computers. One of the defendants previously had been an employee of the company where he was responsible for the plaintiff company’s computer server and network services. The plaintiff alleged that he had created a “back door” to the company server that allowed him to access and alter confidential company information, such as business plans and financial, customer, and trade secret information. The other defendant, also the plaintiff’s former employee, appeared to have in her possession confidential information, as she stated she knew what the plaintiff company was writing in e-mails about her and she had—in a prior lawsuit—produced company e-mails that were neither to nor from her.

Judge Ferenbach considered the plaintiff’s motion for expedited discovery under the applicable rule that although pursuant to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d), generally a party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have held a Rule 26(f) conference, a court may permit expedited discovery upon a showing of good cause. Judge Ferenbach found good cause here “based on plaintiff’s allegations that defendants have access to plaintiff’s computer server, defendants have been deleting files and relevant evidence, and that evidence of their conduct, which is central to the litigation, will be erased through normal use of defendants’ computer . . . .”

In reviewing the plaintiff’s request that the court enter a mirror-imaging order, Judge Ferenbach pointed out that all information stored on a computer is discoverable, except where the request for production imposes an undue burden and expense and/or constitutes an invasion of privileged or private matter. Judge Ferenbach found no such undue burden or invasion would occur by applying and analyzing the facts against a five-pronged test:

(1) “The needs of the case” prong was met because information on the defendants’ computers was directly relevant and had to remain unaltered for the case to be litigated fairly.

(2) “The amount in controversy” prong was satisfied because the plaintiff had alleged it had suffered at least $75,000 in damages.

(3) “The importance of the issues at stake” prong was satisfied because the plaintiff had alleged the case involved the defendants’ accessing information involving business strategy, confidential customer information, and trade secrets, and the court acknowledged it had a responsibility to protect against the dissemination and misuse of such information.

(4) “The potential for finding relevant material” prong was met because the contents of the defendants’ computers were at the center of the case.

(5) “The importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues” prong was met because the documents and information at issue could not be produced another way.

Furthermore, the court noted, ordering mirror imaging would not result in undue expense to the defendants as the plaintiffs were paying the costs. The court additionally took measures to protect the defendants’ privacy and privilege interests by structuring the order so that a neutral computer expert would perform the mirror imaging, the expert would serve as an officer of the court, and the mirror image would be held in a sealed envelope in the clerk of court’s office until the conclusion of litigation, unless the plaintiff had reason to believe spoliation of evidence had occurred. At that time, the plaintiff could move the court for access to the mirror image.

Judge Ferenbach declined to enter a preservation order or issue a temporary injunction. He found a preservation order unnecessary because a duty existed to preserve evidence because “litigants owe an ‘uncompromising duty to preserve’ what they know or reasonably should know will be relevant evidence in a pending lawsuit,” and the complaint against the defendants and the information contained on the defendants’ computers was directly relevant to the suit against them. Judge Ferenbach found the preliminary injunction unnecessary because it ordered mirror imaging.

So, what do you think?  Were the mirror-images warranted?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case Summary Source: Applied Discovery (free subscription required).

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Social Tech eDiscovery: Twitter Law Enforcement Policies Revisited

 

Back in January, we revisited Facebook’s Law Enforcement policies and found that they had changed quite a bit from the from the post we published back in September 2010 regarding those policies.

Private Information within Twitter

As most information in Twitter is publicly shared with everyone, private information kept within Twitter is limited.  From their Privacy Policy page, examples of information that is not public includes:

  • Email address;
  • Password;
  • Cell phone or address book (to enable Twitter to help you find Twitter users you know)
  • Location information (to track your location where you’re “tweeting” from); and
  • Log data (IP address, browser type, the referring domain, pages visited, your mobile carrier, device and application IDs, and search terms).

You can also set “Tweet privacy” so that only certain people will receive your “tweets” or send private messages through the direct message syntax in Twitter.  Sometimes, information meant to be private messages to one individual can be inadvertently published to all if you’re not careful – as former congressman Anthony Weiner found out (remember him?).  You can also now add photos to tweets directly in Twitter, which would be private if the tweets are private themselves (this does not apply to photos referenced in tweets stored on third party image providers like Flickr, Twitpic or yFrog).

Requesting Private Information from Twitter

If you’re considering requesting provide information from Twitter for litigation purposes, here is what you need to know (from the Guidelines for Law Enforcement page on the Twitter site):

  • Data Retention Information: Twitter doesn’t get very specific on its retention policies other than to say that it “retains different types of information for different time periods” and that “some information may only be stored for a very brief period of time”.  The Privacy Policy page does note that log data may be retained for up to 18 months.
  • Private Information Requires a Subpoena or Court Order: Non-public information about Twitter users is not released except “as lawfully required by appropriate legal process such as a subpoena, court order, or other valid legal process”.  Twitter notes that they don’t “require email verification or identity authentication”, so the information may not be valid for fake or anonymous profiles.
  • Emergency Requests for Information: Twitter evaluates these on a case-by-case basis, but will usually provide the information if there is “a good faith belief that there is an emergency involving the death or serious physical injury to a person”, assuming they have it.  Emergency requests can be emailed to  lawenforcement@twitter.com.  Twitter notes that only email from law enforcement domains will be accepted and all others will be disregarded.
  • Requests from Non-U.S. Law Enforcement: Twitter will honor requests for user information from foreign law enforcement agencies if they are requested through a U.S. court.
  • Notifying Users of Information Requests: Twitter will notify users of requests for their information prior to disclosure unless they’re prohibited from doing so by statute or court order.
  • Information to Be Included in Requests: Requests must include the username and URL of the Twitter profile in question, details about the specific information being requested and its relationship to the investigation and a valid email address for them to acknowledge receipt of the legal request.
  • Methods for Requesting Information: Twitter only accepts legal process from law enforcement agencies delivered by mail or fax.  That’s a very 1970s restriction for an organization whose business it is to provide 21st century technology to its customers.

Now you know how to request private user information, provided you’re a law enforcement organization or have a subpoena or court order to serve them with.

So, what do you think?  Have you needed to request information from Twitter for litigation purposes?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Trends: Rules Changes for Spoliation Could Come as Soon as 2013

 

With cases related to preservation and spoliation issues continuing to be prevalent, as well as continued greater emphasis on proportionality in eDiscovery, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has requested comments on possible changes to the federal rules relating to preservation and spoliation of evidence.  Much of the framework for the proposed rules was derived from Judge Shira Scheindlin's opinions on eDiscovery, particularly those in the Zubulake case.  These changes could be finalized as soon as December 2013.

As there are currently no rules governing preservation, courts have set their own guidelines – not always consistently from court to court. The hope is that establishment of rules regulating preservation and spoliation will clarify expectations and standardize practices.  Invited by the advisory committee to provide suggestions, the special committee has proposed new Rule 26(h), which specifies that the duty to preserve ESI arises when a subpoena is received by a non-party, or when a person becomes aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to expect to become a party to an action. That duty remains in effect for all existing and subsequently created documents or ESI until the termination of the involvement of the party or non-party, or until a person becomes aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she will not become a party to an action.

A person whose duty to preserve has been triggered must take steps to preserve discoverable documents and ESI, and must consider several factors, including:

  • Importance of the information;
  • Amount in controversy; and
  • Burden and expense to preserve in a form as close to (if not identical to) their original condition as possible.

In addition, new Rule 37(g) has been proposed which identifies a variety of penalties to be imposed, depending on the level of culpability of the spoliating party and the remedial requirements necessary to the case, taking into account the importance of the information lost to the party seeking its discovery.

While the advisory committee decided not to pursue any rule change dealing with preservation back in November, they have continued to pursue those dealing with penalties for spoliation.  However, during the discussion process for preservation rules, standard expectations for preservation of evidence included the issuance of a written litigation hold to key players in an organization most likely to possess documents or ESI that will be important in a case, with the hold to be periodically reviewed and renewed.  Eventual rules for preservation would be expected to include such provisions.

As for spoliation, the advisory committee considered the proposed new rule regarding penalties for spoliation at its meeting on March 22.

The advisory committee has also drafted proposed amendments to Rule 45 concerning serving of subpoenas. Proposed changes include abolishing the requirement that a discovery subpoena be issued in the same court where compliance of the subpoena is expected. Instead, nationwide service of process will be implemented, so, for example a discovery subpoena for a case pending in the Eastern District of Texas would be valid in the Southern District of New York. The subpoenaed party can choose the subpoena to be enforced in the district where compliance is to be made or in the trial court.  Out-of-state parties (or an officer of those parties) can be compelled to travel more than 100 miles to testify at trial if good cause is shown for them to do so. Changes are also proposed requiring that all parties receive notice on the service of a subpoena to a non-party.

The advisory committee decided on revisions to Rule 45 back on March 22. By May 1, the advisory committee will submit its recommendations regarding spoliation and Rule 45 to the federal Standing Committee. The federal Standing Committee is expected to approve the recommendations in June and submit them to the federal Judicial Conference. Assuming the Judicial Conference approves the proposal at its September 2012 meeting, they will transmit it to the US Supreme Court, which will have until May 1 of next year to transmit the proposal to Congress. If Congress does not act, the proposal would become rule on December 1, 2013.

So, what do you think?  Will these rules changes benefit the eDiscovery process?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Daily Is Eighteen! (Months Old, That Is)

 

Eighteen months ago yesterday, eDiscovery Daily was launched.  A lot has happened in the industry in eighteen months.  We thought we might be crazy to commit to a daily blog each business day.  We may be crazy indeed, but we still haven’t missed a business day yet.

The eDiscovery industry has grown quite a bit over the past eighteen months and is expected to continue to do so.   So, there has not been a shortage of topics to address; instead, the challenge has been selecting which topics to address.

Thanks for noticing us!  We’ve more than doubled our readership since the first six month period, had two of our biggest “hit count” days in the last month and have more than quintupled our subscriber base since those first six months!  We appreciate the interest you’ve shown in the topics and will do our best to continue to provide interesting and useful eDiscovery news and analysis.  And, as always, please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic!

We also want to thank the blogs and publications that have linked to our posts and raised our public awareness, including Pinhawk, The Electronic Discovery Reading Room, Unfiltered Orange, Atkinson-Baker (depo.com), Litigation Support Technology & News, Next Generation eDiscovery Law & Tech Blog, InfoGovernance Engagement Area, Justia Blawg Search, Learn About E-Discovery, Ride the Lightning, Litigation Support Blog.com, ABA Journal, Law.com and any other publication that has picked up at least one of our posts for reference (sorry if I missed any!).  We really appreciate it!

As we’ve done in the past, we like to take a look back every six months at some of the important stories and topics during that time.  So, here are some posts over the last six months you may have missed.  Enjoy!

eDiscovery Trends: Is Email Still the Most Common Form of Requested ESI?

eDiscovery Trends: Sedona Conference Provides Guidance for Judges

eDiscovery Trends: Economy Woes Not Slowing eDiscovery Industry Growth

eDiscovery Law: Model Order Proposes to Limit eDiscovery in Patent Cases

eDiscovery Case Law: Court Rules 'Circumstantial Evidence' Must Support Authorship of Text Messages for Admissibility

eDiscovery Best Practices: Cluster Documents for More Effective Review

eDiscovery Best Practices: Could This Be the Most Expensive eDiscovery Mistake Ever?

eDiscovery 101: Simply Deleting a File Doesn’t Mean It’s Gone

eDiscovery Case Law: Facebook Spoliation Significantly Mitigates Plaintiff’s Win

eDiscovery Best Practices: Production is the “Ringo” of the eDiscovery Phases

eDiscovery Case Law: Court Grants Adverse Inference Sanctions Against BOTH Sides

eDiscovery Trends: ARMA International and EDRM Jointly Release Information Governance White Paper

eDiscovery Trends: The Sedona Conference International Principles

eDiscovery Trends: Sampling within eDiscovery Software

eDiscovery Trends: Small Cases Need Love Too!

eDiscovery Case Law: Court Rules Exact Search Terms Are Limited

eDiscovery Trends: DOJ Criminal Attorneys Now Have Their Own eDiscovery Protocols

eDiscovery Best Practices: Perspective on the Amount of Data Contained in 1 Gigabyte

eDiscovery Case Law: Computer Assisted Review Approved by Judge Peck in New York Case

eDiscovery Case Law: Not So Fast on Computer Assisted Review

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery History: A Look Back at Zubulake

 

Yesterday, we discussed a couple of cases within a month’s time where the New York Appellate Division has embraced the federal standards of Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 FRD 212.  Those of us who have been involved in litigation support and discovery management for years are fully aware of the significance of the Zubulake case and its huge impact on discovery of electronic data.  Even if you haven’t been in the industry for several years, you’ve probably heard of the case and understand that it’s a significant case.  But, do you understand just how many groundbreaking opinions resulted from that case?  For those who aren’t aware, let’s take a look back.

The plaintiff, Laura Zubulake, filed suit against her former employer UBS Warburg, alleging gender discrimination, failure to promote, and retaliation. Southern District of New York Judge Shira Sheindlin's rulings in this case are the most often cited in the area of electronic discovery, and were issued prior to the 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That’s somewhat like establishing laws before the Ten Commandments!  The important opinions related to eDiscovery are commonly known as Zubulake I, Zubulake III, Zubulake IV and Zubulake V.  Here is a summary of each of those opinions:

Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 217 F.R.D. 309 (Zubulake I) and Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake III)

The plaintiff argued that key evidence was located in various emails exchanged among employees of UBS, the defendant. Initially, the defendant produced about 350 pages of documents, including approximately 100 pages of email, but the plaintiff produced approximately 450 pages of email correspondence on her own. To address the discrepancy, the plaintiff requested for UBS to locate the documents that existed in backup tapes and other archiving media.

The defendant, arguing undue burden and expense, requested the court to shift the cost of production to the plaintiff, citing Rowe Entertainment v. The William Morris Agency, 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). In May 2003, the court ruled stating that whether the production of documents is unduly burdensome or expensive "turns primarily on whether it is kept in an accessible or inaccessible format". The court determined that the issue of accessibility depends on the media on which data are stored. It described five categories of electronic media, as follows:

  1. Online data, including hard disks;
  2. Near-line data, including optical disks;
  3. Offline storage, such as magnetic tapes;
  4. Backup tapes;
  5. Fragmented, erased and damaged data.

The last two categories were considered inaccessible as they were not readily available and thus subject to cost-shifting. Discussing the Rowe decision, the court concluded that it needed modification and created a new seven factor balance test for cost-shifting:

  1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant information;
  2. The availability of such information from other sources;
  3. The total cost of production, compared to the amount in controversy;
  4. The total cost of production, compared to the resources available to each party;
  5. The relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do so;
  6. The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and
  7. The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.

The defendant was ordered to produce, at its own expense, all responsive email existing on its servers, optical disks, and five backup tapes as selected by the plaintiff. The court would only conduct a cost-shifting analysis after the review of the contents of the backup tapes.

In July 2003, Zubulake III applied the cost-shifting test outlined in Zubulake I based on the sample recovery of data from five backup tapes.  After the results of the sample restoration, both parties wanted the other to fully pay for the remaining backup email. The sample cost the defendant about $19,003 for restoration but the estimated costs for production was $273,649, including attorney and paralegal review costs. After applying the seven factor test, it determined that the defendant should account for 75 percent of the restoration and searching costs, excluding attorney review costs.

Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake IV)

During the restoration effort, the parties discovered that some backup tapes were no longer available. The parties also concluded that relevant emails created after the initial proceedings had been deleted from UBS's email system and were only accessible on backup tapes. The plaintiff then sought an order requiring UBS to pay for the total costs of restoring the remaining backup tapes and also sought an adverse inference instruction against UBS and the costs for re-deposing some individuals required because of the destruction of evidence.

In October 2003, Judge Scheindlin found that the defendant had a duty to preserve evidence since it should have known that it would be relevant for future litigation. However, at the time, she concluded that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the lost evidence supported the adverse inference instruction claim. But, she did order the defendant to cover the costs as claimed by the plaintiff.

Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 2004 WL 1620866 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2004) (Zubulake V)

In July 2004, Judge Scheindlin ruled that UBS had failed to take all necessary steps to guarantee that relevant data was both preserved and produced, and granted the plaintiff's motion for adverse inference instruction sanctions, sought in Zubulake IV, due to the deleted evidence (emails and tapes) and inability to recover key documents during the course of the case.

The court also indicated that defense counsel was partly to blame for the document destruction because it had failed in its duty to locate and preserve relevant information. In addressing the role of counsel in litigation, the court stated that "[c]ounsel must take affirmative steps to monitor compliance so that all sources of discoverable information are identified and searched" by ensuring all relevant documents are discovered, retained, and produced and that litigators must guarantee that relevant documents are preserved by instituting a litigation hold on key data, and safeguarding archival media.

In the final instructions to the jury Judge Scheindlin instructed in part, "[i]f you find that UBS could have produced this evidence, the evidence was within its control, and the evidence would have been material in deciding facts in dispute in this case, you are permitted, but not required, to infer that the evidence would have been unfavorable to UBS." In addition, monetary sanctions were awarded to the plaintiff for reimbursement of costs of additional re-depositions and of the motion leading to this opinion, including attorney fees. The jury found in the plaintiff’s favor on both claims awarding compensatory and punitive awards totaling $29.2 million.

Judge Scheindlin’s opinions in Zubulake, including definitions of accessible and inaccessible data, the seven factor balance test for cost shifting and definition of counsel’s obligation for preserving data, have been referenced in numerous cases since and have provided guidance to organizations preparing for litigation.  For any of you who may not have fully understood the significance of the case, I hope this look back was helpful.

So, what do you think?  Did you learn something new about Zubulake?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Plaintiff Not Compelled To Turn Over Facebook Login Information

 

In Davids v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. CV06-0431, (E.D.N.Y. February 24, 2012), the Eastern District of New York ruled against the defendant on whether the plaintiff in her claim against a pharmaceutical company could be compelled to turn over her Facebook account’s login username and password.

Plaintiff claimed ongoing suffering from osteonecrosis of the jaw (a severe bone disease that affects the maxilla and the mandible) against the defendant. Defendant served Plaintiff with its Second Set of Requests for Production of Documents, which requested Plaintiff’s log-in information to all of her social-networking websites and a release allowing Defendant to obtain documents directly from those websites so that Defendant could inspect all documents that relate to her claim.  In responding to the request, the Plaintiff only produced materials that were available to all Facebook users — not items hidden through Facebook’s privacy settings — claiming that the request was overbroad and a fishing expedition. As a result, the Defendant filed a motion to compel the Plaintiff to turn over her login information, including login for Facebook.

Why did the Defendant request the additional access?  As noted in the transcript:

“Defendant argues that Plaintiff's log-in information is discoverable because statements or pictures on her Facebook page relate directly to her claim of ongoing suffering from osteonecrosis of the jaw. Defendant's claim is predicated on Ms. Davids' profile picture, in which Defendant claims she is smiling. Defendant did not inquire about Ms. Davids' social networking activity at her deposition.”

In the process of determining whether the Defendant could compel such discovery, Magistrate Judge William Wall first noted that “[n]o cases in the Second Circuit or the Eastern District of New York have directly addressed this issue”.  The Defendant based its argument on two cases where access to social media information was granted: Largent v. Reed, 2011 WL 5632688, (Pa. C.P. Franklin Co. Nov. 8, 2011) and Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).  In both cases, “publically available content on the individual plaintiffs’ public Facebook profiles provided sufficient relevant information for the courts to infer that further discovery was necessary”; however, as the court noted in this case, “no such evidence exists”.  Therefore, the court ruled as follows:

“Defendant's argument that Plaintiff smiling in her profile picture on Facebook satisfies its burden in this motion to compel is without merit. Even if Plaintiff is smiling in her profile picture, which is not clear to the court, one picture of Plaintiff smiling does not contradict her claim of suffering, nor is it sufficient evidence to warrant a further search into Plaintiff's account.”

As a result, the court denied the defendant’s motion to compel.

So, what do you think?  Was the lack of publically available content sufficient justification for not granting the motion to compel?  Or should this case have been handled in the same manner as Largent and Romano?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: eDiscovery Violations Leave Delta Holding the Bag

 

In the case In re Delta/AirTran Baggage Fee Antitrust Litig., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13462, 41-43 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 3, 2012), U.S. District Judge Timothy Batten ordered Delta to pay plaintiff attorney’s fees and costs for eDiscovery issues in consolidated antitrust cases claiming Delta and AirTran Holdings, Inc. conspired to charge customers $15 to check their first bag. Noting that there was a “huge hole” in Delta’s eDiscovery process, Judge Batten reopened discovery based on defendants’ untimely production of records and indications that there was overwriting of backup tapes, inconsistencies in deposition testimony and documents, and neglect in searching and producing documents from hard drives.

Plaintiffs asserted that Delta did not conduct a reasonable inquiry to confirm its implicit representations that (1) all of the relevant hard drives had been processed, and (2) there were no missing back-up tapes. Arguing that Delta should have ensured that all sources of discoverable information were identified and searched and searched in the evidence locker, Plaintiffs contended that Delta falsely certified that its discovery responses were correct and complete. As a result, Plaintiffs contended that the case had been “unnecessarily delayed and its costs unnecessarily increased, and the fact that Delta is now producing these documents is immaterial”.

The Court agreed, noting:

“The Court finds that Delta did not conduct a reasonable inquiry. With respect to the collected but unsearched hard drives, Delta has not substantially justified its failure to ensure the drives were run through Clearwell and searched back in 2009. While its counsel did email {Delta’s IT Group} CSIRT a list of custodians whose hard drives should have been loaded onto Clearwell, CSIRT did not respond with confirmation that each listed person’s drive was on the system; CSIRT only stated that files were identified by “user employee id, not by name.” Delta has not shown that it ever confirmed with CSIRT that each hard drive that was supposed to be run through Clearwell actually had been. This oversight is a huge hole in Delta’s electronic discovery process, and Delta has not adequately explained why it did not ensure in 2009 that every collected hard drive was actually processed through Clearwell and searched.”

Judge Batten determined that Delta had violated FRCP 26(g) early disclosure requirements and failed to supplement discovery, justifying sanctions under FRCP 37(c)(1). Ruling that Delta needed to pay plaintiffs’ fees and costs in bringing the discovery motions and for extended discovery activities, Judge Batten strongly suggested that both sides meet and confer to attempt to agree to those fees and costs.  However, Judge Batten found that Delta would not be sanctioned with the exclusion of the late production, because Delta: 1) Informed the Court and Plaintiffs after they discovered the issue; 2) Requested the Court suspend the case schedule; and 3) There was no evidence the Defendants willfully withheld the discovery.

So, what do you think?  Were the sanctions justified?  Or should more sanctions have been applied?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: At The Eleventh Hour, Encrypted Hard Drive Is Decrypted

 

In our previous post regarding the case U.S. v. Fricosu, Colorado district judge Robert Blackburn ruled that a woman must produce an unencrypted version of her Toshiba laptop's hard drive to prosecutors in a mortgage fraud case for police inspection.  The woman, Ramona Fricosu, had argued that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination protected her from having to disclose the password to her hard drive, which was encrypted using PGP Desktop and seized when investigators served a search warrant on her home.

In providing his ruling, Judge Blackburn referenced In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Boucher in which a password protected laptop was seized. After an initial magistrate judge ruling finding that the defendant could not be compelled to reveal the contents of his mind (via the password), the grand jury requested (which a Vermont District judge granted) to require the defendant to produce, not the password itself, but rather an unencrypted version of the drive.

While Judge Blackburn ruled that Fricosu was required to provide the government in this case with an unencrypted copy of the Toshiba laptop computer’s hard drive, he also ruled that the government would be “precluded from using Ms. Fricosu’s act of production of the unencrypted contents of the computer’s hard drive against her in any prosecution”.

Still, the defendant appealed.  On February 21st, the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals refused to get involved, saying Ramona Fricosu's case must first be resolved in District Court before her attorney can appeal.  She would have been required to turn over the unencrypted contents of the drive as of March 1.

However, at the last minute, Colorado federal authorities decrypted the laptop.  “They must have used or found successful one of the passwords the co-defendant (Scott Whatcott) provided them,” Fricosu’s attorney, Philip Dubois, said in a telephone interview.  Dubois said the authorities delivered to him a copy of the information they discovered on the drive, but he said he had not examined it.

So, what do you think?  Will disclosure of the password preclude a later appeal?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.