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Case Law

eDiscovery Case Law: Plaintiff Not Compelled To Turn Over Facebook Login Information
 

In Davids v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. CV06-0431, (E.D.N.Y. February 24, 2012), the Eastern District of New York ruled against the defendant on whether the plaintiff in her claim against a pharmaceutical company could be compelled to turn over her Facebook account’s login username and password.

Plaintiff claimed ongoing suffering from osteonecrosis of the jaw (a severe bone disease that affects the maxilla and the mandible) against the defendant. Defendant served Plaintiff with its Second Set of Requests for Production of Documents, which requested Plaintiff’s log-in information to all of her social-networking websites and a release allowing Defendant to obtain documents directly from those websites so that Defendant could inspect all documents that relate to her claim.  In responding to the request, the Plaintiff only produced materials that were available to all Facebook users — not items hidden through Facebook’s privacy settings — claiming that the request was overbroad and a fishing expedition. As a result, the Defendant filed a motion to compel the Plaintiff to turn over her login information, including login for Facebook.

Why did the Defendant request the additional access?  As noted in the transcript:

“Defendant argues that Plaintiff's log-in information is discoverable because statements or pictures on her Facebook page relate directly to her claim of ongoing suffering from osteonecrosis of the jaw. Defendant's claim is predicated on Ms. Davids' profile picture, in which Defendant claims she is smiling. Defendant did not inquire about Ms. Davids' social networking activity at her deposition.”

In the process of determining whether the Defendant could compel such discovery, Magistrate Judge William Wall first noted that “[n]o cases in the Second Circuit or the Eastern District of New York have directly addressed this issue”.  The Defendant based its argument on two cases where access to social media information was granted: Largent v. Reed, 2011 WL 5632688, (Pa. C.P. Franklin Co. Nov. 8, 2011) and Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).  In both cases, “publically available content on the individual plaintiffs’ public Facebook profiles provided sufficient relevant information for the courts to infer that further discovery was necessary”; however, as the court noted in this case, “no such evidence exists”.  Therefore, the court ruled as follows:

“Defendant's argument that Plaintiff smiling in her profile picture on Facebook satisfies its burden in this motion to compel is without merit. Even if Plaintiff is smiling in her profile picture, which is not clear to the court, one picture of Plaintiff smiling does not contradict her claim of suffering, nor is it sufficient evidence to warrant a further search into Plaintiff's account.”

As a result, the court denied the defendant’s motion to compel.

So, what do you think?  Was the lack of publically available content sufficient justification for not granting the motion to compel?  Or should this case have been handled in the same manner as Largent and Romano?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: eDiscovery Violations Leave Delta Holding the Bag
 

In the case In re Delta/AirTran Baggage Fee Antitrust Litig., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13462, 41-43 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 3, 2012), U.S. District Judge Timothy Batten ordered Delta to pay plaintiff attorney’s fees and costs for eDiscovery issues in consolidated antitrust cases claiming Delta and AirTran Holdings, Inc. conspired to charge customers $15 to check their first bag. Noting that there was a “huge hole” in Delta’s eDiscovery process, Judge Batten reopened discovery based on defendants’ untimely production of records and indications that there was overwriting of backup tapes, inconsistencies in deposition testimony and documents, and neglect in searching and producing documents from hard drives.

Plaintiffs asserted that Delta did not conduct a reasonable inquiry to confirm its implicit representations that (1) all of the relevant hard drives had been processed, and (2) there were no missing back-up tapes. Arguing that Delta should have ensured that all sources of discoverable information were identified and searched and searched in the evidence locker, Plaintiffs contended that Delta falsely certified that its discovery responses were correct and complete. As a result, Plaintiffs contended that the case had been “unnecessarily delayed and its costs unnecessarily increased, and the fact that Delta is now producing these documents is immaterial”.

The Court agreed, noting:

“The Court finds that Delta did not conduct a reasonable inquiry. With respect to the collected but unsearched hard drives, Delta has not substantially justified its failure to ensure the drives were run through Clearwell and searched back in 2009. While its counsel did email {Delta’s IT Group} CSIRT a list of custodians whose hard drives should have been loaded onto Clearwell, CSIRT did not respond with confirmation that each listed person’s drive was on the system; CSIRT only stated that files were identified by “user employee id, not by name.” Delta has not shown that it ever confirmed with CSIRT that each hard drive that was supposed to be run through Clearwell actually had been. This oversight is a huge hole in Delta’s electronic discovery process, and Delta has not adequately explained why it did not ensure in 2009 that every collected hard drive was actually processed through Clearwell and searched.”

Judge Batten determined that Delta had violated FRCP 26(g) early disclosure requirements and failed to supplement discovery, justifying sanctions under FRCP 37(c)(1). Ruling that Delta needed to pay plaintiffs’ fees and costs in bringing the discovery motions and for extended discovery activities, Judge Batten strongly suggested that both sides meet and confer to attempt to agree to those fees and costs.  However, Judge Batten found that Delta would not be sanctioned with the exclusion of the late production, because Delta: 1) Informed the Court and Plaintiffs after they discovered the issue; 2) Requested the Court suspend the case schedule; and 3) There was no evidence the Defendants willfully withheld the discovery.

So, what do you think?  Were the sanctions justified?  Or should more sanctions have been applied?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: At The Eleventh Hour, Encrypted Hard Drive Is Decrypted
 

In our previous post regarding the case U.S. v. Fricosu, Colorado district judge Robert Blackburn ruled that a woman must produce an unencrypted version of her Toshiba laptop's hard drive to prosecutors in a mortgage fraud case for police inspection.  The woman, Ramona Fricosu, had argued that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination protected her from having to disclose the password to her hard drive, which was encrypted using PGP Desktop and seized when investigators served a search warrant on her home.

In providing his ruling, Judge Blackburn referenced In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Boucher in which a password protected laptop was seized. After an initial magistrate judge ruling finding that the defendant could not be compelled to reveal the contents of his mind (via the password), the grand jury requested (which a Vermont District judge granted) to require the defendant to produce, not the password itself, but rather an unencrypted version of the drive.

While Judge Blackburn ruled that Fricosu was required to provide the government in this case with an unencrypted copy of the Toshiba laptop computer’s hard drive, he also ruled that the government would be “precluded from using Ms. Fricosu’s act of production of the unencrypted contents of the computer’s hard drive against her in any prosecution”.

Still, the defendant appealed.  On February 21st, the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals refused to get involved, saying Ramona Fricosu's case must first be resolved in District Court before her attorney can appeal.  She would have been required to turn over the unencrypted contents of the drive as of March 1.

However, at the last minute, Colorado federal authorities decrypted the laptop.  “They must have used or found successful one of the passwords the co-defendant (Scott Whatcott) provided them,” Fricosu’s attorney, Philip Dubois, said in a telephone interview.  Dubois said the authorities delivered to him a copy of the information they discovered on the drive, but he said he had not examined it.

So, what do you think?  Will disclosure of the password preclude a later appeal?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Computer Assisted Review Approved by Judge Peck in New York Case
 

In Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe & MSL Group, No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC) (AJP) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012), Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion on last Friday (February 24), approving of the use of computer-assisted review of electronically stored information (“ESI”) for this case, making it likely the first case to recognize that “computer-assisted review is an acceptable way to search for relevant ESI in appropriate cases.”  As noted in our previous blog post about the case, the parties had been instructed to submit draft protocols by February 16th.

After providing a background of the Title VII gender discrimination case, Judge Peck went on to reference his article (Search, Forward: Will manual document review and keyword searches be replaced by computer-assisted coding?) to explain computer-assisted review.  He then detailed the parties’ negotiation of an agreed protocol for the computer-assisted review for this case.  The Court accepted the defendants’ proposal, which included seven iterative “seeding” reviews, but included the following caveat:

“But if you get to the seventh round and [plaintiffs] are saying that the computer is still doing weird things, it’s not stabilized, etc., we need to do another round or two, either you will agree to that or you will both come in with the appropriate QC information and everything else and [may be ordered to] do another round or two or five or 500 or whatever it takes to stabilize the system.”

The opinion also included a section entitled “Further Analysis and Lessons for the Future” in which several, more general topics surrounding computer-assisted review were addressed.  Judge Peck recognized that “computer-assisted review is not a magic, Staples-Easy-Button, solution appropriate for all cases” and noted that “[t]he goal is for the review method to result in higher recall and higher precision than another review method, at a cost proportionate to the ‘value’ of the case” (referenced in the article Technology-Assisted Review in E-Discovery Can Be More Effective and More Efficient Than Exhaustive Manual Review, written by Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack).

In his conclusion, Judge Peck noted:

“This Opinion appears to be the first in which a Court has approved of the use of computer-assisted review.  That does not mean computer-assisted review must be used in all cases, or that the exact ESI protocol approved here will be appropriate in all future cases that utilize computer-assisted review.  Nor does this Opinion endorse any vendor … nor any particular computer-assisted review tool.  What the Bar should take away from this Opinion is that computer-assisted review is an available tool and should be seriously considered for use in large-data-volume cases where it may save the producing party (or both parties) significant amounts of legal fees in document review.  Counsel no longer have to worry about being the “first” or “guinea pig” for judicial acceptance of computer-assisted review.  As with keywords or any other technological solution to e-discovery, counsel must design an appropriate process, including use of available technology, with appropriate quality control testing, to review and produce relevant ESI while adhering to Rule 1 and Rule 26(b)(2)(C) proportionality.  Computer-assisted review now can be considered judicially-approved for use in appropriate cases.”

For those in the industry yearning for case law that addresses the approved use of technology assisted review methodologies, Judge Peck’s in-depth discussion of the topic and conclusion appears to address that need.  It will be interesting to see how this case continues and whether additional discussion of the methodology will be discussed in case filings!

So, what do you think?  Is it high time for courts to recognize and approve computer-assisted review or is the court system still not ready for technology based approaches?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Predictive Coding Considered by Judge in New York Case

In Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe, No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2012), Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York instructed the parties to submit proposals to adopt a protocol for e-discovery that includes the use of predictive coding, perhaps the first known case where a technology assisted review approach was considered by the court.

In this case, the plaintiff, Monique Da Silva Moore, filed a Title VII gender discrimination action against advertising conglomerate Publicis Groupe, on her behalf and the behalf of other women alleged to have suffered discriminatory job reassignments, demotions and terminations.  Discovery proceeded to address whether Publicis Groupe:

  • Compensated female employees less than comparably situated males through salary, bonuses, or perks;
  • Precluded or delayed selection and promotion of females into higher level jobs held by male employees; and
  • Disproportionately terminated or reassigned female employees when the company was reorganized in 2008.

Consultants provided guidance to the plaintiffs and the court to develop a protocol to use iterative sample sets of 2,399 documents from a collection of 3 million documents to yield a 95 percent confidence level and a 2 percent margin of error (see our previous posts here, here and here on how to determine an appropriate sample size, randomly select files and conduct an iterative approach). In all, the parties expect to review between 15,000 to 20,000 files to create the “seed set” to be used to predictively code the remainder of the collection.

The parties were instructed to submit their draft protocols by February 16th, which is today(!).  The February 8th hearing was attended by counsel and their respective ESI experts.  It will be interesting to see what results from the draft protocols submitted and the opinion from Judge Peck that results.

So, what do you think?  Should courts order the use of technology such as predictive coding in litigation?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Court Rules Exact Search Terms Are Limited
 

In Custom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting v. Dowell, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146, 7-8 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 3, 2012), the plaintiff and defendant could not agree on search terms to be used for discovery on defendant’s forensically imaged computers.  The court directed each party to submit a proposed list of search terms and indicated that each party would be permitted to file objections to the opposing party's proposed list.  After reviewing the proposals, and the defendant’s objections to the plaintiff’s proposed list, the court ruled that the defendant’s proposed list was “problematic and inappropriate” and that their objections to the plaintiff’s proposed terms were “without merit” and ruled for use of the plaintiff’s search terms in discovery.

Plaintiff alleged the defendants formed a competing company by “illegally accessing, copying, and using Plaintiff's computer software and data programming source code systems” and sued defendants for copyright infringement, trade secret misappropriation, breach of contract and other claims.  The court ordered discovery of ESI on defendants' computers through use of a forensic process to recover and then search the ESI.  In July 2011, the plaintiffs provided a request for production to defendants that requested “any and all documents which contain, describe, and/or relate in any manner to any of the words, phrases and acronyms, or derivatives thereof, contained in the list [provided], irrespective of whether exact capitalization, alternative spelling, or any other grammatical standard was used.”  The defendants submitted their own proposed list, which “excludes irrelevant information by requiring precise matches between search terms and ESI”.

Referencing Victor Stanley (previous blog posts regarding that case here, here, here and here), Missouri District Court Judge Richard Webber noted in his ruling that “While keyword searches have long been recognized as appropriate and helpful for ESI search and retrieval, there are well-known limitations and risks associated with them.”  Quoting from The Sedona Conference Best Practices Commentary on the Use of Search & Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, the court noted that keyword searches “capture many documents irrelevant to the user's query…but at the same time exclude common or inadvertently misspelled instances” of the search terms.

The defendant issued three objections to the plaintiff’s terms, which the court addressed as follows:

  • Plaintiffs’ Terms would Include an Unreasonable Number of Irrelevant Results: Assuming that the argument was based on a contention by the defendants that the discovery would be overly burdensome, the court noted that the “burden or expense of conducting such a search must be low, and Defendants have presented the Court with no evidence that suggests otherwise.”
  • Plaintiffs' Terms would Produce Privileged Results: The Court noted that a producing party can create a privilege log to exclude documents that would otherwise fit the search term results.
  • Some of Plaintiffs' terms will Encompass Only Irrelevant Information: Noting that the defendants' “objection is a conclusory statement, stated without any argumentation or other support”, the Court found that a search of these terms may produce "matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense”.

The Court also found that the defendants' proposed list would be “problematic and inappropriate” and “would fail to produce discoverable ESI simply because of an inexact match in capitalization or phrasing between a search term and the ESI” and rejected that list, ordering use of the plaintiff’s list for searching.

So, what do you think?  Was that the right call, or was the plaintiff’s request overbroad?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: KPMG Loses Another Round to Pippins
 

As discussed previously in eDiscovery Daily, KPMG sought a protective order in Pippins v. KPMG LLP, No. 11 Civ. 0377 (CM)(JLC), 2011 WL 4701849 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2011) to require the preservation of only a random sample of 100 hard drives from among those it had already preserved for this and other litigation or shift the cost of any preservation beyond that requested scope.  Lawyers for Pippins won a ruling last November by Magistrate Judge James Cott to use all available drives and Judge Cott encouraged the parties to continue to meet and confer to reach agreement on sampling.  However, the parties were unable to agree and KPMG appealed to the District Court.

Last Friday, District Court Judge Colleen McMahon upheld the lower court ruling, noting:

"It smacks of chutzpah (no definition required) to argue that the Magistrate failed to balance the costs and benefits of preservation when KPMG refused to cooperate with that analysis by providing the very item that would, if examined, demonstrate whether there was any benefit at all to preservation.”

“KPMG could have established [that producing all the drives was unnecessary] by producing several hard drives to Plaintiffs and Magistrate Judge Cott. … But KPMG has established nothing of the sort,” McMahon added.

“Even assuming that KPMG’s preservation costs are both accurate and wholly attributable to this litigation — which I cannot verify — I cannot possibly balance the costs and benefits of preservations when I’m missing one side of the scale (the benefits).”

“I gather that KPMG takes the position that the only Audit Associates who are presently ‘parties’ are the named plaintiffs, and so only the named plaintiffs’ hard drives really need to be preserved. But that is nonsense,” she continued. “Under Zubulake IV, the duty to preserve all relevant information for ‘key players’ is triggered when a party ‘reasonably anticipates litigation.’ … At the present moment, KPMG should ‘reasonably anticipate’ that every Audit Associate who will be receiving opt-in notice is a potential plaintiff in this action,” McMahon concluded.

Outten & Golden partner Justin Swartz, representing Pippins, commented after the ruling: "All we're asking for is the chance to look at a few hard drives, find out what's on them, and negotiate a resolution."  Steven Catlett, representing Sidley Austin for KPMG, did not provide a comment.

So, what do you think?  Was this a ruling against proportionality in eDiscovery or is KPMG’s refusal to provide any hard drives defeating their proportionality argument?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Burn Your Computer and the Court Will Burn You
 

In Evans v. Mobile Cnty. Health Dept., No. CA 10-0600-WS-C, (S.D. Ala. Jan. 24, 2012), Alabama Magistrate Judge William Cassady granted a motion for sanctions, including an adverse inference instruction, where the plaintiff had burned and destroyed her computer that she used during the time she claimed she was harassed.

Evans sued the Mobile County Health Department alleging reverse discrimination. The court entered a scheduling order that instructed Evans to preserve all relevant information. In discovery, the health department asked Evans for all documents, including electronically stored information (ESI), related to her claims.

Initially, Evans did not produce any documents in response to the defendant's request, but at her deposition, she produced a small number of documents and admitted that she had others, including e-mails. After her deposition, the defendant renewed its request for Evans to produce all ESI in her possession and asked to inspect her personal computer. When the plaintiff did not comply, the defendant filed a motion to compel.

After the motion was filed, Evans' counsel told the defendant that Evans had destroyed her computer. Evans explained that her computer crashed about eight months after her complaint was filed. When she sought help from computer experts, who told her to buy another computer, she burned her computer to destroy the personal information it contained due to the "threat of identity theft." She then bought a new computer. The defendant filed a motion for sanctions and sought dismissal of the case.

Judge Cassady granted the defendant's motion to compel, finding that the plaintiff's claims that she had produced all relevant ESI difficult to believe in light of her deposition testimony and her other discovery violations. Accordingly, Judge Cassady required Evans to produce e-mails from her gmail account and a notebook she referenced in her deposition that contained relevant evidence. The plaintiff also had to produce her new computer for inspection and pay for the defendant's fees and costs in bringing the motion.

Judge Cassady also granted defendant's request for sanctions. In determining the appropriate punishment, he looked first to Eleventh Circuit law, but the court had not set forth specific guidelines for the imposition of sanctions. Therefore, Judge Cassady applied Alabama state law, since it was consistent with general federal spoliation standards. Alabama law requires courts to consider five factors in analyzing a request for sanctions: "(1) the importance of the evidence destroyed; (2) the culpability of the offending party; (3) fundamental fairness; (4) alternative sources of the information obtainable from the evidence destroyed; and (5) the possible effectiveness of other sanctions less severe than dismissal."

Judge Cassady found that Evans had destroyed the evidence in bad faith: her culpability was "excessively high." However, the judge stopped short of dismissing the case. Since the defendant could still defend itself against Evans' allegations, the magistrate judge decided that the court would give the jury an adverse inference instruction at trial. It also awarded defendant its attorneys' fees and costs for the motion.

So, what do you think?  Should the case have been dismissed or were the sanctions sufficient?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case Summary Source: Applied Discovery (free subscription required).

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Practicing Law and Discovery Services Companies Don’t Mix
 

At least, not in DC.

Vendors seeking to assist attorneys in offloading substantial portions of discovery-practice need to be careful not to cross the line into the unauthorized practice of law, according to a new ethics opinion by the District of Columbia Bar. On January 12, 2012, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law released Opinion 21-12 regarding the “Applicability of Rule 49 to Discovery Services Companies.” This opinion provides guidelines for attorneys and discovery vendors regarding supervision of large-scale document reviews and vendors’ marketing practices, which are intended to prevent the unauthorized practice of law (UPL). Under these guidelines, the role of discovery-service providers in the e-discovery process must be limited to administrative, technical, and logistical tasks. This opinion and these guidelines additionally make clear that the onus of supervising a discovery project rests squarely on the shoulders of the D.C. Bar member who holds the attorney-client relationship with the client.

Rule 49 of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals provides:

No person shall engage in the practice of law in the District of Columbia or in any manner hold out as authorized or competent to practice law in the District of Columbia unless enrolled as an active member of the District of Columbia Bar, except as otherwise permitted by these Rules.

The ‘practice of law’ includes “[f]urnishing an attorney or attorneys, or other persons” to provide legal services. Rule 49(b)(2)(F).

Opinion 21-12 provides the following “principles” to provide guidance regarding “the permissible scope of services that may be performed [by document services companies]” without running afoul of the UPL rules. Opinion, at 7.

First, Rule 49’s UPL rules apply only to the provision of legal services in the District of Columbia. To the extent a discovery provider advertises itself as being able to assist with any discovery project occurring in the district, even if the vendor is not physically located in the district, then Rule 49’s prohibitions apply because such company would be viewed as “holding itself out” as being able to provide legal services in the district. Opinion, at 7–8.

Second, in line with the committee’s prior 1999 Opinion 6-99, contract-attorney companies cannot make the final selection of contract attorneys to staff on a project, nor can the companies provide legal supervision over the contract attorneys. Both of those tasks must be handled by a member of the D.C. Bar with an attorney-client relationship with the client. The company’s role should be limited to the administrative aspects of the review (i.e., finding and interviewing reviewers, handling payroll and taxes, making sure the reviewers show up to work, etc.). A company is allowed to provide and supervise a person doing non-legal work if that person is not identified to the client as a lawyer. Opinion, at 8.

Third, a discovery-service company cannot use broad-based statements in its marketing materials (i.e., that the company is an “end-to-end” vendor or can provide “soup-to-nuts” solutions) without including a UPL disclaimer. This disclaimer must appear on the same page, in the same font, and in proximity to the potentially misleading statement. Statements regarding the legal expertise of the company’s staff also must contain similar disclaimers. Opinion, at 8–9.

Although the committee previously examined Rule 49 and its applicability to legal-services providers in 1999 and 2005, the committee saw fit to re-examine its prior decisions because companies providing discovery services “have dramatically expanded the scope” of their offerings. Opinion, at 4. The committee noted that these companies “offer a host of related services, from e-discovery consulting to database management to the eventual production of documents in litigation,” and that the companies also may “offer the physical space where the document review will take place, computers for conducting the review, and servers for hosting the document review.” Id.

The committee was concerned with the companies’ use of broad language in their marketing materials, including “one-stop shopping” and “comprehensive review and project management,” and about the marketing of companies’ management staff as having legal expertise that would be used in the discovery process. Opinion, at 4–5. Although the committee noted that some services provided by the companies may not “cross the line into legal practice,” such as administrative tasks, allowing discovery companies to make broad-based statements could mislead the public by implying that the companies are providing a legal judgment. Opinion, at 6.

Opinion 21-12 provides clarity to discovery-services vendors by outlining more clearly their role in the discovery process, which is limited to administrative, technical, and logistical functions. The opinion also will assist attorneys overseeing such projects by reminding them of their supervisory role over document reviews.

So, what do you think?  Is this a good idea?  Should it be adopted in other jurisdictions?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Source: American Bar Association

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Fifth Amendment Doesn’t Extend to Encrypted Hard Drives – Or Does It?
 

In the case U.S. v. Fricosu, Colorado district judge Robert Blackburn has ruled that a woman must produce an unencrypted version of her Toshiba laptop's hard drive to prosecutors in a mortgage fraud case for police inspection.  The woman, Ramona Fricosu, had argued that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination protected her from having to disclose the password to her hard drive, which was encrypted using PGP Desktop and seized when investigators served a search warrant on her home.

The day the search warrant was carried, Fricosu spoke with her imprisoned ex-husband Scott (indicted with Fricosu in the case) by phone. The conversation was recorded, and Fricosu implied that relevant information could be found on the encrypted laptop:

Scott: (SC [simultaneous conversation]) oh yeah that’s right it was on your laptop wasn’t it

Ramona: I think so but I’m not sure

Scott: OK

Ramona: yeah cause they kept asking me for passwords and I said, ya know no I just didn’t answer them

Scott: right (SC). Because when you went there you took your laptop

Ramona: yeah I think so I think I did

Scott: and so (SC) it would been on there

Ramona: yeah

Scott: OK

Ramona: and my lawyer said I’m not obligated by law to give them any passwords or anything they need to figure things out for themselves

Based on this conversation, the government sought a warrant under the “All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, requiring Ms. Fricosu to produce the unencrypted contents of the computer.”  Fricosu declined, “asserting her privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment”.

In providing his ruling, Judge Blackburn referenced In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Boucher in which child pornography was identified on the defendant's laptop during a border search in Vermont. When the laptop was later seized, it was determined to be password protected. A magistrate judge initially sided with the defendant finding that he could not be compelled to reveal the contents of his mind, which is what the act of producing the password would be.  Revising the grand jury’s request to require the defendant to produce, not the password itself, but rather an unencrypted version of the drive, a Vermont District judge granted that request.

With that case as precedent, Judge Blackburn ruled that Fricosu was required to provide the government in this case with an unencrypted copy of the Toshiba laptop computer’s hard drive.  However, Judge Blackburn also ruled that the government would be “precluded from using Ms. Fricosu’s act of production of the unencrypted contents of the computer’s hard drive against her in any prosecution”.

Fricosu’s attorney has indicated he plans to appeal the ruling and noted that his client may not even be able to decrypt the hard drive, stating “If that's the case, then we'll report that fact to the court, and the law is fairly clear that people cannot be punished for failure to do things they are unable to do”.

So, what do you think?  Should production of the hard drive have been compelled?  Does the preclusion from using evidence from the hard drive against her in prosecution address any Fifth Amendment concerns?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.