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Electronic Discovery

eDiscovery Case Law: Judge Peck Stays Defendant’s Production in Da Silva Moore
Yesterday, we discussed the latest event in the eDiscovery case of the year – the defendant’s response opposing the plaintiff’s motion for recusal.  I thought today we would discuss the plaintiffs’ latest objection – to United States District Court Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck’s rejection of their request to stay discovery pending the resolution of outstanding motions and objections.  However, news in this case happens quickly.

In a short, one-page order on Monday, Judge Peck issued a stay, stopping defendant MSLGroup’s production of electronically stored information in Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe & MSL Group, (Case No. 11-CV-1279).

Here is the content of the order:

“On reconsideration, for the reasons stated at today’s conference (see transcript), the Court has granted plaintiffs’ request to stay MSL’s production of ESI, pending Judge Carter’s decision on plaintiffs’ motions for collective action certification and to amend their complaint.  Defendants have consented to the stay. Jurisdictional discovery regarding Publicis, and discovery between plaintiff and MSL unrelated to MSL’s ESI production, are not stayed.

Plaintiffs’ May 9, 2012 objections to my prior denial of the stay (Dkt. No. 190) are moot.”

That’s it – short and sweet (to the plaintiffs, at least).

This came after the plaintiffs filed an objection last Wednesday (May 9) to Judge Peck’s rejection of their request to stay discovery pending the resolution of outstanding motions and objections. Those motions include a ruling on the plaintiffs’ objections to Judge Peck’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ issues associated with discovery with predictive coding, the plaintiffs’ motion for Peck to recuse himself from the case and motions for conditional certification of collective action and for leave to file a second amended complaint.

For a brief recap and links to prior events in this highly contentious case, yesterday’s blog post provides background since Judge Peck’s order approving computer-assisted review.

More to come, I’m sure.

So, what do you think?  Will computer-assisted review be derailed in this case after all?  Was Judge Peck right to stay production?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Defendant Responds to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Recusal in Da Silva Moore
Geez, you take a week or so to cover some different topics and a few things happen in the most talked about eDiscovery case of the year.  Time to catch up!  Today, we’ll talk about the response of the defendant MSLGroup Americas to the plaintiffs’ motion for recusal in the Da Silva Moore case.  Tomorrow, we will discuss the plaintiffs’ latest objection – to Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck’s rejection of their request to stay discovery pending the resolution of outstanding motions and objections.  But, first, a quick recap.

Several weeks ago, in Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe & MSL Group, No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC) (AJP) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012), Judge Peck of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion making it likely the first case to accept the use of computer-assisted review of electronically stored information (“ESI”) for this case.  However, on March 13, District Court Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. granted plaintiffs’ request to submit additional briefing on their February 22 objections to the ruling.  In that briefing (filed on March 26), the plaintiffs claimed that the protocol approved for predictive coding “risks failing to capture a staggering 65% of the relevant documents in this case” and questioned Judge Peck’s relationship with defense counsel and with the selected vendor for the case, Recommind.

Then, on April 5, Judge Peck issued an order in response to Plaintiffs’ letter requesting his recusal, directing plaintiffs to indicate whether they would file a formal motion for recusal or ask the Court to consider the letter as the motion.  On April 13, (Friday the 13th, that is), the plaintiffs did just that, by formally requesting the recusal of Judge Peck.  But, on April 25, Judge Carter issued an opinion and order in the case, upholding Judge Peck’s opinion approving computer-assisted review.

As for the motion for recusal, that’s still pending.  On Monday, April 30, the defendant filed a response (not surprisingly) opposing the motion for recusal.  In its Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Recusal or Disqualification, the defendants noted the following:

  • Plaintiffs Agreed to the Use of Predictive Coding: Among the arguments here, the defendants noted that, after prior discussions regarding predictive coding, on January 3, the “[p]laintiffs submitted to the Court their proposed version of the ESI Protocol, which relied on the use of predictive coding. Similarly, during the January 4, 2012 conference itself, Plaintiffs, through their e-discovery vendor, DOAR, confirmed not only that Plaintiffs had agreed to the use of predictive coding, but also that Plaintiffs agreed with some of the details of the search methodology, including the “confidence levels” proposed by MSL.”
  • It Was Well Known that Judge Peck Was a Leader In eDiscovery Before The Case Was Assigned to Him: The defendants referenced, among other things, that Judge Peck’s October 2011 article, Search, Forward discussed “computer-assisted coding,” and that Judge Peck stated in the article: “Until there is a judicial decision approving (or even critiquing) the use of predictive coding, counsel will just have to rely on this article as a sign of judicial approval.”
  • Ralph Losey Had No Ex Parte Contact with Judge Peck: The defendants noted that their expert, Ralph Losey, “has never discussed this case with Judge Peck” and that his “mere appearance” at seminars and conferences “does not warrant disqualification of all judges who also appear.”

As a result, the defendants argued that the court should deny plaintiffs motion for recusal because:

  • Judge Peck’s “Well-Known Expertise in and Ongoing Discourse on the Topic of Predictive Coding Are Not Grounds for His Disqualification”;
  • His “Professional Relationship with Ralph Losey Does Not Mandate Disqualification”;
  • His “Comments, Both In and Out of the Courtroom, Do Not Warrant Recusal”; and
  • His “Citation to Articles in his February 24, 2012 Opinion Was Proper”.

For details on these arguments, click the link to the Memorandum above.  Judge Carter has yet to rule on the motion for recusal.

So, what do you think?  Did the defendants make an effective argument or should Judge Peck be recused?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Twitter Seeks to Succeed Where Defendant Failed
Yesterday, we discussed a case where the court denied a criminal defendant’s attempt to quash a subpoena of his Twitter account information.  Now it’s Twitter’s turn to file a motion to quash the court’s order.  Filed this past Monday (May 7), the motion seeks to quash the order based on the grounds that the order imposes an undue burden on Twitter for three reasons including the reason that it forces them to “violate federal law”.

In People v. Harris, No. 2011NY080152 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.), the social network filed to quash a subpoena that ordered it to turn over “any and all user information” for Twitter-user Malcolm Harris between Sept. 15 and Dec. 31, 2011.

Twitter’s counsel argued that the order violates the Fourth Amendment, which guards citizens against unreasonable search and seizures, and would force the company to violate federal law.

Twitter also stated that the order does not comply with the Uniform Act, a stance the information network conveyed to Assistant District Attorney Lee Langston in March. “Pursuant to the Uniform Act, a criminal litigant cannot compel an appearance by, or production of documents from, a California resident without presenting the appropriate certification to the California court, scheduling a hearing and obtaining a California subpoena for production,” Twitter’s legal team said in the email response.

In its motion, the company even argued that, based on Twitter’s terms of service around content ownership (Twitter users own their content), Harris has legal standing to challenge the original subpoena; the court previously ruled that he did not.

“This is a big deal. Law enforcement agencies — both the federal government and state and city entities — are becoming increasingly aggressive in their attempts to obtain information about what people are doing on the Internet,” ACLU senior staff attorney Aden Fine said in a statement.

“[The Internet] is, in some ways, the ultimate embodiment of the First Amendment. But one potential problem for free speech on the Internet is that, for almost all of us, we need to rely on Internet companies. And while the government is bound by the First Amendment, the First Amendment may not always prevent private companies from restricting our free speech rights,” Fine said. “That is why it is so important that the public — and other companies — know when a company actually stands up for its users’ rights. Twitter did so here, and Twitter should be applauded for that.”

So, what do you think?  Does Twitter make some valid arguments and will they succeed where the defendant failed?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case Summary Source: VentureBeat.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Trends: For an Appropriate eDiscovery Outcome, Call the Master
Special Master, that is.

Last week, Fios sponsored a webcast entitled Special Masters & e-Discovery with Craig Ball, who, in addition to being a prolific contributor to continuing legal and professional education programs throughout the US (and previous thought leader interviewee on this blog) has served as court-appointed special master in 30 cases (including at least one case covered here).  Not surprisingly, the webcast was very informative, reflecting Craig’s considerable experience and knowledge in having served in that role in so many cases.  A few highlights:

  • Appointing a Special Master: In Federal cases, Fed. R. Civ. P. 53 discusses the ability for a court to appoint a master with the parties’ consent.  Several states also have equivalent rules, for example, Rule 171 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure governs the ability to do so in Texas.
  • Circumstances Where Special Master is Most Often Required: Special masters are typically called in when special knowledge is required that neither party (nor their experts) possesses, or when one party is suspected of malfeasance.  Craig estimated that about half of the thirty cases where he has been retained have been because of suspected malfeasance by one party.  From an expertise standpoint, Craig noted that he most often fills this role related to a computer forensics need.
  • To Be “Special”, You Need to “Master” More than One Skill: Special masters need not only to be able to understand the law, they also need to understand systems, forms of ESI, mechanisms for preservation and formats of production.  In other words, they need the ability to “speak Geek”.
  • Special Masters Are Different From Mediators: A mediator’s job is to obtain agreement between parties.  While a special master may also do that to a degree, he/she must also apply good sense to the situation.  Craig’s analogy was that “just because both lawyers believe that they can fly” doesn’t mean that the special master should concur with that agreement.
  • Why Not Rely on the Judge for Such Services?:  Craig noted that many judges don’t have the technical expertise to adequately address all eDiscovery issues, so a special master can be called upon to provide recommendations regarding those issues to the Court.
  • Special Masters Are, Unsurprisingly, Not Free: Typically, they charge “senior partner” rates, reflecting their advanced level of expertise and experience.  Who pays?  It depends on the case, but potential malfeasance by a party can slant the costs to that party.  Special masters add value that can result in potentially significant cost savings to one or both parties, so they typically recoup those costs (and, often, a lot more).

The webcast also referenced two articles related to the subject of special masters and eDiscovery:

  • E‐Discovery: A Special Master’s Perspective: Written by Craig himself, this nine page article talks about the pros and cons of Special Masters, the eight questions that lawyers need to be able to answer when working with special masters and the three typical reasons that eDiscovery fails, among other topics.  It also provides a terrific appendix with a two page Exemplar ESI Special Master Appointment Order.
  • Special Masters and e-Discovery: The Intersection of Two Recent Revisions to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: This fifty-nine page article was written by The Honorable Shira A. Scheindlin (United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York and presiding judge of the notable Zubulake v. UBS Warburg case) & Jonathan M. Redgrave (founding partner of the firm of Redgrave, Daley, Ragan & Wagner and Chair Emeritus of The Sedona Conference’s® Working Group on Best Practices for Electronic Document Retention and Production).  It discusses the changes to Rule 53, governing the appointment of special masters and the changes to the Federal Rules for eDiscovery, suggesting appropriate uses for special masters for legal and technical issues.

If you missed the webcast (which is too bad, because Craig was entertaining and informative, as always), these articles provide good information on the use of special masters in eDiscovery.

So, what do you think?  Have you ever used a special master to address eDiscovery issues?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Is the Third Time the Charm for Technology Assisted Review?
A few weeks ago, in Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe & MSL Group, Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck issued an opinion making it the first case to accept the use of computer-assisted review of electronically stored information (“ESI”) for this case.  Or, so we thought.  Now, the plaintiff has objected to the plan and even formally requested the recusal of Judge Peck.  Conversely, in Kleen Products LLC v. Packaging Corporation of America, et al., the plaintiffs have asked Magistrate Judge Nan Nolan to require the producing parties to employ a technology assisted review approach (referred to as “content-based advanced analytics,” or CBAA) in their production of documents for discovery purposes, and that request is currently being considered.  Now, there’s a third case where the use of technology assisted review is actually being approved in an order by the judge.

In Global Aerospace Inc., et al, v. Landow Aviation, L.P. dba Dulles Jet Center, et al, Virginia State Circuit Court Judge James H. Chamblin ordered that the defendants can use predictive coding for discovery in this case, despite the plaintiff’s objections that the technology is not as effective as human review.  The order was issued after the defendants issued a motion requesting either that predictive coding technology be allowed in the case or that the plaintiffs pay any additional costs associated with traditional review.  The defendant has an 8 terabyte data set that they are hoping to reduce to a few hundred gigabytes through advanced culling techniques.

In ruling, Judge Chamblin noted: “Having heard argument with regard to the Motion of Landow Aviation Limited Partnership, Landow Aviation I, Inc., and Landow Company Builders, Inc., pursuant to Virginia Rules of Supreme Court 4:1(b) and (c) and 4:15, it is hereby ordered Defendants shall be allowed to proceed with the use of predictive coding for purposes of processing and production of electronically stored information.”

Judge Chamblin’s order specified 60 days for processing, and another 60 days for production and noted that the receiving party will still be able to question “the completeness of the contents of the production or the ongoing use of predictive coding.”  (Editor’s note: I would have included the entire quote, but it’s handwritten and Judge Chamblin has handwriting almost as bad as mine!)

As in the other cases, it will be interesting to see what happens next.  Will the plaintiff attempt to appeal or even attempt a Da Silva-like push for recusal of the Judge?  Or will they accept the decision and gear their efforts toward scrutinizing the resulting production?  Stay tuned.

So, what do you think?  Will this be the landmark case that becomes the first court-approved use of technology assisted review?  Or will the parties continue to “fight it out”?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Best Practices: First Name Searches Are Not Always Proper

I’ve worked with numerous clients over the years and provided assistance regarding searching best practices to maximize recall without sacrificing search precision, including the use of fuzzy and synonym searches to identify additional potentially responsive files and sampling to test the effectiveness of searches.  In several cases, the initial list of proposed search terms sent to me by the client includes first names of several individuals to search for as standalone terms.  Unfortunately, first names don’t always make the best search terms.

Why?  Because, in many cases, the first names are so common that they can apply to several people, not just the desired individuals to be retrieved.  Depending on the size of the collection, searching for names like “Bob”, “Bill”, “Cathy”, “Jim”, “Karen” or “Pat” could retrieve many additional files to be reviewed for numerous individuals other than those specifically sought, potentially driving up review costs unnecessarily.

Another issue with first name searches is the potential variations in first names that must be included to ensure that retrieval is complete.  Take this name, for example:

“Billy Bob Byrd”

To adequately perform a first name search, your search might need to include the following: “Billy”, “Bill”, “William”, “WR” (for “William Robert”), “Bob”, “Bobby”, “Robert” and maybe even “BB” (or “BBB”).  Searching for all these terms could yield many additional hits that are probably not responsive, costing time and money to review.  While emails and other informal communications may just refer to him as “Billy Bob”, more formalized communications such as financial documents would probably refer to his name differently.  So, it’s important to include all potential variations, several of which could add considerably more false hits.

You also have the potential that the name might also have another meaning.  For example, “Bill” can be a person’s name, but “bill” is another word for invoice (keep in mind that most search engines are case insensitive, so it doesn’t matter if it’s capitalized or not).  So, searching for “bill” as a person would also yield every instance where an invoice is referred to as a “bill”.

With that in mind, it’s important to get the complete names of the people you’re searching for, as well as any known nicknames, so that you can then make decisions on the best terms to use to retrieve the most hits for each person.  Consider these names:

  • Terry Bradshaw: “Terry” is a fairly common name, so I might opt to search for “Bradshaw” first and see what I get.  Or, to limit further, retrieve only documents where both “Terry” and “Bradshaw” are both mentioned.
  • Jay Leno: Same here, “Jay” is common, “Leno” is more unique.
  • Jennifer Lopez: “Jennifer” is more common than “Lopez”, though both are fairly common.  I would search for “Lopez” first, but assuming that the client provided the nickname “JLo”, I would search for that alternative also (if not, that would hopefully fall out during review as an additional term to search for).
  • Shaquille O’Neal: This is one case where the first name is actually more unusual than the last name, so I might prefer to search for “Shaquille” and would also search for the nickname of “Shaq”.

Of course, there may be occasions where only the first name is mentioned in a document without the last name.  If you can, try to combine with some other criteria to refine the broad search for the first name, such as email address of the individual in question or email addresses of those most likely to be talking about that individual.

What about the instances where both the first and last names are common?  What about my name, “Doug Austin”?  “Doug” isn’t an extremely common first name, but it’s somewhat common, and “Austin” is the name of a city.  Searching for either term by itself could be overbroad.  So, it makes sense to try to combine them.  To do so in a phrase search, however, could be limiting as searching for “Doug Austin” could miss occurrences of “Austin, Doug”.  Conducting the search as a proximity search (e.g., “Doug within 3 words of Austin”) will catch variations, regardless of order.

This is just one example why keyword searching isn’t an exact science.  These aren’t necessarily hard and fast rules and each situation is different.  It’s important to randomly sample and test search terms to ensure an appropriate balance of recall and precision.  Of course, parties sometimes agree that it may be necessary to include first names as standalone terms, even when they are common and may retrieve a high number of additional files that are not responsive, though testing those terms before negotiating with opposing counsel can help you to be prepared to negotiate a more favorable set of terms.

So, what do you think?  Do your search term lists include standalone first names?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Da Silva Moore Plaintiffs Question Predictive Coding Proposal, Judge Peck’s Activities
A few weeks ago, in Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe & MSL Group, No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC) (AJP) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012), Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion making it likely the first case to accept the use of computer-assisted review of electronically stored information (“ESI”) for this case.  However, on March 13, District Court Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. granted plaintiffs’ request to submit additional briefing on their February 22 objections to the ruling.  In that briefing (filed last Monday, March 26), the plaintiffs claimed that the protocol approved for predictive coding “risks failing to capture a staggering 65% of the relevant documents in this case” and questioned Judge Peck’s relationship with defense counsel and with the selected vendor for the case, Recommind.

While the plaintiffs noted that “the use of predictive coding may be appropriate under certain circumstances”, they made several contentions in their brief, including the following:

  • That the protocol approved for predictive coding “was adopted virtually wholesale from Defendant MSLGroup”;
  • That “Judge Peck authored an article and made no fewer than six public appearances espousing the use of predictive coding” during “the ten months between the filing of the Amended Complaint and the February 24 written opinion”;
  • That Judge Peck appeared on several of these panels (three alone with Ralph Losey, Jackson Lewis’ ediscovery counsel in this case (and a previous thought leader on this blog) who the plaintiff refers to as “another outspoken predictive coding advocate whom Judge Peck ‘know[s] very well’”;
  • That “defense counsel Losey and Judge Peck cited each other’s positions on predictive coding with approval in their respective articles, which came out just four months before Judge Peck issued his ESI opinion”;
  • That, to promote its predictive coding technology, “Recommind is a frequent sponsor of the e-discovery panels on which Judge Peck and Defense counsel Losey sit” and “Judge Peck’s February 24 e-discovery ruling is expected to be a boon not only to the predictive coding industry, but also to Recommind’s bottom line”;
  • That, with regard to the defendants’ proposed protocol, “Judge Peck failed to hold an evidentiary hearing or obtain expert testimony as to its reliability and accuracy”; and
  • That, “in the same preliminary study MSL relies on to tout the quality of the technology to be used in its predictive coding protocol, the technology’s “recall,” was very low, on average 35%”, so the defendants’ proposed protocol “risks failing to capture up to 65% of the documents material to Plaintiffs’ case”.

In a declaration supplementing the plaintiffs’ filing, Paul J. Neale, chief executive officer at DOAR Litigation Consulting and the plaintiffs’ eDiscovery consultant, contended that Judge Peck approved a predictive coding process that “does not include a scientifically supported method for validating the results”. He also contended in the declaration that Peck relied on “misstatements” by two Recommind employees (Eric Seggebruch and Jan Puzicha) that misrepresent the effectiveness and accuracy of the Recommind predictive coding process and also noted that Recommind did not perform as well at the 2011 Text Retrieval Conference (TREC) as its marketing materials and experts assert.

Now, the ball is back in Judge Carter’s court.  Will he hold an evidentiary hearing on the eDiscovery issues raised by the plaintiff?  Will he direct Judge Peck to do so?  It will be interesting to see what happens next?

So, what do you think?  Do the plaintiff’s objections have merit?  Will Judge Carter give the defendants a chance to respond?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery History: A Look Back at Zubulake
Yesterday, we discussed a couple of cases within a month’s time where the New York Appellate Division has embraced the federal standards of Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 FRD 212.  Those of us who have been involved in litigation support and discovery management for years are fully aware of the significance of the Zubulake case and its huge impact on discovery of electronic data.  Even if you haven’t been in the industry for several years, you’ve probably heard of the case and understand that it’s a significant case.  But, do you understand just how many groundbreaking opinions resulted from that case?  For those who aren’t aware, let’s take a look back.

The plaintiff, Laura Zubulake, filed suit against her former employer UBS Warburg, alleging gender discrimination, failure to promote, and retaliation. Southern District of New York Judge Shira Sheindlin’s rulings in this case are the most often cited in the area of electronic discovery, and were issued prior to the 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That’s somewhat like establishing laws before the Ten Commandments!  The important opinions related to eDiscovery are commonly known as Zubulake I, Zubulake III, Zubulake IV and Zubulake V.  Here is a summary of each of those opinions:

Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 217 F.R.D. 309 (Zubulake I) and Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake III)

The plaintiff argued that key evidence was located in various emails exchanged among employees of UBS, the defendant. Initially, the defendant produced about 350 pages of documents, including approximately 100 pages of email, but the plaintiff produced approximately 450 pages of email correspondence on her own. To address the discrepancy, the plaintiff requested for UBS to locate the documents that existed in backup tapes and other archiving media.

The defendant, arguing undue burden and expense, requested the court to shift the cost of production to the plaintiff, citing Rowe Entertainment v. The William Morris Agency, 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). In May 2003, the court ruled stating that whether the production of documents is unduly burdensome or expensive “turns primarily on whether it is kept in an accessible or inaccessible format”. The court determined that the issue of accessibility depends on the media on which data are stored. It described five categories of electronic media, as follows:

  1. Online data, including hard disks;
  2. Near-line data, including optical disks;
  3. Offline storage, such as magnetic tapes;
  4. Backup tapes;
  5. Fragmented, erased and damaged data.

The last two categories were considered inaccessible as they were not readily available and thus subject to cost-shifting. Discussing the Rowe decision, the court concluded that it needed modification and created a new seven factor balance test for cost-shifting:

  1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant information;
  2. The availability of such information from other sources;
  3. The total cost of production, compared to the amount in controversy;
  4. The total cost of production, compared to the resources available to each party;
  5. The relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do so;
  6. The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and
  7. The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.

The defendant was ordered to produce, at its own expense, all responsive email existing on its servers, optical disks, and five backup tapes as selected by the plaintiff. The court would only conduct a cost-shifting analysis after the review of the contents of the backup tapes.

In July 2003, Zubulake III applied the cost-shifting test outlined in Zubulake I based on the sample recovery of data from five backup tapes.  After the results of the sample restoration, both parties wanted the other to fully pay for the remaining backup email. The sample cost the defendant about $19,003 for restoration but the estimated costs for production was $273,649, including attorney and paralegal review costs. After applying the seven factor test, it determined that the defendant should account for 75 percent of the restoration and searching costs, excluding attorney review costs.

Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake IV)

During the restoration effort, the parties discovered that some backup tapes were no longer available. The parties also concluded that relevant emails created after the initial proceedings had been deleted from UBS’s email system and were only accessible on backup tapes. The plaintiff then sought an order requiring UBS to pay for the total costs of restoring the remaining backup tapes and also sought an adverse inference instruction against UBS and the costs for re-deposing some individuals required because of the destruction of evidence.

In October 2003, Judge Scheindlin found that the defendant had a duty to preserve evidence since it should have known that it would be relevant for future litigation. However, at the time, she concluded that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the lost evidence supported the adverse inference instruction claim. But, she did order the defendant to cover the costs as claimed by the plaintiff.

Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 2004 WL 1620866 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2004) (Zubulake V)

In July 2004, Judge Scheindlin ruled that UBS had failed to take all necessary steps to guarantee that relevant data was both preserved and produced, and granted the plaintiff’s motion for adverse inference instruction sanctions, sought in Zubulake IV, due to the deleted evidence (emails and tapes) and inability to recover key documents during the course of the case.

The court also indicated that defense counsel was partly to blame for the document destruction because it had failed in its duty to locate and preserve relevant information. In addressing the role of counsel in litigation, the court stated that “[c]ounsel must take affirmative steps to monitor compliance so that all sources of discoverable information are identified and searched” by ensuring all relevant documents are discovered, retained, and produced and that litigators must guarantee that relevant documents are preserved by instituting a litigation hold on key data, and safeguarding archival media.

In the final instructions to the jury Judge Scheindlin instructed in part, “[i]f you find that UBS could have produced this evidence, the evidence was within its control, and the evidence would have been material in deciding facts in dispute in this case, you are permitted, but not required, to infer that the evidence would have been unfavorable to UBS.” In addition, monetary sanctions were awarded to the plaintiff for reimbursement of costs of additional re-depositions and of the motion leading to this opinion, including attorney fees. The jury found in the plaintiff’s favor on both claims awarding compensatory and punitive awards totaling $29.2 million.

Judge Scheindlin’s opinions in Zubulake, including definitions of accessible and inaccessible data, the seven factor balance test for cost shifting and definition of counsel’s obligation for preserving data, have been referenced in numerous cases since and have provided guidance to organizations preparing for litigation.  For any of you who may not have fully understood the significance of the case, I hope this look back was helpful.

So, what do you think?  Did you learn something new about Zubulake?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Trends: DOJ Criminal Attorneys Now Have Their Own eDiscovery Protocols
Criminal attorneys, are you discouraged that there is a lack of eDiscovery rules and guidelines for criminal cases?  If you work for the Department of Justice or other related law enforcement agencies, cheer up!

As noted in the Law Technology News article, DOJ Lays Down the Law on Criminal E-Discovery Protocols, written by Evan Koblentz, the government’s Joint Electronic Technology Working Group (JETWG), led by the DOJ, unveiled its best practices guide for eDiscovery at a federal software summit in Washington on February 10.  The 21 page document, “intended for cases where the volume and/or nature of the ESI produced as discovery significantly increases the complexity of the case”, primarily consists of three sections:

  • Recommendations for ESI Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases: Provides a general framework for managing ESI, including planning, production, transmission, dispute resolution, and security;
  • Strategies and Commentary on ESI Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases: Provide more detailed guidance for implementing the recommendations – this section will evolve to reflect experiences in actual cases; and
  • ESI Discovery Checklist: One page checklist for addressing ESI production issues.

While the one page checklist has several items that would apply to any case, there are some items specific to criminal cases that would make it a handy reference for conducting eDiscovery on those cases.  The three sections are based on ten basic principles, which should have familiarity to those who have been dealing with eDiscovery in civil cases.  They are as follows:

  1. Lawyers have a responsibility to have an adequate understanding of electronic discovery.
  2. In the process of planning, producing, and resolving disputes about ESI discovery, the parties should include individuals with sufficient technical knowledge and experience regarding ESI.
  3. At the outset of a case, the parties should meet and confer about the nature, volume, and mechanics of producing ESI discovery. Where the ESI discovery is particularly complex or produced on a rolling basis, an on-going dialogue may be helpful.
  4. The parties should discuss what formats of production are possible and appropriate, and what formats can be generated. Any format selected for producing discovery should maintain the ESI’s integrity, allow for reasonable usability, reasonably limit costs, and, if possible, conform to industry standards for the format.
  5. When producing ESI discovery, a party should not be required to take on substantial additional processing or format conversion costs and burdens beyond what the party has already done or would do for its own case preparation or discovery production.
  6. Following the meet and confer, the parties should notify the court of ESI discovery production issues or problems that they reasonably anticipate will significantly affect the handling of the case.
  7. The parties should discuss ESI discovery transmission methods and media that promote efficiency, security, and reduced costs. The producing party should provide a general description and maintain a record of what was transmitted.
  8. In multi-defendant cases, the defendants should authorize one or more counsel to act as the discovery coordinator(s) or seek appointment of a Coordinating Discovery Attorney.
  9. The parties should make good faith efforts to discuss and resolve disputes over ESI discovery, involving those with the requisite technical knowledge when necessary, and they should consult with a supervisor, or obtain supervisory authorization, before seeking judicial resolution of an ESI discovery dispute or alleging misconduct, abuse, or neglect concerning the production of ESI.
  10. All parties should limit dissemination of ESI discovery to members of their litigation team who need and are approved for access, and they should also take reasonable and appropriate measures to secure ESI discovery against unauthorized access or disclosure.

Evan’s article provides comments from Andrew Goldsmith, the national criminal eDiscovery coordinator, regarding the efforts and intent of the document and training program for DOJ attorneys and other law enforcement personnel, as well as efforts of the department to determine how to apply commercial, civil litigation oriented, eDiscovery software to criminal cases.  It’s a good read and the guidelines look promising as a resource for criminal attorneys to manage eDiscovery in those cases.

So, what do you think?  Do these guidelines show promise for eDiscovery in criminal cases?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Court Rules Exact Search Terms Are Limited
In Custom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting v. Dowell, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146, 7-8 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 3, 2012), the plaintiff and defendant could not agree on search terms to be used for discovery on defendant’s forensically imaged computers.  The court directed each party to submit a proposed list of search terms and indicated that each party would be permitted to file objections to the opposing party’s proposed list.  After reviewing the proposals, and the defendant’s objections to the plaintiff’s proposed list, the court ruled that the defendant’s proposed list was “problematic and inappropriate” and that their objections to the plaintiff’s proposed terms were “without merit” and ruled for use of the plaintiff’s search terms in discovery.

Plaintiff alleged the defendants formed a competing company by “illegally accessing, copying, and using Plaintiff’s computer software and data programming source code systems” and sued defendants for copyright infringement, trade secret misappropriation, breach of contract and other claims.  The court ordered discovery of ESI on defendants’ computers through use of a forensic process to recover and then search the ESI.  In July 2011, the plaintiffs provided a request for production to defendants that requested “any and all documents which contain, describe, and/or relate in any manner to any of the words, phrases and acronyms, or derivatives thereof, contained in the list [provided], irrespective of whether exact capitalization, alternative spelling, or any other grammatical standard was used.”  The defendants submitted their own proposed list, which “excludes irrelevant information by requiring precise matches between search terms and ESI”.

Referencing Victor Stanley (previous blog posts regarding that case here, here, here and here), Missouri District Court Judge Richard Webber noted in his ruling that “While keyword searches have long been recognized as appropriate and helpful for ESI search and retrieval, there are well-known limitations and risks associated with them.”  Quoting from The Sedona Conference Best Practices Commentary on the Use of Search & Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, the court noted that keyword searches “capture many documents irrelevant to the user’s query…but at the same time exclude common or inadvertently misspelled instances” of the search terms.

The defendant issued three objections to the plaintiff’s terms, which the court addressed as follows:

  • Plaintiffs’ Terms would Include an Unreasonable Number of Irrelevant Results: Assuming that the argument was based on a contention by the defendants that the discovery would be overly burdensome, the court noted that the “burden or expense of conducting such a search must be low, and Defendants have presented the Court with no evidence that suggests otherwise.”
  • Plaintiffs’ Terms would Produce Privileged Results: The Court noted that a producing party can create a privilege log to exclude documents that would otherwise fit the search term results.
  • Some of Plaintiffs’ terms will Encompass Only Irrelevant Information: Noting that the defendants’ “objection is a conclusory statement, stated without any argumentation or other support”, the Court found that a search of these terms may produce “matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense”.

The Court also found that the defendants’ proposed list would be “problematic and inappropriate” and “would fail to produce discoverable ESI simply because of an inexact match in capitalization or phrasing between a search term and the ESI” and rejected that list, ordering use of the plaintiff’s list for searching.

So, what do you think?  Was that the right call, or was the plaintiff’s request overbroad?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.