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Preservation

Court Denies Request for Sanctions for Routine Deletion of Files of Departed Employees: eDiscovery Case Law

In Charvat et. al. v. Valente et. al., 12-5746 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 2015), Illinois Magistrate Judge Mary M. Rowland denied the plaintiff’s request for spoliation sanctions for the defendant’s admitted destruction of computer files belonging to two departed employees, finding that the plaintiff did not provide any evidence that the defendant acted in bad faith.

Case Background

In this case about consumer complaints regarding alleged improper telemarketing activities by a company affiliated with Carnival Corporation, the defendant investigated the allegations and produced most of the documents relating to its investigation.  However, the defendant withheld 14 documents as privileged, because they “relate specifically to legal advice sought by Carnival from outside counsel”.  Judge Rowland conducted an in camera review of the documents described on the Privilege Log and ruled that the defendant must produce two of the documents, but determined that “[a]ll other documents on the Privilege Log are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine.”

The plaintiff also requested spoliation sanctions or instructions given the defendant’s admitted destruction of computer files belonging to two departed employees.  The defendant acknowledged deleting the computer files belonging to the two departed employees consistent with its routine business practices of deleting files 30 days following termination of employment. The two employees left in September and October 2011 and the defendant’s investigation into the consumer complaints concluded in July 2011, so the defendant asserted that “at the time of their respective departures from the company, Carnival had completed its investigation of RMG and did not anticipate any imminent litigation against the travel agency.”  The plaintiff countered by arguing that the defendant could not contend that certain documents authored by the two departed employees were “work product” created in “anticipation of litigation” while also asserting that it routinely deleted their computer files because it did not “anticipate any imminent litigation.”

Judge’s Ruling

Noting that “work product is exempt from mandatory disclosure regardless of the status of the anticipated litigation” and “work-product protection continues even after the prospect of anticipated litigation disappears”, Judge Rowland stated that “although Carnival was free to delete Morales’s and Hernandez’s files in September and October 2011 because there was no reasonably foreseeable litigation at that time, their emails prepared as part of the RMG investigation remain privileged.”  She also then stated that “[i]n any event, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that Carnival acted in bad faith”, determining that “[t]here is no evidence that Carnival’s routine deletion of former employees’ files in accordance with an established document retention policy was done for the purpose of hiding adverse information.”  As a result, the plaintiff’s request for sanctions was denied.

So, what do you think?  Should the defendant have been able to delete the files of the departed employees?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Denies Plaintiff’s Request for Spoliation Sanctions, as Most Documents Destroyed Before Duty to Preserve: eDiscovery Case Law

In Giuliani v. Springfield Township, et al., Civil Action No. 10-7518 (E.D.Penn. June 9, 2015), Pennsylvania District Judge Thomas N. O’Neill, Jr. denied the plaintiffs’ motion for spoliation sanctions, finding that the duty to preserve began when the case was filed and finding that “plaintiffs have not shown that defendants had any ill motive or bad intent in failing to retain the documents which plaintiffs seek”.

Case Background

In this harassment and discrimination case, the plaintiff owned land within the defendant’s township and alleged that the defendant’s zoning decisions violated the plaintiff’s civil rights violations. In June 2009, the defendant withdrew its opposition to the plaintiffs’ application for use of the property and its Zoning Hearing Board granted the plaintiffs’ zoning appeal, ending the zoning dispute.   The plaintiff then filed this new complaint against the defendant in January 2011.

The plaintiffs contended that the defendants’ production had been deficient because defendants “provided a miniscule number [of emails] in response to Plaintiffs’ [discovery] request[s] – just 24 emails spanning a seventeen-year period of near-constant controversy.”  In response, the defendants noted that, during the time period relevant to this case, it did not generate large volumes of email and also cited it’s document retention policy, which stated that “e-mail messages and attachments that do not meet the definition of records and are not subject to litigation and other legal proceedings should be deleted immediately after they are read”.

The defendants also did not preserve data relating to the case until the case was filed in 2011, believing that all of the outstanding issues related to the plaintiffs’ land development applications had finally been resolved after the zoning dispute was resolved in 2009.  The plaintiffs disputed that interpretation of when the duty to preserve arose and also pointed out instances where the defendants failed to instruct key custodians to preserve data related to the case.

Judge’s Ruling

With regard to the beginning of the duty to preserve by the defendants, Judge O’Neill stated that “Plaintiffs’ arguments are not sufficient to meet their burden to show that defendants’ duty to preserve files related to other properties, emails or planning commission board minutes was triggered at any time prior to the commencement of this action. They have not set forth any reason why I should disbelieve ‘the Township’s assertion that it had absolutely no reason to anticipate litigation until it was served with the Complaint on January 7, 2011,’…and that in June 2009, ‘with the property being leased in its entirety to one tenant, the Township . . . believed that all disputes with the Giulianis had come to an end.’”

As for alleged preservation failures after the duty to preserve commenced, Judge O’Neill determined that “Plaintiffs have not met their burden to establish that defendants actually suppressed the evidence they seek. At most, defendants lost or deleted the evidence plaintiffs seek as the result of mere inadvertent negligence. Plaintiffs have not set forth any proof that defendants in fact failed to preserve emails, documents relating to other properties or Planning Commission Board Minutes at any time after January 7, 2011…Further plaintiffs have not shown that defendants had any ill motive or bad intent in failing to retain the documents which plaintiffs seek.”  As a result, Judge O’Neill denied the plaintiffs’ motion for spoliation sanctions.

So, what do you think?  Should the duty to preserve have been applied earlier?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Quality Control, Making Sure the Numbers Add Up: eDiscovery Best Practices

Having touched on this topic a few years ago, a recent client experience spurred me to revisit it.

Friday, we wrote about tracking file counts from collection to production, the concept of expanded file counts, and the categorization of files during processing.  Today, let’s walk through a scenario to show how the files collected are accounted for during the discovery process.

Tracking the Counts after Processing

We discussed the typical categories of excluded files after processing – obviously, what’s not excluded is available for searching and review.  Even if your approach includes technology assisted review (TAR) as part of your methodology, it’s still likely that you will want to do some culling out of files that are clearly non-responsive.

Documents during review may be classified in a number of ways, but the most common ways to classify documents as to whether they are responsive, non-responsive, or privileged.  Privileged documents are also often classified as responsive or non-responsive, so that only the responsive documents that are privileged need be identified on a privilege log.  Responsive documents that are not privileged are then produced to opposing counsel.

Example of File Count Tracking

So, now that we’ve discussed the various categories for tracking files from collection to production, let’s walk through a fairly simple eMail based example.  We conduct a fairly targeted collection of a PST file from each of seven custodians in a given case.  The relevant time period for the case is January 1, 2013 through December 31, 2014.  Other than date range, we plan to do no other filtering of files during processing.  Identified duplicates will not be reviewed or produced.  We’re going to provide an exception log to opposing counsel for any file that cannot be processed and a privilege log for any responsive files that are privileged.  Here’s what this collection might look like:

  • Collected Files: After expansion and processing, 7 PST files expand to 101,852 eMails and attachments.
  • Filtered Files: Filtering eMails outside of the relevant date range eliminates 23,564
  • Remaining Files after Filtering: After filtering, there are 78,288 files to be processed.
  • NIST/System Files: eMail collections typically don’t have NIST or system files, so we’ll assume zero (0) files here. Collections with loose electronic documents from hard drives typically contain some NIST and system files.
  • Exception Files: Let’s assume that a little less than 1% of the collection (912) is exception files like password protected, corrupted or empty files.
  • Duplicate Files: It’s fairly common for approximately 30% or more of the collection to include duplicates, so we’ll assume 24,215 files here.
  • Remaining Files after Processing: We have 53,161 files left after subtracting NIST/System, Exception and Duplicate files from the total files after filtering.
  • Files Culled During Searching: If we assume that we are able to cull out 67% (approximately 2/3 of the collection) as clearly non-responsive, we are able to cull out 35,618.
  • Remaining Files for Review: After culling, we have 17,543 files that will actually require review (whether manual or via a TAR approach).
  • Files Tagged as Non-Responsive: If approximately 40% of the document collection is tagged as non-responsive, that would be 7,017 files tagged as such.
  • Remaining Files Tagged as Responsive: After QC to ensure that all documents are either tagged as responsive or non-responsive, this leaves 10,526 documents as responsive.
  • Responsive Files Tagged as Privileged: If roughly 8% of the responsive documents are determined to be privileged during review, that would be 842 privileged documents.
  • Produced Files: After subtracting the privileged files, we’re left with 9,684 responsive, non-privileged files to be produced to opposing counsel.

The percentages I used for estimating the counts at each stage are just examples, so don’t get too hung up on them.  The key is to note the numbers in red above.  Excluding the interim counts in black, the counts in red represent the different categories for the file collection – each file should wind up in one of these totals.  What happens if you add the counts in red together?  You should get 101,852 – the number of collected files after expanding the PST files.  As a result, every one of the collected files is accounted for and none “slips through the cracks” during discovery.  That’s the way it should be.  If not, investigation is required to determine where files were missed.

So, what do you think?  Do you have a plan for accounting for all collected files during discovery?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Quality Control By The Numbers: eDiscovery Best Practices

Having touched on this topic a few years ago, a recent client experience spurred me to revisit it.

A while back, we wrote about Quality Assurance (QA) and Quality Control (QC) in the eDiscovery process.  Both are important in improving the quality of work product and making the eDiscovery process more defensible overall.  With regard to QC, an overall QC mechanism is tracking of document counts through the discovery process, especially from collection to production, to identify how every collected file was handled and why each non-produced document was not produced.

Expanded File Counts

Scanned counts of files collected are not the same as expanded file counts.  There are certain container file types, like Outlook PST files and ZIP archives that exist essentially to store a collection of other files.  So, the count that is important to track is the “expanded” file count after processing, which includes all of the files contained within the container files.  So, in a simple scenario where you collect Outlook PST files from seven custodians, the actual number of documents (emails and attachments) within those PST files could be in the tens of thousands.  That’s the starting count that matters if your goal is to account for every document or file in the discovery process.

Categorization of Files During Processing

Of course, not every document gets reviewed or even included in the search process.  During processing, files are usually categorized, with some categories of files usually being set aside and excluded from review.  Here are some typical categories of excluded files in most collections:

  • Filtered Files: Some files may be collected, and then filtered during processing. A common filter for the file collection is the relevant date range of the case.  If you’re collecting custodians’ source PST files, those may include messages outside the relevant date range; if so, those messages may need to be filtered out of the review set.  Files may also be filtered based on type of file or other reasons for exclusion.
  • NIST and System Files: Many file collections also contain system files, like executable files (EXEs) or Dynamic Link Library (DLLs) that are part of the software on a computer which do not contain client data, so those are typically excluded from the review set. NIST files are included on the National Institute of Standards and Technology list of files that are known to have no evidentiary value, so any files in the collection matching those on the list are “De-NISTed”.
  • Exception Files: These are files that cannot be processed or indexed, for whatever reason. For example, they may be password-protected or corrupted.  Just because these files cannot be processed doesn’t mean they can be ignored, depending on your agreement with opposing counsel, you may need to at least provide a list of them on an exception log to prove they were addressed, if not attempt to repair them or make them accessible (BTW, it’s good to establish that agreement for disposition of exception files up front).
  • Duplicate Files: During processing, files that are exact duplicates may be put aside to avoid redundant review (and potential inconsistencies). Some exact duplicates are typically identified based on the HASH value, which is a digital fingerprint generated based on the content and format of the file – if two files have the same HASH value, they have the same exact content and format.  Emails (and their attachments) may be identified as duplicates based on key metadata fields, so an attachment cannot be “de-duped” out of the collection by a standalone copy of the same file.

All of these categories of excluded files can reduce the set of files to actually be searched and reviewed.  On Monday, we’ll illustrate an example of a file set from collection to production to illustrate how each file is accounted for during the discovery process.

So, what do you think?  Do you have a plan for accounting for all collected files during discovery?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Similar Spoliation Case, Somewhat Different Outcome: eDiscovery Case Law

Remember the Malibu Media, LLC v. Tashiro case that we covered a couple of weeks ago, which involved spoliation sanctions against a couple accused of downloading its copyrighted adult movies via a BitTorrent client?  Here’s a similar case with the same plaintiff and similar spoliation claims, but with a somewhat different outcome (at least for now).

In Malibu Media, LLC v. Michael Harrison, Case No. 12-cv-1117 (S.D. Ind. June 8, 2015), Indiana District Judge William T. Lawrence denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, upholding the magistrate judge’s ruling which found an adverse inference instruction for destroying a hard drive with potentially responsive data on it to be not warranted, and ruled that “it will be for a jury to decide” if such a sanction is appropriate.

Case Background

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant installed a BitTorrent Client onto his computer and then went to a torrent site to upload and download its copyrighted Work, specifically, six adult films (or portions thereof).  As in the Tashiro case, the plaintiff used a German company to identify certain IP addresses that were being used to distribute the plaintiff’s copyrighted movies, and the defendant was eventually identified by Comcast as the subscriber assigned to this particular IP address.

After the lawsuit was filed, in January 2013, the defendant’s hard drive on his custom-built gaming computer crashed and he took it to an electronics recycling company, to have it “melted”. He then replaced the gaming computer’s hard drive. In addition to his gaming computer, the defendant also had another laptop. During discovery, that laptop and the new hard drive were examined by forensic experts; while the laptop revealed extensive BitTorrent use, it did not contain any of the plaintiff’s movies or files and the new hard drive did not reveal any evidence of BitTorrent use.  Nonetheless, because of the destroyed hard drive, the plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions for the Intentional Destruction of Material Evidence, as well as a motion for summary judgment.

In an evidentiary hearing in December 2014, the magistrate judge recommended that the motion for sanctions be denied, concluding that the defendant “did not destroy the hard drive in bad faith”, that “[h]ad [Harrison] truly wished to hid adverse information, the Court finds it unlikely that [Harrison] would have waited nearly five months to destroy such information” and noted that he found the defendant’s testimony to be credible.  The plaintiff filed an objection to that report and recommendation, arguing that “bad faith should be inferred from the undisputed evidence.”

Judge’s Ruling

Regarding both the summary judgment motion and the motion for sanctions, Judge Lawrence stated the following:

“The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Dinsmore that default judgment was not warranted in this case. That said, Magistrate Judge Dinsmore found an adverse inference not to be warranted because he found Harrison’s testimony to be credible. While the Court does not necessarily disagree with Magistrate Judge Dinsmore—in that it is certainly possible a jury would find Harrison’s testimony to be credible—ultimately, the Court believes this is an issue best left for a jury to decide. Malibu Media has presented sufficient evidence to the contrary, and in light of the fact that Malibu Media’s motion for summary judgment was denied on the same grounds, the Court believes leaving the issue of spoliation to the jury to be the best approach. Accordingly, at trial the Court will instruct the jury that if it finds that Harrison destroyed the gaming computer’s hard drive in bad faith, it can assume that the evidence on the gaming computer’s hard drive would have been unfavorable to Harrison.”

So, what do you think?  Should this case have been handled the same way the Malibu Media, LLC v. Tashiro case was handled?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Plaintiff Once Again Sanctioned with an Adverse Inference Instruction, But Still No Complete Dismissal: eDiscovery Case Law

In Lynn M. Johnson v. BAE Systems, Inc. et. al., Civil Action No. 11-cv-02172 (RLW) (D.D.C. May 27, 2015), District of Columbia District Judge Robert L. Wilkins granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff’s claims for negligence, battery, and defamation, but chose to “impose lesser, but nonetheless severe, sanctions” in the form of an adverse inference instruction for her remaining claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Case Background

The plaintiff, a U.S. government employee deployed in Iraq, sued the defendants for actions taken by its employee during a project that they worked on together, alleging “severe physical and emotional health problems”.  During discovery, the defendant requested medical records in preparation for an expert witness’s examination of the plaintiff – she provided the defendant with falsified medical records which she had edited in an effort to eliminate references to health issues that predated her deployment to Iraq. The defendant filed a motion for sanctions seeking dismissal and the Court granted in part and denied in part the motion, sanctioning the plaintiff and her counsel with fees and an adverse inference instruction.

Then, on September 25, 2013, the defendant requested a forensic examination of the plaintiff’s computer.  That evening, the plaintiff contracted with a local computer technician who performed various maintenance functions, which included running a program called CCleaner that is capable of permanently deleting files.  Subsequent forensic analysis showed that several Microsoft Outlook .pst email storage files were placed into the recycling bin and deleted on September 27.  The technician testified that the plaintiff did not tell him she was in litigation, she did not ask him not to delete anything from her computer and he did not place the Outlook files in the recycle bin. The defendants also requested Facebook messages, and the court found evidence that the plaintiff had tampered with those messages, as well.

Judge’s Ruling

Regarding the latest activities by the plaintiff, Judge Wilkins stated that “The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Johnson destroyed, attempted to destroy, or caused to be destroyed files on her computer with potential relevance to this case”, noting that “under no circumstances should Ms. Johnson have contracted with a computer technician to ‘clean up’ a computer sought for forensic imaging, particularly without making a disk image or even informing the technician of ongoing litigation. That she chose to do so is very troubling.”  Judge Wilkins expressed similar concern by the plaintiff’s failure to produce Facebook messages from earlier than February 2013.

Summarizing the behavior by the plaintiff, Judge Wilkins stated “Over the course of this suit, Ms. Johnson has repeatedly obfuscated the truth. She has altered medical records, contradicted herself in depositions and testimony before the Court, and failed to preserve and produce relevant documents during discovery.”  Still, Judge Wilkins could not bring himself to dismiss the case, stating “Although it is an exceedingly close question, the Court concludes that Ms. Johnson’s conduct does not merit this most serious of remedies.”

As a result, Judge Wilkins awarded the defendant an adverse inference instruction sanction against the plaintiff, awarded the forensic expert’s fees spent by the defendant’s expert and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for negligence, battery, and defamation.

So, what do you think?  Should the repeated violations by the plaintiff have led to full dismissal?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Judge Recommends Default Judgment Sanctions Against Defendants, Even Though Some Deleted Files Were Recoverable: eDiscovery Case Law

In Malibu Media, LLC v. Tashiro, Case No. 13-cv-00205 -WTL-MJD (S.D. Ind. May 18, 2015), Indiana Magistrate Judge Mark J. Dinsmore issued a Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions, recommending that the Court grant the plaintiff’s motion against the defendants for spoliation of evidence and perjury and enter default judgment against the defendants.

Case Background

In 2013, the plaintiff retained a German company to investigate whether certain internet users were infringing plaintiff’s copyrights by uploading and/or downloading its copyrighted adult movies via a BitTorrent client and, after monitoring the BitTorrent file distribution network, the provider identified certain IP addresses that were being used to distribute Plaintiff’s copyrighted movies.  The plaintiff initially filed suit against an unidentified defendant, but amended the complaint to name the defendants after the plaintiff subpoenaed the alleged infringer’s ISP.

During discovery, one of the defendants agreed to provide her computer hard drives for forensic imaging.  The plaintiff’s expert examined each of the images of the hard drives for evidence of BitTorrent use, finding evidence on one drive that the “hard drive was repeatedly used to download BitTorrent files and also had BitTorrent software installed on the hard drive.”  He also determined that numerous files and folders associated with BitTorrent use had been deleted the night before the drive was turned over for imaging.  In addition, the expert determined that three additional drives had been connected to the defendant’s laptop computer, but had not been turned over for imaging.  As a result, the plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions alleging spoliation of evidence and perjury in the form of misrepresentations by defendants at their depositions and in their responses to various discovery requests.  The defendants argued that because the files were recoverable, spoliation had not occurred, but the contention that all the deleted files were recoverable was disputed by the plaintiff.

Judge’s Ruling

With regard to the recoverability of the files, Judge Dinsmore stated “Based on the relative credentials of the parties’ experts, the Court concludes that Patrick Paige’s testimony is more accurate and more credible. As such, the Court finds it highly likely that thousands of files were deleted and were unrecoverable. This confirms that Defendant Charles did not temporarily delete relevant evidence; instead, he permanently destroyed that evidence. As a result, Charles is liable for spoliation.”  He also noted that “even if the files that Charles deleted had been recoverable, this would not absolve Charles of liability” as the metadata associated with those recovered files would have been altered, which “would impede Plaintiff’s use of those files in proving its underlying claim of copyright infringement”.

As for the perjury claim, while finding some of the defendants’ answers not to constitute perjury, Judge Dinsmore failed to reach that conclusion regarding at least one of the drives that the defendant failed to disclose.  He stated that “At best, her omission of the XPS 600 from her discovery responses resulted from an egregious failure to reasonably investigate whether her interrogatory answers were complete. At worst, her failure to include the XPS 600 was a knowing and intentional omission that indicates that she did in fact commit perjury.”

Finding that “a sanction short of default would not appropriately address the goals of deterrence and punishment”, Judge Dinsmore recommended that the Court grant the plaintiff’s motion against the defendants for spoliation of evidence and perjury and enter default judgment against the defendants.

So, what do you think?  Was the recommendation of severe sanctions appropriate in this case?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Plaintiff Ordered to Image its Sources of ESI, Respond to Disputed Discovery Requests: eDiscovery Case Law

In Electrified Discounters, Inc. v. MI Technologies, Inc. et al., Case No. 3:13cv1332 (RNC) (D. Conn. May 19, 2015), Connecticut Magistrate Judge Donna F. Martinez granted the defendant’s motion to compel the plaintiff ‘s responses to discovery and ordered the plaintiff to “image its sources of electronically stored information (‘ESI’), including its hard drives and QuickBook files”.

Case Background

In this trademark infringement case between competitors who sell replacement lamps for rear projection televisions and front projectors via online marketplaces, the defendants filed a motion to compel the plaintiff ‘s responses to discovery and argued that the plaintiff failed to issue a timely litigation hold and that the plaintiff’s production of ESI was “careless and indifferent.”  Specifically, the defendant stated that the plaintiff anticipated filing a lawsuit against the defendant in 2011, but that the plaintiff’s attorney admittedly did not counsel his client regarding its duty to retain relevant information until 2013 when the lawsuit was filed.

Additionally, in March 2015, the plaintiff’s company president testified in his deposition that he routinely deletes emails based on their age when his mailbox becomes full, that he deletes emails about once a month, that he continued to delete emails during this litigation and, on the day before his deposition, he deleted approximately 1000 emails.  Other records also were admittedly destroyed by the plaintiff company, which responded to the defendant’s request for plaintiff’s lamp sales that “[a]s part of its routine business practices, Electrified discards its records of lamps sales after approximately one year following payment.”

Judge’s Ruling

With regard to the defendant’s criticism of plaintiff’s failure to institute a timely litigation hold and its careless and indifferent production efforts after the duty to preserve arose, Judge Martinez stated “After reviewing the deposition testimony of Electrified’s witnesses, the court agrees that the defendant’s concern is well-founded.”  Those depositions included one plaintiff employee, who testified that his company uses a Quickbooks program, which contains detailed inventory and sales records dating back to 2006 as well as the company president, who also acknowledged that the Quickbook database contains inventory and sales information.

Citing Pension Committee and Zubulake, Judge Martinez stated that “The duty to preserve evidence is ‘well established.’”  With regard to the plaintiff’s admitted preservation failures, she stated “This cannot continue. Pending the final disposition of all claims in this action, plaintiff Electrified is ordered to preserve all documents, electronically-stored information, and/or tangible things that might be relevant to this subject matter or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in this action.”  In an attempt to limit further spoliation of data, Judge Martinez stated that the plaintiff “shall image its sources of electronically stored information (‘ESI’), including its hard drives and QuickBook files.”

With regard to the twenty discovery requests in dispute, Judge Martinez granted the defendant’s motion to compel for each one, ordering the plaintiff to search and produce responsive ESI within 14 days of the order.  She also ordered the plaintiff “to show cause by June 2, 2015 why the court should not award defendant [requested] attorney’s fees incurred in the making of the motion to compel pursuant to Rule 37(a)(5).”

So, what do you think?  Are sanctions the next step in this case?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

New York Supreme Court Sanctions Two Attorney Defendants for “Egregious Misconduct” in Spoliation of Data: eDiscovery Case Law

In HMS Holdings Corp. v. Arendt, et al., 2015 NY Slip Op 50750(U) (Sup. Ct., Albany County, May 19, 2015), the New York Supreme Court in Albany County ordered a mandatory adverse inference instruction so that the trier of fact could “draw the strongest possible adverse inference from defendants’ bad faith and intentional destruction, deletion and failure to produce relevant evidence”. The court also awarded attorney fees, and forwarded a copy of the order regarding Defendant Lange to the New York State Committee on Professional Standards for attorneys.

Case Background

In this business litigation against the defendants who were former employees of the plaintiff, the parties to this case entered into a stipulation in September 2014 providing that defendants would forensically image all personal and work computers, flash or zip drives, and all mobile devices in their possession, custody or control. After the defendants provided the forensic images to the plaintiffs and their forensics expert for review, the plaintiffs’ expert alleged that defendants Curtin and Lange (both licensed attorneys) had intentionally and deliberately destroyed relevant electronically stored information. The instances of spoliation as alleged by the plaintiff’s expert were as follows:

  • Curtin used the Secure Erase wiping software on his laptop six times in September 2014, after the litigation hold had gone into effect – he claimed that he did so to improve the performance of his laptop;
  • Curtin also failed to produce a Toshiba hard drive (to which he was found to have copied a considerable volume of confidential defendant business materials the day before he terminated his employment with the defendant) claiming he could not find the drive;
  • “Shadow Copies” on Lange’s laptop revealed that there were documents in a directory of Lange’s hard drive containing the term “HMS” that no longer were present on September 15, 2014, when the computer was produced for forensic imaging;
  • Lange also failed to produce text messages from her iPhone 4, which she replaced in August 2014. She claimed that the store where she purchased it could not transfer data to her new phone; however, the plaintiff’s expert found data from her personal computer indicating that she had backed up her old iPhone to the computer after she purchased the new phone.

The plaintiffs requested sanctions against those defendants. In a Decision & Order dated March 2, 2015, the Court held as follows:

“Through the affidavit of its computer forensics expert and the documentary evidence submitted in support of the motion, HMS has made a prima facie showing that Curtin and Lange engaged in the spoliation of potentially relevant ESI with a culpable mental state during the pendency of this action.”

The court called for an evidentiary hearing, which was held on March 24, 2015, to hear the testimony of defendants and the parties’ computer experts.

Court’s Ruling

Noting the options that Curtin had selected with the Secure Erase software (“Erase” instead of “First Aid”, “Most Secure” instead of “Fastest”), the Court stated that it “does not find Curtin’s explanation for his use of Secure Erase to be worthy of belief.” Also, noting that Curtin “failed to disclose the existence of the Toshiba drive in response to HMS’s interrogatories” and “acknowledged the existence of the drive only after being confronted with HMS’s forensic proof of the same”, the Court ruled that it “does not find his explanation for failing to produce the Toshiba external drive to be credible.”

As for files deleted from Lange’s hard drive, the Court found “that Lange was under a duty of preservation at all pertinent times with respect to the alleged spoliation of ESI” from the laptop and found it to be “intentional and willful”. And, with regard to the iPhone, the Court concluded “that Lange knowingly gave false testimony regarding the destruction and disposition of her iPhone 4” when she testified that she disposed of her old iPhone on August 8, 2014, but actually backed it up on August 15, 2014.

As a result, the Court ruled:

“Given the willful and deliberate nature of defendants’ misconduct, imposition of a mandatory presumption is warranted. The trier of fact should be permitted to draw the strongest possible adverse inference from defendants’ bad faith and intentional destruction, deletion and failure to produce relevant evidence Thus, the trier of fact should be instructed as a matter of law that defendants engaged in the intentional and willful destruction of evidence, advised of the extent of each defendant’s proven spoliation, and permitted to presume that the evidence spoliated by each defendant was relevant to this action, would have supported HMS’s claims against the defendant and been unfavorable to the defendant.”

The court also awarded attorney fees, and forwarded a copy of the order regarding Defendant Lange to the New York State Committee on Professional Standards for attorneys.

So, what do you think? Was that the right amount to award? Or should the judge have awarded a lesser amount? Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Sanctions Plaintiff for Failing to Preserve Audio Recording: eDiscovery Case Law

In Compass Bank v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, Civil No. 13-CV-0654-BAS(WVG)(S.D. Cal. May 8, 2015), California Magistrate Judge William V. Gallo ruled that the plaintiff “wilfully engaged in the spoliation of relevant evidence”, and “has demonstrated a pattern of recalcitrant behavior during discovery in this litigation” and awarded an adverse inference jury instruction sanction against the plaintiff as well as defendant’s attorney fees and costs.

Case Background

During discovery in this case, the defendant issued two sets of document requests (in April and October 2014, respectively) which included all audio recordings relating to a letter of credit at the center of the dispute, allegedly issued on behalf of the plaintiff by its former branch manager. The plaintiff did not produce any audio recordings during discovery. Then, on February 12 of this year, the defendant took the deposition of the plaintiff’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness, during which she stated that during a phone call with the former branch manager in February of 2013, he admitted that he issued the letter of credit. She also testified that the plaintiff automatically records all of her phone calls in the regular course of business, and automatically records the calls of all its Trade Service Division officers. During her deposition, the plaintiff’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness stated, “our lines in international trade services and the letter of credit are recorded 24/7.”

The defendant immediately requested that the plaintiff produce the audio recording of the subject call. In a letter dated March 6, 2015, the plaintiff informed the defendant that it could not locate any such recording. The defendant subsequently filed a motion for sanctions, requesting either terminating or adverse inference jury instruction sanctions against the plaintiff, presenting evidence that the plaintiff had only searched one of the witness’s work phone numbers, when she actually had two phone numbers.

Judge’s Ruling

Because one of the main disputes in this case is whether the plaintiff issued the letter of credit and the audio recording seemed to verify that, Judge Gallo ruled that “the relevance of this evidence cannot reasonably be disputed”. He also ruled that the plaintiff had a duty to preserve the recording, noting that even though “the subject call occurred prior to Plaintiff filing the Complaint, Plaintiff has previously argued to this Court that it reasonably anticipated litigation regarding the letter of credit in February of 2013.”

With regard to whether the evidence was lost or destroyed with a culpable state of mind, based on the fact that “no evidence has been presented to the Court that Plaintiff initiated a litigation hold” and that “not only did Plaintiff not produce the recording of the subject call or any other calls, it utterly failed to even disclose that such calls were recorded”, Judge Gallo found that “Plaintiff wilfully failed to produce the recording in response to discovery requests, wilfully failed to conduct a diligent search in an effort to locate the recording, and wilfully withheld the recording from Defendant”. Judge Gallo also noted that the plaintiff “has a history of being recalcitrant and failing to produce relevant discovery” for failing to produce an Interview Summary of the former branch manager under the work product doctrine that ultimately proved to be clearly not protected.

As a result, Judge Gallo, while declining to award terminating sanctions, awarded a “less drastic” adverse inference jury instruction sanction against the plaintiff as well as ordered the plaintiff to reimburse defendant’s attorney fees and costs to be determined after a review the defendant’s detailed time calculations and declaration(s).

So, what do you think? Do you agree that the audio recording was lost or destroyed with a culpable state of mind? Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.