Close
Enter your
text here

Case Law

Defendants Claim of Lightning Strike and Power Surge Doesn’t Save Them from Sanctions: eDiscovery Case Law

In a recent post in Craig Ball’s excellent blog, Ball in your Court, Craig stated that “you are more likely to be hit by lightning than to be sanctioned for non-preservation of ESI”.  So, if you claim that your devices are hit by lightning, causing your relevant ESI to be lost, does that make it more or less likely that you will be sanctioned?  :o)

In InternMatch, Inc. v. Nxtbigthing, LLC, et. al., No. 14-05438 (N.D. Cali., Feb. 8, 2016), California District Judge Jon S. Tigar, finding that the defendants “consciously disregarded their obligations to preserve relevant evidence” when they discarded various electronic devices after experiencing an alleged power surge without checking to see if they could recover any files from them, granting an adverse inference instruction sanction and plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees.

Case Background

In this trademark infringement case, the plaintiff requested copies of any documents, including electronic documents, relating to the defendants’ defense that it had continually and extensively used the disputed trademark. The defendants responded (and the owner of the defendant company (Chad Batterman) stated in his deposition) that a lightning strike in 2011 and a power surge in April 2015 had destroyed responsive documents, including corporate records central to the parties’ dispute and marketing materials that allegedly established prior use of the trademark.

in November 2015, the plaintiff filed a motion for terminating sanctions, accusing Defendants of intentionally destroying the electronic versions of the documents.

Judge’s Ruling

Using the newly amended FRCP Rule 37(e) as a guideline, Judge Tigar also considered the five factors identified by the Ninth Circuit in determining whether the terminating sanction is justified:

(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its dockets; (3) the risk of prejudice to the party seeking sanctions; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.

With regard to the defendant’s duty to preserve and whether that duty was upheld, Judge Tigar found “that at least by January 2015, Defendants knew about the present action and were under a duty to preserve relevant evidence.  The evidence shows that Defendants violated this duty…Prior to discarding the desktop, Batterman did not make any effort to determine whether the hard drive on the desktop was salvageable or any data could be recovered from it…As a result, the parties can only access the few existing paper copies of the relevant documents, rather than the electronic files, which would include valuable information such as the creation and modification history of the files.”

Continuing, Judge Tigar stated: “The Court finds that at the very least, Defendants consciously disregarded their obligations to preserve relevant evidence. There is no evidence that Defendants took any steps to preserve relevant information after the litigation began…After the alleged power surge, Defendants failed to identify whether data from the electronic devices might be recoverable, and instead simply discarded the devices.

The Court also finds Defendants’ evidence that the surge occurred in the first place to be unbelievable. Not only is the alleged chronology of events highly improbable, but Defendants’ story is filled with inconsistencies. The Court does not know what actually happened to the missing evidence, if it ever existed, but concludes that Defendants have failed to show that it was lost in a power surge.”

While finding that sanctions were warranted, Judge Tigar concluded “that sanctions short of entry of default are appropriate” and granted the plaintiff’s request for an adverse inference instruction sanction, as well as attorneys’ fees associated with bringing the Motion for Terminating Sanctions.

So, what do you think?  Should the termination sanction have been awarded?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Rules Plaintiff’s Duty to Preserve Did Not Extend to Employee’s Internet History: eDiscovery Case Law

In Marten Transport, Ltd. V. Plattform Advertising, Inc., No. 14-02464 (D. Kansas, Feb. 8, 2016), Kansas Magistrate Judge Teresa J. James denied the defendant’s Motion for Spoliation Sanctions, ruling that, although the plaintiff had a duty to preserve relevant ESI as of Fall 2013, that duty to preserve did not extend to the internet history of one of its employees until June 2015, and by then the internet history was lost.

Case Background

In this action under the Lanham Act for trademark infringement and unfair competition, the plaintiff accused the defendant of making unauthorized job postings to the defendant’s sites using the plaintiff’s trademarks and information after the plaintiff terminated its agreement with the defendant.  Plaintiff’s counsel sent a cease and desist letter in September 2013 and ultimately filed suit in September 2014.

In January 2015, the plaintiff served its Rule 26 disclosures identifying one of its employees (Jolene Vinck), as an individual “believed to have discoverable information relating to the matter.”  In June 2015, Defendant’s counsel sent a letter to the plaintiff alleging that after the defendant removed all of the plaintiff’s job postings from its website on September 17, 2013, the plaintiff logged back in and created six job postings on five separate dates.

In September 2015, as part of its first supplemental production, the plaintiff produced a December 2013 email to Vinck from a third party informing her that the relationship with the defendant had been terminated, which included Vinck’s response that she didn’t know and “had been posting on there all along”.  After the defendant requested Vinck’s internet history in its second request for production, the plaintiff advised the defendant that Vinck’s internet history was no longer available as she received a new work station in February 2015 in the ordinary course of business, and the plaintiff did not have access to any web browsing history relating to any computer assigned to her prior to February 2015.  After attempting to confer, the defendant filed a motion seeking spoliation sanctions due to the plaintiff’s failure to preserve Vinck’s internet history on the previous computer.

Judge’s Ruling

As directed by the Court during the hearing on the subject motion, the plaintiff subsequently filed Declarations regarding its unsuccessful efforts to search for and locate the previous computer and regarding whether it otherwise had the capability to retrieve Vinck’s internet history.  As a result of those efforts, Judge James indicated that “the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has made thorough and reasonable good faith efforts to locate Computer 1, but it cannot be located”, concluding that “the internet history on Computer 1 is lost and cannot be restored or retrieved by other means”.

While finding that “Plaintiff had a duty to preserve relevant information, and that duty commenced in Fall 2013”, Judge James assessed the scope of that duty and determined that there was “nothing in this record to support a conclusion that Plaintiff knew or should have known that Vinck’s Fall 2013 internet history would be relevant in this case until Plaintiff received the June 16, 2015 letter from Defendant’s counsel.”  In denying the defendant’s motion for spoliation sanctions, Judge James stated:

“The stated reasons behind the 2015 amendments to Rule 37(e) further support the Court’s conclusions in this case. The general intent of amended Rule 37(e) was to address the excessive effort and money being spent on ESI preservation as a result of the continued exponential growth in the volume of ESI, along with the uncertainty caused by significantly differing standards among the federal circuits for imposing sanctions or curative measures on parties who failed to preserve ESI.  In revising Rule 37(e), the Advisory Committee expressly instructed that ‘reasonable steps’ to preserve ESI suffice; the Rule ‘does not call for perfection.’”

So, what do you think?  Should the plaintiff’s duty to preserve have extended to employees’ internet histories?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Happy St. Patrick’s Day!!

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Plaintiff’s Failure to Demonstrate Allegations Leads to Summary Judgment for Defendant: eDiscovery Case Law

In Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, Case No. 13-6312 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 8, 2016), in a case of dueling summary judgment motions, Illinois Magistrate Judge Geraldine Soat Brown denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, but granted the defendant’s summary motion in its entirety, concluding that the plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence to prove its allegations of illegally downloading movies.

Case Background

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, identified through his Internet Protocol (“IP”) address, downloaded its copyrighted work, specifically, twenty-four adult movies from the plaintiff’s site, using BitTorrent.  In this matter, the defendant was allowed to proceed anonymously as “John Doe.”  With regard to the identification of the defendant via the IP address, the defendant claimed that, during the time in question, he had many guests at his house, and any number of people could have downloaded from his IP.

In a forensic examination of the defendant’s hard drives from his computer, the plaintiff’s expert did not find any evidence that the plaintiff’s copyrighted works, or the BitTorrent software, had been on the defendant’s computer.  However, he did find evidence that one external storage device and one internal hard drive that were capable of storing files downloaded via BitTorrent had been connected to the defendant’s computer, but they had not been produced by the defendant.  He also found several virtual machines on one of the defendant’s hard drives, but not the program “VMWare” he believed was used to create them.

The defendant retained his own expert to conduct a forensic examination of his hard drive.  The defendant expert also concluded that there was no evidence that the plaintiff’s copyrighted works, or the BitTorrent software, had been on the defendant’s computer.  With regard to the two devices identified by the plaintiff’s expert, the defendant’s expert determined that they were last used in 2012 (which was before the infringement period and before the date the plaintiff says the works at issue were created) and the virtual machines were last used no more recently than September 2010, which was the expiration timeframe for the one-year student license for VMWare that the defendant would have received as a graduate student.  The defendant also moved to strike declarations from plaintiff’s experts regarding the forensic and IP evidence, as the plaintiff never served any Rule 26(a)(2) disclosure – in response, the plaintiff characterized them as “lay witnesses — not experts”.

The plaintiff and defendant filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the case.

Judge’s Ruling

Stating that “[u]nlike other cases, Malibu has no evidence that any of its works were ever on Doe’s computer or storage device”, Judge Brown denied the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, as follows:

“Considering all of Malibu’s evidence, including the Fieser, Patzer, and Paige declarations Doe has moved to strike, in the light most favorable to Doe, Malibu’s summary judgment motion must be denied. Even if those contested declarations are considered, Malibu has not eliminated all material questions of fact about whether there was actionable infringement and, if so, whether Doe was the infringer.”

With regard to the defendant’s motion to strike declarations from plaintiff’s experts, Judge Brown granted the motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2) and 37(c)(1).  As a result, Judge Brown ruled “[w]ithout the evidence of Fieser’s and Patzer’s declarations, there is no evidence linking Doe or even his IP address to Malibu’s works. Paige’s evidence, which depends entirely on the finding of IPP using Excipio’s system, does not contain any evidence based on his personal knowledge that Doe copied or distributed any of Malibu’s works. Doe’s motion for summary judgment is, accordingly, granted.”

So, what do you think?  Should the defendant’s summary judgment motion have been granted?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Here are links to two previous cases we have covered regarding this plaintiff.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Predictive Coding is Officially Approved in First English Case: eDiscovery Case Law

Last month, in Pyrrho Investments Ltd v MWB Property Ltd [2016] EWHC 256 (Ch), citing the landmark DaSilva Moore case (among other authorities), Master Matthews approved the use of predictive coding, due to the “enormous” expense of manually searching through the three million electronic documents associated with the case.  This is the believed to be the first time an English court has approved the use of predictive coding.

In this case, the parties, through several rounds of correspondence, “agreed on the (automated) method to be employed”, which “involves ‘predictive coding’”, and “also the scope of the keywords to be employed”.  Citing DaSilva Moore, Master Matthews referenced several comments in Judge Peck’s decision nearly four years earlier, including:

“The decision to allow computer-assisted review in this case was relatively easy – the parties agreed to its use (although disagreed about how best to implement such review). The Court recognises that computer-assisted review is not a magic, Staples-easy-Button, solution appropriate for all cases. The technology exists and should be used where appropriate, but it is not a case of machine replacing humans: it is the process used and the interaction of man and machine that the court needs to examine…The goal is for the review method to result in higher recall and higher precision than another review method, at cost proportionate to the ‘value’ of the case… Computer-assisted review appears to be better than the available alternatives, and thus should be used in appropriate cases.”

Master Matthews also referenced Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Ltd v Quinn, where the Irish High Court also endorsed the use of predictive coding.  In that case, the process was proposed by the plaintiffs and approved by the court over the objections by the defendants.

In approving the use of predictive coding in this case, Master Matthews provided these factors in favor of the decision {emphasis added}:

“(1)          Experience in other jurisdictions, whilst so far limited, has been that predictive coding software can be useful in appropriate cases.

(2)           There is no evidence to show that the use of predictive coding software leads to less accurate disclosure being given than, say, manual review alone or keyword searches and manual review combined, and indeed there is some evidence (referred to in the US and Irish cases to which I referred above) to the contrary,

(3)           Moreover, there will be greater consistency in using the computer to apply the approach of a senior lawyer towards the initial sample (as refined) to the whole document set, than in using dozens, perhaps hundreds, of lower-grade fee-earners, each seeking independently to apply the relevant criteria in relation to individual documents.

(4)           There is nothing in the CPR or Practice Directions to prohibit the use of such software.

(5)           The number of electronic documents which must be considered for relevance and possible disclosure in the present case is huge, over 3 million.

(6)           The cost of manually searching these documents would be enormous, amounting to several million pounds at least, hr my judgment, therefore, a full manual review of each document would be “unreasonable” within paragraph 25 of Practice Direction B to Part 31, at least where a suitable automated alternative exists at lower cost.

(7)           The costs of using predictive coding software would depend on various factors, including importantly whether the number of documents is reduced by keyword searches, but the estimates given in this case vary between £181,988 plus monthly hosting costs of £15,717, to £469,049 plus monthly hosting costs of £20,820. This is obviously far less expensive than the full manual alternative, though of course there may be additional costs if manual reviews still need to be carried out when the software has done its best.

(8)           The ‘value’ of the claims made in this litigation is in the tens of millions of pounds. In my judgment the estimated costs of using the software are proportionate.

(9)           The trial in the present case is not until June 2017, so there would be plenty of time to consider other disclosure methods if for any reason the predictive software route turned out to be unsatisfactory.

(10)         The parties have agreed on the use of the software, and also how to use it, subject only to the approval of the Court.”

In approving the use of predictive coding in this case, Master Matthews also stated that “There were no factors of any weight pointing in the opposite direction.”  And, saving us the trouble of checking to see if there were any previous English cases that approved predictive coding, he noted that “a search of the BAILII online database for ‘predictive coding software’ returned no hits at all, and for ‘predictive coding’ and ‘computer-assisted review’ only the Irish case referred to above.”

In his blog, eDisclosure Information Project, Chris Dale (whose thought leader interview on this blog was published last Friday), posted his reaction to the decision and referenced several other blogs and publications with their coverage of the decision as well.

So, what do you think?  Will this case become the “DaSilva Moore” for English courts?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Craig Ball of Craig D. Ball, P.C.: eDiscovery Trends

This is the fifth of the 2016 LegalTech New York (LTNY) Thought Leader Interview series.  eDiscovery Daily interviewed several thought leaders at LTNY this year to get their observations regarding trends at the show and generally within the eDiscovery industry.  Unlike previous years, some of the questions posed to each thought leader were tailored to their position in the industry, so we have dispensed with the standard questions we normally ask all thought leaders.

Today’s thought leader is Craig Ball.  A frequent court appointed special master in electronic evidence, Craig is a prolific contributor to continuing legal and professional education programs in the United States and abroad, having delivered over 1,700 presentations and papers.  Craig’s articles on forensic technology and electronic discovery frequently appear in the national media and he teaches E-Discovery and Digital Evidence at the University of Texas School of Law.  He currently blogs on eDiscovery topics at ballinyourcourt.com.

What are your general observations emerging eDiscovery trends for 2016?

{Interviewed Craig after LTNY, as he did not make it to the show this year}

I skipped LegalTech this year – first time in twenty years – because Mardi Gras was early this year, I chose the circus on the Mississippi over the one on the Hudson.  Still, I got lots of feedback from those who attended LTNY while I was catching beads at 29 parades.  I wanted to see if I’d missed anything of note.  The only trend that emerged was lack of change in the focus of the show.  LTNY is still dominated by electronic discovery as it has been for almost a decade; but, there are continued signs of consolidation within the industry as organizations fold into one another.

Not surprisingly, we don’t see outright failure in this space.  Companies don’t disappear, but instead reach a point where whatever is left is absorbed by a national brand for its equipment or core technology.  So, we’ve seen steady consolidation within the industry, and that trend continues.  As the broader economy goes, so goes litigation and discovery.

Another trend that I’ve observed is an increased focus on eDiscovery automation and considerable growth of, and investment in, eDiscovery automation providers.  What are your thoughts about that trend?

The term “automation” has gotten some play lately.  I’m trying to figure out what each usage means because it’s still in the buzzword phase as marketers deploy the term in the never-ending struggle to differentiate their products. Automated workflows are key to Cloud SaaS offerings.  Hosted systems must be capable of programmatic routines to ingest and process data, effecting ready hand-off of data across processing and review.    An automated SaaS offering should be sufficiently autonomous to facilitate workflow across multiple stages of the EDRM with little manual intervention.

Assuming “automation” means  we can put something into the hopper and it will emerge ready for review or production in forms we were expecting, then automation is a necessary precursor to growth and cost effectiveness in hosted products.  That’s positive for consumers if it means price reductions and commoditization of features of electronic discovery.  It may not be so great for the vendor community unless they can scale up the volume.

In the case Nuvasive v. Madsen Medical, the Court recently vacated an adverse inference instruction sanction previously applied against the plaintiff because of the amendment to Rule 37(e).  Do you see that as a trend for other cases and do you expect that other parties that have been sanctioned will file motions to have their sanctions re-considered?

I don’t think it signals a trend. There are relatively few cases that fall into the transition point.  I don’t expect to see a rash of sanctions being reconsidered by virtue of the latest amendments.

Nuvasive is interesting because it goes to the issue of whether it’s fundamentally fair to impose the new Rules retroactively.  The Rules speak to that issue and make it clear that they can be applied retroactively as long as they operate fairly.  The amendments to the Rules make clear that serious sanctions (such as adverse inference instructions) require proof of an intent to deprive a discovering party of the particular information.  Nuvasive involved serious sanctions, so I can see why the Court might want to weigh amended Rule 37(e).  Still, I’m not sure why the parties and the Court failed to anticipate the Rule changes, as the amendment process was pretty far along in July 2015, when sanctions were imposed.  The tenor of the Court’s opinion in reversing himself was that it was just ‘bad luck’ that the amended rules kicked in when they did.

I think that we will see judicial action once termed “sanctions” couched in less-loaded terms.  After Rule 37(e), Courts will distinguish punitive responses from remedial actions designed to rectify unwarranted failure to preserve relevant information. New Rule 37(e) won’t tie the hands of jurists determined to rectify discovery abuse.  We’re already seeing push back from jurists unwilling to surrender discretionary authority when the facts demand fairness.   As well, we’ve seen at least one case where the Court reversed himself, citing 37(e) as the basis for reconsideration.  As is apparent in Nuvasive and in Judge Francis’ recent order in Cat 3, the Rules are tools, and they can be turned this way and that in determined hands.

Sanctions aren’t going away, and that’s a good thing.  We are mired in the last century when it comes to discovery.  Lawyers need direction, and sanctions opinions supply guidance.  There is little in the way of a “carrot” for eDiscovery – all we have is the “stick.”  If courts fail to sanction incompetence and abuse, then lawyers won’t pursue competence, and parties will continue to “twiddle their thumbs” until evidence disappears.  Few lawyers maliciously hide damaging evidence; but, they’re expert at rationalizing it away or, in the case of e-discovery, content to let their ignorance serve as their armor.  “What you don’t know, can’t hurt me,” is their credo.

What are you working on that you’d like our readers to know about?

I’m going back to basics.  Last year was about trying to develop a core curriculum and re-engineer my teaching to make it an engaging foundation in information technology for lawyers.  I hope 2016 will bring an increased ability to push out more information and reach more people.  I’m doing a project for the DC Bar where I will be providing evening CLE programs by live semi-weekly webcasts.  Small groups of motivated people are my sweet spot.  As always, I’m looking forward to this year’s Georgetown University Law School eDiscovery Training Academy, during the first full week in June.  Both the faculty and the students are delightful.  I’ve come to recognize that anyone willing to work at it can learn the technology they need to be formidable in e-discovery in just three solid days.  That’s less time than most of us spend at Starbucks each year.

I’m using the California ethics decision (which we covered here when it was still a Proposed Opinion) as a jumping off point for the concept of core competencies for lawyers.  As you know, the State Bar of California issued an advisory opinion last year identifying nine areas in which lawyers must either be competent in order to accept a case involving eDiscovery or must associate competent counsel or decline representation. That courageous opinion serves as an effective touchstone for talking to lawyers– not just in California, but all over– about the skills they must embrace to be competent to accept a case involving eDiscovery.

There are virtually no cases without electronic evidence, only cases where the lawyers choose to ignore it.  And there is so much more coming!  Never in history have advocates had so much powerful evidence at their disposal, and never have they been so content to look away.  Three days per advocate could change all that—a long weekend.  But, finding the time is only half the battle.  The other half is finding the course that doesn’t give short shrift to the “e” in e-discovery.

Candidly, 2016 is also about taking some time for me.  I’ve been doing 50 to 70 presentations a year for twenty years.  I average about four flights a week; so, I’m hoping to cut all that down by half.  I’m saying “no” more and stopping to smell the roses.  That’s why I’ve gotten a second home in New Orleans, and will spend more time reading, thinking and working on fewer projects with greater focus.  Every teacher needs a sabbatical, right?

Thanks, Craig, for participating in the interview!

And to the readers, as always, please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic!

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Jason R. Baron of Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP: eDiscovery Trends

This is the third of the 2016 LegalTech New York (LTNY) Thought Leader Interview series.  eDiscovery Daily interviewed several thought leaders at LTNY this year to get their observations regarding trends at the show and generally within the eDiscovery industry.  Unlike previous years, some of the questions posed to each thought leader were tailored to their position in the industry, so we have dispensed with the standard questions we normally ask all thought leaders.

Today’s thought leader is Jason R. Baron.  An internationally recognized speaker and author on the preservation of electronic documents, Jason is a member of Drinker Biddle’s Information Governance and eDiscovery practice and also a member of the leadership team for the Information Governance Initiative.  Jason previously served as Director of Litigation for the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and as trial lawyer and senior counsel at the Department of Justice.  He was a founding co-coordinator of the National Institute of Standards and Technology TREC Legal Track, a multi-year international information retrieval project devoted to evaluating search issues in a legal context.  He also founded the international DESI (Discovery of Electronically Stored Information) workshop series, bringing together lawyers and academics to discuss cutting-edge issues in eDiscovery.

What are your general observations about LTNY this year and how it fits into emerging trends?

It’s clear to me that there has been a maturing of the market for the kind of analytics software that some of us have been evangelizing about in the eDiscovery space for some time.  This year, it was noticeable that there weren’t 27 sessions devoted to technology assisted review in e-discovery cases!  However, in place of that narrower focus, there were any number of sessions on analytics and applying analytics to a broader segment of the legal space, which I applaud.

Also, I think there was an acknowledgement that, from the perspective of Information Governance, there is an analytics play to be had.  With bigger and bigger data sets, companies need to face the fact that both employees and customers generate huge amounts of data and they need to make sure that they understand and have visibility into that data.  So, the tools that evolved for purposes of eDiscovery are perfectly suitable – with tweaks – to cover a variety of legal purposes, and we’re seeing that play out at LegalTech.

At LTNY, you were one of the panelists on the Thursday keynote addressing issues such as private servers, bring-your-own-device (BYOD) and other organization challenges for managing data by individual employees.  What do organizations, such as government entities and corporations, need to do manage personal data more effectively?

Well, I’m glad you asked me that.  The session that I had the privilege of speaking on (with Judge Scheindlin and Edward McMahon as fellow panelists and Professor Dan Capra moderating) was all about what I call “shadow IT,” which is a phenomenon that is closely related to but distinct from BYOD.   In the past decade or so, we all have been empowered to simply go to the Internet to use whatever variety of cool apps that are out there, like Google Docs and Dropbox, to facilitate communications and doing work and “parking” documents.  We go out and communicate routinely on Gmail and other forms of commercial services.  All of these activities, to the extent that they involve communications that relate to business or the work of governments, are what I consider to be “shadow IT” in nature because they are not controlled by a traditional IT department in a corporation or agency.

So, maybe a decade ago, if there was a Rule 34 request, you were pretty much assured that all of the relevant material could be gathered by a state-of-the-art IT custodian performing a collection effort against individual accounts on an official system.  That’s no longer absolutely the case.  Today, you need to ask follow-up questions as to where individuals are parking their documents and where are they communicating outside the “official” channel for doing so.

In government, there are very well known, long standing rules for what constitutes a Federal record, including email.  There is an expectation on the part of the public – and there should be an expectation on the part of government officials — that Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for records created about government business will be made available. (Indeed, at least some of those records will be preserved as permanent records in the National Archives of the United States.)  So, it is incumbent to make sure that one follows the rules — and the rules for government are different than what they are for the private sector.  A clear statute in place since 2014 says that anytime that you’re communicating about government business on a private commercial network, you need to either “cc” or forward that message within twenty days to an official record keeping system.  This isn’t the place to get into what regulations were prior to 2014 and how that plays out in terms of the political realm, but our panel did cover the general topic of the responsibility of the officials to make sure that their communications about government business are, in fact, captured in an official system somewhere.

Also, for some time, I have been a very big advocate of email archiving and capture technologies generally, so that we don’t lose history and don’t lose a broad swath of government records that are otherwise not going to be captured if you simply leave it to individuals themselves to take steps to preserve. 

The problem of shadow IT is one that is equally of concern in the private sector because high level corporate officials sometimes, in various verticals, are governed by strict email archiving requirements (e.g.,SEC and FINRA rules).  So senior people need to also be aware that, if they’re communicating about cover topics outside of the usual channels, they need to take additional steps to make sure that those are properly archived.

These issues are only emerging now and it’s probably only going to get “worse”!  In my view, the issues are going to be more complex in the future with more apps, more platforms, more devices and more opportunities for “end runs” around the traditional IT department.

In the case Nuvasive v. Madsen Medical, the Court recently vacated an adverse inference instruction sanction previously applied against the plaintiff because of the amendment to Rule 37(e).  Do you see that as a trend for other cases and do you expect that other parties that have been sanctioned will file motions to have their sanctions re-considered?

There are some subtle provisions as to when courts will or will not apply the new rules to existing cases.  But, beyond that, I have been watching with great interest the number of decisions that have been handed down that are applying the new provisions of Rule 37, and doing so in a way that suggests that courts will continue to be quite active in monitoring what is happening in discovery — imposing severe sanctions where appropriate and, when there isn’t the requisite level of intent, applying some sort of curative measures otherwise.  So, I think there may have been a greater level of judicial activity than was anticipated in the immediate period since December 1 when the rules changed.  It seems clear to most observers in the space that we’re going to have dozens and dozens of decisions in 2016 that apply the new rules, and we will get to see the patterns emerging pretty quickly.

What are you working on that you’d like our readers to know about?

I think the exciting work of the Information Governance Initiative (IGI) continues to push smart conversations in the space about how corporations can get a handle on their data.  We had a very successful IGI summit, known as the Chief Information Governance Officers (CIGO) summit, in Chicago last year.  We’re going to have the second CIGO summit in May of this year again in Chicago and we’re looking forward to that.  We also have any number of activities that we’re planning to do in terms of retreats, dinners and boot camps, etc. I think IG is still an emerging discipline that should be of great interest to many corporate actors who don’t have a good handle on their existing workflows, policies and programs about data – whether it’s data breach or data reduction or data archiving or data analytics.  I feel very privileged to be part of a group of individuals at the IGI that are really doing some serious thinking about these types of topics.

I must say I was surprised by Monica Bay at LegalTech, who pulled me in at the last moment to be a judge at the second “Shark Tank” session held there —  where I felt a little like being on “America’s Got Talent” as one of three judges in the room looking at the individual entrepreneurs who were giving presentations.  But, as the session progressed (and as recorded by David Horrigan, who was tweeting the session in live stream fashion) it seemed very clear to me that maybe it’s time for me to retire!  I say so because of the profusion of disruptive technologies in the space, whether it has to do with smart contracts or dialing up lawyers over the web, it all heavily suggests that all of our current business models are going to be disrupted in due course and maybe very soon!  There are simply a lot of exciting technologies in the space for which the CodeX people are fostering a platform.  In the end I confess to being quite happy that Monica pulled me in, and I would urge your readership to pay attention to what CodeX is doing.  I believe there is a conference coming up (CodeX FutureLaw 2016) on May 20, which is focusing on how technology is changing the landscape of the legal profession and the impact of those changes.

Thanks, Jason, for participating in the interview!

And to the readers, as always, please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic!

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Our Nation’s Largest City is Not Immune to eDiscovery Sanctions: eDiscovery Case Law

In Stinson v. City of New York, 10 Civ. 4228 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2016), New York District Judge Robert W. Sweet granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs’ motion seeking sanctions for spoliation of evidence against the defendants for failure to issue a litigation hold, opting for a permissive inference rather than a mandatory adverse inference sanction against the defendants.

Case Background

In this civil rights class action against the City of New York, it was determined that the City did not issue any litigation hold until August 8, 2013, more than three years after the filing of the Complaint in this case and the litigation hold was not effectively communicated, and none of the officers who were named in the City’s initial disclosures acknowledged receiving it.

At the time of the litigation hold, the document destruction processes at the NYPD were governed by Operations Order 44, which specified the length of time the Department would be required to retain various categories of documents.  Order 44 authorized the destruction of most bureau chief memos after three years, police officers’ monthly performance reports after four years, and criminal court summonses after four years.  With regard to emails, the City’s 30(b)(6) witness stated that “although the NYPD did not have a specific policy with regards to the destruction of email communications, it did impose a hard size limit on officers’ inboxes, and that when officers hit that limit, ‘they delete.’”  The City also did not dispute that it had not made any effort to preserve or produce text messages between NYPD officers.

With regard to the defendants’ production, the Court noted that they produced fewer than 25 emails from key players, with no emails produced from the former Commissioner, the former Chief of the department, and three other key custodians. The defendants explained the lack of email production by contending that the “Police Department on the whole did not operate via email”, but that contention was countered by email communications with the city that the plaintiffs acquired from third parties.

Judge’s Ruling

Citing Chin v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Judge Sweet stated that:

“In order to merit an adverse inference, the party seeking sanctions must establish 1) that the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it at the time it was destroyed, 2) that the records were destroyed with a culpable state of mind, and 3) that the destroyed evidence was relevant to the party’s claim or defense such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it would support that claim or defense.”

  • With regard to the defendants’ obligation, Judge Sweet rejected the defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs’ preservation requests were overbroad, stating “Plaintiffs’ putative overbroad demands do not excuse the City’s failure to issue a litigation hold, to properly supervise its implementation, or to suspend document retention policies that would foreseeably lead to the spoliation of evidence.”
  • With regard to the defendants’ culpable state of mind, Judge Sweet stated that “the City’s conduct shows a broad failure to take its preservation obligations seriously rather than any deliberate attempt to lie or mislead”, but noted that the “City’s conduct does, however, support a finding of gross negligence”.
  • With regard to the relevance of the destroyed documents, Judge Sweet determined that the “evidence adduced thus far indicates that at least some of the destroyed documents will be relevant to the Plaintiffs’ claims”, though he did note that the showing of relevance by the plaintiffs was “relatively limited”.

As sanctions for the defendants’ spoliation, the plaintiffs requested a set of sixteen adverse inferences touching on almost every aspect of their case, but Judge Sweet opted for a lesser level of sanctions, stating:

“Given the City’s lack of bad faith in its spoliation of evidence and the relatively limited showing of relevance made by the Plaintiffs, a permissive, rather than a mandatory adverse inference is warranted…A permissive inference will ensure that the City faces consequences for its failure to take its preservation obligations seriously, but will not result in an unwarranted windfall for the Plaintiffs. The jury will be instructed that the absence of documentary evidence does not in this case establish the absence of a summons quota policy.”

So, what do you think?  Was that a sufficient sanction for the defendants’ “gross negligence” in failing to issue a litigation hold?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Dispute Over Adequacy of Defendant’s Production Leads to Court Ordered Meet and Confer: eDiscovery Case Law

In Gardner et. al. v. Continental Casualty Company, No. 13-1918 (D. Conn., Jan. 13, 2016), Connecticut Magistrate Judge Joan Glazer Margolis, granting the plaintiff’s motion to compel in part, ordered the parties to meet and confer regarding “’sampling and iterative confinement’ or ‘quick peek protocol’ of the 38,000 documents ‘hit’ by the agreed upon search terms and notify the court in writing “about their progress, or lack thereof, on or before February 12, 2016.”

Case Background

In this class action for violations of Connecticut’s Unfair Trade Practices Act, the parties agreed (after some negotiation) to a list of search terms from the e-mail of twenty-three custodians, which resulted in a return of approximately 38,000 documents.  However, after the defendant reviewed these documents for relevancy and privilege, it produced only 2,214 pages, of which 274 pages consisted of copies of the complaints, with exhibits, filed in the lawsuit.

The plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel, arguing that the defendant “cherry-picked” the produced documents and called the production “incomplete and inadequate”, citing to four documents where they contended that the defendant redacted or omitted “highly relevant” materials.  The defendant countered that it had provided the plaintiffs with extensive discovery over twenty-two months, including 16,800 pages of documents and indicated that it “spent significant resources reviewing the 38,000 documents identified as the result of the search term process,” and provided their own justification for the redactions in the four documents mentioned by the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs responded that they did not accept the defendant’s “just trust us” approach to relevancy, that “the entire exercise of agreeing on search terms was to avoid a prolonged and detailed debate over what ESI documents are `responsive’ to the discovery requests”, that ESI production based on search term hits only “is a common discovery practice ordered by courts,” and that documents provided by LTCG (the defendant’s third-party claims administrator) were far more comprehensive and informative than those provided by the defendant, confirming that the defendant’s “ESI production is woefully deficient.”

Judge’s Ruling

In considering the plaintiff’s motion, Judge Margolis stated that the “position taken by plaintiffs is simply untenable – defendant is not obligated to turn over all 38,000 documents, after a review eliminates some on the basis of privilege…As every law school student and law school graduate knows, when performing a computer search on WESTLAW and/or LEXIS, not every case responsive to a search command will prove to be relevant to the legal issues for which the research was performed. Searching tens of thousands, and hundreds of thousands, of electronic documents is no different. The Court shares, however, plaintiffs’ legitimate concern that LTCG produced different, and obviously relevant, documents that were not provided by defendant itself.”

To attempt to have the parties resolve the dispute themselves, Judge Margolis ordered that “counsel shall confer further regarding variations of two approaches discussed in the Strauch Ruling — ‘sampling and iterative refinement’ or ‘quick peek protocol’ – of the 38,000 documents ‘hit’ by the agreed upon search terms, and shall notify the Magistrate Judge, in writing, about their progress, or lack thereof, on or before February 12, 2016.”  As for the four redacted documents in dispute, Judge Margolis ordered the defendant to forward unredacted versions “for her in camera review, to determine if defendant’s redactions were appropriate or overbroad with respect to those four documents”.

So, what do you think?  Was that a reasonable resolution to the dispute or should the court have ruled one way or the other?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Alteration of Domain in Produced Emails Leads to Sanctions for Plaintiffs: eDiscovery Case Law

In CAT3, LLC v. Black Lineage, Inc., No. 14 Civ. 5511 (AT) (JCF) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2016), New York Magistrate Judge James C. Francis IV, ruling that emails produced by the plaintiffs were “intentionally altered”, ordered that the plaintiffs would be precluded from relying on their version of those emails to demonstrate their case and that the plaintiffs would bear the “costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees, incurred by the defendants in establishing the plaintiffs’ misconduct and in securing relief.”

Case Background

One of the key issues in this case regarding trademark infringement regarded similarity between the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ trademarks and whether the defendants developed their trademark (FLASHXHYPE) mark independently or after learning of the plaintiffs’ development of their trademark (SLAMXHYPE).  In a deposition of the defendant company’s president, communication between the defendant and plaintiff companies was provided (which had been produced as PDF images) that showed the plaintiffs’ employee’s address as having the email domain “@slamxhype.com.”  However, on cross examination, the deponent testified that the email he received was identical, except that it showed the plaintiffs’ employee’s address with the email domain “@ecko.com.”

The defendants’ counsel then sought to explore the discrepancy, and in May 2015, they demanded production of the plaintiffs’ emails in native form.  The plaintiffs did not initially respond and, ultimately, their attorneys withdrew and were replaced by new counsel.  In July 2015, the Court ordered the plaintiffs to comply with the defendants’ request and the plaintiffs produced a USB drive containing a PST file, a zip file, and several separate PDFs of relevant emails.

The defendants subjected that production to a forensic analysis which determined that there were two versions of each email message: a “top” level version and, behind each email message, a “near-duplicate copy of the message containing the identical message,” but with different email domains appearing for a number of the senders and recipients.  The underlying near-duplicate versions were the original emails, which had been deleted, albeit not without leaving a digital imprint.

Relying largely on the forensic analysis, the defendants then moved for sanctions consisting of some combination of dismissal of the complaint, imposition of an adverse inference, an order of preclusion, and assessment of attorneys’ fees and costs.

Judge’s Ruling

In considering the application of the amended Rule 37(e) to the situation, Judge Francis determined that “because the amendment is in some respects more lenient as to the sanctions that can be imposed for violation of the preservation obligation, there is no inequity in applying it.”

With regard to the plaintiffs’ claim that “there has been no destruction or loss of any evidence, and there certainly has not been both (i) loss of evidence AND (ii) “such evidence cannot be restored or replaced” as required by Rule 37, Judge Francis, citing Victor Stanley (the first case ever covered by this blog), stated “the plaintiffs argue that even if they are the ‘gang that couldn’t spoliate straight,’ they cannot be sanctioned because their misdeeds were discovered and the information recovered. They are incorrect.”  Elaborating, Judge Francis said that “it cannot be said that the information lost has been ‘restored or replaced’”, noting that “as the plaintiffs themselves suggest, the fact that there are near-duplicate emails showing different addresses casts doubt on the authenticity of both”.

Regarding the plaintiffs’ contention that the manipulation of the emails was unintentional and possibly due to the migration of the plaintiffs’ emails from one system to another, Judge Francis refuted that notion, stating that the “evidence supports the defendants’ allegation that the plaintiffs intentionally altered the emails at issue”.

With regard to relief, Judge Francis, while considering dismissal of the action or imposition of an adverse inference as possible sanctions, stated “such drastic sanctions are not mandatory”.  Therefore, he ordered a “two-fold remedy”, ordering that the plaintiffs would be “precluded from relying upon their version of the emails at issue to demonstrate notice to the defendants of use of the SLAMXHYPE mark” and that the plaintiffs would bear the “costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees, incurred by the defendants in establishing the plaintiffs’ misconduct and in securing relief.”

So, what do you think?  Were those sanctions warranted?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Changes in Federal Rules Result in Reversal of Adverse Inference Sanction: eDiscovery Case Law

In Nuvasive, Inc. v. Madsen Med. Inc., No. 13cv2077 BTM(RBB) (S.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2016), California Chief District Judge Barry Ted Moskowitz, considering new standards imposed under recently amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e), granted the plaintiff’s motion for an order vacating the Court’s previous order granting (in part) the defendants’ Motion for Sanctions for Spoliation of Evidence.

Case Background

In a previous ruling (which we covered here), Judge Moskowitz granted the defendants’ motion for adverse inference sanctions for failure to preserve text messages from four custodial employees that were key to the case.  The plaintiff sought relief under Rule 60(b) based on an amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e), which went into effect on December 1, 2015.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing that it was untimely and also argued that it was neither “just” nor “practicable” to apply the new rule because: (1) the mere fact that trial was postponed to February 2016 due to the Court’s schedule should not have the effect of absolving the plaintiff of its discovery misconduct; (2) application of the amended rule would cause substantial prejudice to the defendant, which took discovery and filed its spoliation motion under the standard applicable at the time; and (3) there is no alternative sanction that would remedy the prejudice to the defendants caused by the plaintiff’s destruction of evidence.

Judge’s Ruling

In assessing the new Rule 37(e) language, Judge Moskowitz stated that “It is clear from the language of (e)(2) as well as the Committee Notes that the adverse inference instruction that the Court was going to give falls within the measures that are not permissible absent a finding of intent. The Committee Notes explain: ‘Subdivision (e)(2) applies to jury instructions that permit or require the jury to presume or infer that lost information was unfavorable to the party that lost it. Thus, it covers any instruction that directs or permits the jury to infer from the loss of information that it was in fact unfavorable to the party that lost it.’”

Continuing, Judge Moskowitz observed that “In its prior orders, the Court did not make any finding that NuVasive intentionally failed to preserve the text messages so that Defendants could not use them in this litigation. Instead, the Court found that NuVasive was at fault for not enforcing compliance with the litigation hold. The record does not support a finding of intentional spoliation by NuVasive. Therefore, under Rule 37(e), as amended, it would not be proper for the Court to give the adverse inference instruction.”

Judge Moskowitz rejected the defendants’argument that the motion was untimely, noting that the plaintiff brought its motion on December 10, 2015, just nine days after the new rule went into effect.  While acknowledging that “NuVasive has had a bit of good luck in that trial is scheduled for February, after the effective date of the new rule”, Judge Moskowitz indicated that he was “not convinced that there is any prejudice” to the defendant, noting that, “even under the standard applied by the Court in initially ruling upon Defendants’ motion for sanctions, intent was relevant”.

Judge Moskowitz did indicate he would allow both parties “to present evidence to the jury regarding the loss of electronically stored information and will instruct the jury that the jury may consider such evidence along with all other evidence in the case in making its decision.”

So, what do you think?  Should sanction orders be vacated because of the amendment to Rule 37(e)?  Will this create a wave of motions requesting that courts vacate similar orders in other cases?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.