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Failure to Preserve Cloud-Based Data Results in Severe Sanction for Defendant – eDiscovery Case Law
 

In Brown v. Tellermate Holdings, 2:11-cv-1122 (S.D. Ohio Jul 1, 2014), Magistrate Judge Terence Kemp granted plaintiffs’ motion for judgment and motion to strike, ruling that the defendant could not “present or rely upon evidence that it terminated the Browns' employment for performance-related reasons” and enabling the plaintiffs to use documents produced by the defendant “designated as attorneys'-eyes-only” to be used by the plaintiffs “without restriction”, due to the defendant’s failure to preserve or produce data from their Salesforce.com database.

You have to love an opinion that begins like this:

“There may have been a time in the courts of this country when building stone walls in response to discovery requests, hiding both the information sought and even the facts about its existence, was the norm (although never the proper course of action). Those days have passed. Discovery is, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, intended to be a transparent process.”

That’s how this lengthy opinion began in this case where the plaintiffs, former sales agents, sued the defendant for age discrimination after they were terminated.  The defendant responded by arguing that the terminations were performance related.  To address that argument, the plaintiffs sought records from the defendant’s through salesforce.com to demonstrate that they consistently met or exceeded their quotas. In response, the defendant “with the participation of its counsel, either intentionally or inadvertently failed to fulfill certain of its discovery obligations, leading to a cascade of unproductive discovery conferences, improperly-opposed discovery motions, and significant delay and obstruction of the discovery process.”  As Judge Kemp described, the defendant’s counsel:

  • “failed to uncover even the most basic information about an electronically-stored database of information (the ‘salesforce.com’ database);
  • as a direct result of that failure, took no steps to preserve the integrity of the information in that database;
  • failed to learn of the existence of certain documents about a prior age discrimination charge (the "Frank Mecka matter") until almost a year after they were requested;
  • and, as a result of these failures, made statements to opposing counsel and in oral and written submissions to the Court which were false and misleading, and which had the effect of hampering the Browns' ability to pursue discovery in a timely and cost-efficient manner (as well as the Court's ability to resolve this case in the same way).”

One of the defendant’s attorneys went so far as to provide these reasons to the plaintiffs as to why they could not produce the information from Salesforce.com:

  • "Tellermate does not maintain salesforce.com information in hard copy format."
  • "Tellermate cannot print out accurate historical records from salesforce.com. . . ."
  • "[D]iscovery of salesforce.com information should be directed to salesforce.com, not Tellermate."

The defendant later claimed that it was “contractually prohibited from providing salesforce.com information” and that it “cannot access historical salesforce.com data” – both of which were untrue.

Ultimately, it became clear that the defendant had not exported or preserved the data from salesforce.com and had re-used the plaintiffs’ accounts, spoliating the only information that could have addressed the defendant’s claim that the terminations were performance related (the defendant claimed did not conduct performance reviews of its sales representatives).  As a result, Judge Kemp stated that the “only realistic solution to this problem is to preclude Tellermate from using any evidence which would tend to show that the Browns were terminated for performance-related reasons” and issued the following severe sanctions:

“Tellermate shall not, in connection with either the pending summary judgment motion or at trial, be entitled to present or rely upon evidence that it terminated the Browns' employment for performance-related reasons. The documents produced by Tellermate in April, 2013 and designated as attorneys'-eyes-only may be used by the Browns without restriction, subject to Tellermate's ability to redesignate particular documents as confidential under the existing protective order, provided it does so within fourteen days and has a good faith basis for so designating each particular document. Tellermate shall produce the remaining Frank Mecka documents to the Browns within fourteen days. Finally, Tellermate and its counsel shall pay, jointly, the Browns' reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the filing and prosecution of those two motions as well as in the filing of any motions to compel discovery relating to the salesforce.com and Frank Mecka documents.”

So, what do you think?  Do the sanctions fit the activities by the defendant?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Denies Sanctions for Deletion of “Smoking Gun” Email, Grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment – eDiscovery Case Law
 

In the case In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 08 C 7082, MDL No. 1997 (N.D. Ill. May 19, 2014), Illinois District Judge Matthew F. Kennelly not only denied the plaintiffs’ request for an adverse inference sanction against the defendants for destroying emails, but also granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, as the plaintiffs failed to provide any supporting circumstantial evidence to meet their burden of proof.

The plaintiffs filed this suit on behalf of all those who purchased text-messaging services from AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile, and Verizon Wireless, alleging that these providers, along with defendant CTIA-The Wireless Association, conspired to fix prices for Text Messaging Services in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.  On September 9, 2008, shortly after the last carrier increased text messaging rates, Senator Herbert Kohl, chairman of the antitrust subcommittee of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, sent a two-page letter to the chief executive officers of the four carrier defendants "to express my concern regarding what appear to be sharply rising rates your companies have charged to wireless phone customers for text messaging”. 

A day later, The Wall Street Journal published an article (Text-Messaging Rates Come Under Scrutiny) regarding Senator Kohl’s investigation.  That same day a T-Mobile employee sent the text of the article via email to several individuals, including T-Mobile employees Adrian Hurditch, then the company's vice president of services and strategic pricing, and Lisa Roddy, then the company's director of marketing planning and analysis, but the subsequent thread of emails between Hurditch and Roddy was deleted.  The plaintiffs claimed that once Senator Kohl began contacting wireless carriers, T-Mobile had a duty to preserve all relevant electronically stored information and their failure to preserve and produce the emails reflected its “willfulness, bad faith, or fault” and warranted sanctions.

Judge Kennelly “agree[d] that plaintiffs have shown that T-Mobile's employees likely deleted the e-mail(s) intentionally and that they did so for the purpose of concealing the e-mail's contents. Nonetheless, plaintiffs have not shown that the actions of the T-Mobile personnel involved concealment of information that meets the requirement of being ‘adverse’ to T-Mobile. Specifically, the record does not reflect that Hurditch, the sender of the original e-mail that was deleted and the person who called T-Mobile's price increase ‘collusive,’ was in a position to have knowledge of or participate in any collusion between the wireless carriers.”  As a result, Judge Kennelly declined to order sanctions against T-Mobile for deletion of the e-mail or e-mails.

The plaintiffs also claimed that another defendant, CTIA destroyed emails and cleared the laptop profile of CTIA’s Head of Wireless Internet Development, but, because the plaintiffs did not provide any evidence that would support an inference that the missing information was adverse, their request for sanctions was again denied.

With regard to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs argued that Hurditch’s email to Roddy on September 10, 2008, with a reference to collusion, is a “smoking gun.”  However, Judge Kennelly stated that “Hurditch's status as well informed within his company and as ‘an active mentor’ to Roddy do not qualify him as having knowledge of a conspiracy”; therefore, “there are too many unsupported steps in the logic required to permit a reasonable inference that Hurditch was aware of a conspiracy”.  With no other supporting circumstantial evidence, the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof to survive the motion for summary judgment; therefore, Judge Kennelly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

So, what do you think?  Should a spoliation sanction have been issued against the defendant who “likely deleted the e-mail(s) intentionally”?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Orders Sharing of Costs for Forensic Examination of Plaintiff’s Emails – eDiscovery Case Law

In Zeller v. So. Central Emergency Med. Servs. Inc., 1:13-CV-2584 (M.D. Pa. May 20, 2014), Pennsylvania Magistrate Judge Karoline Mehalchick used the Zubulake seven factor test to rule that the costs for restoring and searching the plaintiff’s emails should be shared, up to a maximum contribution by $1,500 by the plaintiff.

In this wrongful termination case based on plaintiff’s claims of retaliation by the defendant after the plaintiff took a leave of absence under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the parties began the eDiscovery process to recover the plaintiff’s emails and asked the Court to resolve the issue of “first review” of documents identified as a result of an agreed upon search of Plaintiff’s emails, and the matter of cost-sharing.

The plaintiff asserted that he is entitled to a “first review” of all documents to be produced while the defendants asserted that after forensic retrieval of emails from Plaintiff’s email account, all non-potentially privileged documents should be forwarded directly to the defendants to save time.  Noting that “Plaintiff has no obligation to produce emails that are wholly irrelevant to either party’s claim or defense” and that broad search terms such as the plaintiff’s wife’s name was used, Judge Mehalchick ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to a “first review” of the results of the forensic examination of his email account.

Regarding the cost sharing request by the defendants, Judge Mehalchick referenced Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B) and determined that the data requested was inaccessible without the forensic examination and used the seven factor balance test below for cost-shifting from Zubulake v. UBS Warburg to decide whether forensic examination costs should be shifted.  The factors are:

  1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant information;
  2. The availability of such information from other sources;
  3. The total cost of production, compared to the amount in controversy;
  4. The total cost of production, compared to the resources available to each party;
  5. The relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do so;
  6. The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and
  7. The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.

Judge Mehalchick stated that “the parties were unable to identify the total cost of production of the search, compared to the amount in controversy and the resources to each party”.  However, with regard to the other five factors, she ruled that “the request is specifically tailored to discovery relevant information”, that “there is no other source which could possibly be available”, that since the parties have agreed on a forensic examiner “neither party has any more ability than the other to control the cost”, that “the information sought is important to the issues at stake in the litigation” and that “it is to the benefit of both parties to obtain the information sought”.

As a result, Judge Mehalchick found “that some cost-shifting is appropriate” and ruled “Plaintiff and Defendant should share equally in the cost of restoring and searching Plaintiff’s emails, up to a maximum contribution by Plaintiff of One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1500.00).”

So, what do you think?  Was the Zubulake test applied appropriately?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Denies Defendant’s Request to Image Plaintiff’s PCs Three Years after Termination – eDiscovery Case Law
 

Here’s an interesting case courtesy of Virginia Lawyer’s Weekly…

In Downs v. Virginia Health Systems, Civil No. 5:13cv00083, (W.D. Va. June 2, 2014), Virginia Magistrate Judge James G. Welsh, citing proportionality and privacy concerns, denied the defendant’s motion to compel the mirror imaging of the Plaintiff’s personal computers nearly three years after she had been terminated.

The plaintiff brought an employee discrimination case against the defendant following being terminated after nearly seventeen years of employment as an executive secretary.  Among the reasons the defendant gave to justify her discharge was that that she had accessed her supervisor’s e-mail account without authority (she disputed that the access was not authorized) and that she had similarly forwarded information from that account to her personal email accounts and her home computers without permission.

The plaintiff represented that she had deleted all material she sent to her home computers following her August 2011 termination; therefore, the defendant requested to have the plaintiff’s two family computers mirror-imaged “to ensure against any further spoliation or destruction of evidence”.  The plaintiff objected to that request as “overly broad, burdensome, ‘personally intrusive,’ and ‘would necessarily invade’ the attorney-client privilege”.  She also argued that the defendants’ in-house IT experts and its own computer logs and reports would provide the same information being requested by the defendant to be mirror-imaged.

Judge Welsh stated that “On its face, the discovery issue presented by the defendants’ request for an exhaustive forensic examination of the plaintiff’s computers is also directly within the scope of ESI discovery contemplated by the inspection, copying, testing and sampling provisions of Rule 34(a)(1)(A).”  Ultimately, however, he also stated as follows:

“Consideration of the defendants’ ESI motion in a manner consistent with the forgoing discovery rules, standards and principles, compels the following findings and conclusions:

(1) nothing in the record suggests any willful failure, fault or bad faith by the plaintiff on her discovery obligations that would justify the requested computer forensics examination;

(2) the “mirror-imaging” of the plaintiff’s family computers three years after her termination raises significant issues of confidentiality and privacy;

(3) there was no duty on the part of the plaintiff to preserve her family computers as evidence,

(4) principles of proportionality direct that the requested discovery is not sufficiently important to warrant the potential burden or expense in this case; and

(5) on the current record that the defendants have failed to justify a broad, and frankly drastic, forensic computer examination of the plaintiff’s two family computers.”

As a result, “even though the defendants have demonstrated a connection between the plaintiff’s two family computers and the issues this lawsuit”, Judge Welsh stated that “the court’s consideration of the several other relevant factors, including the proportionality balance required by Rule 26(b)(2), all weigh heavily against permitting the exhaustive and intrusive computer forensic examination the defendants seek” and denied the defendant’s motion to compel.

So, what do you think?  Should the drives have been imaged or did the defendant’s request fail the proportionality test?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Twitter’s Law Enforcement Policies Revisited Again – Social Tech eDiscovery

It’s time to take another look at the social media platforms to see how they handle private information and law enforcement requests (such as subpoenas).  Let’s start with Twitter.

In 2010 and 2012, we reviewed Twitter’s Privacy Policy and Law Enforcement Guidelines.  Since our last review, despite their efforts to fight it, Twitter was ordered to produce tweets for a New York criminal case (People v. Harris).  At the time, Manhattan Criminal Court Judge Matthew Sciarrino stated that “If you post a tweet, just like if you scream it out the window, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy”, but acknowledged that his decision was “partially based on Twitter’s then terms of service agreement”, which was subsequently modified to add the statement “You Retain Your Right To Any Content You Submit, Post Or Display On Or Through The Service.”  After its appeal was denied, Twitter ultimately complied with the order.

There aren’t a lot of changes to Twitter’s Privacy Policy since our post in 2012, though the page is rearranged.  Most information in Twitter is still publicly shared with everyone, as noted by the tip at the top – “What you say on Twitter may be viewed all around the world instantly” (which former congressman and failed NYC mayor candidate Anthony Weiner famously discovered).  Your privacy settings determine whether some information such as location of tweets, email address and cell phone number is private or not.

In the Privacy Policy, Twitter now provides some details about Data Retention of account data, which is about 30 days from the date of deactivation, with the data being permanently deleted within a week afterwards.  Although the Data Retention section of the Guidelines for Law Enforcement page still states “Twitter retains different types of information for different time periods”.

One key change to the Guidelines for Law Enforcement page is that Twitter now provides a web form for law enforcement officers to submit general inquiries or emergency disclosure requests (no more sending faxes!).  If you’re not an authorized law enforcement or government representative, you can’t use the form.

Tomorrow, we will take a look at Twitter’s latest Transparency Report to show government requests for data over the last six months of 2013.  See you then!

So, what do you think?  Have you needed to request information from Twitter for litigation purposes?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Samsung and Quinn Emanuel Ordered to Pay Over $2 Million for “Patentgate” Disclosure – eDiscovery Case Law

Remember the “patentgate” disclosure last year (by Samsung and their outside counsel firm of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP) of confidential agreements that Apple had with Nokia?  Did you think they were going to avoid having to pay for that disclosure?  The answer is no.

In a June 20 ruling by California Magistrate Judge Paul S. Grewal, he began by noting “With the present quiet on the docket, it is easy to forget the long tumult of this case that once reigned. The ceremonial courtroom has cleared. The fire drills of motions on shortened time have ceased. All that remains for now, at least for the undersigned, is the relatively mundane issue of what makes for reasonable fees.

The fees at issue arise from this court’s order awarding sanctions to Apple and Nokia. The sanctions followed the court’s finding that Samsung and Quinn Emanuel were responsible for the unauthorized distribution of Apple and Nokia confidential information. Samsung and QE object to certain of the fees Apple and Nokia now claim, which means the court must wade into the billing entries and make various calls. So, here goes.”

The summary of events related to the inadvertent disclosure by Quinn Emanuel are described here and the details of the sanction applied to Quinn Emanuel are described here.

The question in this order turned to the fees and costs requested by Apple and Nokia.  Section C of the order was titled “With Limited Exceptions, Apple And Nokia’s Requests Have Been Sufficiently Supported To Sustain The Requested Award” and Judge Grewal stated that “in the over four hundred pages of correspondence and billing records submitted for review, the court has identified only 19 records that it finds troubling” (those were entries where partners and senior associates block billed ten or more hours on “drafting,” “preparing” “revising” or paying “attention to” various briefs and were listed in detail, along with the reduced amount after a 20% reduction penalty).

As for the rest of the entries, Judge Grewal commented that “[t]he court notes and appreciates that both Apple and Nokia have applied a series of discounts to their requests already” and ordered that, aside from the noted exceptions “the court finds that the remaining costs and fees requested by Apple and Nokia are reasonable and shall be awarded.  No later than 30 days from this order, Samsung and QE are to pay Nokia a total of $1,145,027.95 and Apple a total of $893,825.77 in fees and costs.” (emphasis added)

So, what do you think? Were those amounts awarded excessive?  Or did Samsung and Quinn Emanual get off lightly?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Rules in Dispute Between Parties Regarding ESI Protocol, Suggests Predictive Coding – eDiscovery Case Law

In a dispute over ESI protocols in FDIC v. Bowden, CV413-245 (S.D. Ga. June 6, 2014), Georgia Magistrate Judge G. R. Smith approved the ESI protocol from the FDIC and suggested the parties consider the use of predictive coding.

After FDIC-insured Darby Bank & Trust Co. failed in November 2010, the FDIC took over as receiver (as FDIC-R) and brought a bank mismanagement case against sixteen of Darby’s former directors and officers.  Thus far, the parties had been unable to agree on a Joint Protocol for Electronically Stored Information (ESI) and the dispute ultimately reached the court.  The FDIC-R had already spent $614,000 to digitally scan about “2.01 terabytes of data or 153.6 million pages” of data at the bank, but the defendants insisted that the FDIC-R shoulder the burden and expense of reviewing the documents and determining their responsiveness to the claims “”[e]ven though the Bank’s documents were created under Defendants’ custody and control”.

The defendants also argued for a protocol which involved the FDIC-R to “repeatedly search, review, and re-review myriad ‘second-run’ (Phase II) documents, then turn over to them the documents relevant to both claims and defenses that arise in this litigation. The FDIC-R argued for a protocol in which it would produce “categories of documents most likely to contain relevant information” which the defendants could then search, claiming that protocol would be the more “correct allocation of discovery burdens between the parties.” The defendants contended that “search terms alone won’t suffice” and the FDIC-R’s proposed protocol does not relieve the receiver of its Rule 34 burden to “locate and produce responsive documents.”

After reviewing the two proposed protocols, Judge Smith ruled that “given the common ground between the dueling protocols here, the FDIC-R’s ESI protocol will be implemented, as modified by the FDIC-R’s ‘briefing concessions’…as well as by the additional guidance set forth in this Order.”  Those briefing concessions included “offering to open ‘all of the Bank’s former documents . . . [so defendants can retrieve them] to the same extent that the FDIC-R can’” and “offering, in ‘Phase II’ of the disclosure process, to ‘meet and confer with Defendants to reach agreement upon a set of reasonable search terms to run across the database of sources of the ESI to identify documents for production’”.  In approving the FDIC-R’s protocol, Judge Smith stated that “the FDIC-R may meaningfully deploy suitable search terms to satisfy its initial disclosure requirements and respond to forthcoming Rule 34 document requests”.

Also, referencing the DaSilva Moore decision of 2012, Judge Smith stated that “the parties shall consider the use of predictive coding” if ESI protocol disagreements persisted noting that it “has emerged as a far more accurate means of producing responsive ESI in discovery”.

So, what do you think? Should organizations bear the bulk of the discovery burden in cases against individual defendants? Or should the burden be balanced between both parties?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

eDiscovery Daily will resume posts on Monday, July 7.  Happy Birthday America!

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Plaintiff Ordered to Re-Open Social Media Account for Discovery – eDiscovery Case Law
 

In Chapman v. Hiland Operating, LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. Case No. 1:13-cv-052 (D.N.D. May 29, 2014), while noting that he was “skeptical” that reactivating the plaintiff’s Facebook account would produce any relevant, noncumulative information, North Dakota Magistrate Judge Charles S. Miller ordered the plaintiff to “make a reasonable, good faith attempt” to reactivate her Facebook account.

The defendant’s requests for production included a request for communications in the form of, “emails, text messages, instant messages, journal updates, Facebook postings, notes, cards, and/or memorandums”.  The plaintiff objected to that request on several grounds, including that it violated the attorney client and work product privileges, was “unintelligible, improperly vague and ambiguous” and overbroad.

However, in the plaintiff’s deposition, she stated that her attorney advised her to deactivate her Facebook account, which occurred prior to the production request by the defendants. She also stated that stated that she attempted to reactivate her account to respond to discovery requests but was unable to remember her password, but had not attempted to change her password or contacted Facebook regarding reactivating her account. She claimed that she rarely used the account, and when she did it was primarily to communicate with her nieces and nephews. 

Judge Miller noted that although the court was “skeptical” that the plaintiff’s Facebook account “will contain any relevant, noncumulative information, especially given the amount of discovery already completed in this case”, he granted in part the defendant’s motion to compel and ordered the plaintiff and attorney to “make a reasonable, good faith attempt” to reactivate the Facebook account.   He instructed that the plaintiffs do not have to permit defense counsel to be present during the attempt to reactivate the account, and if the account is reactivated, plaintiffs do not have to provide defense counsel the account login and password or full access to the account.

If the Facebook account is reactivated, Judge Miller ordered the plaintiffs to produce in the form of a screen shot other similar format all information from the account referencing a co-plaintiff’s health and his relationship with the other plaintiff since October 19, 2008, and ordered the plaintiff to complete the items by June 27th (last Friday).

So, what do you think? Was the plaintiff’s attorney out of line in ordering the plaintiff to deactivate her Facebook account?  Are screen shots the best way to produce social media data?Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Refuses to Dismiss Spoliation Claim Due to Defendant’s Failure to Produce Key Native File with Metadata – eDiscovery Case Law

In Raines v. College Now Greater Cleveland, Inc., 1:14-CV-00003 (N.D. Ohio June 3, 2014), Ohio District Judge James S. Gwin refused to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim of tortious spoliation of evidence due to the defendant’s failure to produce the metadata associated with a key report authored by the plaintiff.

In 2012, the defendant hired the plaintiff as Executive Director of the Higher Education Compact of Greater Cleveland. As part of her role, the plaintiff produced a Student Privacy Report, entitled Higher Education Compact of Greater Cleveland; Strategic Issues Paper: Student Information Access (the Student Privacy Report). The Student Privacy Report focused on potential violations of student privacy rights and the plaintiff identified concerns to her defendant employer that student privacy rights might be violated because the defendant allowed access to student information. The plaintiff filed a complaint after she was fired the next year by the defendant (and replaced with a substantially younger individual).

The plaintiff claimed spoliation of evidence when the defendants only produced the Student Privacy Report in physical form, without the native file and related metadata. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff could not make that claim because she was not able to show that this production disrupted the case and brought a motion to dismiss the claim of tortious spoliation of evidence (as well as the overall claim).

Judge Gwin noted that, “to state a claim for spoliation of evidence, a plaintiff must establish the following:

(1) A pending or probable litigation involving the plaintiff;

(2) Knowledge on the part of defendant that litigation exists or is probable;

(3) Willful destruction of evidence by defendant designed to disrupt the plaintiff’s case;

(4) Disruption of the plaintiff’s case; and

(5) Damages proximately caused by the defendant’s acts.”

The plaintiff alleged that the defendants knew litigation was likely, and “willfully” destroyed their electronic copy of her Student Privacy Report, claiming that the “metadata associated with the report has independent importance”.

While noting that the plaintiff’s spoliation claim “is not clear regarding damages”, Judge Gwin stated that the plaintiff “sufficiently alleges a claim to survive a motion to dismiss”. Therefore, the motion to dismiss the spoliation claim was denied and Judge Gwin stated, “We will later sort through whether any loss of metadata has caused damage”.

So, what do you think? Should metadata be required to be included in production of key documents? Or is production of a physical document sufficient? Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Order for Financial Records and Facebook Conversations Modified Due to Privacy Rights – eDiscovery Case Law
 

In Stallings v. City of Johnston City, No. 13-cv-422-DRH-SCW, 2014 U.S. Dist. (S.D. III. May 19, 2014), Illinois Chief District Judge David R. Herndon modified an earlier order by a magistrate judge in response to the plaintiff’s appeal, claiming that the order violated the privacy rights of the plaintiff, and of minor children with whom the plaintiff had held conversations on Facebook.

The initial order concerned discovery production of the plaintiff’s financial records through a previously issued subpoena. The plaintiff had objected to this production, on the grounds that the defendant had not specified the information sought from the records, namely an unidentified amount of money missing from the defendant’s accounts. In the objection, the plaintiff stated a belief that “seeking the financial records is a fishing expedition on the [defendant’s] part.” However, the magistrate judge ordered the production of the records and found upon review several cash deposits that were deemed potentially relevant, and then directed that the production of the plaintiff’s financial records would be subject to a protective order.

On the matter of the Facebook conversations, the plaintiff had produced approximately 466 pages of printed documents from the relevant account, with the names redacted, in response to the defendant’s discovery request for “[e]ach and every social media posting by [plaintiff] from 2011 to the present concerning her employment” at the defendant, “allegations of wronging against her, her suspension or termination, the investigation into missing money or wrongdoing … her lawsuit, her emotional or physical well-being, or any other matter identified in her Amended Complaint.” The defendant objected to the redaction of names, to which the plaintiff responded that they did not have an unredacted hard copy of the pages due to technical difficulties involving Facebook’s policies. The magistrate judge directed the plaintiff to produce either an electronic version of the Facebook pages, or a hard copy of unredacted pages.

The plaintiff then appealed on these orders, arguing that “defendants have presented no basis to override her right to privacy in her bank records afforded under the Illinois Constitution” and further that the request for unredacted Facebook data “violates her privacy, as well as the privacy of minors and other individuals not involved in this litigation.” At issue regarding the Facebook pages was that Facebook only allows users to download the contents of their entire account, which would require the plaintiff to produce all of her Facebook conversations since 2007 if submitted as discovery, when the defendant requested only documents from 2011 onward.

Upon reviewing the issue of the financial records, Judge Herndon found that any evidence of cash deposits made to the plaintiff’s account during the specified time period were relevant to the defendant, but agreed that the plaintiff has a right to privacy of bank records. Therefore, it was ordered that discovery of evidence would be limited to only those deposits made in cash, “demonstrating that they were made in cash and on what date.”

With regard to the discovery issues concerning Facebook pages, Judge Herndon noted that while the plaintiff states potential violation of privacy for minors, the plaintiff had not indicated clearly whether any of the conversation relevant to the litigation had taken place with minors. Further, it was noted that some of the redacted pages did contain relevant conversations, or conversations that could be deemed relevant at a later date, such as potential admissions against interest or inconsistent testimony. Therefore, the plaintiff was ordered to produce “a redacted hard copy of all relevant Facebook pages from 2011 to the present” as well as “the names and towns of residence of the individuals with whom [plaintiff] had relevant conversations.” Further, “[i]f any of the relevant conversations are between individuals who are currently minors, [plaintiff] is not to provide defendants with the minor’s name or town of residence unless Ordered by the Court at a later date.”

So, what do you think? Are sufficient steps being taken to protect individual rights to privacy concerning discovery? Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

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