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eDiscovery Trends: For Da Silva Moore Addicts
 

I am getting prepared to head for sunny Los Angeles for LegalTech West Coast shortly, so today I’m getting by with a little help from my friends.  Tomorrow and Wednesday, I’ll be covering the show.  It wouldn’t be a week in eDiscovery without some tidbits about the Da Silva Moore case, so here are some other sources of information and perspectives about the eDiscovery case of the year (so far).  But, first, let’s recap.

Several weeks ago, in Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe & MSL Group, No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC) (AJP) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012), Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion making it likely the first case to accept the use of computer-assisted review of electronically stored information (“ESI”) for this case.  However, on March 13, District Court Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. granted plaintiffs’ request to submit additional briefing on their February 22 objections to the ruling.  In that briefing (filed on March 26), the plaintiffs claimed that the protocol approved for predictive coding “risks failing to capture a staggering 65% of the relevant documents in this case” and questioned Judge Peck’s relationship with defense counsel and with the selected vendor for the case, Recommind.

Then, on April 5, Judge Peck issued an order in response to Plaintiffs’ letter requesting his recusal, directing plaintiffs to indicate whether they would file a formal motion for recusal or ask the Court to consider the letter as the motion.  On April 13, (Friday the 13th, that is), the plaintiffs did just that, by formally requesting the recusal of Judge Peck (the defendants issued a response in opposition on April 30).  But, on April 25, Judge Carter issued an opinion and order in the case, upholding Judge Peck’s opinion approving computer-assisted review.

Not done, the plaintiffs filed an objection on May 9 to Judge Peck's rejection of their request to stay discovery pending the resolution of outstanding motions and objections (including the recusal motion, which has yet to be ruled on.  Then, last Monday, Judge Peck issued a stay, stopping defendant MSLGroup's production of electronically stored information.

More News

And, there’s even more news.  As Sean Doherty of Law Technology News reports, last Monday, Judge Peck denied an amicus curiae (i.e., friend-of-the-court) brief filed in support of the plaintiffs' motion for recusal.  For more on the filing and Judge Peck’s denial of the motion, click here.

Summary of Filings

Rob Robinson of ComplexD has provided a thorough summary of filings in a single PDF file.  He provides a listing of the filings, a Scribd plug-in viewer of the file – all 1,320 pages(!), so be patient as the page takes a little time to load – and a link to download the PDF file.  The ability to search through the entire case of filings for key issues and terms is well worth it.  Thanks, Rob!

Da Silva Moore and the Role of ACEDS

Also, Sharon Nelson of the Ride The Lightning blog (and a previous thought leader interviewee on this blog) has provided a very detailed blog post regarding the in depth investigation that the Association of Certified E-Discovery Specialists® (ACEDS™) has conducted on the case, including requesting financial disclosures for Judge Peck for 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 (for items including for “honoraria” and “teaching fees.”).  She wonders why “a certification body would want to be so heavily involved in an investigation of a judge in a very controversial case” and offers some possible thoughts as to why.  A very interesting read!

So, what do you think?  Are you “maxed out” on Da Silva Moore coverage yet?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Another Case with Inadmissible Text Messages
 

Yesterday, we discussed a case – Commonwealth v. Koch, No. 1669-MDA-2010, 2011 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2716 (Sept. 16, 2011) – where a Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled text messages inadmissible, declaring that parties seeking to introduce electronic materials, such as cell phone text messages and email, must be prepared to substantiate their claim of authorship with “circumstantial evidence” that corroborates the sender's identity.  That case is now being appealed to the state Supreme Court.  Today, we have another case – Rodriguez v. Nevada, No. 56413, 2012 WL 1136437 (Nev. Apr. 5, 2012) – where text messages were ruled inadmissible.

In this case, the Nevada Supreme Court found that a lower court abused its discretion in admitting text messages because the State failed to provide sufficient evidence corroborating the identity of the sender. The defendant, Kevin Rodriguez, was found guilty in trial court of multiple counts associated with an attack of a woman in her home. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in overruling an objection to the admission of 12 text messages because the state failed to authenticate the messages and the messages constituted inadmissible hearsay.

Citing Commonwealth v. Koch, among other cases, the Nevada Supreme Court found that it is necessary that the identity of the author of the text message be established through corroborating evidence presented. In this case, the state did establish that the victim’s cell phone was stolen during the attack, and that the defendant was in possession of the cell phone prior to being arrested.

The court noted that “Text messages offer new analytical challenges when courts consider their admissibility.  However, those challenges do not require a deviation from basic evidentiary rules applied when determining authentication and hearsay.”  Further noting that “establishing the identity of the author of a text message through the use of corroborating evidence is critical to satisfying the authentication requirement for admissibility", the court concluded that when there has been an objection to admissibility of a text message, “the proponent of the evidence must explain the purpose for which the text message is being offered and provide sufficient direct or circumstantial corroborating evidence of authorship in order to authenticate the text message as a condition precedent to its admission”.

Since the state did not offer any corroborating evidence that the defendant authored 10 of the 12 text messages, those messages were ruled as inadmissible.  The other two messages were deemed admissible and not considered to be hearsay because in those instances, the state was able to present bus surveillance video of the defendant participating in using the phone at the time those two messages were sent. Despite the erroneous admission of the other 10 text messages, however, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the error was harmless as there was a considerable amount of other evidence pointing to the guilt of the defendant.

So, what do you think?  Should text messages be ruled inadmissible without corroborating evidence?  Will cases like this significantly reduce the use of text messages as evidence in litigation?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Inadmissibility of Text Messages Being Appealed
 

Last October, we covered a case – Commonwealth v. Koch, No. 1669-MDA-2010, 2011 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2716 (Sept. 16, 2011) – where a Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled text messages inadmissible, declaring that parties seeking to introduce electronic materials, such as cell phone text messages and email, must be prepared to substantiate their claim of authorship with “circumstantial evidence” that corroborates the sender's identity.  That case, where Amy N. Koch was originally convicted at trial on drug charges (partially due to text messages found on her cell phone), is now being appealed to the state Supreme Court.

This article from The Legal Intelligencer regarding the case, notes the following:

“The justices limited the appeal to two issues, leaving the language used by the state intact.

First, the justices will examine whether the text messages “were not offered for their truth” and were therefore admissible. The state questioned whether the Superior Court, in reversing a Cumberland County judge’s decision to admit the texts, had ruled against its own previous holding in another case and thusly created “uncertainty in the law.”

The high court is also tasked with reviewing the case in terms of Pa.R.E. 901, on “Requirement of Authentication or Identification.” According to the Tuesday allocatur grant, prosecutors asked the court to examine whether the Superior Court panel “misapprehended” Rule 901, again going against its own jurisprudence and again creating “uncertainty.”

Despite a victory before the intermediate appellate court, Koch’s attorney called the justice’s decision to take up the case “good news.”

For Camp Hill, Pa., attorney Michael O. Palermo Jr., the challenge represents a chance for the high court to set precedent against electronic documents “blindly coming into evidence.”

“I have a problem with that and I hope the Supreme Court does too,” Palermo told The Legal following the grant of allocatur.”

So, what do you think?  Was the Superior court right in ruling against the admission of these text messages as evidence? Will the State Supreme Court uphold the decision to rule the text messages as inadmissible?  If they do, will that decision create more eDiscovery problems than it solves?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Judge Peck Stays Defendant’s Production in Da Silva Moore
 

Yesterday, we discussed the latest event in the eDiscovery case of the year – the defendant’s response opposing the plaintiff’s motion for recusal.  I thought today we would discuss the plaintiffs’ latest objection – to United States District Court Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck's rejection of their request to stay discovery pending the resolution of outstanding motions and objections.  However, news in this case happens quickly.

In a short, one-page order on Monday, Judge Peck issued a stay, stopping defendant MSLGroup's production of electronically stored information in Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe & MSL Group, (Case No. 11-CV-1279).

Here is the content of the order:

“On reconsideration, for the reasons stated at today's conference (see transcript), the Court has granted plaintiffs' request to stay MSL's production of ESI, pending Judge Carter's decision on plaintiffs' motions for collective action certification and to amend their complaint.  Defendants have consented to the stay. Jurisdictional discovery regarding Publicis, and discovery between plaintiff and MSL unrelated to MSL's ESI production, are not stayed.

Plaintiffs' May 9, 2012 objections to my prior denial of the stay (Dkt. No. 190) are moot.”

That’s it – short and sweet (to the plaintiffs, at least).

This came after the plaintiffs filed an objection last Wednesday (May 9) to Judge Peck's rejection of their request to stay discovery pending the resolution of outstanding motions and objections. Those motions include a ruling on the plaintiffs' objections to Judge Peck's dismissal of the plaintiffs' issues associated with discovery with predictive coding, the plaintiffs' motion for Peck to recuse himself from the case and motions for conditional certification of collective action and for leave to file a second amended complaint.

For a brief recap and links to prior events in this highly contentious case, yesterday’s blog post provides background since Judge Peck’s order approving computer-assisted review.

More to come, I’m sure.

So, what do you think?  Will computer-assisted review be derailed in this case after all?  Was Judge Peck right to stay production?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Defendant Responds to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Recusal in Da Silva Moore
 

Geez, you take a week or so to cover some different topics and a few things happen in the most talked about eDiscovery case of the year.  Time to catch up!  Today, we’ll talk about the response of the defendant MSLGroup Americas to the plaintiffs’ motion for recusal in the Da Silva Moore case.  Tomorrow, we will discuss the plaintiffs’ latest objection – to Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck's rejection of their request to stay discovery pending the resolution of outstanding motions and objections.  But, first, a quick recap.

Several weeks ago, in Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe & MSL Group, No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC) (AJP) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012), Judge Peck of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion making it likely the first case to accept the use of computer-assisted review of electronically stored information (“ESI”) for this case.  However, on March 13, District Court Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. granted plaintiffs’ request to submit additional briefing on their February 22 objections to the ruling.  In that briefing (filed on March 26), the plaintiffs claimed that the protocol approved for predictive coding “risks failing to capture a staggering 65% of the relevant documents in this case” and questioned Judge Peck’s relationship with defense counsel and with the selected vendor for the case, Recommind.

Then, on April 5, Judge Peck issued an order in response to Plaintiffs’ letter requesting his recusal, directing plaintiffs to indicate whether they would file a formal motion for recusal or ask the Court to consider the letter as the motion.  On April 13, (Friday the 13th, that is), the plaintiffs did just that, by formally requesting the recusal of Judge Peck.  But, on April 25, Judge Carter issued an opinion and order in the case, upholding Judge Peck’s opinion approving computer-assisted review.

As for the motion for recusal, that’s still pending.  On Monday, April 30, the defendant filed a response (not surprisingly) opposing the motion for recusal.  In its Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Recusal or Disqualification, the defendants noted the following:

  • Plaintiffs Agreed to the Use of Predictive Coding: Among the arguments here, the defendants noted that, after prior discussions regarding predictive coding, on January 3, the “[p]laintiffs submitted to the Court their proposed version of the ESI Protocol, which relied on the use of predictive coding. Similarly, during the January 4, 2012 conference itself, Plaintiffs, through their e-discovery vendor, DOAR, confirmed not only that Plaintiffs had agreed to the use of predictive coding, but also that Plaintiffs agreed with some of the details of the search methodology, including the “confidence levels” proposed by MSL.”
  • It Was Well Known that Judge Peck Was a Leader In eDiscovery Before The Case Was Assigned to Him: The defendants referenced, among other things, that Judge Peck’s October 2011 article, Search, Forward discussed “computer-assisted coding,” and that Judge Peck stated in the article: “Until there is a judicial decision approving (or even critiquing) the use of predictive coding, counsel will just have to rely on this article as a sign of judicial approval.”
  • Ralph Losey Had No Ex Parte Contact with Judge Peck: The defendants noted that their expert, Ralph Losey, “has never discussed this case with Judge Peck” and that his “mere appearance” at seminars and conferences “does not warrant disqualification of all judges who also appear.”

As a result, the defendants argued that the court should deny plaintiffs motion for recusal because:

  • Judge Peck’s “Well-Known Expertise in and Ongoing Discourse on the Topic of Predictive Coding Are Not Grounds for His Disqualification”;
  • His “Professional Relationship with Ralph Losey Does Not Mandate Disqualification”;
  • His “Comments, Both In and Out of the Courtroom, Do Not Warrant Recusal”; and
  • His “Citation to Articles in his February 24, 2012 Opinion Was Proper”.

For details on these arguments, click the link to the Memorandum above.  Judge Carter has yet to rule on the motion for recusal.

So, what do you think?  Did the defendants make an effective argument or should Judge Peck be recused?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Trends: EDRM and Statistical Sampling
 

I’ve been proud to be a member of The Electronic Discovery Reference Model (EDRM) for the past six years (all but the first year) and I’m always keen to report on activities and accomplishments of the various working groups within EDRM.  Since this blog was founded, we’ve reported on 1) the unveiling of the EDRM Data Set, which has become a standard for useful eDiscovery test and demo data, 2) the EDRM Metrics Privilege Survey (which I helped draft), to collect typical volumes and percentages of privileged documents throughout the industry, 3) Model Code of Conduct which focuses on the ethical duties of eDiscovery service providers, and 4) the collaboration between EDRM and ARMA and subsequent joint Information Governance white paper.  EDRM’s latest announcement yesterday is a new guide, Statistical Sampling Applied to Electronic Discovery, which is now available for review and comment. 

As EDRM notes in their announcement, “The purpose of the guide is to provide guidance regarding the use of statistical sampling in e-discovery contexts. Most of the material is definitional and conceptual, and is intended for a broad audience. The later material and the accompanying spreadsheet provide additional information, particularly technical information, to people in e-discovery roles who become responsible for developing further expertise in this area.”

The Guide is comprised of six sections, as follows:

  1. Introduction: Includes basic concepts and definitions, alludes to mathematical techniques to be discussed in more detail in subsequent sections, identifies potential eDiscovery situations where sampling techniques may be useful and identifies areas not covered in this initial guide.
  2. Estimating Proportions within a Binary Population: Provides some common sense observations as to why sampling is useful, along with a straightforward explanation of statistical terminology and the interdependence of sample size, margin of error/confidence range and confidence level.
  3. Guidelines and Considerations: Provides guidelines for effective statistical sampling, such as cull prior to sampling, account for family relationships, simple vs. stratified random sampling and use of sampling in machine learning, among others.
  4. Additional Guidance on Statistical Theory: Covers mathematical concepts such as binomial distribution, hypergeometric distribution, and normal distribution.  Bring your mental “slide-rule”!
  5. Examples Using the Accompanying Excel Spreadsheet: Describes an attached workbook (EDRM Statistics Examples 20120427.xlsm) that contains six sheets that include a notes section as well as basic, observed and population normal approximation models and basic and observed binomial methods to assist in learning these different sampling methods.
  6. Validation Study: References a Daegis article that provides an empirical study of sampling in the eDiscovery context.  In addition to that article, consider reading our previous posts on determining an appropriate sample size to test your search, how to generate a random selection and a practical example to test your search using sampling.

Comments can be posted at any of the EDRM Statistical Sampling pages, or emailed to the group at mail@edrm.net.  As a big proponent of statistical sampling as an effective and cost-effective method for verifying results, I’m very interested to see where this guide goes and how people will use it.  BTW, EDRM’s Annual Kickoff Meeting is next week (May 16 and 17) in St. Paul, MN – it’s not too late to become a member and help shape the future of eDiscovery with other industry leaders!

So, what do you think?  Do you perform statistical sampling to verify results within your eDiscovery process?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Trends: For an Appropriate eDiscovery Outcome, Call the Master
 

Special Master, that is.

Last week, Fios sponsored a webcast entitled Special Masters & e-Discovery with Craig Ball, who, in addition to being a prolific contributor to continuing legal and professional education programs throughout the US (and previous thought leader interviewee on this blog) has served as court-appointed special master in 30 cases (including at least one case covered here).  Not surprisingly, the webcast was very informative, reflecting Craig’s considerable experience and knowledge in having served in that role in so many cases.  A few highlights:

  • Appointing a Special Master: In Federal cases, Fed. R. Civ. P. 53 discusses the ability for a court to appoint a master with the parties’ consent.  Several states also have equivalent rules, for example, Rule 171 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure governs the ability to do so in Texas.
  • Circumstances Where Special Master is Most Often Required: Special masters are typically called in when special knowledge is required that neither party (nor their experts) possesses, or when one party is suspected of malfeasance.  Craig estimated that about half of the thirty cases where he has been retained have been because of suspected malfeasance by one party.  From an expertise standpoint, Craig noted that he most often fills this role related to a computer forensics need.
  • To Be “Special”, You Need to “Master” More than One Skill: Special masters need not only to be able to understand the law, they also need to understand systems, forms of ESI, mechanisms for preservation and formats of production.  In other words, they need the ability to “speak Geek”.
  • Special Masters Are Different From Mediators: A mediator’s job is to obtain agreement between parties.  While a special master may also do that to a degree, he/she must also apply good sense to the situation.  Craig’s analogy was that “just because both lawyers believe that they can fly” doesn’t mean that the special master should concur with that agreement.
  • Why Not Rely on the Judge for Such Services?:  Craig noted that many judges don’t have the technical expertise to adequately address all eDiscovery issues, so a special master can be called upon to provide recommendations regarding those issues to the Court.
  • Special Masters Are, Unsurprisingly, Not Free: Typically, they charge “senior partner” rates, reflecting their advanced level of expertise and experience.  Who pays?  It depends on the case, but potential malfeasance by a party can slant the costs to that party.  Special masters add value that can result in potentially significant cost savings to one or both parties, so they typically recoup those costs (and, often, a lot more).

The webcast also referenced two articles related to the subject of special masters and eDiscovery:

  • E‐Discovery: A Special Master's Perspective: Written by Craig himself, this nine page article talks about the pros and cons of Special Masters, the eight questions that lawyers need to be able to answer when working with special masters and the three typical reasons that eDiscovery fails, among other topics.  It also provides a terrific appendix with a two page Exemplar ESI Special Master Appointment Order.
  • Special Masters and e-Discovery: The Intersection of Two Recent Revisions to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: This fifty-nine page article was written by The Honorable Shira A. Scheindlin (United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York and presiding judge of the notable Zubulake v. UBS Warburg case) & Jonathan M. Redgrave (founding partner of the firm of Redgrave, Daley, Ragan & Wagner and Chair Emeritus of The Sedona Conference’s® Working Group on Best Practices for Electronic Document Retention and Production).  It discusses the changes to Rule 53, governing the appointment of special masters and the changes to the Federal Rules for eDiscovery, suggesting appropriate uses for special masters for legal and technical issues.

If you missed the webcast (which is too bad, because Craig was entertaining and informative, as always), these articles provide good information on the use of special masters in eDiscovery.

So, what do you think?  Have you ever used a special master to address eDiscovery issues?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery BREAKING Case Law: Judge Carter Upholds Judge Peck’s Predictive Coding Order

A few weeks ago, in Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe & MSL Group, No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC) (AJP) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012), Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion making it likely the first case to accept the use of computer-assisted review of electronically stored information (“ESI”) for this case.  However, on March 13, District Court Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. granted plaintiffs’ request to submit additional briefing on their February 22 objections to the ruling.  In that briefing (filed on March 26), the plaintiffs claimed that the protocol approved for predictive coding “risks failing to capture a staggering 65% of the relevant documents in this case” and questioned Judge Peck’s relationship with defense counsel and with the selected vendor for the case, Recommind.  Then, on April 5, Judge Peck issued an order in response to Plaintiffs’ letter requesting his recusal, directing plaintiffs to indicate whether they would file a formal motion for recusal or ask the Court to consider the letter as the motion.  On April 13, (Friday the 13th, that is), the plaintiffs did just that, by formally requesting the recusal of Judge Peck.

Now, on April 25 (signed two days ago and filed yesterday), Judge Carter has issued an opinion and order in the case, upholding Judge Peck’s opinion approving computer-assisted review.  In the opinion and order, Judge Carter noted:

“[T]he Court adopts Judge Peck’s rulings because they are well reasoned and they consider the potential advantages and pitfalls of the predictive coding software. The Court has thoroughly reviewed the ESI protocol along with the parties’ submissions.  At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiffs and Judge Peck disagree about the scope of Plaintiffs’ acquiescence concerning the use of the method. Judge Peck’s written order states that Plaintiffs have consented to its use, (Opinion and Order at 17 (“The decision to allow computer-assisted review in this case was relatively easy – the parties agreed to its use (although disagreed about how best to implement such review.”))), while Plaintiffs argue that Judge Peck’s order mischaracterizes their position (Pl. Reply, dated March 19, 2012, at 4-5). Nevertheless, the confusion is immaterial because the ESI protocol contains standards for measuring the reliability of the process and the protocol builds in levels of participation by Plaintiffs. It provides that the search methods will be carefully crafted and tested for quality assurance, with Plaintiffs participating in their implementation. For example, Plaintiffs’ counsel may provide keywords and review the documents and the issue coding before the production is made. If there is a concern with the relevance of the culled documents, the parties may raise the issue before Judge Peck before the final production. Further, upon the receipt of the production, if Plaintiffs determine that they are missing relevant documents, they may revisit the issue of whether the software is the best method. At this stage, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the use of the predictive coding software will deny Plaintiffs access to liberal discovery. “

“Plaintiffs’ arguments concerning the reliability of the method are also premature. It is difficult to ascertain that the predictive software is less reliable than the traditional keyword search. Experts were present during the February 8 conference and Judge Peck heard from these experts. The lack of a formal evidentiary hearing at the conference is a minor issue because if the method appears unreliable as the litigation continues and the parties continue to dispute its effectiveness, the Magistrate Judge may then conduct an evidentiary hearing. Judge Peck is in the best position to determine when and if an evidentiary hearing is required and the exercise of his discretion is not contrary to law. Judge Peck has ruled that if the predictive coding software is flawed or if Plaintiffs are not receiving the types of documents that should be produced, the parties are allowed to reconsider their methods and raise their concerns with the Magistrate Judge. The Court understands that the majority of documentary evidence has to be produced by MSLGroup and that Plaintiffs do not have many documents of their own. If the method provided in the protocol does not work or if the sample size is indeed too small to properly apply the technology, the Court will not preclude Plaintiffs from receiving relevant information, but to call the method unreliable at this stage is speculative.”

“There simply is no review tool that guarantees perfection. The parties and Judge Peck have acknowledged that there are risks inherent in any method of reviewing electronic documents. Manual review with keyword searches is costly, though appropriate in certain situations. However, even if all parties here were willing to entertain the notion of manually reviewing the documents, such review is prone to human error and marred with inconsistencies from the various attorneys’ determination of whether a document is responsive. Judge Peck concluded that under the circumstances of this particular case, the use of the predictive coding software as specified in the ESI protocol is more appropriate than keyword searching. The Court does not find a basis to hold that his conclusion is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Thus, Judge Peck’s orders are adopted and Plaintiffs’ objections are denied.”

So, what do you think?  Will this settle the issue?  Or will the plaintiffs attempt another strategy to derail the approved predictive coding plan?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Is the Third Time the Charm for Technology Assisted Review?
 

A few weeks ago, in Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe & MSL Group, Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck issued an opinion making it the first case to accept the use of computer-assisted review of electronically stored information (“ESI”) for this case.  Or, so we thought.  Now, the plaintiff has objected to the plan and even formally requested the recusal of Judge Peck.  Conversely, in Kleen Products LLC v. Packaging Corporation of America, et al., the plaintiffs have asked Magistrate Judge Nan Nolan to require the producing parties to employ a technology assisted review approach (referred to as "content-based advanced analytics," or CBAA) in their production of documents for discovery purposes, and that request is currently being considered.  Now, there’s a third case where the use of technology assisted review is actually being approved in an order by the judge.

In Global Aerospace Inc., et al, v. Landow Aviation, L.P. dba Dulles Jet Center, et al, Virginia State Circuit Court Judge James H. Chamblin ordered that the defendants can use predictive coding for discovery in this case, despite the plaintiff's objections that the technology is not as effective as human review.  The order was issued after the defendants issued a motion requesting either that predictive coding technology be allowed in the case or that the plaintiffs pay any additional costs associated with traditional review.  The defendant has an 8 terabyte data set that they are hoping to reduce to a few hundred gigabytes through advanced culling techniques.

In ruling, Judge Chamblin noted: “Having heard argument with regard to the Motion of Landow Aviation Limited Partnership, Landow Aviation I, Inc., and Landow Company Builders, Inc., pursuant to Virginia Rules of Supreme Court 4:1(b) and (c) and 4:15, it is hereby ordered Defendants shall be allowed to proceed with the use of predictive coding for purposes of processing and production of electronically stored information.”

Judge Chamblin’s order specified 60 days for processing, and another 60 days for production and noted that the receiving party will still be able to question "the completeness of the contents of the production or the ongoing use of predictive coding."  (Editor’s note: I would have included the entire quote, but it’s handwritten and Judge Chamblin has handwriting almost as bad as mine!)

As in the other cases, it will be interesting to see what happens next.  Will the plaintiff attempt to appeal or even attempt a Da Silva-like push for recusal of the Judge?  Or will they accept the decision and gear their efforts toward scrutinizing the resulting production?  Stay tuned.

So, what do you think?  Will this be the landmark case that becomes the first court-approved use of technology assisted review?  Or will the parties continue to “fight it out”?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Friday the 13th Is Unlucky for Judge Peck
 

A few weeks ago, in Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe & MSL Group, No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC) (AJP) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012), Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion making it likely the first case to accept the use of computer-assisted review of electronically stored information (“ESI”) for this case.  However, on March 13, District Court Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. granted plaintiffs’ request to submit additional briefing on their February 22 objections to the ruling.  In that briefing (filed on March 26), the plaintiffs claimed that the protocol approved for predictive coding “risks failing to capture a staggering 65% of the relevant documents in this case” and questioned Judge Peck’s relationship with defense counsel and with the selected vendor for the case, Recommind.  Then, on April 5, Judge Peck issued an order in response to Plaintiffs’ letter requesting his recusal, directing plaintiffs to indicate whether they would file a formal motion for recusal or ask the Court to consider the letter as the motion.

This past Friday, April 13, the plaintiffs filed their formal motion, which included a Notice of Motion for Recusal or Disqualification, Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Recusal or Disqualification and Declaration of Steven L. Wittels in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Recusal or Disqualification.

In the 28 page Memorandum of Law, the plaintiffs made several arguments that they contended justified Judge Peck’s recusal in this case.  They included:

  • In the first conference over which Judge Peck presided on December 2, 2011, he remarked that Defendants “must have thought they died and went to Heaven” to have him assigned to this case and he subsequently repeated that remark in at least two public panels afterward.  In one of the panel appearances, he also (according to the plaintiffs) acknowledged that the plaintiffs’ only alternative was to ask him to recuse himself (in that same panel discussion, Judge Peck also quoted the plaintiff as saying “Oh no no, we’re ok with using computer-assisted review; we just had some questions about the exact process”).
  • In the second status conference held before Judge Peck on January 4, the plaintiffs noted that he encouraged the defendants to enlist the assistance of their eDiscovery counsel, Ralph Losey – whom Judge Peck claimed to know “very well.” During the next four weeks, Judge Peck served on three public panels with defense counsel Losey about predictive coding which the plaintiffs referred to as “ex parte contacts” where the plaintiffs were not informed.  Judge Peck also wrote an article last year entitled Search Forward, where, according to the plaintiffs, he “cited favorably to defense counsel Losey's blog post Go Fish” and Losey responded “in kind to Judge Peck‟s article by posting a blog entry, entitled Judge Peck Calls Upon Lawyers to Use Artificial Intelligence and Jason Barn[sic] Warns of a Dark Future of Information Burn-Out If We Don’t, where he embraced Judge Peck's position on predictive coding”.
  • One week after the LegalTech trade show, on February 8, the plaintiffs contended that “Judge Peck adopted Defendant MSL’s predictive coding protocol wholesale from the bench” and, on February 24 (link above), he issued the written order “[f]or the benefit of the Bar”.  Some of the materials cited were authored by Judge Peck, Ralph Losey, and Maura R. Grossman, eDiscovery counsel at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, all of whom served together on the panel at LegalTech.
  • The plaintiffs also noted that Judge Peck “confirms that he received, at a minimum, transportation, lodging, and meals free of cost for no less than 10 appearances at eDiscovery conferences in 2010” and did not disclose this compensation (or compensation for similar appearances in 2011 and 2012) to the plaintiffs.  They also noted that Judge Peck failed to inform them of Recommind’s sponsorship of the LegalTech conference where Judge Peck participated on panel discussions regarding predictive coding.

Regardless whether Judge Peck is partial or not, the plaintiffs argued in the Memorandum that “§ 455(a) requires a judge‟s recusal for the mere appearance of impropriety or partiality – i.e. if a reasonable outsider might entertain a plausible suspicion or doubt as to the judge‟s impartiality”.

In his order on April 5, Judge Peck noted that the “defendants will have 14 days to respond”, so it will be interesting to see if they do and what that response entails.  They will certainly have some bold statements to address from the plaintiffs if they do respond.

So, what do you think?  Do the plaintiffs make a valid argument for recusal?  Or is this just a case of “sour grapes” on their part for disagreeing, not with predictive coding in general, but the specific approach to predictive coding addressed in Judge Peck’s order of February 24?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.