Close
Enter your
text here

Case Law

Award to Apple in Samsung Case Cut Almost in Half, For Now – eDiscovery Case Law

In Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Case No.: C 11-CV-01846-LHK (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2013), District Judge Lucy Koh reduced the amount of the previous jury award against Samsung in its ongoing intellectual property case from nearly $1.05 billion to over $598 million, due to ordering a new trial on damages for several Samsung products that amounted to over $450 million being stricken from the jury’s award.

In August of last year, a jury of nine found that Samsung infringed all but one of the seven patents at issue and found all seven of Apple’s patents valid – despite Samsung’s attempts to have them thrown out. They also determined that Apple didn’t violate any of the five patents Samsung asserted in the case.  Apple had been requesting $2.5 billion in damages.  Apple later requested additional damages of $707 million to be added to the $1.05 billion jury verdict.  This case was notable from an eDiscovery perspective due to the adverse inference instruction issued by California Magistrate Judge Paul S. Grewal against Samsung just prior to the start of trial for spoliation of data, though it appears that the adverse inference instruction did not have a significant impact in the verdict.

Notice of the Patents

A significant portion of this ruling was related to notice of the patents.  As Judge Koh noted in her ruling, “Under 35 U.S.C. § 287(a), there can be no damages award where a defendant did not have actual or constructive notice of the patent or registered trade dress at issue. Thus, it is improper to award damages for sales made before the defendant had notice of the patent, and an award that includes damages for sales made before notice of any of the intellectual property (“IP”) infringed is excessive as a matter of law.”  The parties disputed whether Apple had given Samsung notice of each of the patents prior to the filing of the complaint and the amended complaint.

Apple had provided to the Court numbers necessary to calculate Samsung’s profits and reasonable royalty awards based on damages numbers provided by Apple’s damages expert, but with later notice dates, enabling the Court, for some products, to calculate how much of the jury’s award compensated for the sales before Samsung had notice of the relevant IP.  However, as Judge Koh noted, “for other products, the jury awarded an impermissible form of damages for some period of time, because Samsung had notice only of utility patents for some period, but an award of infringer’s profits was made covering the entire period from August 4, 2010 to June 15, 2012. For these products, the Court cannot remedy the problem by simply subtracting the extra sales.” {emphasis added}  The Court had instructed the jury that infringer’s profits are not a legally permissible remedy for utility patent infringement.

Ruling

Therefore, Judge Koh ordered a new trial on damages for 14 products, totaling $450,514,650 being stricken from the jury’s award.  This left an award of $598,908,892 on the remaining awarded products.

So, what do you think?  What will be the final award and how much will it cost to determine that?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

EEOC Sanctioned for Failing to Comply with Motion to Compel Production – eDiscovery Case Law

As noted previously in this blog, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was ordered to turn over social media information related to a class action case alleging sexual harassment and retaliation.  Apparently, they were less than cooperative in complying with that order.

In EEOC v. Original Honeybaked Ham Co. of Georgia, 11-cv-02560-MSK-MEH, 2012 U.S. Dist. (D. Colo. Feb. 27, 2013), Colorado Magistrate Judge Michael E. Hegarty sanctioned the EEOC for failing to provide discovery of social media content.

This has been a busy case with at least eight court rulings in 2013 alone, including ruling where Judge Hegarty barred the EEOC from asserting claims not specifically identified during pre-suit litigation and prohibited the EEOC from seeking relief on behalf of individuals who the defendant could not reasonably identify from the information provided by the EEOC.

In this ruling, Judge Hegarty stated: “I agree that the EEOC has, on several occasions, caused unnecessary expense and delay in this case. In certain respects, the EEOC has been negligent in its discovery obligations, dilatory in cooperating with defense counsel, and somewhat cavalier in its responsibility to the United States District Court.”

Elaborating, Judge Hegarty stated, as follows:

“The offending conduct has been demonstrated in several aspects of the EEOC’s discovery obligations. These include, without limitation, the following. First, the circumstances surrounding the EEOC’s representations to this Court concerning its decision to use its own information technology personnel to engage in forensic discovery of the Claimants’ social media (cell phones for texting, web sites for blogging, computers for emailing), for which I had originally appointed a special master. The EEOC unequivocally requested this change, which I made an Order of the Court on November 14, 2012 (docket #248). Weeks later, the EEOC reneged on this representation, requiring the Court and the Defendant to go back to the drawing board. Second, in a similar vein, the EEOC changed its position — again ostensibly because some supervisor(s) did not agree with the decisions that the line attorneys had made — after lengthy negotiation and agreement with Defendant concerning the contents of a questionnaire to be given to the Claimants in this case, designed to assist in identifying the social media that would be forensically examined. The EEOC’s change of mind in midstream (and sometimes well downstream) has required the Defendant to pay its attorneys more than should have been required and has multiplied and delayed these proceedings unnecessarily.”

Stating that he had “for some time, believed that the EEOC’s conduct was causing the Defendant to spend more money in this lawsuit than necessary”, Judge Hegarty granted (in part) the defendants’ Motion for Sanctions and required the EEOC to “pay the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs expended in bringing this Motion”.  Perhaps more to come.

So, what do you think?  Was the sanction sufficient?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Rules Production Must be TIFFs with Bates Numbers – eDiscovery Case Law

In Branhaven, LLC v. Beeftek, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist., (D. Md. Jan. 4, 2013), Maryland Magistrate Judge Susan K. Gauvey sanctioned plaintiff’s attorneys for wrongfully certifying the completeness of their eDiscovery production and also ruled that defendants “demonstrated that without Bates stamping and .tiff format”, the plaintiff’s production “was not reasonably usable and therefore was insufficient under Rule 34”.

In this trademark infringement suit, the defendants alleged numerous instances of “discovery abuses intended to harass defendants, cause unnecessary delay, and needlessly increase the cost of litigation” by the plaintiff, resulting in $51,122 in legal fees and expenses related to the plaintiff’s “document dump” of 112,000 pages of electronically stored information (ESI).  The Plaintiffs produced their ESI in PDF format, which was challenged by the defendants, because the production was untimely and not in TIFF format with Bates Numbers on every page.

While noting that the court did not “want to micromanage discovery between counsel”, Judge Gauvey stated however that “neither does this judge want to endorse this ‘hands off’ approach in working with clients to meet discovery obligations and this casual and even reckless attitude of plaintiff’s counsel to opposing party’s right to timely and orderly discovery.”

With regard to the PDF production, Judge Gauvey referred to the plaintiff’s contention that “the Protocol for Discovery of Electronically Stored Information (Local Rules of District of Maryland) which states that TIFF is the preferred format is only advisory” as a “weak defense”.

Judge Gauvey also noted “as defendants point out, Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(ii) provides two options regarding the form in which a party may produce documents and plaintiff did not satisfy either. The July 20 production was not in a form ‘in which it is ordinarily maintained’ or in ‘a reasonably usable form’…The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 34 warn that: ‘[a] party that responds to a discovery request by simply producing electronically stored information in a form of its choice, without identifying that form in advance of the production in the response required by Rule 34(b) runs the risk that the requesting party can show that the produced form is not reasonably usable’…That is precisely what happened here…Defendant was blindsided by the volume of the documents (since the prior productions consisted of 388 pages). Moreover, defendants had every reason to think that the documents would be completely Bates-stamped, as prior productions were and further defendants had no reason to think that this production would be so incredibly voluminous, as to require special arrangements and explicit agreement.”

Judge Gauvey ordered the defendant to submit a bill of costs by January 15 for the technical fees they incurred to process the flawed production (which they did, for $2,200). The plaintiff also agreed to pay an undisclosed sum in attorneys’ fees related to the sanctions motion.

On the surface, the ruling that “without Bates stamping and .tiff format, the data was not reasonably usable and therefore was insufficient under Rule 34” appears to take a step backward with regard to production format expectations.  However, the ruling also notes that the production “was not in a form ‘in which it is ordinarily maintained’” and the plaintiff’s previous PDF productions (apparently Bates stamped) and the defendant’s productions in PDF format (also presumably Bates stamped) were allowed.  Perhaps, if the plaintiff had produced the files in native format instead of a poorly executed PDF format production, the ruling would have been different?

So, what do you think?  Does this ruling appear to be a setback for native productions?  Or merely reflection of a poorly executed PDF format production?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Must Losing Plaintiff Pay Defendant $2.8 Million for Predictive Coding of One Million Documents? Court Says Yes – eDiscovery Case Law

In Gabriel Technologies Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., (Dist. Court, SD Cal., February, 1 2013), District Judge Anthony J. Battaglia awarded the defendant over $12.4 million in attorneys’ fees to be paid by the losing plaintiff in the case.  The amount included over $2.8 million for “computer-assisted, algorithm-driven document review” and nearly $392,000 for contract attorneys to review documents identified by the algorithm as responsive.

Defendants filed motions for summary judgment in this four year patent and breach of contract case in September 2011 and August 2012 and ultimately successfully obtained judgment in their favor for all of the plaintiff’s claims (pending appeal).  Then, on October 12, 2012, the defendants filed a motion for recovery of attorneys’ fees in the case – to the tune of $13.4 million.

One key component of the request for fees in the October 2012 motion was the request to recover fees of $2,829,349.10 “for document review performed by complex computer algorithm generated by San Francisco-based H5”.  As noted in the motion:

“Over the course of this litigation, Defendants collected almost 12,000,000 records—most in the form of Electronically Stored Information (ESI)…Rather than review this entire volume, the parties negotiated and agreed to a set of search terms early in this litigation to cull irrelevant documents from the review population. Defendants applied those terms across all the ESI Defendants collected for this case. Rather than manually reviewing the huge volume of resultant records, Defendants paid H5 to employ its proprietary technology to sort these records into responsive and non-responsive documents…The H5 algorithm made initial responsiveness determinations for more than one million documents.”

Based on the above citation, it seems evident that the H5 algorithm was used only after keyword search terms reduced the set to more than one million documents, not on the original 12 million documents.  And, the fees for applying the algorithm to those one million documents were over $2.8 million, or roughly in the range of $2.80 per document.  Interesting…

The motion also requested recovery of $391,928.91 in fees assessed by Black Letter for human review of the resulting identified responsive documents, noted as follows: “Black Letter Discovery’s attorneys reviewed those documents already deemed responsive by the H5 algorithm and checked them for confidentiality, privilege, and relevance.”

In his ruling, Judge Battaglia noted with regard to the fees for the algorithm and for human review:

“For this reason, the review performed by H5 and Black Letter accomplished different objectives with the H5 electronic process minimizing the overall work for Black Letter. Again, the Court finds Cooley’s decision to undertake a more efficient and less time-consuming method of document review to be reasonable under the circumstances. In this case, the nature of Plaintiffs’ claims resulted in significant discovery and document production, and Cooley seemingly reduced the overall fees and attorney hours required by performing electronic document review at the outset. Thus, the Court finds the requested amount of $2,829,349.10 to be reasonable.”

As a result, Judge Battaglia awarded the fees for both the algorithm and for human review as part of an overall award of $12,401,014.51 (about $1 million less than the total requested).  Plaintiff’s local counsel was also ordered to pay $64,316.50 to the defendants as part of the judgment.

So, what do you think?  Does that appear to be a reasonable cost for predictive coding of one million documents?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Stored Communications Act Limits Production of Google Emails – eDiscovery Case Law

In Optiver Australia Pty. Ltd. & Anor. v. Tibra Trading Pty. Ltd. & Ors. (N.D.Cal., January 23, 2013), California Magistrate Judge Paul S. Grewal granted much of the defendant’s motion to quash subpoena of Google for electronic communications sent or received by certain Gmail accounts allegedly used by employees of the defendant because most of the request violated the terms of the Stored Communications Act.

The plaintiff alleged that several of its former employees copied the plaintiff’s proprietary source code, left the plaintiff company, and used the code to found the defendant in 2006.  After receiving a production from the defendant, the plaintiff “suspected that key emails relating to the allegedly stolen code were previously deleted”; as a result, the Federal Court of Australia ordered further discovery.  The defendant filed an ex parte application for judicial assistance pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to serve a subpoena upon Google for documents to be used in the foreign proceeding, which was granted.

The plaintiff submitted two requests to Google, as follows:

  • “Request One: Documents sufficient to identify the recipient(s), sender, subject, date sent, date received, date read, and date deleted of emails, email attachments, or Google Talk messages that contain either of the terms ‘PGP’ or ‘Optiver’ (case insensitive) sent or received between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2007” for selected email addresses; and
  • “Request Two: Documents sufficient to show the recipient(s), sender, subject, date sent, date received, date read, and date deleted of emails, email attachments, or Google Talk messages sent or received between November 3, 2005 to December 31, 2009 that were sent to or from” selected email addresses.

The defendant moved to quash the subpoena.

Judge Grewal noted that “it is well-established that civil subpoenas, including those issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, are subject to the prohibitions of the Stored Communications Act (‘SCA)”, which was passed in 1986.  The SCA prohibits service providers from knowingly disclosing the contents of a user’s electronic communications.

Judge Grewal ruled that the plaintiff’s “Request One is invalid because it seeks disclosure of the terms ‘Optiver’ and ‘PGP’” and granted the defendant’s motion to quash that request.  As for Request Two, Judge Grewal ruled that it “violates the SCA insofar as it seeks the subject of the communications, but the remainder is permissible.”  Therefore, he ruled that Google was required to provide only the following: “Documents sufficient to show the recipient(s), sender, date sent, date received, date read, and date deleted of emails, email attachments, or Google Talk messages sent or received between November 3, 2005 to December 31, 2009 that were sent to or from the email addresses listed”.

So, what do you think?  Was the correct information excluded due to the SCA?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Blind Reliance on Vendor for Discovery Results in Sanctions – eDiscovery Case Law

In Peerless Indus., Inc. v. Crimson AV, LLC, No. 1:11-cv-1768 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2013), Illinois Magistrate Judge Susan E. Cox sanctioned the defendant for a “hands off approach” to discovery by relying on a vendor for conducting the discovery from a closely related non-party to the suit.  The opinion and order can be downloaded here.

The plaintiff sued the defendant and its managing director, Vladimir Gleyzer, in a patent infringement case and filed two motions: 1) a motion to compel the deposition of Tony Jin, and 2) a renewed motion for sanctions.

Motion to Compel Deposition

Jin, the president of China-based Sycamore, was found in a previous ruling to be “principal of both Crimson and Sycamore and that he exercise[d] a considerable amount of financial and managerial control over both companies”, with much of basis for the decision coming from the testimony of Gleyzer himself.  Based on a five-factor test to determine whether Jin was a managing agent, Judge Cox determined that “Mr. Jin appears to satisfy nearly every factor”, granted the plaintiff’s motion to compel the deposition and ordered it to be conducted in the Northern District of Illinois, not in China.

Motion for Sanctions

As for the plaintiff’s renewed motion for sanctions, it was the 30(b)(6) deposition of Gleyzer that made it “clear that defendant did not conduct a reasonable investigation regarding Sycamore’s document production or Sycamore’s document retention for purposes of this litigation.”  Gleyzer “was apparently unable to answer questions about Sycamore’s computer and backup systems, what searches were performed, which employees had relevant information, whether a document hold had been implemented, or whether employees at Sycamore were even contacted regarding plaintiff’s document request.”

So, why was the defendant’s 30(b)(6) deponent unable to answer such basic questions?  As noted in the order, “What is evident from Mr. Gleyzer’s deposition, however, is that defendants took a back seat approach and instead let the process proceed through a vendor.  Mr. Gleyzer testified that there was a process outlined ‘I guess by the vendor’ so the vendor provided instruction to Mr. Jin on how to collect documents.  Crimson, or at least Mr. Gleyzer himself, then had no part in the process of obtaining the requested discovery or of determining how Sycamore managed their documents and what might be relevant to plaintiff’s requests.”

Judge Cox stated: “Such a hands-off approach is insufficient.  Because of the control or ‘close coordination’ between the two companies, defendants were required to produce the requested information.  Defendants cannot place the burden of compliance on an outside vendor and have no knowledge, or claim no control, over the process.”

Sanctions Granted

As a result, Judge Cox granted the motion for sanctions and instructed the plaintiff to “submit a bill of costs for the preparation for the motion of sanctions” by January 31 – which they did, for $16,408.  The defendant has appealed the ruling.

Using vendors for various stages of discovery is common, but that doesn’t excuse the producing party from being fully knowledgeable about the process that took place.  What’s interesting is how the defendant was sunk by its own 30(b)(6) witness, who is also a named party in the suit.  For some best practices regarding preparing your 30(b)(6) witness, click here.

So, what do you think?  Were the sanctions appropriate?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Waste Management Wants to Throw Away the Metadata – eDiscovery Case Law

In the case In Re: Waste Management of Texas, Inc., No. 06-12-00097-CV (Tex: Court of Appeals, Sixth Dist., Jan. 18, 2013), a Texas appeals court refused to grant Waste Management’s petition for writ of mandamus asks us to direct the trial court to withdraw its order to produce native, electronic format with all metadata.

This antitrust case between competing sanitation companies in Texas has had a lengthy discovery phase.  As noted in the opinion issued by Chief Justice Josh R. Morriss, III:

“In late 2009—in response to an order that compelled the production of various internal business records but reserved for a later decision the question of whether the production must include metadata—Waste Management produced responsive records in the format of its choice, Adobe portable document format an explicit exception in the order, the 2009 production excluded the records’ metadata. In September 2012, the trial court ordered Waste Management to produce similar information, but this time in its native, electronic format with all metadata.”

As a result, Waste Management petitioned for a writ of mandamus asking the 6th District Court of Appeals of Texas to direct the trial court to withdraw its order, claiming that :

  • “the 2012 discovery order requires disclosure of ‘trade secrets and proprietary, confidential information, to a direct competitor.’”;
  • “the order requires production of data outside the relevant geographic area and is thus an overbroad ‘fishing expedition.’”;
  • “(a) that the order is a ‘do over’ that requires Waste Management to review and redact the data a second time, (b) that it requires the production of metadata after metadata was relinquished earlier, (c) that it insufficiently specifies the form in which the data is to be produced, (d) that production in native format makes redaction impossible, and (e) that producing metadata in native format is more costly.”;
  • “the order contradicts an agreed scheduling order entered ten weeks before…to provide data for a time period of only September 1, 2005, through October 31, 2010”; and
  • the opposing party “should be responsible for the costs because a ‘do-over’ is an “extraordinary step”.

The court found that Waste Management “failed to introduce any such evidence” that the discovery order will disclose trade secrets and rejected their various claims, including undue burden claims.  With regard to the claim that the order is a ‘do-over’ and that the opposing party had not previously requested metadata, the court noted previous requests that contained the following instruction “Any and all data or information which is in electronic or magnetic form should be produced in a reasonable manner”.  Citing FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b) which requires “a form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably useable form or forms”, the court stated “We conclude Bray’s original instruction that the electronic discovery must be produced in a ‘reasonable manner is the functional equivalent of the Federal ‘reasonably useable form or forms.’”.

So, what do you think?  Was it appropriate to require production of metadata?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Is 31,000 Missed Relevant Documents an Acceptable Outcome? – eDiscovery Case Law

It might be, if the alternative is 62,000 missed relevant documents.

Last week, we reported on the first case for technology assisted review to be completed, Global Aerospace Inc., et al, v. Landow Aviation, L.P. dba Dulles Jet Center, et al, in which predictive coding was approved last April by Virginia State Circuit Court Judge James H. Chamblin.  Now, as reported by the ABA Journal (by way of the Wall Street Journal Law Blog), we have an idea of the results from the predictive coding exercise.  Notable numbers:

  • Attorneys “coded a sample of 5,000 documents out of 1.3 million as either relevant or irrelevant” to serve as the seed set for the predictive coding process,
  • The predictive coding “program turned up about 173,000 documents deemed relevant”,
  • The attorneys “checked a sample of about 400 documents deemed relevant by the computer program. About 80 percent were indeed relevant. The lawyers then checked a sample of the documents deemed irrelevant. About 2.9 percent were possibly relevant”,
  • Subtracting the 173,000 documents deemed relevant from the 1.3 million total document population yields 1,127,000 documents not deemed relevant.  Extrapolating the 2.9 percent sample of missed potentially relevant document to the rest of the documents deemed non relevant yields 32,683 potentially relevant documents missed.

“For some this may be hard to stomach,” the WSJ Law Blog says in the article. “The finding suggests that more than 31,000 documents may be relevant to the litigation but won’t get turned over to the other side. What if the smoking gun is among them?”

However, the defendants, in arguing for the use of predictive coding in this case, asserted that “manual review of the approximately two million documents at issue would be extremely costly while locating only about 60 percent of potentially relevant documents”.  Of course, the rise in popularity of technology assisted review is not only due to the cost savings but also the growing belief of increased accuracy over human review as concluded in the oft-cited Richmond Journal of Law and Technology white paper from Maura Grossman and Gordon Cormack, Technology-Assisted Review in e-Discovery can be More Effective and More Efficient than Exhaustive Manual Review.

Assuming that the defendants’ effectiveness estimate of manual review is reasonable, then it could be argued that more than 62,000 relevant documents could have been missed using manual review at a much higher cost for review.  While we don’t know what the actual number of missed documents would have been, it’s certainly fair to conclude that the predictive coding effort saved considerable review costs in this case with comparable, if not better, accuracy.

There will be several sessions at Legal Tech® New York 2013 starting tomorrow discussing aspects of predictive coding.  For a preview of LegalTech, click here.

So, what do you think?  What do you think of the results?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Another Social Media Request Denied as a “Carte Blanche” Request – eDiscovery Case Law

After last week’s recap of 2012 cases, it’s time to start discussing cases in 2013!

In Keller v. National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co., No. CV 12-72-M-DLC-JCL, (Dist. Court, D. Montana Jan. 2, 2013), the defendants filed a motion to compel the plaintiff’s to respond to various discovery requests.  While Magistrate Judge Jeremiah Lynch granted their request to compel the plaintiffs to produce medical records, he denied the defendant’s request “to delve carte blanche into the nonpublic sections of Plaintiffs’ social networking accounts”.

In this breach of contract case claiming damages in the form of unpaid medical expenses and $100,000 in uninsured motorist benefits against the defendant who insured the plaintiff under an automobile liability policy after an automobile accident, the defendant filed a motion to compel the plaintiffs to respond to various discovery requests.  As part of the motion to compel, the defendants requested “any and all records, reports or other documentation for each physician or other health care provider with whom Plaintiff Jennifer Keller has treated or consulted for the period beginning January 1, 2000 up to August 26, 2008”.  The defendants also requested “a full printout of all of [each of the plaintiff’s] social media website pages and all photographs posted thereon including, but not limited to, Facebook, Myspace, Twitter, LinkedIn, LiveJournal, Tagged, Meetup, myLife, Instagram and MeetMe from August 26, 2008 to the present”.

Noting that “Plaintiffs have not shown or argued that producing those records would be unduly burdensome, or that National Farmers Union propounded the discovery request for purposes of harassment”, Judge Lynch granted the motion to compel with regard to the medical records.  However, with regard to the request for social media web pages, while noting that the “content of social networking sites is not protected from discovery merely because a party deems the content ‘private’”, Judge Lynch referenced Tompkins v. Detroit Metropolitan Airport and noted a requirement for a “threshold showing that the requested information is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence”.  In this case, Judge Lynch ruled that the defendant “has not made the requisite threshold showing”, stating that the defendant “is not entitled to delve carte blanche into the nonpublic sections of Plaintiffs’ social networking accounts”.

Therefore, while granting the defendant’s request that the “Plaintiffs must provide a list of all the social networking sites to which they belong”, the remainder of the defendant’s request for social media information was denied, subject to their “right to renew the motion in the event it can make the threshold showing of relevance discussed above”.

So, what do you think?  Should the request have been granted?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

First Case for Technology Assisted Review to be Completed – eDiscovery Trends

As reported in Law Technology News by Evan Koblentz, it appears we have our first case in which predictive coding has been completed.

Last April, as reported in this blog, in Global Aerospace Inc., et al, v. Landow Aviation, L.P. dba Dulles Jet Center, et al, Virginia State Circuit Court Judge James H. Chamblin ordered that the defendants can use predictive coding for discovery in this case, despite the plaintiff’s objections that the technology is not as effective as human review.  The order was issued after the defendants issued a motion requesting either that predictive coding technology be allowed in the case or that the plaintiffs pay any additional costs associated with traditional review.  The defendant had an 8 terabyte data set that they were hoping to reduce to a few hundred gigabytes through advanced culling techniques.

According to the Law Technology News article, defense counsel at Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis, and also at Baxter, Baker, Sidle, Conn & Jones, used OrcaTec’s Document Decisioning Suite technology and that OrcaTec will announce that the process is finished after plaintiff’s counsel at Jones Day did not object to the results by a recent deadline.

As reported in the article, eDiscovery analyst David Horrigan of 451 Research, expressed his surprise that Global Aerospace didn’t head in a different direction and wondered aloud why plaintiff’s counsel did not object to the results after initially objecting to the technology itself.

“It’s disappointing this issue has apparently been resolved on [plaintiff’s] missed procedural deadline,” he said. “Not unlike the predictive coding vs. keyword search debate in Kleen Products being postponed, if this court deadline has really been missed, we’ve lost an opportunity for a court ruling on predictive coding being decided on the merits.”

For more about what predictive coding is and its effectiveness, here are a couple of previous posts on the subject.  For other cases where predictive coding and other technology assisted review mechanisms have been discussed, check out this year end case summary from last week.

So, what do you think?  Does this pave the way for more cases to use technology assisted review?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.