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Case Law

eDiscovery Case Law: Defendant Responds to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Recusal in Da Silva Moore
 

Geez, you take a week or so to cover some different topics and a few things happen in the most talked about eDiscovery case of the year.  Time to catch up!  Today, we’ll talk about the response of the defendant MSLGroup Americas to the plaintiffs’ motion for recusal in the Da Silva Moore case.  Tomorrow, we will discuss the plaintiffs’ latest objection – to Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck's rejection of their request to stay discovery pending the resolution of outstanding motions and objections.  But, first, a quick recap.

Several weeks ago, in Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe & MSL Group, No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC) (AJP) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012), Judge Peck of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion making it likely the first case to accept the use of computer-assisted review of electronically stored information (“ESI”) for this case.  However, on March 13, District Court Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. granted plaintiffs’ request to submit additional briefing on their February 22 objections to the ruling.  In that briefing (filed on March 26), the plaintiffs claimed that the protocol approved for predictive coding “risks failing to capture a staggering 65% of the relevant documents in this case” and questioned Judge Peck’s relationship with defense counsel and with the selected vendor for the case, Recommind.

Then, on April 5, Judge Peck issued an order in response to Plaintiffs’ letter requesting his recusal, directing plaintiffs to indicate whether they would file a formal motion for recusal or ask the Court to consider the letter as the motion.  On April 13, (Friday the 13th, that is), the plaintiffs did just that, by formally requesting the recusal of Judge Peck.  But, on April 25, Judge Carter issued an opinion and order in the case, upholding Judge Peck’s opinion approving computer-assisted review.

As for the motion for recusal, that’s still pending.  On Monday, April 30, the defendant filed a response (not surprisingly) opposing the motion for recusal.  In its Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Recusal or Disqualification, the defendants noted the following:

  • Plaintiffs Agreed to the Use of Predictive Coding: Among the arguments here, the defendants noted that, after prior discussions regarding predictive coding, on January 3, the “[p]laintiffs submitted to the Court their proposed version of the ESI Protocol, which relied on the use of predictive coding. Similarly, during the January 4, 2012 conference itself, Plaintiffs, through their e-discovery vendor, DOAR, confirmed not only that Plaintiffs had agreed to the use of predictive coding, but also that Plaintiffs agreed with some of the details of the search methodology, including the “confidence levels” proposed by MSL.”
  • It Was Well Known that Judge Peck Was a Leader In eDiscovery Before The Case Was Assigned to Him: The defendants referenced, among other things, that Judge Peck’s October 2011 article, Search, Forward discussed “computer-assisted coding,” and that Judge Peck stated in the article: “Until there is a judicial decision approving (or even critiquing) the use of predictive coding, counsel will just have to rely on this article as a sign of judicial approval.”
  • Ralph Losey Had No Ex Parte Contact with Judge Peck: The defendants noted that their expert, Ralph Losey, “has never discussed this case with Judge Peck” and that his “mere appearance” at seminars and conferences “does not warrant disqualification of all judges who also appear.”

As a result, the defendants argued that the court should deny plaintiffs motion for recusal because:

  • Judge Peck’s “Well-Known Expertise in and Ongoing Discourse on the Topic of Predictive Coding Are Not Grounds for His Disqualification”;
  • His “Professional Relationship with Ralph Losey Does Not Mandate Disqualification”;
  • His “Comments, Both In and Out of the Courtroom, Do Not Warrant Recusal”; and
  • His “Citation to Articles in his February 24, 2012 Opinion Was Proper”.

For details on these arguments, click the link to the Memorandum above.  Judge Carter has yet to rule on the motion for recusal.

So, what do you think?  Did the defendants make an effective argument or should Judge Peck be recused?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Twitter Seeks to Succeed Where Defendant Failed
 

Yesterday, we discussed a case where the court denied a criminal defendant’s attempt to quash a subpoena of his Twitter account information.  Now it’s Twitter’s turn to file a motion to quash the court’s order.  Filed this past Monday (May 7), the motion seeks to quash the order based on the grounds that the order imposes an undue burden on Twitter for three reasons including the reason that it forces them to “violate federal law”.

In People v. Harris, No. 2011NY080152 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.), the social network filed to quash a subpoena that ordered it to turn over “any and all user information” for Twitter-user Malcolm Harris between Sept. 15 and Dec. 31, 2011.

Twitter’s counsel argued that the order violates the Fourth Amendment, which guards citizens against unreasonable search and seizures, and would force the company to violate federal law.

Twitter also stated that the order does not comply with the Uniform Act, a stance the information network conveyed to Assistant District Attorney Lee Langston in March. “Pursuant to the Uniform Act, a criminal litigant cannot compel an appearance by, or production of documents from, a California resident without presenting the appropriate certification to the California court, scheduling a hearing and obtaining a California subpoena for production,” Twitter’s legal team said in the email response.

In its motion, the company even argued that, based on Twitter’s terms of service around content ownership (Twitter users own their content), Harris has legal standing to challenge the original subpoena; the court previously ruled that he did not.

“This is a big deal. Law enforcement agencies — both the federal government and state and city entities — are becoming increasingly aggressive in their attempts to obtain information about what people are doing on the Internet,” ACLU senior staff attorney Aden Fine said in a statement.

“[The Internet] is, in some ways, the ultimate embodiment of the First Amendment. But one potential problem for free speech on the Internet is that, for almost all of us, we need to rely on Internet companies. And while the government is bound by the First Amendment, the First Amendment may not always prevent private companies from restricting our free speech rights,” Fine said. “That is why it is so important that the public — and other companies — know when a company actually stands up for its users’ rights. Twitter did so here, and Twitter should be applauded for that.”

So, what do you think?  Does Twitter make some valid arguments and will they succeed where the defendant failed?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case Summary Source: VentureBeat.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Court Denies Criminal Defendant’s Attempt to Quash Twitter Subpoena
 

In People v. Harris, 2011NY080152 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Apr. 20, 2012), Criminal Court Judge Matthew A. Sciarrino, Jr. ruled that the defendant lacked standing to move to quash the prosecution’s subpoena served upon Twitter, a third-party in the case, for records of the defendant’s Twitter account. The defendant was a protester arrested during a march on the Brooklyn Bridge as part of the Occupy Wall Street movement, and in prosecuting the case, the prosecution sought his Twitter records for the time period relevant to the defendant’s involvement in the march.

In denying the defendant’s motion to quash, Judge Sciarrino analogized a subpoena issued to a third-party online social networking service like Twitter to one issued against a bank for a bank customer’s account information. The judge noted that in such bank cases a customer has “no proprietary or possessory interests” in his bank records, as they are the business records of the bank. Similarly, here, when the defendant signed up for Twitter, he agreed to certain terms, including a license that he granted to Twitter to “use, display and distribute” his Tweets. “Twitter’s license to use the defendant’s Tweets means that the Tweets the defendant posted were not his,” and therefore he had no proprietary interest in the Tweets.

Judge Sciarrino also acknowledged that although the defendant’s belief that he had a privacy interest in his own Tweets was “understandable,” it was “without merit.” The court pointed out that the “very nature and purpose” of Twitter is to help its users share information instantaneously with the world. Although a user may believe the Fourth Amendment should provide him online the same protection he would receive in his physical home, he is mistaken: Twitter users "may think that the same 'home' principle may be applied to their Twitter account. When in reality the user is sending information to the third party, Twitter. At the same time the user is also granting a license for Twitter to distribute that information to anyone, any way and for any reason it chooses."

Judge Sciarrino also denied the defendant’s motion to intervene in proceedings to quash the prosecution’s subpoena. It also found that the court is “compelled to evaluate the subpoena under federal laws governing internet communications,” that is, the Stored Communications Act; as such, the subpoena was proper because the defendant had a required hearing and notice, the information sought was relevant and material to the case, and the subpoena was not overly broad in its request.

So, what do you think?  Did the judge make the right call or should the defendant have been able to quash the subpoena?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case Summary Source: Applied Discovery (free subscription required).

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: No Race Tires on This Vehicle, Taxation of eDiscovery Costs Granted
 

The trend for defendants requesting plaintiffs to be responsible for eDiscovery costs when they lose is continuing.  Sometimes that request is granted, at least partially, as in this case and this case.  In another case, taxation of eDiscovery costs was initially granted, but then reversed due to the parties' agreement to split the costs.  Then, there’s the case of Race Tires America, Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corporation.  Last May, the winning defendants were awarded $367,000 as reimbursement for eDiscovery costs.  (Hoosier Daddy!)  But, then in March of this year, an appellate court reversed all but $30,370 of those costs, implementing a narrow interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) for assigning those costs.  Now, a new case addresses the issue of taxation of costs once again.

In the case In re Online DVD Rental Antitrust Litig., No. M 09-2029 PJH, (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2012), a federal court recently broadly interpreted the language in the federal statute governing the taxation of costs, 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4).

In this class action involving claims that Netflix had reached an agreement with Walmart to divide the market for sales and online rentals of DVDs, Netflix won summary judgment and filed a motion seeking to recover its costs, including those relating to eDiscovery. After the clerk awarded the costs, the plaintiff subscribers filed a motion with the court seeking review of the award.

In denying the plaintiffs’ request to limit the costs, the court rejected the Third Circuit’s narrow view of 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) as expressed in its recent decision in the Race Tires America, Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp. case, which vacated the district court’s approval of many eDiscovery costs. Although the court noted the Third Circuit’s “well-reasoned opinion,” the California court concluded that “in the absence of directly analogous Ninth Circuit authority, and in view of the court’s prior order in connection with the Blockbuster subscriber plaintiffs’ motion for review of the clerk's taxation of costs, broad construction of section 1920 with respect to electronic discovery production costs—under the facts of this case—is appropriate.” Ultimately, the court awarded the defendants slightly more than $700,000 in costs.

So, what do you think?  Will this ruling isolate the Race Tires case as an anomaly?  Will our monthly Netflix subscription rates go down?  (Probably not.)  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case Summary Source: Applied Discovery (free subscription required).  For eDiscovery news and best practices, check out the Applied Discovery Blog here.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Court Grants Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Mirror-Imaging of Defendant’s Computers
 

In approving a motion for expedited discovery in United Factory Furniture Corp. v. Alterwitz, No. 2:12-cv-00059-KJD-VCF, (D. Nev. Apr. 6, 2012), Magistrate Judge Cam Ferenbach granted the plaintiff’s motion for a mirror-imaging order after determining the benefit outweighed the burden of the discovery, and it denied as unnecessary the plaintiff’s motion for an order to preserve evidence and a preliminary injunction from spoliation of evidence.

The plaintiff filed this motion after discovering that the defendants appeared to be tampering with the plaintiff’s computers. One of the defendants previously had been an employee of the company where he was responsible for the plaintiff company’s computer server and network services. The plaintiff alleged that he had created a “back door” to the company server that allowed him to access and alter confidential company information, such as business plans and financial, customer, and trade secret information. The other defendant, also the plaintiff’s former employee, appeared to have in her possession confidential information, as she stated she knew what the plaintiff company was writing in e-mails about her and she had—in a prior lawsuit—produced company e-mails that were neither to nor from her.

Judge Ferenbach considered the plaintiff’s motion for expedited discovery under the applicable rule that although pursuant to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d), generally a party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have held a Rule 26(f) conference, a court may permit expedited discovery upon a showing of good cause. Judge Ferenbach found good cause here “based on plaintiff’s allegations that defendants have access to plaintiff’s computer server, defendants have been deleting files and relevant evidence, and that evidence of their conduct, which is central to the litigation, will be erased through normal use of defendants’ computer . . . .”

In reviewing the plaintiff’s request that the court enter a mirror-imaging order, Judge Ferenbach pointed out that all information stored on a computer is discoverable, except where the request for production imposes an undue burden and expense and/or constitutes an invasion of privileged or private matter. Judge Ferenbach found no such undue burden or invasion would occur by applying and analyzing the facts against a five-pronged test:

(1) “The needs of the case” prong was met because information on the defendants’ computers was directly relevant and had to remain unaltered for the case to be litigated fairly.

(2) “The amount in controversy” prong was satisfied because the plaintiff had alleged it had suffered at least $75,000 in damages.

(3) “The importance of the issues at stake” prong was satisfied because the plaintiff had alleged the case involved the defendants’ accessing information involving business strategy, confidential customer information, and trade secrets, and the court acknowledged it had a responsibility to protect against the dissemination and misuse of such information.

(4) “The potential for finding relevant material” prong was met because the contents of the defendants’ computers were at the center of the case.

(5) “The importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues” prong was met because the documents and information at issue could not be produced another way.

Furthermore, the court noted, ordering mirror imaging would not result in undue expense to the defendants as the plaintiffs were paying the costs. The court additionally took measures to protect the defendants’ privacy and privilege interests by structuring the order so that a neutral computer expert would perform the mirror imaging, the expert would serve as an officer of the court, and the mirror image would be held in a sealed envelope in the clerk of court’s office until the conclusion of litigation, unless the plaintiff had reason to believe spoliation of evidence had occurred. At that time, the plaintiff could move the court for access to the mirror image.

Judge Ferenbach declined to enter a preservation order or issue a temporary injunction. He found a preservation order unnecessary because a duty existed to preserve evidence because “litigants owe an ‘uncompromising duty to preserve’ what they know or reasonably should know will be relevant evidence in a pending lawsuit,” and the complaint against the defendants and the information contained on the defendants’ computers was directly relevant to the suit against them. Judge Ferenbach found the preliminary injunction unnecessary because it ordered mirror imaging.

So, what do you think?  Were the mirror-images warranted?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case Summary Source: Applied Discovery (free subscription required).

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery BREAKING Case Law: Judge Carter Upholds Judge Peck’s Predictive Coding Order

A few weeks ago, in Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe & MSL Group, No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC) (AJP) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012), Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion making it likely the first case to accept the use of computer-assisted review of electronically stored information (“ESI”) for this case.  However, on March 13, District Court Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. granted plaintiffs’ request to submit additional briefing on their February 22 objections to the ruling.  In that briefing (filed on March 26), the plaintiffs claimed that the protocol approved for predictive coding “risks failing to capture a staggering 65% of the relevant documents in this case” and questioned Judge Peck’s relationship with defense counsel and with the selected vendor for the case, Recommind.  Then, on April 5, Judge Peck issued an order in response to Plaintiffs’ letter requesting his recusal, directing plaintiffs to indicate whether they would file a formal motion for recusal or ask the Court to consider the letter as the motion.  On April 13, (Friday the 13th, that is), the plaintiffs did just that, by formally requesting the recusal of Judge Peck.

Now, on April 25 (signed two days ago and filed yesterday), Judge Carter has issued an opinion and order in the case, upholding Judge Peck’s opinion approving computer-assisted review.  In the opinion and order, Judge Carter noted:

“[T]he Court adopts Judge Peck’s rulings because they are well reasoned and they consider the potential advantages and pitfalls of the predictive coding software. The Court has thoroughly reviewed the ESI protocol along with the parties’ submissions.  At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiffs and Judge Peck disagree about the scope of Plaintiffs’ acquiescence concerning the use of the method. Judge Peck’s written order states that Plaintiffs have consented to its use, (Opinion and Order at 17 (“The decision to allow computer-assisted review in this case was relatively easy – the parties agreed to its use (although disagreed about how best to implement such review.”))), while Plaintiffs argue that Judge Peck’s order mischaracterizes their position (Pl. Reply, dated March 19, 2012, at 4-5). Nevertheless, the confusion is immaterial because the ESI protocol contains standards for measuring the reliability of the process and the protocol builds in levels of participation by Plaintiffs. It provides that the search methods will be carefully crafted and tested for quality assurance, with Plaintiffs participating in their implementation. For example, Plaintiffs’ counsel may provide keywords and review the documents and the issue coding before the production is made. If there is a concern with the relevance of the culled documents, the parties may raise the issue before Judge Peck before the final production. Further, upon the receipt of the production, if Plaintiffs determine that they are missing relevant documents, they may revisit the issue of whether the software is the best method. At this stage, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the use of the predictive coding software will deny Plaintiffs access to liberal discovery. “

“Plaintiffs’ arguments concerning the reliability of the method are also premature. It is difficult to ascertain that the predictive software is less reliable than the traditional keyword search. Experts were present during the February 8 conference and Judge Peck heard from these experts. The lack of a formal evidentiary hearing at the conference is a minor issue because if the method appears unreliable as the litigation continues and the parties continue to dispute its effectiveness, the Magistrate Judge may then conduct an evidentiary hearing. Judge Peck is in the best position to determine when and if an evidentiary hearing is required and the exercise of his discretion is not contrary to law. Judge Peck has ruled that if the predictive coding software is flawed or if Plaintiffs are not receiving the types of documents that should be produced, the parties are allowed to reconsider their methods and raise their concerns with the Magistrate Judge. The Court understands that the majority of documentary evidence has to be produced by MSLGroup and that Plaintiffs do not have many documents of their own. If the method provided in the protocol does not work or if the sample size is indeed too small to properly apply the technology, the Court will not preclude Plaintiffs from receiving relevant information, but to call the method unreliable at this stage is speculative.”

“There simply is no review tool that guarantees perfection. The parties and Judge Peck have acknowledged that there are risks inherent in any method of reviewing electronic documents. Manual review with keyword searches is costly, though appropriate in certain situations. However, even if all parties here were willing to entertain the notion of manually reviewing the documents, such review is prone to human error and marred with inconsistencies from the various attorneys’ determination of whether a document is responsive. Judge Peck concluded that under the circumstances of this particular case, the use of the predictive coding software as specified in the ESI protocol is more appropriate than keyword searching. The Court does not find a basis to hold that his conclusion is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Thus, Judge Peck’s orders are adopted and Plaintiffs’ objections are denied.”

So, what do you think?  Will this settle the issue?  Or will the plaintiffs attempt another strategy to derail the approved predictive coding plan?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Is the Third Time the Charm for Technology Assisted Review?
 

A few weeks ago, in Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe & MSL Group, Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck issued an opinion making it the first case to accept the use of computer-assisted review of electronically stored information (“ESI”) for this case.  Or, so we thought.  Now, the plaintiff has objected to the plan and even formally requested the recusal of Judge Peck.  Conversely, in Kleen Products LLC v. Packaging Corporation of America, et al., the plaintiffs have asked Magistrate Judge Nan Nolan to require the producing parties to employ a technology assisted review approach (referred to as "content-based advanced analytics," or CBAA) in their production of documents for discovery purposes, and that request is currently being considered.  Now, there’s a third case where the use of technology assisted review is actually being approved in an order by the judge.

In Global Aerospace Inc., et al, v. Landow Aviation, L.P. dba Dulles Jet Center, et al, Virginia State Circuit Court Judge James H. Chamblin ordered that the defendants can use predictive coding for discovery in this case, despite the plaintiff's objections that the technology is not as effective as human review.  The order was issued after the defendants issued a motion requesting either that predictive coding technology be allowed in the case or that the plaintiffs pay any additional costs associated with traditional review.  The defendant has an 8 terabyte data set that they are hoping to reduce to a few hundred gigabytes through advanced culling techniques.

In ruling, Judge Chamblin noted: “Having heard argument with regard to the Motion of Landow Aviation Limited Partnership, Landow Aviation I, Inc., and Landow Company Builders, Inc., pursuant to Virginia Rules of Supreme Court 4:1(b) and (c) and 4:15, it is hereby ordered Defendants shall be allowed to proceed with the use of predictive coding for purposes of processing and production of electronically stored information.”

Judge Chamblin’s order specified 60 days for processing, and another 60 days for production and noted that the receiving party will still be able to question "the completeness of the contents of the production or the ongoing use of predictive coding."  (Editor’s note: I would have included the entire quote, but it’s handwritten and Judge Chamblin has handwriting almost as bad as mine!)

As in the other cases, it will be interesting to see what happens next.  Will the plaintiff attempt to appeal or even attempt a Da Silva-like push for recusal of the Judge?  Or will they accept the decision and gear their efforts toward scrutinizing the resulting production?  Stay tuned.

So, what do you think?  Will this be the landmark case that becomes the first court-approved use of technology assisted review?  Or will the parties continue to “fight it out”?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Court Orders eDiscovery Evidentiary Hearing When Parties Are Unable to Cooperate
 

A month ago, in Chura v. Delmar Gardens of Lenexa, Inc., No. 11-2090-CM-DJW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36893 (D. Kan. Mar. 20, 2012), Magistrate Judge David J. Waxse ordered an evidentiary hearing to discuss the sufficiency of the defendant’s search for ESI and format of production in response to the plaintiff’s motion to compel additional searching and production.

The case involved an employment dispute with claims of sexual harassment, hostile work environment and other employment-based causes of action.  At a status conference, the parties had agreed to create a list of search terms in an attempt to resolve outstanding eDiscovery issues. However, the parties were unable to reach a consensus, and the plaintiffs filed a motion to compel the defendant to search for and produce ESI.

The plaintiffs’ Request for Production 1 requested the defendant to produce information from 10 individuals identified by the defendants with knowledge of the facts concerning the allegations in the complaint or answer; however, the defendants’ reply merely referred the plaintiffs to the complaints and personnel files of the plaintiffs.  In their motion to compel, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendant “failed to produce their written complaints, any emails or phone logs, the investigation files, and their personnel files”.  The plaintiffs also claimed that the defendant also “failed to produce responsive documents that one would expect to find in this type of litigation”, such as:

  • “emails between Defendant’s managers and witnesses regarding Plaintiffs’ allegations or Defendant’s defenses”;
  • “notes by the human resource director from the investigation she conducted as a result of Plaintiffs’ complaints about the alleged harasser and the environment at the nursing facility where Plaintiffs worked”; and
  • “reports and emails to the corporate office regarding the complaints”.

The plaintiffs noted that, “It does not make any sense that in response to numerous complaints from employees about the work environment that a corporate human resources manager would be sent to investigate and not create a single document reporting her findings to Defendant’s corporate managers.”  They also suggested that the defendant had searched for the agreed-upon search terms in Microsoft Outlook on the alleged harasser’s computer only and argued that the defendant should run a forensically sound search of “all computers used by employees of the facility and corporate office who participated in or were involved in Defendant’s investigation of the allegations”.

While noting that it “cannot determine whether Defendant met its duty to both preserve relevant evidence” (based upon the limited information provided in the parties’ briefing), the Court found that “Defendant’s failure to produce any ESI, such as emails, attachments, exhibits, and word processing documents, raises justifiable concerns that Defendant may have 1) failed to preserve relevant evidence, or 2) failed to conduct a reasonable search for ESI responsive to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests.”  Therefore, the court set an evidentiary hearing for April 30, at which the defendant was instructed “to be prepared to present evidence on the following topics”:

  1. At the time of the initial charge of discrimination, what did Defendant’s system of creating and storing ESI consist of;
  2. When and how a litigation hold was instituted;
  3. What employees were notified of the litigation hold;
  4. What efforts were made to preserve ESI;
  5. What or whose computers or components of the computer systems were searched for responsive ESI;
  6. How the computers of computer information systems were searched (e.g., keyword searches, manual review, computer-assisted coding); and
  7. Who performed the searches.

So, what do you think?  Was the evidentiary hearing an appropriate next step?  Should more cases conduct eDiscovery evidentiary hearings when there are disputes?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Friday the 13th Is Unlucky for Judge Peck
 

A few weeks ago, in Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe & MSL Group, No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC) (AJP) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012), Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion making it likely the first case to accept the use of computer-assisted review of electronically stored information (“ESI”) for this case.  However, on March 13, District Court Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. granted plaintiffs’ request to submit additional briefing on their February 22 objections to the ruling.  In that briefing (filed on March 26), the plaintiffs claimed that the protocol approved for predictive coding “risks failing to capture a staggering 65% of the relevant documents in this case” and questioned Judge Peck’s relationship with defense counsel and with the selected vendor for the case, Recommind.  Then, on April 5, Judge Peck issued an order in response to Plaintiffs’ letter requesting his recusal, directing plaintiffs to indicate whether they would file a formal motion for recusal or ask the Court to consider the letter as the motion.

This past Friday, April 13, the plaintiffs filed their formal motion, which included a Notice of Motion for Recusal or Disqualification, Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Recusal or Disqualification and Declaration of Steven L. Wittels in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Recusal or Disqualification.

In the 28 page Memorandum of Law, the plaintiffs made several arguments that they contended justified Judge Peck’s recusal in this case.  They included:

  • In the first conference over which Judge Peck presided on December 2, 2011, he remarked that Defendants “must have thought they died and went to Heaven” to have him assigned to this case and he subsequently repeated that remark in at least two public panels afterward.  In one of the panel appearances, he also (according to the plaintiffs) acknowledged that the plaintiffs’ only alternative was to ask him to recuse himself (in that same panel discussion, Judge Peck also quoted the plaintiff as saying “Oh no no, we’re ok with using computer-assisted review; we just had some questions about the exact process”).
  • In the second status conference held before Judge Peck on January 4, the plaintiffs noted that he encouraged the defendants to enlist the assistance of their eDiscovery counsel, Ralph Losey – whom Judge Peck claimed to know “very well.” During the next four weeks, Judge Peck served on three public panels with defense counsel Losey about predictive coding which the plaintiffs referred to as “ex parte contacts” where the plaintiffs were not informed.  Judge Peck also wrote an article last year entitled Search Forward, where, according to the plaintiffs, he “cited favorably to defense counsel Losey's blog post Go Fish” and Losey responded “in kind to Judge Peck‟s article by posting a blog entry, entitled Judge Peck Calls Upon Lawyers to Use Artificial Intelligence and Jason Barn[sic] Warns of a Dark Future of Information Burn-Out If We Don’t, where he embraced Judge Peck's position on predictive coding”.
  • One week after the LegalTech trade show, on February 8, the plaintiffs contended that “Judge Peck adopted Defendant MSL’s predictive coding protocol wholesale from the bench” and, on February 24 (link above), he issued the written order “[f]or the benefit of the Bar”.  Some of the materials cited were authored by Judge Peck, Ralph Losey, and Maura R. Grossman, eDiscovery counsel at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, all of whom served together on the panel at LegalTech.
  • The plaintiffs also noted that Judge Peck “confirms that he received, at a minimum, transportation, lodging, and meals free of cost for no less than 10 appearances at eDiscovery conferences in 2010” and did not disclose this compensation (or compensation for similar appearances in 2011 and 2012) to the plaintiffs.  They also noted that Judge Peck failed to inform them of Recommind’s sponsorship of the LegalTech conference where Judge Peck participated on panel discussions regarding predictive coding.

Regardless whether Judge Peck is partial or not, the plaintiffs argued in the Memorandum that “§ 455(a) requires a judge‟s recusal for the mere appearance of impropriety or partiality – i.e. if a reasonable outsider might entertain a plausible suspicion or doubt as to the judge‟s impartiality”.

In his order on April 5, Judge Peck noted that the “defendants will have 14 days to respond”, so it will be interesting to see if they do and what that response entails.  They will certainly have some bold statements to address from the plaintiffs if they do respond.

So, what do you think?  Do the plaintiffs make a valid argument for recusal?  Or is this just a case of “sour grapes” on their part for disagreeing, not with predictive coding in general, but the specific approach to predictive coding addressed in Judge Peck’s order of February 24?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: The Other Technology Assisted Review Case
 

We’ve covered the Da Silva Moore case quite a bit over the past few weeks (with posts here, here, here and here), but that’s not the only case where technology assisted review is currently being considered and debated.  On February 21, in Kleen Products LLC v. Packaging Corporation of America, et al., the plaintiffs asked Magistrate Judge Nan Nolan to require the producing parties to employ a technology assisted review approach (referred to as "content-based advanced analytics," or CBAA) in their production of documents for discovery purposes.

In their filing, the plaintiffs claimed that “[t]he large disparity between the effectiveness of [the computer-assisted coding] methodology and Boolean keyword search methodology demonstrates that Defendants cannot establish that their proposed [keyword] search methodology is reasonable and adequate as they are required.”  Citing studies conducted between 1994 and 2011 claimed to demonstrate the superiority of computer-assisted review over keyword approaches, the plaintiffs claimed that computer-assisted coding retrieved for production “70 percent (worst case) of responsive documents rather than no more than 24 percent (best case) for Defendants’ Boolean, keyword search.”

In their filing, the defendants contended that the plaintiffs "provided no legitimate reason that this Court should deviate here from reliable, recognized, and established discovery practices" in favor of their "unproven" CBAA methods. The defendants also emphasized that they have "tested, independently validated, and implemented a search term methodology that is wholly consistent with the case law around the nation and that more than satisfies the ESI production guidelines endorsed by the Seventh Circuit and the Sedona Conference." Having (according to their briefing) already produced more than one million pages of documents using their search methods, the defendants conveyed outrage that the plaintiffs would ask the court to "establish a new and radically different ESI standard for cases in this District."

The defendants also cited Best Practices Commentary on the Use of Search & Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, a 2007 publication from The Sedona Conference (available for download here), which includes a quote from a 2004 federal district court opinion, saying "by far the most commonly used search methodology today is the use of 'keyword searches.'" The defendants also stated that the plaintiffs cited no case with a ruling to use computer-assisted review.  True at the time, the Da Silva Moore ruling by Judge Andrew Peck approving the use of technology assisted review was issued just three days later.

The hearing was continued to April, and it will be interesting to see whether Magistrate Judge Nolan will require, over objection, the use of computer-assisted review for the review and production of electronically stored information in this case. Based on the disputes we’ve seen in the first two cases (Da Silva Moore and Kleen Products) contemplating the use of technology assisted review, it appears that the acceptance curve for technology assisted review processes will be a rocky one.

So, what do you think?  Should Judge Nolan rule in favor of the plaintiffs, or have the defendants done enough to ensure a complete and accurate production?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.