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Preservation

Court Awards Sanctions, But Declines to Order Defendants to Retain an eDiscovery Vendor – Yet – eDiscovery Case Law

In Logtale, Ltd. v. IKOR, Inc., No. C-11-05452 CW (DMR) (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2013), California Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu granted the plaintiff’s motion to compel responses to discovery and awarded partial attorney’s fees as a result of defendants’ conduct.  The judge did not grant the plaintiff’s request to order Defendants to retain an eDiscovery vendor to conduct a thorough and adequate search for responsive electronic documents, but did note that the court would do so “if there are continuing problems with their document productions”.

Case Background

The plaintiff, a shareholder in pharmaceutical company IKOR, Inc. (“IKOR”), a filed suit against the defendant and two of its officers, Dr. James Canton and Dr. Ross W. Tye, accusing the defendant of misrepresentations to induce the plaintiff to invest, breach of fiduciary duties, breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The defendant brought counterclaims for breach of a licensing agreement, theft of intellectual property, and interference with prospective economic advantage.

In the motion to compel, the plaintiff sought to compel the defendants’ compliance with a prior court order to compel the production of all responsive documents as well as to compel production from Dr. Canton, who objected to several of Plaintiff’s discovery requests.  The plaintiff contended that Defendants’ document productions were incomplete and that they “failed to adequately search for all responsive electronic documents”, asserting that all three defendants had produced a total of only 121 emails, 109 of which were communications with the plaintiff (including only three pages in response to a request seeking all documents relating to the defendant’s communications with a company run by three of IKOR’s principals. The “dearth of responsive documents, as well as the lack of emails from at least one key individual”, caused the plaintiff to “raise concerns about the quality of Defendants’ document preservation and collection efforts” and express concerns about possible “evidence spoliation through the deletion of emails”. The plaintiff also contended that Dr. Canton waived his objections by failing to serve a timely response.

Judge’s Ruling

Judge Nyu agreed with the plaintiff’s, noting that “Given the paucity of documents produced by Defendants to date, as well as counsel’s own acknowledgment that Defendants’ productions have been incomplete, the court shares Plaintiff’s concerns about the inadequacy of Defendants’ search for responsive documents. Defense counsel has not been sufficiently proactive in ensuring that his clients are conducting thorough and appropriate document searches, especially in light of obvious gaps and underproduction. Under such circumstances, it is not enough for counsel to simply give instructions to his clients and count on them to fulfill their discovery obligations. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure place an affirmative obligation on an attorney to ensure that a client’s search for responsive documents and information is complete.”  She also agreed with the plaintiff regarding Dr. Canton’s objections, since he “offered no reason for his late responses”.

Judge Nyu ordered the defendants to “produce all remaining responsive documents by no later than August 26, 2013”, noting that “if there are continuing problems with their document productions, the court will order them to retain the services of an e-discovery vendor”.  Judge Nyu also granted attorney’s fees for the plaintiff’s activities “as a result of Defendants’ conduct”, albeit at a reduced amount of $5,200.

So, what do you think?  Was the sanction warranted?   Should the judge have ordered the defendants to retain an eDiscovery vendor?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Imagine if the Zubulake Case Turned Out Like This – eDiscovery Case Law

You’ve got an employee suing her ex-employer for discrimination, hostile work environment and being forced to resign.  During discovery, it was determined that a key email was deleted due to the employer’s routine auto-delete policy, so the plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions.  Sound familiar?  Yep. Was her motion granted?  Nope.

In Hixson v. City of Las Vegas, No. 2:12-cv-00871-RCJ-PAL (D. Nev. July 11, 2013), Nevada Magistrate Judge Peggy A. Leen ruled that the duty to preserve had not yet arisen when the plaintiff sent an internal email complaining she was being subjected to a hostile work environment and discrimination and that the failure to suspend its then-existing practice of automatically purging emails after 45 days did not warrant sanctions.

Here’s the timeline:

  • In March 2010, the plaintiff sent an email to a City of Las Vegas Personnel Analyst in the Employee Relations Division complaining she was being subjected to a hostile work environment and discrimination.
  • A chain of correspondence took place between April 6 and 7 of 2010 between the union representative assisting the plaintiff and a city employee.
  • In July 2010, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant constructively terminated her by forcing her to submit her resignation.
  • In September 2010, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission.

The plaintiff and the defendant both produced the chain of correspondence from April 6 and 7 of 2010, but the defendant’s production omitted an email from the city employee (Dan Tarwater) to the union representative (Michael Weyland) commenting that “perhaps Weyland will have the good sense to have the Plaintiff retract her hostile work environment claim”.  Thus, the plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions.

The defendant indicated that their email system permanently deleted all messages after 45 days unless a sender or a recipient affirmatively saved the document to a folder, which didn’t happen with this particular email and also argued that “because Plaintiff has a copy of the email, any failure to disclose it is harmless”.

Judge Leen ruled that the “record in this case is insufficient to support a finding that the City was on notice Ms. Hixson contemplated litigation sufficient to trigger a duty to preserve electronically stored information by suspending its then-existing practice of automatically purging emails after 45 days.”  She also stated that “Plaintiff resigned July 15, 2010, and asserts she was constructively discharged. Nothing in the record suggests that on or before the date of her resignation, the Plaintiff threatened litigation, or informed the City that she had retained counsel about her employment disputes…By July 15, 2010, when Plaintiff resigned, the email system the City used as the time would have already purged Mr. Tarwater’s April 7, 2010, email unless it was saved to a folder.”

As a result, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions.

So, what do you think?  Did the defendant have a duty to preserve the email and, if so, should the motion for sanctions have been granted?   Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Scheindlin Reverses Magistrate Judge Ruling, Orders Sanction for Spoliation of Data – eDiscovery Case Law

If you’re hoping to get away with failing to preserve data in eDiscovery, you might want to think again if your case appears in the docket for the Southern District of New York with Judge Shira Scheindlin presiding.

As reported in by Victor Li in Law Technology News, (Scheindlin Not Charmed When Revisiting Spoliation a Third Time), Judge Scheindlin, who issued two of the most famous rulings with regard to eDiscovery sanctions for spoliation of data – Zubulake v. UBS Warburg and Pension Committee of the Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America Securities – sanctioned Sekisui America Corp. and Sekisui Medical Co. with an adverse inference jury instruction for deleting emails in its ongoing breach of contract case, as well as an award of “reasonable costs, including attorneys’ fees, associated with bringing this motion”.

Last year, the plaintiffs sued two former executives, including CEO Richard Hart of America Diagnostica, Inc. (ADI), a medical diagnostic products manufacturer acquired by Sekisui in 2009, for breach of contract.  While the plaintiffs informed the defendants in October 2010 that they intended to sue, they did not impose a litigation hold on their own data until May 2012. According to court documents, during the interim, thousands of emails were deleted in order to free up server space, including Richard Hart’s entire email folder and that of another ADI employee (Leigh Ayres).

U.S. Magistrate Judge Frank Maas of the Southern District of New York, while finding that the actions could constitute gross negligence by the plaintiffs, recommended against sanctions because:

  • There was no showing of bad faith, and;
  • The defendants could not prove that the emails would have been beneficial to them, or prove that they were prejudiced by the deletion of the emails.

The defendants appealed.  Judge Scheindlin reversed the ruling by Magistrate Judge Maas, finding that “the destruction of Hart’s and Ayres’ ESI was willful and that prejudice is therefore presumed” and the “Magistrate Judge’s Decision denying the Harts’ motion for sanctions was therefore ‘clearly erroneous.’”

With regard to the defendants proving whether the deleted emails would have been beneficial to them, Judge Scheindlin stated “When evidence is destroyed intentionally, such destruction is sufficient evidence from which to conclude that the missing evidence was unfavorable to that party.  As such, once willfulness is established, no burden is imposed on the innocent party to point to now-destroyed evidence which is no longer available because the other party destroyed it.”

Judge Scheindlin also found fault with the proposed amendment to Rule 37(e) to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which would limit the imposition of eDiscovery sanctions for spoliation to instances where the destruction of evidence caused substantial prejudice and was willful or in bad faith, stating “I do not agree that the burden to prove prejudice from missing evidence lost as a result of willful or intentional misconduct should fall on the innocent party.  Furthermore, imposing sanctions only where evidence is destroyed willfully or in bad faith creates perverse incentives and encourages sloppy behavior.”

As a result, Judge Scheindlin awarded the defendants’ request for an adverse inference jury instruction and also awarded “reasonable costs, including attorneys’ fees, associated with bringing this motion”.  To see the full opinion order (via Law Technology News), click here.

So, what do you think?  Should sanctions have been awarded?   Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Permissive Adverse Inference Instruction Upheld on Appeal – eDiscovery Case Law

In Mali v. Federal Insurance Co., Nos. 11-5413-cv, 12-0174-cv (XAP) (2d Cir. June 13, 2013), the Second Circuit explained the distinctions between two types of adverse inference instructions: a sanction for misconduct versus an explanatory instruction that details the jury’s fact-finding abilities. Because the lower court opted to give a permissive adverse inference instruction, which is not a punishment, the court did not err by not requiring the defendant to show that the plaintiffs acted with a culpable state of mind.

After a fire destroyed a barn converted into a residence, the plaintiffs sought to recover $1.3 to $1.5 million from their insurance policy. The insurance company made three payments before becoming skeptical of the plaintiffs’ claim. In particular, the company balked at the plaintiffs’ statement that they had high-end amenities, such as four refrigerators and copper gutters, and their sketch of the barn’s layout, which showed fourteen rooms, a second floor with four rooms and a bathroom, and four skylights. During discovery, the plaintiffs claimed they had no photographs of the barn, but at trial, an appraiser testified that the plaintiffs had shown her photographs of items in the barn and of the barn, which she testified only had one floor, not two as the plaintiffs claimed.

The defendants asked the court to impose an adverse inference instruction on the plaintiffs as a sanction for destroying the photographic evidence. Over the plaintiffs’ objection, the court instructed the jury that it could draw an adverse inference from the plaintiffs’ failure to produce the photographs. The jury agreed with the defendant and found the plaintiffs had submitted fraudulent claims that forfeited their insurance coverage.

On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the jury’s verdict should be vacated and that a new trial was required because the court did not make findings to justify this sanction. However, the appellate court ruled that the plaintiffs’ argument was “based on a faulty premise” because the trial court “did not impose a sanction on the Plaintiffs.” Therefore, no findings were required. It also found the plaintiffs’ reliance on a prior Second Circuit decision, Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Financial Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2002), where the court ruled that a trial court “must find facts that justify” an adverse inference instruction based on spoliation, inapposite. In Residential Funding, the plaintiff failed to meet its discovery obligations because it did not produce e-mails or backup tapes. The court refused to impose the defendant’s requested sanction, which was an instruction to the jury that it “‘should presume the e-mails . . . which have not been produced, would have disproved [Residential]’s theory of the case,’” because the defendant had not provided facts sufficient to support the sanction.

Here, the Second Circuit explained the distinction between the two types of adverse inferences in these cases: (1) one that punishes “misconduct that occurred outside the presence of the jury during the pretrial discovery proceedings, often consisting of a party’s destruction of, or failure to produce, evidence properly demanded by the opposing party,” and (2) one that “simply explains to the jury, as an example of the reasoning process known in law as circumstantial evidence, that a jury’s finding of certain facts may (but need not) support a further finding that other facts are true.” The court ruled that the latter instruction “is not a punishment” but instead is “an explanation to the jury of its fact-finding powers.”

The Mali court found the trial court’s instructions did not “direct the jury to accept any fact as true” or “instruct the jury to draw any inference against the Plaintiffs.” Because “the court left the jury in full control of all fact finding,” it fell within the explanatory classification of instructions.

So, what do you think?  Was the permissive adverse inference instruction warranted?   Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case Summary Source: Applied Discovery (free subscription required).  For eDiscovery news and best practices, check out the Applied Discovery Blog here.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Spoliation Sanctions Can Apply to Audio Files Too – eDiscovery Case Law

In Hart v. Dillon Cos., 2013 U.S. Dist. (D. Colo. 2013), Colorado Magistrate Judge David L. West granted the plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions for Spoliation of Evidence for failing to preserve a tape recorded interview with the plaintiff and set a hearing and oral argument as to what sanctions should be imposed for October.

As noted in the opinion, here are the facts:

  • On August 23, 2011, the plaintiff was terminated by the defendant for allegedly giving herself the incorrect pay rate while working in the bookkeeping department. As part of the defendant’s investigation, a loss prevention specialist for the defendant secretly tape recorded an interview with the plaintiff on August 6 which in part led to the termination of the plaintiff.
  • On November 1, 2011, the plaintiff filed an E.E.O.C. charge of discrimination.
  • On November 7, 2011, the defendant denied the plaintiff’s request for arbitration knowing the plaintiff would probably litigate the matter.
  • Sometime between January and March of 2012, the loss prevention specialist inadvertently taped over or erased his interview with the plaintiff.
  • On January 30, 2012, the plaintiff filed her Complaint.
  • On March 1, 2012, the defendant issued a litigation hold on all related documentation. Before the contents of the tape were destroyed, Pollard prepared a “case narrative” in writing which the defendant asserts is substantially accurate and the plaintiff claims does not include exculpatory information and the tenor of the interview.

As noted in the opinion, there is a three part test to determine spoliation of evidence:

1. Is the evidence relevant to an issue at trial?

2. Did the party have a duty to preserve the evidence because it knew or should have known, that litigation was imminent?

3. Was the other party prejudiced by the destruction of the evidence?

Judge West found that the interview was relevant as the defendant relied on the interview as part of the decision to terminate the plaintiff.  He also found that the defendant had a duty to preserve the data as far back as November 7, 2011, when the plaintiff’s request for arbitration was denied.  And, he found that the plaintiff was prejudiced by destruction of the audio, noting as many as 21 discrepancies between the defendant’s case narrative and the plaintiff’s stated recollection in her deposition and affidavit.  As he noted:

“Defendant was clearly four (4) months late in issuing a “litigation hold” concerning the tape in Pollard’s possession, and the Court finds Defendant is highly culpable for the failure to preserve the taped interview.

A failure to preserve evidence may be negligent, grossly negligent, or willful. After the duty to preserve attaches, the failure to collect taped recording from a key player is grossly negligent or willful behavior.”

Thus, Judge West granted the plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions for Spoliation of Evidence and ordered the hearing to determine the sanctions to be applied to the defendant.

So, what do you think?  Did the judge make the right decision?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Printed Copies of Documents Not Enough, Spoliation Sanctions Upheld for Discarding Computer – eDiscovery Case Law

On May 30, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department upheld a spoliation sanction against a plaintiff that failed to preserve electronic files and discarded his computer containing those files.

As reported in IT-Lex.org (Gross Negligence + Lack Of Litigation Hold = Spoliation Sanctions), In Harry Weiss, Inc. v. Moskowitz, a dispute involving diamond dealers and brokers, the Appellate Division upheld the defendants’ motion for spoliation sanctions to the extent of precluding plaintiff from offering any evidence and/or testimony at trial in opposition to defendants’ defenses and counterclaims, unanimously affirmed, with costs.  As noted in the transcript:

“More than two years into this litigation, plaintiff’s bookkeeper revealed at his deposition for the first time that certain electronic files that were created to track defendants’ commissions were either “lost” or “deleted” at the end of 2007 and 2008, after a copy of the file had been printed. The bookkeeper further testified that he created and kept all of plaintiff’s records on one computer, which had been in use for the last ten years. A month later, when defendants’ attorney sought to forensically examine the computer to determine if any of the deleted files could be restored, plaintiff’s bookkeeper claimed, for the first time, that the computer was “broken” and had been thrown away in late 2009 or early 2010, after the commencement of this action. Thereafter, the bookkeeper testified that numerous documents supporting plaintiff’s claim that defendants were not entitled to commissions could not be produced because they were stored only on the discarded computer.”

The plaintiff was put on notice of its obligation to “preserve all relevant records, electronic or otherwise,” at the very latest, in July 2009, when it received defendants’ answer asserting counterclaims for commissions, so the disposition of the computer was spoliation of that data.

The plaintiff claimed that disposal of the computer did not cause defendants any prejudice because many of the files were printed prior to its disposal, but the court rejected that argument, noting that “converting the files from their native format to hard-copy form would have resulted in the loss of discoverable metadata”. “In addition, by discarding the computer after its duty to preserve had attached without giving notice to defendants, plaintiff deprived defendants of the opportunity to have their own expert examine the computer to determine if the deleted files could be restored”.

So, what do you think?  Was the sanction justified?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Want to Make eDiscovery Proportional? Tie it to the Amount at Stake – eDiscovery Trends

Apparently, the effect of the proposed amendments to the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure approved for public comment may not be limited to just Federal courts.  They also could have a significant effect on New York’s state courts as well.

According to Brendan Pierson in the New York Law Journal (Proposal Would Tie Scope of Discovery to Amount in Controversy), the “most sweeping change would amend Rule 26(b)(1) to require that courts allow discovery that is ‘proportional to the needs of the case considering the amount in controversy, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.’”  Since New York courts “generally follow” the current federal discovery standard in which any material that could lead to admissible evidence is generally discoverable (regardless of the amount in controversy), the presumption is that they would follow the new standard as well.

If the US system is the “broadest discovery system on the planet” (according to Alvin Lindsay, a Hogan Lovells partner and an expert in discovery issues), the proposed changes would “bring discovery in the United States more in line with the rest of the world”.

The author cites the Zubulake v. UBS Warburg case as a key turning point in the number of documents preserved and produced in litigation and that growing eDiscovery costs have led to a “backlash among practitioners”.  According to experts, the proposed rules changes are “likely to gain broad support”.  “I don’t know who you’re going to get who’s going to oppose the principle of proportionality,” said Paul Sarkozi, a partner at Tannenbaum Helpern Syracuse & Hirschtritt and vice-chair of the commercial litigation section of the New York State Bar Association.

However, one “possible source of opposition could be class action plaintiffs attorneys, who can sometimes benefit from the more extensive discovery available under current rules”.  It will be interesting to see if there is considerable opposition from plaintiffs’ attorneys.  For more in the article, click here.

So, what do you think?  Are you pleased or concerned with the proposed amendments?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Appellate Court Denies Sanctions for Routine Deletion of Text Messages – eDiscovery Case Law

In PTSI, Inc. v. Haley, No. 684 WDA 2012, 2013 Pa. Super. (Pa. Super. Ct. May 24, 2013), the appellate court denied a motion for spoliation sanctions where the defendants routinely deleted text messages and other data to “clean up” their personal electronic devices: the volume of messages and limited amount of phone storage made it difficult to retain all data and still use the phone for messaging.

Here, the plaintiff filed claims of conversion, breach of the duty of loyalty, and breach of fiduciary duty against its former at-will employees and their new competing business. The trial court dismissed all claims at summary judgment. It also denied PTSI’s motion seeking sanctions for spoliation, because the deletion of electronically stored information, including text messages, was not relevant to the summary judgment decision.

During discovery, PTSI filed a motion seeking sanctions based on its two former employees’ deletion of electronic records from their computers and phones, including text messages. The company claimed the information was “vital to the prosecution of this case” and could not be “feasibly reconstructed or retrieved without enormous time and expense to PTSI, if at all.”

Under Pennsylvania law, the court had to evaluate three factors to determine the appropriate sanction: “(1) the degree of fault of the party who altered or destroyed the evidence; (2) the degree of prejudice suffered by the opposing party; and (3) whether there is a lesser sanction that will avoid substantial unfairness to the opposing party and, where the offending party is seriously at fault, will serve to deter such conduct by others in the future.”

To determine the level of fault, the court considered the extent of the duty to preserve the evidence, based on whether litigation is foreseeable and whether the evidence might be prejudicial to the opposing party, and whether the evidence was destroyed in bad faith. The court also considered proportionality in making decisions, including five factors spelled out in the comments to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure:

  • the nature and scope of the litigation, including the importance and complexity of the issues and the amounts at stake;
  • the relevance of electronically stored information and its importance to the court’s adjudication in the given case;
  • the cost, burden and delay that may be imposed on the parties to deal with electronically stored information;
  • the ease of producing electronically stored information and whether substantially similar information is available with less burden; and
  • any other factors relevant under the circumstances.

Here, the amount in controversy and the importance of the issues involving the data did not support awarding a discovery sanction. Moreover, PTSI could not show that its former employees’ “innocent clean up of personal electronic devices to allow them to function was unusual, unreasonable or improper under the circumstances.” Because the defendants “routinely deleted text messages, often on a daily basis, so as not to unduly encumber their iPhones” and because of “the volume of text messages that are frequently exchanged by cell phone users and the limited amount of storage on cell phones, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to save all text messages and to continue to use the phone for messaging.” Furthermore, the order of preservation was entered well after any relevant data would have already been created and deleted. In addition, similar information was available from other sources and custodians; the forensic examiner in the case unearthed more than 1,000 e-mails from the employees’ computers. Finally, any spoliation inference could not defeat the summary judgment motion.

The appellate court agreed with the trial court’s reasoning and found no abuse of discretion.

So, what do you think?  Should the sanctions have been granted?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case Summary Source: Applied Discovery (free subscription required).  For eDiscovery news and best practices, check out the Applied Discovery Blog here.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Judge Rules Against Spoliation Sanctions when the Evidence Doesn’t Support the Case – eDiscovery Case Law

In Cottle-Banks v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., No. 10cv2133-GPC (WVG) (S.D. Cal. May 21, 2013), California District Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel denied the plaintiff’s motion for spolation sanctions because the plaintiff was unable to show that deleted recordings of customer calls would have likely been relevant and supportive of her claim.

The defendant provides services and products such as set-top cable boxes and customers call in to order these services and products.  The plaintiff alleged a practice of charging customers for boxes without disclosing, and obtaining approval for equipment charges – a violation of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 543(f).  The plaintiff’s discovery requests included copies of recording of her own calls with the defendant, and the defendant began preserving tapes when the plaintiff notified the defendant that she would seek call recordings in discovery, not before that.  As a result, the plaintiff filed a motion for spoliation sanctions, requesting an adverse inference and requesting that the defendant be excluded from introducing evidence that it’s call recordings complied with 47 U.S.C. § 543(f).

From the call recordings still available, a sample of recordings was provided to the plaintiff – in those calls, it was evident that the defendant did, in fact, get affirmative acceptance of the additional charges as a matter of practice.

Judge Curiel ruled that the defendant “had an obligation to preserve the call recordings when the complaint was filed in September 2010” and that the defendant “had an obligation to preserve the call recording, [so] Defendant was negligent in failing to preserve the back up tapes. Thus, Defendant had a culpable state of mind.”  However, because the “Plaintiff cited only two call recordings out of 280 call recordings produced to support her position”, the judge concluded “that the deleted call recordings would not have been supportive of Plaintiff’s claim.”  Because “Plaintiff has not demonstrated all three factors to support an adverse inference sanction”, Judge Curiel denied the plaintiff’s motion as to adverse inference and preclusion.

So, what do you think?  Should the sanction request have been denied?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Spoliation of Data Can Get You Sent Up the River – eDiscovery Case Law

Sometimes, eDiscovery can literally be a fishing expedition.

I got a kick out of Ralph Losey’s article on E-Discovery Law Today (Fishing Expedition Discovers Laptop Cast into Indian River) where the defendant employee in a RICO case in Simon Property Group, Inc. v. Lauria, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184638 (M.D. Fla. 2012) threw her laptop into a river.  Needless to say, given the intentional spoliation of evidence, the court imposed struck all of the defenses raised by the defendant and scheduled the case for trial on the issue of damages.  Magistrate Judge Karla Spaulding summarized the defendant’s actions in the ruling:

“This case has all the elements of a made-for-TV movie: A company vice president surreptitiously awards lucrative business deals to a series of entities that she and her immediate family members control. To cover up the egregious self-dealing, she fabricates multiple fictitious personas and then uses those fictitious personas to “communicate” with her employer on behalf of the entities she controls. She also cut-and-pastes her supervisor’s signature onto service agreements in an attempt to make it seem as if her activities have been approved. After several years, a whistleblower exposes the scheme to the company. The company then tells the vice president that she is being investigated and warns her not to destroy any documents or evidence. Sensing that her scheme is about to collapse around her and wanting to cover her tracks, the vice president then travels to the East Coast of Florida and throws her laptop computer containing information about these activities into a river.”

At least she didn’t deny it when deposed as noted in the ruling:

“When asked why she threw the laptop away, Lauria testified as follows:

Q: Okay. Why did you throw the laptop away?

A: Because I knew that something was coming down and I just didn’t want all the stuff around.

Q: So you were trying to get rid of documentation and e-mails and things?

A: Uh-huh, yes.

Q: That directly related to the lawsuit?

A: Yes. Now, they do, yes.”

Maybe she should have used the George Costanza excuse and state that she didn’t know it was “frowned upon”.

So, what do you think?  Was that wrong?  Just kidding.  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

BTW, Ralph is no stranger to this blog – in addition to several of his articles we’ve referenced, we’ve also conducted thought leader interviews with him at LegalTech New York the past two years.  Here’s a link if you want to check those out.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.