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eDiscovery Case Law: Not So Fast On eDiscovery Cost Reimbursement
 

Yesterday, we noted a potential reversal in the case approving computer-assisted review of electronically stored information (“ESI”) in the Southern District of New York.  Today, we look at another eDiscovery ruling where a significant reduction in award amount was ruled.

One of the emerging trends for 2011 was the growing number of cases where the prevailing party was awarded reimbursement of eDiscovery costs, including this case and this case.  Another case of eDiscovery cost reimbursement reported in this blog was Race Tires Amer., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire, Corp., No. 2:07-cv-1294, 2011 WL 1748620 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 2011), where U.S. District Judge Terrence F. McVerry in Pittsburgh ruled that the winning defendants in an antitrust case were entitled to reimbursement of more than $367,000 in eDiscovery costs. 

The plaintiff had argued previously that the costs should be disallowed because "electronic document collection, hard drive imaging and indexing and searching, commonly referred to as 'eDiscovery charges,' are not enumerated under Section 1920(4), and thus are not properly deemed recoverable costs."  But Judge McVerry found that Congress, in the Judicial Administration and Technical Amendments Act of 2008, modified the wording of Section 1920(4), changing the phrase "fees for exemplifications and copies of papers" to read "fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials."  Since that amendment, Judge McVerry said, "no court has categorically excluded eDiscovery costs from allowable costs."

Given the extent of the defendant’s eDiscovery activities, including copying nearly 500 gigabytes of data in response to over 400 search terms and creation of a litigation database, the court awarded $367,000 of the $389,000 eDiscovery costs requested by the defendants.

Naturally, the plaintiffs appealed that ruling to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

In a ruling that will undoubtedly not be popular with corporate defendants, the Third Circuit ruled that only an isolated portion of eDiscovery costs was taxable. As noted by the appeals court:

“The decisions that allow taxation of all, or essentially all, electronic discovery consultant charges, such as the District Court‘s ruling in this case, are untethered from the statutory mooring. Section 1920(4) does not state that all steps that lead up to the production of copies of materials are taxable. It does not authorize taxation merely because today‘s technology requires technical expertise not ordinarily possessed by the typical legal professional. It does not say that activities that encourage cost savings may be taxed.”

As a result, the appeals court significantly reduced the eDiscovery costs that the plaintiffs would have owed Hoosier and DMS under the lower court’s decision:

“We conclude that of the numerous services the vendors performed, only the scanning of hard copy documents, the conversion of native files to TIFF, and the transfer of VHS tapes to DVD involved copying, and that the costs attributable to only those activities are recoverable under § 1920(4)‘s allowance for the costs of making copies of any materials. Those costs total $30,370.42. We find that none of the charges imposed by DMS‘s vendor are taxable, and that the award in favor of Hoosier should be reduced by $95,210.13, the difference between the  electronic discovery vendors‘ charges awarded by the District Court ($125,580.55) and the charges of Hoosier‘s electronic discovery vendors we find taxable ($30,370.42).” {emphasis added}

So, what do you think?  Do you agree with the narrow ruling of taxable eDiscovery costs or do you think the original, more expansive ruling was correct?  Will this lead to more cases settling?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery History: A Look Back at Zubulake
 

Yesterday, we discussed a couple of cases within a month’s time where the New York Appellate Division has embraced the federal standards of Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 FRD 212.  Those of us who have been involved in litigation support and discovery management for years are fully aware of the significance of the Zubulake case and its huge impact on discovery of electronic data.  Even if you haven’t been in the industry for several years, you’ve probably heard of the case and understand that it’s a significant case.  But, do you understand just how many groundbreaking opinions resulted from that case?  For those who aren’t aware, let’s take a look back.

The plaintiff, Laura Zubulake, filed suit against her former employer UBS Warburg, alleging gender discrimination, failure to promote, and retaliation. Southern District of New York Judge Shira Sheindlin's rulings in this case are the most often cited in the area of electronic discovery, and were issued prior to the 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That’s somewhat like establishing laws before the Ten Commandments!  The important opinions related to eDiscovery are commonly known as Zubulake I, Zubulake III, Zubulake IV and Zubulake V.  Here is a summary of each of those opinions:

Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 217 F.R.D. 309 (Zubulake I) and Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake III)

The plaintiff argued that key evidence was located in various emails exchanged among employees of UBS, the defendant. Initially, the defendant produced about 350 pages of documents, including approximately 100 pages of email, but the plaintiff produced approximately 450 pages of email correspondence on her own. To address the discrepancy, the plaintiff requested for UBS to locate the documents that existed in backup tapes and other archiving media.

The defendant, arguing undue burden and expense, requested the court to shift the cost of production to the plaintiff, citing Rowe Entertainment v. The William Morris Agency, 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). In May 2003, the court ruled stating that whether the production of documents is unduly burdensome or expensive "turns primarily on whether it is kept in an accessible or inaccessible format". The court determined that the issue of accessibility depends on the media on which data are stored. It described five categories of electronic media, as follows:

  1. Online data, including hard disks;
  2. Near-line data, including optical disks;
  3. Offline storage, such as magnetic tapes;
  4. Backup tapes;
  5. Fragmented, erased and damaged data.

The last two categories were considered inaccessible as they were not readily available and thus subject to cost-shifting. Discussing the Rowe decision, the court concluded that it needed modification and created a new seven factor balance test for cost-shifting:

  1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant information;
  2. The availability of such information from other sources;
  3. The total cost of production, compared to the amount in controversy;
  4. The total cost of production, compared to the resources available to each party;
  5. The relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do so;
  6. The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and
  7. The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.

The defendant was ordered to produce, at its own expense, all responsive email existing on its servers, optical disks, and five backup tapes as selected by the plaintiff. The court would only conduct a cost-shifting analysis after the review of the contents of the backup tapes.

In July 2003, Zubulake III applied the cost-shifting test outlined in Zubulake I based on the sample recovery of data from five backup tapes.  After the results of the sample restoration, both parties wanted the other to fully pay for the remaining backup email. The sample cost the defendant about $19,003 for restoration but the estimated costs for production was $273,649, including attorney and paralegal review costs. After applying the seven factor test, it determined that the defendant should account for 75 percent of the restoration and searching costs, excluding attorney review costs.

Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake IV)

During the restoration effort, the parties discovered that some backup tapes were no longer available. The parties also concluded that relevant emails created after the initial proceedings had been deleted from UBS's email system and were only accessible on backup tapes. The plaintiff then sought an order requiring UBS to pay for the total costs of restoring the remaining backup tapes and also sought an adverse inference instruction against UBS and the costs for re-deposing some individuals required because of the destruction of evidence.

In October 2003, Judge Scheindlin found that the defendant had a duty to preserve evidence since it should have known that it would be relevant for future litigation. However, at the time, she concluded that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the lost evidence supported the adverse inference instruction claim. But, she did order the defendant to cover the costs as claimed by the plaintiff.

Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 2004 WL 1620866 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2004) (Zubulake V)

In July 2004, Judge Scheindlin ruled that UBS had failed to take all necessary steps to guarantee that relevant data was both preserved and produced, and granted the plaintiff's motion for adverse inference instruction sanctions, sought in Zubulake IV, due to the deleted evidence (emails and tapes) and inability to recover key documents during the course of the case.

The court also indicated that defense counsel was partly to blame for the document destruction because it had failed in its duty to locate and preserve relevant information. In addressing the role of counsel in litigation, the court stated that "[c]ounsel must take affirmative steps to monitor compliance so that all sources of discoverable information are identified and searched" by ensuring all relevant documents are discovered, retained, and produced and that litigators must guarantee that relevant documents are preserved by instituting a litigation hold on key data, and safeguarding archival media.

In the final instructions to the jury Judge Scheindlin instructed in part, "[i]f you find that UBS could have produced this evidence, the evidence was within its control, and the evidence would have been material in deciding facts in dispute in this case, you are permitted, but not required, to infer that the evidence would have been unfavorable to UBS." In addition, monetary sanctions were awarded to the plaintiff for reimbursement of costs of additional re-depositions and of the motion leading to this opinion, including attorney fees. The jury found in the plaintiff’s favor on both claims awarding compensatory and punitive awards totaling $29.2 million.

Judge Scheindlin’s opinions in Zubulake, including definitions of accessible and inaccessible data, the seven factor balance test for cost shifting and definition of counsel’s obligation for preserving data, have been referenced in numerous cases since and have provided guidance to organizations preparing for litigation.  For any of you who may not have fully understood the significance of the case, I hope this look back was helpful.

So, what do you think?  Did you learn something new about Zubulake?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: The Zubulake Rules of Civil Procedure
 

As noted in Law Technology News (N.Y. Appellate Division Continues to Press 'Zubulake' EDD Standard) recently, the New York Appellate Division has embraced the federal standards of Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 FRD 212 in two case rulings within a month’s time.

In Voom HD Holdings v. EchoStar Satellite LLC, 600292/08, the decision, written by Justice Sallie Manzanet-Daniels, was the first by a New York state appellate court to apply the standard for spoliation of electronic evidence applied by Judge Shira Scheindlin in Zubulake in 2003.  As defined by Judge Scheindlin, the Zubulake standard asserts that "once a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine document retention/destruction policy and put in place a 'litigation hold' to ensure the preservation of relevant documents."

The case relates to a 2005 contract dispute between EchoStar and Cablevision subsidiary Voom HD Holdings, within which Voom agreed to provide EchoStar rights to broadcast Voom's programming.  Once the case was filed by Voom in February 2008, EchoStar put a litigation hold in place, instructing employees to save anything that they deemed potentially relevant to the litigation, but did not extend this hold to stopping automatic deletion of eMails from EchoStar's computers until four months later in June 2008.

Voom moved for spoliation sanctions against EchoStar for failing to preserve its eMails and Manhattan Supreme Court Justice Richard Lowe granted the motion, citing Zubulake, finding that EchoStar should have put in place a litigation hold (including a stop to automatic deletion of e-mails) in June 2007, when its corporate counsel sent Voom a letter containing a notice of breach, a demand and an explicit reservation of rights (i.e., reasonably anticipated litigation).  Therefore, EchoStar was given an adverse inference sanction (they had also received a similar sanction in 2005 in Broccoli v. EchoStar Communications Corp., 229 FRD 506).

EchoStar appealed and requested the appellate court to adopt a rule that a company must preserve documents when litigation is pending or when it has "notice of a specific claim."  However, that argument was rejected by The First Department, which ruled that “EchoStar and amicus's approach would encourage parties who actually anticipate litigation, but do not yet have notice of a 'specific claim' to destroy their documents with impunity” and upheld the sanction.

In U.S. Bank National Association v. GreenPoint Mortgage Funding Inc., 600352/09, the First Department held that the producing party should bear the initial costs of "searching for, retrieving and producing discovery," but that lower courts may permit cost shifting based on the factors set forth in Zubulake.  The case was filed by U.S. Bank, NA (indenture trustee for the insurers and holders of the mortgage-backed notes issued by GreenPoint Mortgage Funding Inc., a now defunct mortgage lender specializing in "no-doc" and "low-doc" loans) against GreenPoint.

U.S. Bank served its first document production request on GreenPoint along with its original complaint; however, GreenPoint did not produce the requested documents.  Instead, they moved for a protective order arguing that U.S. Bank should pay the costs associated with its document requests including the cost of attorney review time for confidentiality and privilege assertions.  The court upheld GreenPoint's argument that the "party seeking discovery bears the costs incurred in its production" but rejected GreenPoint's request for U.S. Bank to also bear the attorney costs for privilege and confidentiality determinations.

Upon appeal, the First Department reversed the lower court's conclusion that the requesting party bear the cost of production, finding that, per the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Zubulake, the producing party should “bear the cost of the searching for, retrieving, and producing documents, including electronically stored information.”  In the February 28 ruling, Justice Rolando Acosta wrote that the court was “persuaded that Zubulake should be the rule in this Department.”  However, the court also ruled that the lower court could order cost shifting under CPLR Article 31 between the parties by considering the seven factors set forth in Zubulake.

What are those seven factors?  Tune in tomorrow, when we will provide a refresher to the Zubulake case and its various opinions!

So, what do you think?  Is the Zubulake standard appropriate for these two cases?  Is it appropriate for cases in general?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Plaintiff Not Compelled To Turn Over Facebook Login Information
 

In Davids v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. CV06-0431, (E.D.N.Y. February 24, 2012), the Eastern District of New York ruled against the defendant on whether the plaintiff in her claim against a pharmaceutical company could be compelled to turn over her Facebook account’s login username and password.

Plaintiff claimed ongoing suffering from osteonecrosis of the jaw (a severe bone disease that affects the maxilla and the mandible) against the defendant. Defendant served Plaintiff with its Second Set of Requests for Production of Documents, which requested Plaintiff’s log-in information to all of her social-networking websites and a release allowing Defendant to obtain documents directly from those websites so that Defendant could inspect all documents that relate to her claim.  In responding to the request, the Plaintiff only produced materials that were available to all Facebook users — not items hidden through Facebook’s privacy settings — claiming that the request was overbroad and a fishing expedition. As a result, the Defendant filed a motion to compel the Plaintiff to turn over her login information, including login for Facebook.

Why did the Defendant request the additional access?  As noted in the transcript:

“Defendant argues that Plaintiff's log-in information is discoverable because statements or pictures on her Facebook page relate directly to her claim of ongoing suffering from osteonecrosis of the jaw. Defendant's claim is predicated on Ms. Davids' profile picture, in which Defendant claims she is smiling. Defendant did not inquire about Ms. Davids' social networking activity at her deposition.”

In the process of determining whether the Defendant could compel such discovery, Magistrate Judge William Wall first noted that “[n]o cases in the Second Circuit or the Eastern District of New York have directly addressed this issue”.  The Defendant based its argument on two cases where access to social media information was granted: Largent v. Reed, 2011 WL 5632688, (Pa. C.P. Franklin Co. Nov. 8, 2011) and Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).  In both cases, “publically available content on the individual plaintiffs’ public Facebook profiles provided sufficient relevant information for the courts to infer that further discovery was necessary”; however, as the court noted in this case, “no such evidence exists”.  Therefore, the court ruled as follows:

“Defendant's argument that Plaintiff smiling in her profile picture on Facebook satisfies its burden in this motion to compel is without merit. Even if Plaintiff is smiling in her profile picture, which is not clear to the court, one picture of Plaintiff smiling does not contradict her claim of suffering, nor is it sufficient evidence to warrant a further search into Plaintiff's account.”

As a result, the court denied the defendant’s motion to compel.

So, what do you think?  Was the lack of publically available content sufficient justification for not granting the motion to compel?  Or should this case have been handled in the same manner as Largent and Romano?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Humor: And Now For Something Completely Different…
 

Every now and then, it’s nice to take a break from the regular case law updates, emerging trends reports and best practices tutorials and just have a laugh.  We recently published a two part interview series from LegalTech New York with Ralph Losey, who always has interesting and educational thoughts to share regarding eDiscovery.  Ralph recently published a video post on his excellent blog, e-Discovery Team® entitled How Not to Cooperate in an E-Discovery Conference.

Based on the watermark, it appears that Ralph used XtraNormal to make the video.  XtraNormal enables you to make an animated movie by selecting your animated “actors”, type or record your dialogue, and select a background.  The “actors” sound a bit robotic if you type the dialogue, but that just adds to the humor as the pronunciations and inflections are rather humorous.  Sometimes, they put the emPHASis on the wrong sylLABle.  And, it’s funny to hear them try to pronounce words like “chutzpah”.  🙂

Ralph’s video depicts opposing parties negotiating terms of eDiscovery production, and his attorney representing the producing party is particularly uncooperative.  Complete with applause and a laugh track, the four minute video is guaranteed to amuse anybody that has dealt with discovery negotiations or even works in discovery or litigation support.

Ralph has posted several other videos to YouTube, some of which are educational and others of which (while possibly also being educational) are also fun, including a Star Trek Meets e-Discovery series.

So, what do you think?  Did you get a laugh?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: eDiscovery Violations Leave Delta Holding the Bag
 

In the case In re Delta/AirTran Baggage Fee Antitrust Litig., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13462, 41-43 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 3, 2012), U.S. District Judge Timothy Batten ordered Delta to pay plaintiff attorney’s fees and costs for eDiscovery issues in consolidated antitrust cases claiming Delta and AirTran Holdings, Inc. conspired to charge customers $15 to check their first bag. Noting that there was a “huge hole” in Delta’s eDiscovery process, Judge Batten reopened discovery based on defendants’ untimely production of records and indications that there was overwriting of backup tapes, inconsistencies in deposition testimony and documents, and neglect in searching and producing documents from hard drives.

Plaintiffs asserted that Delta did not conduct a reasonable inquiry to confirm its implicit representations that (1) all of the relevant hard drives had been processed, and (2) there were no missing back-up tapes. Arguing that Delta should have ensured that all sources of discoverable information were identified and searched and searched in the evidence locker, Plaintiffs contended that Delta falsely certified that its discovery responses were correct and complete. As a result, Plaintiffs contended that the case had been “unnecessarily delayed and its costs unnecessarily increased, and the fact that Delta is now producing these documents is immaterial”.

The Court agreed, noting:

“The Court finds that Delta did not conduct a reasonable inquiry. With respect to the collected but unsearched hard drives, Delta has not substantially justified its failure to ensure the drives were run through Clearwell and searched back in 2009. While its counsel did email {Delta’s IT Group} CSIRT a list of custodians whose hard drives should have been loaded onto Clearwell, CSIRT did not respond with confirmation that each listed person’s drive was on the system; CSIRT only stated that files were identified by “user employee id, not by name.” Delta has not shown that it ever confirmed with CSIRT that each hard drive that was supposed to be run through Clearwell actually had been. This oversight is a huge hole in Delta’s electronic discovery process, and Delta has not adequately explained why it did not ensure in 2009 that every collected hard drive was actually processed through Clearwell and searched.”

Judge Batten determined that Delta had violated FRCP 26(g) early disclosure requirements and failed to supplement discovery, justifying sanctions under FRCP 37(c)(1). Ruling that Delta needed to pay plaintiffs’ fees and costs in bringing the discovery motions and for extended discovery activities, Judge Batten strongly suggested that both sides meet and confer to attempt to agree to those fees and costs.  However, Judge Batten found that Delta would not be sanctioned with the exclusion of the late production, because Delta: 1) Informed the Court and Plaintiffs after they discovered the issue; 2) Requested the Court suspend the case schedule; and 3) There was no evidence the Defendants willfully withheld the discovery.

So, what do you think?  Were the sanctions justified?  Or should more sanctions have been applied?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Law: Texas Model Order for Patent eDiscovery Now In the Public Comment Phase
 

In a blog post last October, we discussed the new model order proposed by Federal Circuit Chief Judge Randall Rader as a measure against the "excesses" of eDiscovery production. At that time, the "Model Order on E-Discovery in Patent Cases" had been unanimously voted on by the Federal Circuit Advisory Council and, as a result, could significantly alter the way discovery materials are used in such cases.  This version of the model order is included in proposed local rule amendment GO-12-06 for the Eastern District of Texas.  The amendment has been approved by the judges of the district, subject to public comment, the deadline for which is March 23, a little over two weeks from now.

Reviewed by a working group of the Eastern District's Local Rules Advisory Committee at the court's request to determine whether it should be included in the district's local rules, the working group recognized the "substantial work that went into the [Federal Circuit's] Model Order" and used it as its "baseline." The district created a redlined version of the Federal Circuit model order and provides detailed commentary explaining the reasons for the changes to the Federal Circuit model.  It has some fairly significant changes, some of which include:

  • Cost Shifting: Item #3, addressing circumstances for considering cost shifting, was stricken;
  • ESI Production Parameters: A new item #5 has been added to address production parameters, including document image format in TIFF, text-searchable documents, and native files (the way it’s currently written, you can apparently only request native files after receiving a TIFF production, absent agreement of the parties).  This section also notes that backup preservation and collection and preservation from voice mail and mobile devices is not necessary (absent a showing of good cause);
  • Email Production Requests: Item #7, indicating that email production requests will be only propounded for specific issues instead of general discovery, was stricken.  The next item, related to specifics of email production requests was expanded quite a bit to address information to be exchanged prior to email production and also allow one deponent per producing party to determine “the proper custodians, proper search terms, and proper time frame for e-mail production requests”;
  • Email Production Scope: Language was added to indicate that email requests will “identify the custodian, search terms, and time frame”.  It also bumped up the limit from five to eight custodians per producing party for each request and bumped up the limit from five to ten search terms per custodian per party.

It will be interesting to see whether any additional modifications are implemented as a result of the public comment period.

So, what do you think?  Will model orders become popular as a way to limit the eDiscovery in other types of cases?  Are model orders a good idea or are they too limiting? Please share any comments you might have or if you'd like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: At The Eleventh Hour, Encrypted Hard Drive Is Decrypted
 

In our previous post regarding the case U.S. v. Fricosu, Colorado district judge Robert Blackburn ruled that a woman must produce an unencrypted version of her Toshiba laptop's hard drive to prosecutors in a mortgage fraud case for police inspection.  The woman, Ramona Fricosu, had argued that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination protected her from having to disclose the password to her hard drive, which was encrypted using PGP Desktop and seized when investigators served a search warrant on her home.

In providing his ruling, Judge Blackburn referenced In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Boucher in which a password protected laptop was seized. After an initial magistrate judge ruling finding that the defendant could not be compelled to reveal the contents of his mind (via the password), the grand jury requested (which a Vermont District judge granted) to require the defendant to produce, not the password itself, but rather an unencrypted version of the drive.

While Judge Blackburn ruled that Fricosu was required to provide the government in this case with an unencrypted copy of the Toshiba laptop computer’s hard drive, he also ruled that the government would be “precluded from using Ms. Fricosu’s act of production of the unencrypted contents of the computer’s hard drive against her in any prosecution”.

Still, the defendant appealed.  On February 21st, the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals refused to get involved, saying Ramona Fricosu's case must first be resolved in District Court before her attorney can appeal.  She would have been required to turn over the unencrypted contents of the drive as of March 1.

However, at the last minute, Colorado federal authorities decrypted the laptop.  “They must have used or found successful one of the passwords the co-defendant (Scott Whatcott) provided them,” Fricosu’s attorney, Philip Dubois, said in a telephone interview.  Dubois said the authorities delivered to him a copy of the information they discovered on the drive, but he said he had not examined it.

So, what do you think?  Will disclosure of the password preclude a later appeal?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Trends: DOJ Criminal Attorneys Now Have Their Own eDiscovery Protocols
 

Criminal attorneys, are you discouraged that there is a lack of eDiscovery rules and guidelines for criminal cases?  If you work for the Department of Justice or other related law enforcement agencies, cheer up!

As noted in the Law Technology News article, DOJ Lays Down the Law on Criminal E-Discovery Protocols, written by Evan Koblentz, the government's Joint Electronic Technology Working Group (JETWG), led by the DOJ, unveiled its best practices guide for eDiscovery at a federal software summit in Washington on February 10.  The 21 page document, “intended for cases where the volume and/or nature of the ESI produced as discovery significantly increases the complexity of the case”, primarily consists of three sections:

  • Recommendations for ESI Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases: Provides a general framework for managing ESI, including planning, production, transmission, dispute resolution, and security;
  • Strategies and Commentary on ESI Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases: Provide more detailed guidance for implementing the recommendations – this section will evolve to reflect experiences in actual cases; and
  • ESI Discovery Checklist: One page checklist for addressing ESI production issues.

While the one page checklist has several items that would apply to any case, there are some items specific to criminal cases that would make it a handy reference for conducting eDiscovery on those cases.  The three sections are based on ten basic principles, which should have familiarity to those who have been dealing with eDiscovery in civil cases.  They are as follows:

  1. Lawyers have a responsibility to have an adequate understanding of electronic discovery.
  2. In the process of planning, producing, and resolving disputes about ESI discovery, the parties should include individuals with sufficient technical knowledge and experience regarding ESI.
  3. At the outset of a case, the parties should meet and confer about the nature, volume, and mechanics of producing ESI discovery. Where the ESI discovery is particularly complex or produced on a rolling basis, an on-going dialogue may be helpful.
  4. The parties should discuss what formats of production are possible and appropriate, and what formats can be generated. Any format selected for producing discovery should maintain the ESI’s integrity, allow for reasonable usability, reasonably limit costs, and, if possible, conform to industry standards for the format.
  5. When producing ESI discovery, a party should not be required to take on substantial additional processing or format conversion costs and burdens beyond what the party has already done or would do for its own case preparation or discovery production.
  6. Following the meet and confer, the parties should notify the court of ESI discovery production issues or problems that they reasonably anticipate will significantly affect the handling of the case.
  7. The parties should discuss ESI discovery transmission methods and media that promote efficiency, security, and reduced costs. The producing party should provide a general description and maintain a record of what was transmitted.
  8. In multi-defendant cases, the defendants should authorize one or more counsel to act as the discovery coordinator(s) or seek appointment of a Coordinating Discovery Attorney.
  9. The parties should make good faith efforts to discuss and resolve disputes over ESI discovery, involving those with the requisite technical knowledge when necessary, and they should consult with a supervisor, or obtain supervisory authorization, before seeking judicial resolution of an ESI discovery dispute or alleging misconduct, abuse, or neglect concerning the production of ESI.
  10. All parties should limit dissemination of ESI discovery to members of their litigation team who need and are approved for access, and they should also take reasonable and appropriate measures to secure ESI discovery against unauthorized access or disclosure.

Evan’s article provides comments from Andrew Goldsmith, the national criminal eDiscovery coordinator, regarding the efforts and intent of the document and training program for DOJ attorneys and other law enforcement personnel, as well as efforts of the department to determine how to apply commercial, civil litigation oriented, eDiscovery software to criminal cases.  It’s a good read and the guidelines look promising as a resource for criminal attorneys to manage eDiscovery in those cases.

So, what do you think?  Do these guidelines show promise for eDiscovery in criminal cases?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Best Practices: Google’s Blunder Keeps Them Under the (Smoking) Gun

As we noted back in November, a mistake made by Google during discovery in its lawsuit with Oracle could cost the company dearly, perhaps billions.  Here’s a brief recap of the case:

Google is currently involved in a lawsuit with Oracle over license fees associated with Java, which forms a critical part of Google’s Android operating system.  Google has leveraged free Android to drive mobile phone users to their ecosystem and extremely profitable searches and advertising.

Despite the use of search technology to cull down a typically large ESI population, a key email, written by Google engineer Tim Lindholm a few weeks before Oracle filed suit against Google, was produced that could prove damaging to their case.  With the threat of litigation from Oracle looming, Lindholm was instructed by Google executives to identify alternatives to Java for use in Android, presumably to strengthen their negotiating position.

“What we’ve actually been asked to do (by Larry and Sergey) is to investigate what technical alternatives exist to Java for Android and Chrome,” the email reads in part, referring to Google co-founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin. “We’ve been over a bunch of these, and think they all suck. We conclude that we need to negotiate a license for Java under the terms we need.”

Lindholm added the words “Attorney Work Product” and sent the email to Andy Rubin (Google’s top Android executive) and Google in-house attorney Ben Lee; however, Lindholm’s computer saved nine drafts of the email while he was writing it – before he added the words and addressed the email to Lee.  Because Lee’s name and the words “attorney work product” weren’t on the earlier drafts, they weren’t picked up by the eDiscovery software as privileged documents, and they were produced to Oracle.

Judge William Alsup of the U.S. District Court in Oakland, California, indicated to Google’s lawyers that it might suggest willful infringement of Oracle’s patents and despite Google’s motion to “clawback” the email on the grounds it was “unintentionally produced privileged material”, Alsup refused to exclude the document at trial.  Google next filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Washington, D.C., seeking to have the appeals court overrule Alsup’s decision permitting Oracle to use the email as evidence in the trial.

On February 6, the Federal Circuit upheld Alsup’s ruling that the email is not privileged, denying Google’s mandamus petition. Observing that the email was written at the request of Google’s co-founders, Larry Page and Sergey Brin (who are not lawyers) and did not refer specifically to legal advice or the senior counsel’s investigation, the appeals court rejected Google’s petition.

As we noted before, organizing the documents into clusters based on similar content, might have grouped the unsent drafts with the identified “attorney work product” final version and helped to ensure that the drafts were classified as intended and not produced.

So, what do you think?  Could this mistake cost Google billions?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.