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Case Law

Samsung Again Owes Apple Almost $1 Billion, Sanction Deadline Nears – eDiscovery Case Law

The news continues to get worse for Samsung Electronics Co. in its colossal legal battle with Apple Inc…

A California federal jury ruled on November 21 that Samsung owes Apple $290.5 million for selling mobile devices that infringed five iPhone and iPad patents, bringing the total awarded for infringing on Apple products to almost $930 million.

The jury deliberated over the course of three days before reaching its decision and awarding the amount, which was less than the $380 million Apple sought from Samsung, but far more than Samsung’s efforts to cap damages at $53 million.

In August of last year, Apple was awarded over a billion dollar verdict, but U.S. District Judge Lucy Koh later reduced those damages to a measly $599 million and ordered a retrial on 13 of Samsung’s products, saying the earlier jury’s math on those gadgets didn’t add up.

And, that may not be the worst of it for Samsung.  Due to the disclosure of confidential agreements that Apple had with Nokia, Ericsson, Sharp and Philips – now widely referred to as “patentgate” – Samsung and its outside counsel Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP are facing sanctions for that disclosure.

According to a declaration from Nokia’s Chief Intellectual Property Officer, Paul Melin, on June 4, in a meeting between Samsung and Nokia licensing executives, Dr. Seungho Ahn informed Nokia that the terms of the Apple-Nokia license were known to him. Specifically, according to Mr. Melin, Dr. Ahn stated that Apple had produced the Apple-Nokia license in its litigation with Samsung, and that Samsung’s outside counsel had provided his team with the terms of the Apple-Nokia license. Mr. Melin recounts that to prove to Nokia that he knew the confidential terms of the Apple-Nokia license, Dr. Ahn recited the terms of the license, and even went so far as to tell Nokia that “all information leaks.”

Partner John Quinn of Quinn Emanuel acknowledged the inadvertent disclosure, which was apparently due to an associate at the firm failing to obscure a footnote and two paragraphs while performing a digital redaction of a 150-page report which was posted on an FTP site that was accessible by Samsung personnel.

As a result, California Magistrate Judge Paul S. Grewal ordered an “in camera” review of documents that Samsung claimed as privileged which Apple doubted that they were legitimately withheld from its lawyers.  Then, on November 8 after the review was conducted, Judge Grewal ordered Samsung and Quinn Emanuel to show cause why they should not be sanctioned, stating that “it appears…that sanctions against Samsung and its attorneys are warranted”.  However, he gave Samsung one last chance to defend its actions ordering Samsung to file a brief by December 2 (today) to explain why it should not be sanctioned, while also allowing Apple and Nokia to file a brief to propose appropriate sanctions, with a hearing on the matter set for next Monday, December 9.

So, what do you think?  Can it get any worse for Samsung?   Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Duty to Preserve Triggered When Litigation is "Imminent", Not "Reasonably Foreseeable" – eDiscovery Case Law
 

In the case In re Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate) Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 2385,3:12-md-02385-DRH-SCW (S.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2013), Chief District Judge David R. Herndon ruled that at least in the Seventh Circuit, the duty to preserve is triggered not when litigation is “reasonably foreseeable” but when “a litigant knew or should have known that litigation was imminent.”

In this multidistrict pharmaceutical litigation, the plaintiffs’ steering committee (PSC) sought the production of documents from a drug company’s former employee. The company claimed it deleted the documents under its records retention policy no later than November 2011, before the first lawsuit was filed in this matter. It claimed its duty to preserve did not arise until it knew that litigation was “imminent” in February 2012, when it received the first demand letter from a plaintiff.

The PSC contended that the company’s duty to preserve arose earlier and filed a motion for sanctions. After the court held a hearing on the motion, the drug company’s counsel worked with the custodian and located 40 personal e-mails from his personal e-mail account sent after he left the company that mentioned Pradaxa, the drug in question. The PSC complained that the company’s production was deficient: it wanted the company to produce more than documents that just “referenced” Pradaxa and also complained that the production was inconsistent with the custodian’s declaration that he did not have any Pradaxa-related documents in his possession. The company then asked an outside vendor to review 200 disaster recovery tapes to determine whether it could recover the custodian’s documents.

The PSC filed a motion to compel the custodial file and asked the court for “other relief that the Court deems appropriate” if it found that the file had been destroyed. It claimed the company’s “duty to preserve arose as soon as [it] had reason to anticipate pending litigation and that imminence is not required.” Here, the PSC argued that the company’s duty was triggered because of other litigation stemming from the Pradaxa clinical trials, adverse event reports, and “internet chatter” on the websites of plaintiffs’ law firms.

Judge Herndon agreed with the company and found its duty to preserve did not arise until February 2012 when it received the demand letter and “knew or should have known that litigation was imminent.” Because there was no duty, sanctions were not appropriate. Moreover, even if the duty had arisen before the file was destroyed, the PSC had not shown the company destroyed the file in bad faith and was thus not entitled to a spoliation inference. Instead, it had followed its records retention policy.

So, what do you think?  Should the request for sanctions have been granted?   Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case Summary Source: Applied Discovery (free subscription required).  For eDiscovery news and best practices, check out the Applied Discovery Blog here.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Cost-Shifting Inappropriate when Data is Kept in an Accessible Format – eDiscovery Case Law

In Novick v. AXA Network, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 7767 (AKH) (KNF) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2013), New York Magistrate Judge Kevin Nathaniel Fox ruled that cost-shifting was inappropriate where data was kept in an accessible format.

In September 2012, the court ordered the plaintiff to give the defendants a revised customer list and a list of 10 custodians whose e-mails it had to search over a 2.5 year period. Claiming the request was “excessive and burdensome,” the defendants filed a motion asking for an order requiring the plaintiff to reimburse more than $40,000 in attorney’s fees and costs. Roughly half of the fees went to an outside vendor that processed the searches, and the remainder constituted legal fees.

The defendants argued that cost-shifting was appropriate under Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The defendants premised their argument on the fact that the search of 800 customers returned 80 gigabytes of data, but there were fewer than 400 pages of responsive documents, most of which duplicated prior discovery that the defendants had already produced. Instead, the plaintiff should have limited the search parameters and approached some of the customers to obtain the required information. In essence, the defendants argued that it was unfair “to require them ‘to continue funding unending discovery’” given the small amount at stake or to require it “‘to bear the cost of production to individual parties, if the individual parties are permitted to request every manner of production that occurs to them.’”

The plaintiff argued that cost-shifting was inappropriate because his search request was “extremely specific” and involved only 10 custodians. Moreover, the company’s outside vendor allegedly performed the search improperly. Finally, as a “‘multi-billion dollar company,’” the plaintiff argued that the defendants had a greater “ability to bear the cost.”

Here, Judge Fox found in favor of the plaintiff. Although parties are expected to bear the expense of complying with discovery requests, the court has discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) to shift the costs to protect a party from “undue burden or expense.” Under Zubulake, the court needed to determine “‘whether production of documents is unduly burdensome or expensive’” based on a consideration of “‘whether it is kept in an accessible or inaccessible format.’” Judge Fox found it was unnecessary to apply the eight-factor Zubulake cost-shifting test here because the e-mails in question were not in an inaccessible format.

So, what do you think?  Should the cost-shifting request have been granted?   Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case Summary Source: Applied Discovery (free subscription required).  For eDiscovery news and best practices, check out the Applied Discovery Blog here.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Is a Blended Document Review Rate of $466 Per Hour Excessive? – eDiscovery Replay

Even those of us at eDiscovery Daily have to take an occasional vacation (see above); however, instead of “going dark” for the week, we thought we would use the week to do something interesting.  Up to this week, we have had 815 posts over 3+ years of the blog.  Some have been quite popular, so we thought we would “replay” the top four all-time posts this week in terms of page views since the blog began (in case you missed them).  Casey Kasem would be proud!  Published less than two months ago in September, this post quickly vaulted to the top as the most viewed post of all time with over 1,400 lifetime views!  I guess the nerve of the plaintiff’s lead counsel struck a nerve with our readers!  Enjoy!

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Remember when we raised the question as to whether it is time to ditch the per hour model for document review?  One of the cases we highlighted for perceived overbilling was ruled upon last month.

In the case In re Citigroup Inc. Securities Litigation, No. 09 MD 2070 (SHS), 07 Civ. 9901 (SHS) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2013), New York District Judge Sidney H. Stein rejected as unreasonable the plaintiffs’ lead counsel’s proffered blended rate of more than $400 for contract attorneys—more than the blended rate charged for associate attorneys—most of whom were tasked with routine document review work.

In this securities fraud matter, a class of plaintiffs claimed Citigroup understated the risks of assets backed by subprime mortgages. After the parties settled the matter for $590 million, Judge Stein had to evaluate whether the settlement was “fair, reasonable, and adequate and what a reasonable fee for plaintiffs’ attorneys should be.” The court issued a preliminary approval of the settlement and certified the class. In his opinion, Judge Stein considered the plaintiffs’ motion for final approval of the settlement and allocation and the plaintiffs’ lead counsel’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs of $97.5 million. After approving the settlement and allocation, Judge Stein decided that the plaintiffs’ counsel was entitled to a fee award and reimbursement of expenses but in an amount less than the lead counsel proposed.

One shareholder objected to the lead counsel’s billing practices, claiming the contract attorneys’ rates were exorbitant.

Judge Stein carefully scrutinized the contract attorneys’ proposed hourly rates “not only because those rates are overstated, but also because the total proposed lodestar for contract attorneys dwarfs that of the firm associates, counsel, and partners: $28.6 million for contract attorneys compared to a combined $17 million for all other attorneys.” The proposed blended hourly rate was $402 for firm associates and $632 for firm partners. However, the firm asked for contract attorney hourly rates as high as $550 with a blended rate of $466. The plaintiff explained that these “contract attorneys performed the work of, and have the qualifications of, law firm associates and so should be billed at rates commensurate with the rates of associates of similar experience levels.” In response, the complaining shareholder suggested that a more appropriate rate for contract attorneys would be significantly lower: “no reasonable paying client would accept a rate above $100 per hour.” (emphasis added)

Judge Stein rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the contract attorneys should be billed at rates comparable to firm attorneys, citing authority that “clients generally pay less for the work of contract attorneys than for that of firm associates”:

“There is little excuse in this day and age for delegating document review (particularly primary review or first pass review) to anyone other than extremely low-cost, low-overhead temporary employees (read, contract attorneys)—and there is absolutely no excuse for paying those temporary, low-overhead employees $40 or $50 an hour and then marking up their pay ten times for billing purposes.”

Furthermore, “[o]nly a very few of the scores of contract attorneys here participated in depositions or supervised others’ work, while the vast majority spent their time reviewing documents.” Accordingly, the court decided the appropriate rate would be $200, taking into account the attorneys’ qualifications, work performed, and market rates.

For this and other reasons, the court found the lead counsel’s proposed lodestar “significantly overstated” and made a number of reductions. The reductions included the following amounts:

  • $7.5 million for document review by contract attorneys that happened after the parties agreed to settle; 20 of the contract attorneys were hired on or about the day of the settlement.
  • $12 million for reducing the blended hourly rate of contract attorneys from $466 to $200 for 45,300 hours, particularly where the bills reflected that these attorneys performed document review—not higher-level work—all day.
  • 10% off the “remaining balance to account for waste and inefficiency which, the Court concludes, a reasonable hypothetical client would not accept.”

As a result, the court awarded a reduced amount of $70.8 million in attorneys’ fees, or 12% of the $590 million common fund.

So, what do you think?  Was the requested amount excessive?   Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case Summary Source: Applied Discovery (free subscription required).  For eDiscovery news and best practices, check out the Applied Discovery Blog here.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Crispin v. Christian Audigier Inc. – eDiscovery Replay

Even those of us at eDiscovery Daily have to take an occasional vacation (see above); however, instead of “going dark” for the week, we thought we would use the week to do something interesting.  Up to this week, we have had 815 posts over 3+ years of the blog.  Some have been quite popular, so we thought we would “replay” the top four all-time posts this week in terms of page views since the blog began (in case you missed them).  Casey Kasem would be proud!  Until recently, this post was the most viewed of all time; with nearly 1,300 lifetime views, it is still the second most viewed post all time, originally published way back in December 2010.  Enjoy!

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Discoverability of social media content has been a big topic this year, with several cases addressing the issue, including this one, previously discussed on eDiscovery Daily.  The holiday week look back at cases concludes with Crispin v. Christian Audigier Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 52832 (C.D. Calif. May 26, 2010), which addresses whether ‘private’ data on social networks is discoverable.

This copyright infringement claim brought by artist Buckley Crispin against defendant and designer Christian Audigier, alleges that Audigier used artwork outside the scope of the original oral license between the parties and also sub-licensed the artwork to other companies and individuals (named as co-defendants) without Crispin’s consent.  The defendants served subpoenas on social media providers Facebook, MySpace, and Media Temple, directing them to turn over all communications between Crispin and Audigier, as well as any communications referencing the co-defendants.

Crispin sought to quash the subpoenas, arguing that they sought private electronic communications protected under the Stored Communications Act of 1986 (SCA), prohibiting Electronic Communication Services (ECS) and Remote Computing Services (RCS) providers from turning over those communications, but the motion was denied because Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott determined that Facebook, MySpace, and Media Temple did not qualify for protection from disclosure under the SCA.  Crispin moved for reconsideration with the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California.

District Court Judge Margaret Morrow’s decision partially reversed and partially vacated Judge McDermott’s order, finding that the SCA’s protections (and associated discovery preclusions) include at least some of the content hosted on social networking sites, including the private messaging features of social networking sites protected as private email.  She also concluded that because Facebook, MySpace, and Media Temple all provide private messaging or email services as well as electronic storage, they all qualify as both ECS and RCS providers, with appropriate SCA protections.

However, regarding Facebook wall postings and MySpace comments, Judge Morrow determined that there was insufficient evidence to determine whether these wall postings and comments constitute private communications as the user’s privacy settings for them were less clear and ordered a new evidentiary hearing regarding the portions of the subpoenas that sought those communications.

This opinion sets a precedent that, in future cases, courts may allow protection to social networking and web hosting providers from discovery based on SCA protections as ECS and RCS providers and may consider social media ESI protected, based on the provider’s privacy controls and the individual user’s privacy settings.

So, what do you think?  Is this the most significant eDiscovery case of 2010?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

The Ubiquitous Apple Samsung Case and “Patentgate” – eDiscovery Case Law

When something gets the “gate” suffix added to it, that’s not a good thing.

It’s hard to believe that a case can get more intense than when a billion dollar verdict is awarded (later reduced to a measly $599 million), but the Apple v. Samsung case seems to only be getting more intense, due to the disclosure of confidential agreements that Apple had with Nokia, Ericsson, Sharp and Philips – now widely referred to as “patentgate”.

Here is a summary of events as they are described in California Magistrate Judge Paul S. Grewal’s Order from October 2 regarding Apple’s motion for sanctions (which Nokia joined):

“During the massive fact discovery in this case between August 2011 and March 2012, Apple produced copies of a number of its patent license agreements, including a June 2011 license between Apple and Nokia. Apple marked the Apple-Nokia license as “Highly Confidential —Attorney Eyes’ Only” as permitted by the court’s protective order. Apple also produced and marked as “Highly Confidential —Attorney Eyes’ Only” similar patent license agreements it has reached with Ericsson, Sharp, and Philips.”

“As fact discovery transitioned to expert discovery, on March 24, 2012, Samsung’s outside counsel sent Samsung a draft expert report by Dr. David J. Teece. Dr. Teece’s report concerned damages to be awarded for Apple’s alleged infringement of Samsung’s asserted declared-essential patents. Because it addressed highly confidential, attorneys’ eyes only information, the report should have been fully redacted of that information before it was sent. However, intentionally or inadvertently, it was not. The report as distributed included key terms of each of the four Apple license agreements.”

“Samsung’s outside counsel [Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP] posted the report on an FTP site that was accessible by Samsung personnel. An email providing instructions to access the FTP site was addressed to the regular client distribution list used by counsel to provide Samsung personnel updates regarding this case. The information was then sent, over several different occasions, to over fifty Samsung employees, including high-ranking licensing executives. Specifically, on at least four occasions between March 24, 2012 and December 21, 2012, Samsung’s outside counsel emailed a copy of some version of the report to Samsung employees, as well as various counsel representing Samsung in courts and jurisdictions outside the United States.”

“At this point, things get murky. According to a declaration from Nokia’s Chief Intellectual Property Officer, Paul Melin, on June 4, 2013, in a meeting between Samsung and Nokia licensing executives, Dr. Seungho Ahn informed Nokia that the terms of the Apple-Nokia license were known to him. Specifically, according to Mr. Melin, Dr. Ahn stated that Apple had produced the Apple-Nokia license in its litigation with Samsung, and that Samsung’s outside counsel had provided his team with the terms of the Apple-Nokia license. Mr. Melin recounts that to prove to Nokia that he knew the confidential terms of the Apple-Nokia license, Dr. Ahn recited the terms of the license, and even went so far as to tell Nokia that “all information leaks.” Mr. Melin also reports that Dr. Ahn and Samsung then proceeded to use his knowledge of the terms of the Apple-Nokia license to gain an unfair advantage in their negotiations with Nokia, by asserting that the Apple-Nokia terms should dictate terms of a Samsung-Nokia license.”

Over the next few weeks, Samsung appealed the order to District Judge Lucy Koh, who was even more critical, finding the disclosures “improper” and Samsung’s lack of cooperation “inexcusable”.  A couple weeks later, Samsung provided sworn declarations, including one by Dr. Ahn that strongly contradicted Nokia’s representation of the June meeting. At a follow up hearing, Judge Grewal said he was not yet convinced that sanctions were warranted, ordering an “in camera” review of documents that Samsung claimed as privileged which Apple doubted that they were legitimately withheld from its lawyers.

As for Quinn Emanuel, who is also facing potential sanctions, partner John Quinn acknowledged the inadvertent disclosure, which was apparently due to an associate at the firm failing to obscure a footnote and two paragraphs while performing a digital redaction of the 150-page report and announced the creation of a new document retention policy to provide a “second pair of eyes” and avoid similar errors in the future (as reported by IT-Lex)

This past Friday, Judge Grewal ordered Samsung and Quinn Emanuel to show cause why they should not be sanctioned, stating “Having finally crawled out from under the boxes, it appears to the undersigned that if anything was breached, it was this court’s protective order, and that sanctions against Samsung and its attorneys are warranted”.  However, he gave Samsung one last chance to defend its actions ordering Samsung to file a brief by December 2 to explain why it should not be sanctioned, while also allowing Apple and Nokia to file a brief to propose appropriate sanctions, with a hearing on the matter set for December 9.

It will be interesting to see what transpires from here.  There have been at least 31 court filings so far this year in this case, so it looks like they’re just getting warmed up.

So, what do you think?  Are Quinn Emanuel and Samsung in serious trouble?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Rules Defendant Doesn’t Have Controls of PCs of Former Members, Denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel – eDiscovery Case Law

To require a party to produce evidence in discovery, the party must have “possession, custody, or control” of the evidence. In Kickapoo Tribe of Indians of the Kickapoo Reservation in Kansas v. Nemaha Brown Watershed Joint District No. 7, No. 06-CV-2248-CM-DJW (D. Kan. Sept. 23, 2013), the defendant did not have control over the personal computers of its former members, employees, or staff; it did not have the legal right to obtain information from them “on demand.” Therefore, the court rejected the plaintiff’s motion to compel and refused to order the forensic examination of the personal computers of current or former members, employees, or staff.

In this water rights lawsuit, the Tribe filed a motion to compel seeking an order that the defendant district produce documents and permit the forensic examination of its computers. In August 2012, the Tribe issued a request for production of the documents and computers for inspection on two counts it had recently added to its second amended complaint. Although the district responded, the Tribe found the response lacking and claimed that the district had not produced all responsive documents.

The district objected on four grounds. First, and most important to the requests at issue here, the district maintained that it could not “compel former members of the Board of Directors, former staff, or former employees to produce documents that are in their possession but that are not in the possession of the Watershed District itself.” Second, the district averred that the requests duplicated earlier discovery requests on the first four counts of the complaint, where discovery had already closed. Third, the requests were vague and could include privileged documents. Fourth, the district had already produced all documents.

The court agreed that the district did not “have the duty or ability to compel production of documents from persons no longer associated with the District that are not parties to this action.” Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a)(1), the district did not have “possession, custody, or control” of the requested documents, which it defined as having “actual possession, custody, or control” or “the legal right to obtain the documents on demand.” The Tribe could not meet its burden to prove that the district had control of the requested documents.

However, the district had not shown that the requests were duplicative or cumulative; if any documents were privileged, the district would have to provide a privilege log. It rejected the Tribe’s claim that documents from a third party supported its argument that the district had not produced all documents.

As for the Tribe’s request for an order requiring the forensic mirror imaging of the computers personally owned by the current and former district board members, employees, and staff, the court sided with the district. The advisory committee notes to Rule 34(a), which permits the inspection of electronically stored information, provide that “the inspection of a responding party’s hard drive is not routine, but might be justified in some circumstances.” Here, the district did not have possession, custody, or control of these computers and thus could not produce them; moreover, the Tribe could not show “beyond speculation” that these computers were used for district business. Finally, the court noted that it had “significant concerns regarding the intrusiveness of the request and the privacy rights of the individuals to be affected,” especially in light of the Tribe’s “broad, non-specific request” for inspection.

So, what do you think?  Should the motion to compel have been granted?   Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case Summary Source: Applied Discovery (free subscription required).  For eDiscovery news and best practices, check out the Applied Discovery Blog here.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Plaintiffs’ Supreme Effort to Recuse Judge Peck in Da Silva Moore Denied – eDiscovery Case Law

As we discussed back in July, attorneys representing lead plaintiff Monique Da Silva Moore and five other employees filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the US Supreme Court arguing that New York Magistrate Judge Andrew Peck, who approved an eDiscovery protocol agreed to by the parties that included predictive coding technology, should have recused himself given his previous public statements expressing strong support of predictive coding.  Earlier this month, on October 7, that petition was denied by the Supreme Court.

Da Silva Moore and her co-plaintiffs had argued in the petition that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was too deferential to Peck when denying the plaintiff’s petition to recuse him, asking the Supreme Court to order the Second Circuit to use the less deferential “de novo” standard.

The plaintiffs have now been denied in their recusal efforts in four courts.  Here is the link to the Supreme Court docket item, referencing denial of the petition.

This battle over predictive coding and Judge Peck’s participation has continued for over 18 months.  For those who may have not been following the case or may be new to the blog, here’s a recap.

Last year, back in February, Judge Peck issued an opinion making this case likely the first case to accept the use of computer-assisted review of electronically stored information (“ESI”) for this case.  However, on March 13, District Court Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. granted the plaintiffs’ request to submit additional briefing on their February 22 objections to the ruling.  In that briefing (filed on March 26), the plaintiffs claimed that the protocol approved for predictive coding “risks failing to capture a staggering 65% of the relevant documents in this case” and questioned Judge Peck’s relationship with defense counsel and with the selected vendor for the case, Recommind.

Then, on April 5, 2012, Judge Peck issued an order in response to Plaintiffs’ letter requesting his recusal, directing plaintiffs to indicate whether they would file a formal motion for recusal or ask the Court to consider the letter as the motion.  On April 13, (Friday the 13th, that is), the plaintiffs did just that, by formally requesting the recusal of Judge Peck (the defendants issued a response in opposition on April 30).  But, on April 25, Judge Carter issued an opinion and order in the case, upholding Judge Peck’s opinion approving computer-assisted review.

Not done, the plaintiffs filed an objection on May 9 to Judge Peck’s rejection of their request to stay discovery pending the resolution of outstanding motions and objections (including the recusal motion, which has yet to be ruled on.  Then, on May 14, Judge Peck issued a stay, stopping defendant MSLGroup’s production of electronically stored information.  On June 15, in a 56 page opinion and order, Judge Peck denied the plaintiffs’ motion for recusal.  Judge Carter ruled on the plaintiff’s recusal request on November 7 of last year, denying the request and stating that “Judge Peck’s decision accepting computer-assisted review … was not influenced by bias, nor did it create any appearance of bias”.

The plaintiffs then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Second Circuit of the US Court of Appeals, which was denied this past April, leading to their petition for a writ of certiorari with the US Supreme Court, which has now also been denied.

So, what do you think?  Will we finally move on to the merits of the case?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Denies Plaintiff’s Request for Native Production, Allows PDFs Instead – eDiscovery Case Law

In Westdale Recap Props. v. Np/I&G Wakefield Commons (E.D.N.C. Sept. 26, 2013), North Carolina Magistrate Judge James E. Gates upheld the plaintiff’s motion to compel the defendants to conduct supplemental searches and production, but denied the plaintiff’s motion with regard to requiring the defendant to produce ESI in native format, instead finding that “production in the form of searchable PDF’s is sufficient”.

In this real estate dispute, the plaintiffs asserted claims for fraud against the defendant.  While the two sides were able to agree on a discovery plan and a protective order, they were unable to agree on the form of production for electronically stored information (ESI), leading to the plaintiff’s motion.  The plaintiffs argued that “the metadata is critical where, as here, a fraud claim is at issue”.

The defendants produced 500 pages of documents after the parties agreed on the protective order, followed by a supplemental production of 120 pages and another 24,000 pages after the plaintiffs filed a motion to compel.

FRCP 34 states that the requesting party “may specify the form or forms in which electronically stored information is to be produced”, which the plaintiff did in 70 of 71 requests for production, requesting that “ESI production be in its native format, rather than searchable PDF’s, so that metadata will not be destroyed.”

However, Judge Gates was not convinced of the need for native production, stating “Plaintiffs’ contention that production of ESI in the form of searchable PDF files would destroy the associated metadata appears unfounded. While the PDF files would not necessarily contain the metadata, Centro represents that the metadata would remain intact and plaintiffs have not shown to the contrary.”

Continuing, Judge Gates stated “The court also finds that plaintiffs have not, at this point, demonstrated an adequate need to have all the ESI produced in native format…Instead, as Centro argues, production in the form of searchable PDF’s is sufficient. If after reviewing Centro’s production plaintiffs determine that they still seek production of particular ESI in native format, they may file an appropriate motion.”

Judge Gates did conclude, however, that the defendants were required to perform supplemental searches and production, ordering the defendants to produce all responsive documents based on additional search terms provided by the plaintiffs.

So, what do you think?  Should the plaintiffs have been able to receive the production in their requested native format?   Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Use of Model Order Doesn’t Avoid Discovery Disputes – eDiscovery Trends

In MediaTek, Inc. v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2013), when the parties could not agree on search terms, California Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley ordered one party to run test searches before lodging objections and required both parties to meet and confer before approaching the court with further discovery disputes.

The parties in this patent infringement matter “took steps to rein in” the exorbitant expenses of e-discovery in patent litigation by adopting the Federal Circuit’s Model E-Discovery Order. The parties proposed, and the district court approved, limitations on discovery. In addition to other limitations on interrogatories and depositions, they also agreed to limits on e-mail production. Specifically, they agreed that “production would be phased to occur after basic document production, that such production would be limited to seven custodians per producing party, and that each requesting party would ‘limit its email production requests to include no more than fifteen (15) search terms per producing party for all such requests, with no more than seven (7) search terms used to search the email of any one custodian.’”

However, as the court noted, the “parties’ laudable efforts at controlling discovery costs . . . imploded.” As discovery closed, the plaintiff filed 10 joint discovery letters seeking additional discovery from the defendant; simultaneously, the defendant filed a non-joint letter to “‘preserve its right to discover [] withheld documents.’”

MediaTek asked the court to order Freescale to produce the e-mail of seven custodians based on 15 search terms and “further identified the 7 search terms to be applied to each custodian’s email as required by the stipulated ESI Discovery Order.” Freescale objected and refused to run any searches.

The court addressed certain search terms, ruling as follows:

“The search terms which are variants of the word “United States,” including “domestic,” are considered one search term. The terms”*mcf* OR *mx* OR *mpc* OR *ppc* OR *pcf* OR *sc*” are not variants of the same word; instead, each term applies to a different accused product. Accordingly, each is a separate search term. The same is true for *845* OR *331* etc.; each refers to a different patent, not a variant of the same word. Thus, for example, MediaTek’s first proposed search term (Dkt. No. 133-1 at 3) is actually six search terms.”

The judge ruled the remaining objections to search terms and date ranges premature. Although Freescale claimed the terms were overly broad, it had “not run a test search on a single identified custodian for any of the proposed searches.” If it were to do so, it might learn “that the searches will not return a disproportionately burdensome number of hits.” If, on the other hand, they returned too many irrelevant documents, then the parties needed to work together to narrow the requests.

Therefore, the court ordered MediaTek to provide amended search requests and for Freescale to run test searches before asserting that any request was too broad. If Freescale did find the requests objectionable, the parties had to “meet and confer in person.” As the court noted, the “[t]he process is designed to be collaborative, something that has not occurred up to this point.”

So, what do you think?  Should courts require producing parties to test searches before declaring them overly broad?   Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case Summary Source: Applied Discovery (free subscription required).  For eDiscovery news and best practices, check out the Applied Discovery Blog here.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.