Preservation

Alteration of Domain in Produced Emails Leads to Sanctions for Plaintiffs: eDiscovery Case Law

In CAT3, LLC v. Black Lineage, Inc., No. 14 Civ. 5511 (AT) (JCF) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2016), New York Magistrate Judge James C. Francis IV, ruling that emails produced by the plaintiffs were “intentionally altered”, ordered that the plaintiffs would be precluded from relying on their version of those emails to demonstrate their case and that the plaintiffs would bear the “costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees, incurred by the defendants in establishing the plaintiffs’ misconduct and in securing relief.”

Case Background

One of the key issues in this case regarding trademark infringement regarded similarity between the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ trademarks and whether the defendants developed their trademark (FLASHXHYPE) mark independently or after learning of the plaintiffs’ development of their trademark (SLAMXHYPE).  In a deposition of the defendant company’s president, communication between the defendant and plaintiff companies was provided (which had been produced as PDF images) that showed the plaintiffs’ employee’s address as having the email domain “@slamxhype.com.”  However, on cross examination, the deponent testified that the email he received was identical, except that it showed the plaintiffs’ employee’s address with the email domain “@ecko.com.”

The defendants’ counsel then sought to explore the discrepancy, and in May 2015, they demanded production of the plaintiffs’ emails in native form.  The plaintiffs did not initially respond and, ultimately, their attorneys withdrew and were replaced by new counsel.  In July 2015, the Court ordered the plaintiffs to comply with the defendants’ request and the plaintiffs produced a USB drive containing a PST file, a zip file, and several separate PDFs of relevant emails.

The defendants subjected that production to a forensic analysis which determined that there were two versions of each email message: a “top” level version and, behind each email message, a “near-duplicate copy of the message containing the identical message,” but with different email domains appearing for a number of the senders and recipients.  The underlying near-duplicate versions were the original emails, which had been deleted, albeit not without leaving a digital imprint.

Relying largely on the forensic analysis, the defendants then moved for sanctions consisting of some combination of dismissal of the complaint, imposition of an adverse inference, an order of preclusion, and assessment of attorneys’ fees and costs.

Judge’s Ruling

In considering the application of the amended Rule 37(e) to the situation, Judge Francis determined that “because the amendment is in some respects more lenient as to the sanctions that can be imposed for violation of the preservation obligation, there is no inequity in applying it.”

With regard to the plaintiffs’ claim that “there has been no destruction or loss of any evidence, and there certainly has not been both (i) loss of evidence AND (ii) “such evidence cannot be restored or replaced” as required by Rule 37, Judge Francis, citing Victor Stanley (the first case ever covered by this blog), stated “the plaintiffs argue that even if they are the ‘gang that couldn’t spoliate straight,’ they cannot be sanctioned because their misdeeds were discovered and the information recovered. They are incorrect.”  Elaborating, Judge Francis said that “it cannot be said that the information lost has been ‘restored or replaced’”, noting that “as the plaintiffs themselves suggest, the fact that there are near-duplicate emails showing different addresses casts doubt on the authenticity of both”.

Regarding the plaintiffs’ contention that the manipulation of the emails was unintentional and possibly due to the migration of the plaintiffs’ emails from one system to another, Judge Francis refuted that notion, stating that the “evidence supports the defendants’ allegation that the plaintiffs intentionally altered the emails at issue”.

With regard to relief, Judge Francis, while considering dismissal of the action or imposition of an adverse inference as possible sanctions, stated “such drastic sanctions are not mandatory”.  Therefore, he ordered a “two-fold remedy”, ordering that the plaintiffs would be “precluded from relying upon their version of the emails at issue to demonstrate notice to the defendants of use of the SLAMXHYPE mark” and that the plaintiffs would bear the “costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees, incurred by the defendants in establishing the plaintiffs’ misconduct and in securing relief.”

So, what do you think?  Were those sanctions warranted?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Changes in Federal Rules Result in Reversal of Adverse Inference Sanction: eDiscovery Case Law

In Nuvasive, Inc. v. Madsen Med. Inc., No. 13cv2077 BTM(RBB) (S.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2016), California Chief District Judge Barry Ted Moskowitz, considering new standards imposed under recently amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e), granted the plaintiff’s motion for an order vacating the Court’s previous order granting (in part) the defendants’ Motion for Sanctions for Spoliation of Evidence.

Case Background

In a previous ruling (which we covered here), Judge Moskowitz granted the defendants’ motion for adverse inference sanctions for failure to preserve text messages from four custodial employees that were key to the case.  The plaintiff sought relief under Rule 60(b) based on an amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e), which went into effect on December 1, 2015.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing that it was untimely and also argued that it was neither “just” nor “practicable” to apply the new rule because: (1) the mere fact that trial was postponed to February 2016 due to the Court’s schedule should not have the effect of absolving the plaintiff of its discovery misconduct; (2) application of the amended rule would cause substantial prejudice to the defendant, which took discovery and filed its spoliation motion under the standard applicable at the time; and (3) there is no alternative sanction that would remedy the prejudice to the defendants caused by the plaintiff’s destruction of evidence.

Judge’s Ruling

In assessing the new Rule 37(e) language, Judge Moskowitz stated that “It is clear from the language of (e)(2) as well as the Committee Notes that the adverse inference instruction that the Court was going to give falls within the measures that are not permissible absent a finding of intent. The Committee Notes explain: ‘Subdivision (e)(2) applies to jury instructions that permit or require the jury to presume or infer that lost information was unfavorable to the party that lost it. Thus, it covers any instruction that directs or permits the jury to infer from the loss of information that it was in fact unfavorable to the party that lost it.’”

Continuing, Judge Moskowitz observed that “In its prior orders, the Court did not make any finding that NuVasive intentionally failed to preserve the text messages so that Defendants could not use them in this litigation. Instead, the Court found that NuVasive was at fault for not enforcing compliance with the litigation hold. The record does not support a finding of intentional spoliation by NuVasive. Therefore, under Rule 37(e), as amended, it would not be proper for the Court to give the adverse inference instruction.”

Judge Moskowitz rejected the defendants’argument that the motion was untimely, noting that the plaintiff brought its motion on December 10, 2015, just nine days after the new rule went into effect.  While acknowledging that “NuVasive has had a bit of good luck in that trial is scheduled for February, after the effective date of the new rule”, Judge Moskowitz indicated that he was “not convinced that there is any prejudice” to the defendant, noting that, “even under the standard applied by the Court in initially ruling upon Defendants’ motion for sanctions, intent was relevant”.

Judge Moskowitz did indicate he would allow both parties “to present evidence to the jury regarding the loss of electronically stored information and will instruct the jury that the jury may consider such evidence along with all other evidence in the case in making its decision.”

So, what do you think?  Should sanction orders be vacated because of the amendment to Rule 37(e)?  Will this create a wave of motions requesting that courts vacate similar orders in other cases?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Appeals Court Upholds Terminating Sanctions For Wipe of Cell Phone: eDiscovery Case Law

In Woodell v. Bernstein, et. al., No. 14-2836 (Cal. App., Dec. 30, 2015), the California Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, which imposed terminating sanctions against the plaintiff for spoliation of evidence and dismissed his lawsuit with prejudice after the plaintiff had wiped his cell phone, which was key to the case.

Case Background

In this defamation case, the plaintiff claimed to have lost his cell phone while out walking his dog. One of the defendants found the cell phone on his front lawn near an uprooted sign endorsing his co-defendant for public office. The defendants notified the media and the police that they found the cell phone near the sign and claimed that the plaintiff must have removed the sign, which he denied and, eventually, sued the defendants for defamation.

During deposition of the plaintiff when he was asked for a photo that he had taken the night he lost his phone, he admitted that he had since wiped the phone, stating that “I’ve completely wiped the phone, as I do – did many times working for Google, putting new operating systems on. So whatever photo is – if I have it, I’ll be happy to produce it, but it’s certainly not on the phone anywhere.”  He ultimately indicated that he wiped out the contents of the phone “[s]ometime in early 2012.” He said he did that because the phone was “broken” and he “had to reinstall the operating system”.  When the defendants requested to inspect the phone and arranged to do so, the phone was provided uncharged with the charging connector damaged so that it could not be connected and charged.  In April 2014, the defendants filed a joint motion for terminating sanctions.

Trial Court’s Ruling

The trial court observed that the defendants provided “ample evidence” to show that the plaintiff delayed and obstructed their ability to inspect the phone and, when finally allowed to inspect it, the phone battery was dead and the charging mechanism had been irreparably damaged preventing the phone from being plugged into a charger.  The court added: “What is most disconcerting, however, is the action taken by [Woodell] prior to filing the lawsuit, which included allegedly capturing for his own purpose information from the phone favorable to his position, and then completely wiping clean the operating system such that all potentially relevant information retained on the phone was destroyed.”

The trial court also noted that the plaintiff, in his deposition, stated that he “wiped clean” the phone because he had done that “many times working for Google” but in his declaration he stated that Google instructed him to wipe out the “corrupted system.” In assessing the contradictory evidence, the court found that the plaintiff “was contemplating legal action in 2011, well before he destroyed the contents of the phone in 2012.”  As a result, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for terminating sanctions, determining that it was “patently unjust” to force the defendants to continue to defend an action when they had been denied potentially exculpatory evidence, and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.

The plaintiff appealed the ruling, arguing that terminating sanctions were not appropriate because there was no pattern of conduct with regard to discovery and that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it made factual and credibility findings without holding an evidentiary hearing.

Appellate Court’s Ruling

Regarding the plaintiff’s argument that sanctions were not appropriate because there was no pattern of conduct with regard to discovery, the appellate court stated “It is undisputed that the phone Woodell produced no longer contained the critical data, and the production of the phone was of no value to defendants. Woodell’s argument that the law prevented the trial court from imposing terminating sanctions when there was no pattern of discovery abuse or no violation of a prior discovery order is incorrect.”  The appellate court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding – without holding an evidentiary hearing – that the defendants met their burden of showing that the plaintiff deliberately removed the data from the phone in anticipation of litigation.  As a result, the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s ruling to dismiss the lawsuit.

So, what do you think?  Did the spoliation warrant termination sanctions?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Gives Plaintiff 21.5 Million Reasons for Not Spoliating Emails: eDiscovery Case Law

When you spoliate data, you can lose even after you’ve won…  :o)

In Hausman v. Holland America Line-U.S.A., et al., No. CV13-0937 BJR (W.D. Wa., Jan 5, 2016), Washington District Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein vacated a $21.5 million verdict awarded to a man injured by a closing cruise-ship door in 2011 and ordered a new trial, after the plaintiff’s former assistant alleged that he deleted emails that could hurt his case.

Case Background

The plaintiff sued the defendant in 2013, stating that he suffered dizziness and seizures after an automatic sliding glass door improperly closed and struck his head as the vessel approached Honolulu. After a two-week trial in October, a jury awarded him $21.5 million.

However, the matter did not end there. Approximately two weeks after the trial concluded, the defendants were approached by the plaintiff’s former personal assistant who informed them that the plaintiff had deliberately sabotaged the defendants’ pre-trial discovery efforts, alleging that he: (1) Deleted and/or failed to disclose the existence of emails that he knew were relevant to this lawsuit, (2) Tampered with witness testimony, (3) Fabricated and/or exaggerated the extent of his alleged injuries, and (4) Testified falsely at trial.

Through witness testimony and supporting documents from the personal assistant at an evidentiary hearing held in December, the following allegations were made:

  • The plaintiff panicked when he learned that he would have to produce emails responsive to certain terms and began searching for and deleting those emails over “several days”;
  • He instructed her to delete all email correspondence between the two of them from her computer and phone, which she proceeded to do;
  • He discussed hiring someone to “scrub” his computer and that claimed he had used a large magnet to damage his home office computer’s hard drive; and
  • He had a second personal email account that he used while she was employed as his personal assistant, but that he did not disclose this account to the defendants.

In support of her testimony, the defendants produced copies of 60 emails that she was able to recover from her computer and/or phone after she deleted them, approximately 1/3 of which contained search terms that should have triggered their production.  In one of the deleted emails, the plaintiff wrote to his assistant to say he was sore after spending most of the day on a 10-foot ladder using a fire ax to chop ice that had built up over the front porch of his house, contrary to his claim of vertigo after the incident.

The plaintiff conceded that he did not produce those emails and that nearly one-third of the emails contain the Court-ordered search terms, but claimed the failure to produce these emails was not the result of misconduct on his part, but simply as part of his routine practice of clearing out his inbox.

Judge’s Ruling

In making her ruling, Judge Rothstein stated that “the credibility of Ms. Mizeur and Mr. Hausman is at the heart of this motion: Ms. Mizeur charges that Mr. Hausman intentionally sabotaged Defendants’ discovery efforts and is lying to cover his misconduct; Mr. Hausman charges that Ms. Mizeur is a bitter ex-employee who is lying because she wants to wreak havoc on his life. Thus, this Court must assess the credibility of Ms. Mizeur and Mr. Hausman.”

Finding the former assistant’s explanation regarding a check that she wrote to herself from the plaintiff’s account as an approved expense as “credible”, Judge Rothstein stated “[i]n short, this Court finds Ms. Mizeur to be a truthful witness.”

As for the plaintiff, not so much.

“The same cannot be said for Mr. Hausman”, Judge Rothstein stated. “As a witness, he came across evasive and untrustworthy. He appeared to weigh each answer, not for its truthfulness, but to assess whether it would damage his case. Mr. Hausman also seemed to capitalize on his alleged brain injury when it was convenient for him. He was confused or claimed memory loss when confronted with a question or exhibit that appeared to undermine his claims, yet was animated and full of information when his testimony supported his case.”

Finding “that Plaintiff did not meet his burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the withheld information was inconsequential”, Judge Rothstein concluded “that a miscarriage of justice occurred in this case”, vacated the judgment entered in the case and ordered a new trial.

So, what do you think?  Was this sanction excessive?  Is it ever too late to sanction a party for intentional spoliation of data?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Thanks, as always, to Sharon Nelson’s excellent Ride the Lightning blog for the tip!

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Orders Sanctions Against Defendant for Spoliation of Emails and Other Documents: eDiscovery Case Law

Now, that we’ve recapped last year’s cases, let’s start covering cases for this year…

In Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Ohio Public Employees Retirement System, No. 654586/2012 (Supreme Court of New York, New York County, December 7, 2015), the Court, determining that the defendant had spoliated data, found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated sufficient facts to warrant striking the defendant’s affirmative defenses, but opted to order an adverse inference instruction and also ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and costs in preparing the instant motion for sanctions.

Case Background

In this action to recover principal distributions from the defendant, the defendant, at the direction of in-house counsel, distributed a written litigation hold notice to certain employees who were deemed likely to possess documents relevant to the dispute.  In addition, the defendant’s IT department saved emails in an enterprise email archiving system.  Despite the preservation, the defendant objected to the plaintiff’s discovery requests and did not produce any responsive documents during a period where disputes over the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment were happening, until sometime after the court instructed the parties to go forward with discovery.  The defendant ultimately produced documents responsive to the plaintiff’s discovery requests.

However, several months into discovery, the defendant revealed that due to a “synchronization error,” emails that were preserved in the email archiving system that were subject to the ligation hold were accidentally purged, resulting in the content of 101 responsive emails being lost (though the defendant was able to recover and produce metadata from the lost emails).  Due to that issue and other instances of supposed spoliation by the defendant (including one email that was ultimately produced by another party that had communicated with the defendant), the plaintiff filed an instant motion for sanctions, asking the Court to strike the defendant’s affirmative defense of detrimental reliance, or, in the alternative, order a preclusion sanction or adverse inference.

Court’s Ruling

Finding that the duty to preserve began as early as April 2011 and no later than May 2011, the Court found “that OPERS’ had control of – and access to” lost or destroyed ESI in May 2011” and that the defendant wiped the computer of a key retired employee after the plaintiff had rejected a settlement offer from the defendant.  The court also found that the plaintiff had shown that at least some of the deleted ESI was relevant to the case.

Despite this, the court opted for the lesser sanction sought by the plaintiff, noting:

“Here, Ocwen has demonstrated prejudice as a result of OPERS’ failure to preserve France’s ESI and Bloomberg messages. However, the “extreme sanction” of striking OPERS’ affirmative defense is not appropriate in this case because Ocwen was able to obtain some evidence to disprove detrimental reliance, namely the August 2009 message sent from Gleacher to France…Since the loss of potentially relevant ESI is not fatal to Ocwen’s rebuttal of OPERS’ sixth affirmative defense, the imposition of an adverse inference as to that charge is appropriate and ‘reflects an appropriate balancing under the circumstances.’”

As a result, the court ordered an adverse inference instruction against the defendant and also ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and costs in preparing the instant motion for sanctions.

So, what do you think?  Was that the appropriate sanction?  Or should the defendant have been sanctioned at all?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

2015 eDiscovery Case Law Year in Review, Part 4

As we noted yesterday, Wednesday and Tuesday, eDiscovery Daily published 89 posts related to eDiscovery case decisions and activities over the past year, covering 72 unique cases!  Yesterday, we looked back at cases related to cooperation issues, social media and mobile phone discovery, technology assisted review and the first part of the cases relating to sanctions and spoliation.  Today, let’s take a look back at the rest of the cases relating to sanctions and spoliation.

We grouped those cases into common subject themes and will review them over the next few posts.  Perhaps you missed some of these?  Now is your chance to catch up!

SPOLIATION / SANCTIONS

We covered the first ten cases related to requests for sanctions yesterday, here are the remaining eighteen cases that we covered last year:

Court Denies Plaintiff’s Request for Spoliation Sanctions, as Most Documents Destroyed Before Duty to Preserve: In Giuliani v. Springfield Township, et al., Pennsylvania District Judge Thomas N. O’Neill, Jr. denied the plaintiffs’ motion for spoliation sanctions, finding that the duty to preserve began when the case was filed and finding that “plaintiffs have not shown that defendants had any ill motive or bad intent in failing to retain the documents which plaintiffs seek”.

Judge Recommends Default Judgment Sanctions Against Defendants, Even Though Some Deleted Files Were Recoverable: In Malibu Media, LLC v. Tashiro, Indiana Magistrate Judge Mark J. Dinsmore issued a Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions, recommending that the Court grant the plaintiff’s motion against the defendants for spoliation of evidence and perjury and enter default judgment against the defendants.

Similar Spoliation Case, Somewhat Different Outcome: In Malibu Media, LLC v. Michael Harrison (with the same plaintiff and issues as the case above in this list), Indiana District Judge William T. Lawrence denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, upholding the magistrate judge’s ruling which found an adverse inference instruction for destroying a hard drive with potentially responsive data on it to be not warranted, and ruled that “it will be for a jury to decide” if such a sanction is appropriate.

Plaintiff Once Again Sanctioned with an Adverse Inference Instruction, But Still No Complete Dismissal: In Lynn M. Johnson v. BAE Systems, Inc. et. al., District of Columbia District Judge Robert L. Wilkins granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff’s claims for negligence, battery, and defamation, but chose to “impose lesser, but nonetheless severe, sanctions” in the form of an adverse inference instruction for her remaining claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

New York Supreme Court Sanctions Two Attorney Defendants for “Egregious Misconduct” in Spoliation of Data: In HMS Holdings Corp. v. Arendt, et al., the New York Supreme Court in Albany County ordered a mandatory adverse inference instruction so that the trier of fact could “draw the strongest possible adverse inference from defendants’ bad faith and intentional destruction, deletion and failure to produce relevant evidence”. The court also awarded attorney fees, and forwarded a copy of the order regarding Defendant Lange to the New York State Committee on Professional Standards for attorneys.

Court Sanctions Plaintiff for Failing to Preserve Audio Recording: In Compass Bank v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, California Magistrate Judge William V. Gallo ruled that the plaintiff “wilfully engaged in the spoliation of relevant evidence”, and “has demonstrated a pattern of recalcitrant behavior during discovery in this litigation” and awarded an adverse inference jury instruction sanction against the plaintiff as well as defendant’s attorney fees and costs.

Court Orders Deposition of Expert to Evaluate Issues Resulting from Plaintiff’s Deletion of ESI: In Procaps S.A. v. Patheon Inc., Florida District Judge Jonathan Goodman ordered the deposition of a third-party computer forensic expert, who had previously examined the plaintiff’s computers, to be conducted in part by a Special Master that had been appointed to examine the eDiscovery and forensic issues in the case. The purpose of the ordered deposition was to help the Court decide the issues related to files deleted by the plaintiff and assist the defendant to decide whether or not to file a sanctions motion.

Tired of the “Crap”, Court Sanctions Investors and Lawyers for Several Instances of Spoliation: In Clear-View Technologies, Inc., v. Rasnick et al, California Magistrate Judge Paul S. Grewal sanctioned the defendants $212,320 and also granted a permissive adverse jury instruction that allows the presumption that the defendants’ spoliated documents due to a series of “transgressions” by the defendants and their prior counsel.

Appeals Court Upholds “Death Penalty Order” Sanction That Leads to Multi-Million Dollar Judgment: In Crews v. Avco Corp., a Washington Court of Appeals upheld a “death penalty order” against the defendant for discovery violations, including the failure to produce relevant information, but remanded for amendment of the final judgment of over $17.28 million to reflect any offsets for settlements with other defendants.

Denial of Motion for Spoliation Sanctions Leaves Plaintiff Less Than Glad: In Gladue v. Saint Francis Medical Center, Missouri District Judge Carol E. Jackson denied the plaintiff’s motion for evidentiary and monetary sanctions due to spoliation of evidence, finding that the defendant did not have a duty to preserve emails deleted as part of routine IT operations, had diligently attempted to recover deleted emails and that the plaintiff failed to show that any of the unrecovered emails were relevant to her claims.

How Blue Was My Valley? Not Blue Enough to Cite the Defendant for Discovery Violations: In Malone v. Kantner Ingredients, Nebraska Magistrate Judge Cheryl R. Zwart denied the plaintiffs’ motion to show cause, finding that the defendant “the plaintiffs have presented no evidence” that the defendant “destroyed, hid, or purposefully (or even recklessly) failed to produce responsive ESI” in the case.

Discarding a Relevant Computer Results in Adverse Inference Sanctions, Not Default Judgment: In Grady v. Brodersen, Colorado Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang granted the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions against the defendant in part for failing to produce a computer that the defendant ultimately acknowledged that he discarded, but denied the plaintiff’s request for a default judgment sanction, opting for the less severe adverse inference instruction sanction.

Defendant Does Not Take the Fall for Spoliation in Slip and Fall Case: In Harrell v. Pathmark et al., Pennsylvania District Judge Gene E. K. Pratter, after a hearing to consider whether to draw an adverse inverse instruction due to the defendant’s possible spoliation of video evidence, determined that “a spoliation inference would not be appropriate here”. Finding that the plaintiff had presented no evidence that the defendant had constructive notice of a dangerous condition resulting in her slip and fall, Judge Pratter also granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Court Rules that Australian Company’s Duty to Preserve Only Begins when US Court Has Jurisdiction: In Lunkenheimer Co. v. Tyco Flow Control Pacific Party Ltd., Ohio District Judge Timothy S. Black ruled that the duty to preserve for the defendant (an Australian company with offices and facilities only in Australia) did not begin until the complaint was filed in US courts in December 2011, denying the assertion of the intervenor/counter defendant that the duty to preserve arose in 2002.

Court Awards Attorney Fees to Defendant After Delayed Production by Plaintiff: In Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Westport Insurance Corp., Michigan Magistrate Judge Phillip J. Green awarded some (but not all) of the attorney fees requested by the defendant after the plaintiff “made repeated promises to produce the subject documents”, but “failed to do so for nearly three months after the deadline for responding to Westport’s Rule 34 request” and “compliance was obtained only after Westport filed its motion to compel”.

Plaintiffs Not Sanctioned for Late Production, Citing Their $29,000 Expense to Hire Experts to Assist: In Federico et al. v. Lincoln Military Housing LLC, et al., Virginia Magistrate Judge Douglas E. Miller, concluding that the defendants had not established that the plaintiffs had acted in bad faith when failing to meet production deadlines, declined to impose “any further sanction against Plaintiffs beyond the $29,000 expense associated with their expert’s production of the Facebook records”, except for a portion of the reasonable attorney’s fees associated with the original motion to compel.

Plaintiff Sanctioned for Late Production, But Not for Failure to Produce Data Held by Outside Vendor: In Ablan v. Bank of America, Illinois Magistrate Judge Daniel G. Martin recommended that the defendant’s Motion for Sanctions should be granted in part and denied in part, recommending that the plaintiffs be barred from using any new information at summary judgment or at trial that was contained on eight CD-ROMs produced late, but recommending no sanctions for failing to produce or make available documents held by the plaintiff’s outside vendor.

Payday Loan Company Sanctioned for Discovery Violations: In James v. National Financial LLC, Delaware Vice Chancellor Laster granted the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions after determining that the defendant’s “discovery misconduct calls for serious measures”. However, the plaintiff’s request for a default judgment was not granted, but lesser sanctions that included attorneys’ fees and a ruling that the lack of information contained in the requested document resulted in an admission.

Hope you enjoyed our recap of last year’s cases.  Next year, we’ll do it again for this year’s cases!

Want to take a look at cases we covered the previous four years?  Here they are:

So, what do you think?  Did you miss any of these?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Appeals Court Upholds Default Judgment Sanctions for Defendant’s Multiple Discovery Violations: eDiscovery Case Law

In Long Bay Management Co., Inc. et. al. v. HAESE, LLC et. al., No. 14-P-991 (Mass. App. Ct., Nov. 17, 2015), the Appeals Court of Massachusetts found that the default judge had not abused her discretion in ordering sanctions and assessing damages and ordered that the plaintiffs could submit a petition for appellate attorneys’ fees incurred in responding to the appeal.

In this case, the plaintiffs sued their former legal counsel for overbilling after a former associate of the counsel firm notified the plaintiffs that his billing records had been altered without his knowledge.  The default judge found that throughout the proceedings, the defendants repeatedly abused the discovery process in various ways, including inappropriate subpoena of individuals for deposition who were not “relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action,” seeking information not “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”

The defendants were also found to have “repeatedly stymied” the plaintiff’s efforts to gather discoverable information, by failing to respond to the plaintiff’s discovery requests and never producing the underlying metadata of the billing records despite court orders, using delay tactics and claiming several excuses such as privilege, the inability to separate the metadata from other client files, and missing multiple hearing dates without excuse.  In addition to the numerous discovery violations, the default judge determined that there was also strong evidence, albeit circumstantial, establishing spoliation.

On appeal, the defendant argued that the default judge should have allowed both his motion to stay and motion for reconsideration because the appearance of his new counsel required more time to brief the court why spoliation did not occur, that the damages judge erred in holding the assessment of damages hearing despite becoming aware that the plaintiff had litigated the case under a name that was not the real party in interest and that the default judge erred in preventing him from introducing specific expert testimony.  In response to each argument, the appeals court found that the default and damages judges did not abuse their discretion in ordering sanctions and assessing damages.  The appeals court also ordered that the plaintiffs could submit a petition for appellate attorneys’ fees incurred in responding to the appeal.

So, what do you think?  Did the defendants’ actions warrant a default judgment against them?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Grants Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Plaintiff’s Use of Spoliation Evidence: eDiscovery Case Law

In West v. Talton, No. 13-338 (M.D. Ga., Nov. 2, 2015), Georgia District Judge C. Ashley Royal granted the defendants’ Motion in Limine to exclude all evidence and argument regarding spoliation, reserving its ruling on the remaining issues in the Motion in Limine.

Case Background

In this employment discrimination case, during a deposition of defendants’ representatives in June 2014, the plaintiff discovered that the defendants failed to search and preserve some e-mail accounts as requested during discovery.  Based on this information, the Court granted the plaintiff’s motion to reopen discovery in September 2014. During the additional discovery period, the plaintiff discovered one individual defendant’s email account was deleted shortly after his resignation and backup tapes of the defendants’ server were written over as part of an automatic backup performed every six months which erased any backup of his email account.

Ultimately, the defendants were still able to retrieve the departed employee’s old computer and hire a third-party company to preserve and search the hard drive, from which they were eventually able to produce over a thousand documents and emails.  Nonetheless, the plaintiff sought a spoliation instruction to the jury regarding the deletion of emails, or in the alternative, an opportunity to present evidence of the defendants’ failure to preserve emails to the jury, claiming that he would have discovered more emails to support his claim had the defendants preserved the backup tapes and Holt’s email account.  The defendants argued that this evidence should be excluded because the emails were not deleted in bad faith, and they still retrieved the employee’s hard drive, which included the evidence the plaintiff requested.

Judge’s Ruling

After conducted a hearing to consider the arguments, Judge Royal stated:

“Based on the evidence presented during the hearing, it is not clear that Defendants’ failure to preserve Holt’s email account and the server’s backup tapes was a malicious act or done in bad faith. On the contrary, it appears Holt’s email was deleted pursuant to a routine procedure to delete an employee’s email account shortly after the employee left the Sheriff’s Department and to rewrite over the backup tapes of the server every six months. Plaintiff contends this procedure was more than just “mere negligence” because Defendants were on notice after receiving an EEOC complaint. However, even assuming Plaintiff’s contention is true, it is completely speculative Plaintiff was prejudiced by these events in any way. Defendants hired an outside company to restore Holt’s hard drive and recovered over 70,000 documents from the hard drive. The search terms used were broad and extensive and produced 1,205 hits. Indeed, Plaintiff received more information based on these search terms than what was originally requested during discovery. Further, the third-party company stated there was no evidence on the hard drive of any ‘mass destruction’ or ‘wiping.’”

Judge Royal rejected the plaintiff’s use of Woodward v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP as an analogous case, noting in that case, the plaintiff did not have other evidence to replace a lost video tape.  Stating that “[t]he Court finds the danger of confusing the issues and misleading the jury outweighs the probative value of such evidence”, Judge Royal granted the defendants’ Motion in Limine to exclude all evidence and argument regarding spoliation.

So, what do you think?  Should the court have allowed for a spoliation instruction to the jury or was the defendant’s efforts to provide ESI for the departed employee sufficient?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Agrees to Allow Defendant to Use Search Terms to Identify ESI to Preserve: eDiscovery Case Law

In You v. Japan, No. C 15-03257 WHA (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2015), California District Judge William Alsup granted the defendant’s motion to limit preservation of articles to those that contain one of several relevant search terms, as long as the defendant’s proposal was amended to include one additional term requested by the plaintiffs.

Case Background

In this putative personal injury class action involving claims against numerous defendants for allegedly contributing to sexual violence against them when they were kept as “comfort women” for members of the Japanese military during World War II, one defendant, a newspaper business, sought permission to preserve documents by alternative means to the Court’s required procedures.

This defendant had already retained an electronic, searchable database of all of its articles back to 1992 and was also retaining the versions of articles that are placed in a proprietary application used for laying out each edition of the newspaper for 90 days. However, the defendant contended that retention for longer than that could slow down the system or cause it to crash, indicating that installing a new storage system would cost $18 million and could take up to eight months.  As a result, the defendant filed an administrative motion for miscellaneous relief, seeking permission to employ an alternative method of preserving the documents as used in the proprietary application, namely by preserving articles only if they contain one of four relevant search terms.

The plaintiffs opposed this request, arguing that the defendant’s proposed solution could lead to the destruction of evidence of its state of mind in selecting and editing its articles, since the version of articles in the proprietary application are the only versions that reflect a particular intermediary stage of bringing those articles to publication.  They also contended that the proposed search terms are insufficient because the defendant had also used the term “voluntary corps (teishintai)” in articles about comfort women.

Judge’s Ruling

Judge Alsup, observing that the plaintiffs “do not, however, argue that articles with that term would not have otherwise been preserved under the proposed search terms, nor have they identified any other search terms that should be included”, found “that Sankei’s proposal, if amended to include the term “voluntary corps (teishintai),” is sufficiently broad to preserve the versions of articles in the proprietary application that may be related to the issues in this case.”  As a result, he granted the defendant’s motion.

So, what do you think?  Is limiting preservation to documents responsive to a small set of search terms a good idea?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Not Preserving Texts Results in Adverse Inference Sanctions for Plaintiff: eDiscovery Case Law

In NuVasive, Inc. v. Madsen Med., Inc., No. 13cv2077 BTM(RBB) (S.D. Cal. July 22, 2015), California Chief District Judge Barry Ted Moskowitz granted the defendants’ motion for adverse inference sanctions for failure to preserve text messages from four custodial employees that were key to the case.

Case Background

In this contractual dispute, the defendants sought sanctions in the form of an adverse inference jury instruction for the plaintiff’s failure to preserve evidence, specifically, text messages from four employees.  The defendants contended that these text messages could have been evidence of secret coordination between the plaintiff and former employees of the defendants to effect the termination of the defendants’ contractual relationship with the plaintiff and then have the plaintiff hire the defendants’ sales personnel as its own employees.

With regard to the four employees, each had a different level of failure to preserve the text messages.  One former employee turned over his current phone for imaging instead of the phone used during the relevant time period, which he wiped clean before turning it over to his son. A second employee was not asked to turn in his phone until 2014 (after being notified of a litigation hold in August 2012 and again in September 2013) and when he did, all text messages prior to September 20, 2012 were missing (which the plaintiff attributed to an iPhone iOS 6 software update released on September 19, 2012). The third employee had his phone wiped when he turned it in for an upgrade on two separate occasions, pursuant to company policy.  The fourth employee did not provide the phone he used in 2012 until sometime in 2013 and testified that he may have deleted some relevant messages.

Judge’s Ruling

Judge Moskowitz stated that “In light of all of the text messages that were lost or deleted, the Court concludes that NuVasive was at fault for not enforcing compliance with the litigation hold. Although it is true that Defendants should have taken steps to preserve the text messages of Orlando and Kordonowy while they were still working for MMI, NuVasive still had a duty to preserve the evidence and failed to do so.”

Rejecting the plaintiff’s claims that the defendants had obtained most of the deleted/lost text messages through other individuals, Judge Moskowitz also found that “Defendants have made a sufficient showing of prejudice”, noting from other texts that the defendants provided that it could “reasonably be inferred from these texts, viewed together with other evidence, that the MMI sales representatives were talking to NuVasive about plans to terminate MMI and have the sales representatives work directly for NuVasive. Accordingly, texts during the relevant time period to or from Moore, Kordonowy, Graubart, and Orlando might have furthered MMI’s claims.”

As a result, Judge Moskowitz found that “a properly tailored adverse inference instruction is appropriate and will not cause ‘substantial unfairness’ to NuVasive” and decided to give the following instruction:

“NuVasive has failed to prevent the destruction of evidence for MMI’s and Ms. Madsen’s use in this litigation after its duty to preserve the evidence arose. After considering all of the pertinent facts and circumstances, you may, but are not obligated to, infer that the evidence destroyed was favorable to MMI and unfavorable to NuVasive.”

Judge Moskowitz denied the defendants’ request for attorney’s fees and costs “because Defendants were also partially at fault for not taking steps to preserve text messages of Kordonowy and Orlando while they were still working for MMI.”

So, what do you think?  Was the sanction appropriate for this case?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.