Sanctions

A lot has been discussed about the most recent changes to the Federal Rules, especially with regard to Rule 37(e) and the requirement of the intent to deprive standard to apply more serious sanctions.  But, what activities constitute intent to deprive?  Should failing to issue a litigation hold be considered intent to deprive a party of potentially responsive ESI when that ESI is not preserved?

Rule 37(e)(2) says the following:

(2) only upon finding that the party acted with the intent to deprive another party of the information’s use in the litigation may:

(A) presume that the lost information was unfavorable to the party;

(B) instruct the jury that it may or must presume the information was unfavorable to the party; or

(C) dismiss the action or enter a default judgment.

{emphasis added}

Since the rules – including 37(e) – were implemented in December 1, 2015, there have been several cases where a request for sanctions were not granted because the court ruled a lack of bad faith or intent to deprive.  In one case, Nuvasive v. Madsen Medical, the court (in October 2015) had granted the defendants’ motion for adverse inference sanctions against the plaintiff for failure to preserve text messages from four employees suspected of secret coordination with the plaintiff.  However, after the 2015 Rules changes were adopted, the plaintiff sought relief under Rule 60(b) based on the amendment to Rule 37(e).  California Chief District Judge Barry Ted Moskowitz, having previously found the plaintiff did not intentionally fail to preserve the text messages, reversed the previous ruling and granted the plaintiff’s motion for an order vacating the Court’s previous order that granted the defendants’ Motion for Sanctions.  So, the ruling changed as a result of the Rules changes.

Here are four other cases since the beginning of 2016 where sanctions were denied because of a lack of bad faith or intent to deprive.  Of course, sanctions do still happen and they can still be severe — here are two cases with examples of severe sanctions.

In the Pension Committee case in 2010, New York District Court Judge Shira Scheindlin defined negligence, gross negligence, and willfulness from an eDiscovery standpoint and she stated: “[O]nce a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine document retention/destruction policy and put in place a ‘litigation hold’ to ensure the preservation of relevant documents.”  Judge Scheindlin also noted that by July 2004, when the final relevant Zubulake opinion was issued, “the failure to issue a written litigation hold constitutes gross negligence because that failure is likely to result in the destruction of relevant information.”

Granted, gross negligence and intent to deprive are not the same thing.  But, it’s 2017 now, not 2010 (much less 2004).  Given what most attorneys know today (or should know) about the requirement to issue a written litigation hold, should failure to do so be considered bad faith?

Not only that, but it’s possible to automate a good portion of the litigation hold issuance and tracking process, so it’s easier than ever to demonstrate due diligence in the litigation hold process.  There’s less excuse than ever to manage an effective litigation hold and meet your duty to preserve.

So, what do you think?  Should failing to issue a litigation hold be considered intent to deprive?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

In Shawe v. Elting, Case No. 487, 2016 (Supreme Court of Delaware, Feb. 13, 2017), the Delaware Supreme Court found that the Court of Chancery followed the correct legal standards and made no errors of law in its sanctions award of over $7 million against the appellant, agreeing with the lower court that his behavior was “unusually deplorable”.

Case Background

The plaintiff appealed an order of the Court of Chancery sanctioning him for misconduct throughout litigation with his current business partner and former romantic partner, where, after an evidentiary hearing, the Court of Chancery found that the plaintiff committed several violations, including:

• Breaking into the defendant’s office, having the President of the company’s forensic technology business image her hard drive, concealing the activities with a write blocker, and replacing the computer to cover his tracks (several times over a two year period);
• Remote accessing the defendant’s computer at least 44 times on 29 different occasions, gaining access to 19,000 emails, including 12,000 privileged communications between the defendant and her attorney;
• Hiring another third party to break into the defendant’s office, take pictures, and remove hard copies of documents;
• Claiming (after the suit was filed) that his niece dropped his phone in a cup of soda and he ultimately threw it away because he found it in a drawer with rat droppings;
• Deleting nearly 19,000 files from his laptop, which was discovered because his computer had made volume shadow copies and his own expert discovered it;
• Lying about his activities in his discovery responses and at his deposition, as well as giving false trial testimony and submitting a false affidavit during post-trial briefing.

The court also found that the plaintiff’s improper conduct impeded the administration of justice, unduly complicated the proceedings, and caused the court to make false factual findings. The Court of Chancery ordered the plaintiff to pay 100% of the fees the defendant incurred in connection with bringing the motion for sanctions, and 33% of the fees the defendant incurred litigating the merits of the case, awarding the defendant a total of $7,103,755 in fees and expenses.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the Court of Chancery erred in three respects: (1) by finding that he acted in bad faith when he deleted the files from his laptop and failed to safeguard his cell phone; (2) for failing to afford him criminal due process protections before sanctioning him for “perjury”; and (3) by awarding the defendant an excessive fee.

Judge’s Ruling

With regard to intent, the Court noted that the plaintiff/appellant “deleted 41,000 files from his laptop in December 2014 in the face of two litigation hold notices, one of which he issued, and an expedited discovery order that permitted Elting to conduct forensic discovery of Shawe’s laptop.”  Even though most of those files were recovered due to the laptop’s volume shadow copy system, the Court ruled that “does not negate his illicit intent” and also found that the “Court of Chancery was well within its discretion to sanction Shawe for his litigation misconduct” for throwing out his cell phone.

With regard to the “perjury” sanction, the Court stated: “While Shawe’s conduct may have constituted perjury, the court did not charge or convict him of perjury. Rather, the court imposed a civil sanction against him for his repeated lies under oath in interrogatory responses, at deposition, at trial, and in a post-trial affidavit to cover up what he had done. Shawe’s falsehoods wasted the court’s time, needlessly complicated and expanded the proceedings, and caused the court to find erroneous facts in its Merits Opinion. The Court of Chancery thus acted well within its discretion to sanction him for lying during the litigation.”

With regard to the claim that the defendant was awarded an excessive fee, the Court noted that the “Court of Chancery has broad discretion in fixing the amount of attorneys’ fees to be awarded” and “[a]bsent a clear abuse of discretion”, declined to reverse the award.

As a result, the Court affirmed the award, stating: “After a careful review of the record, we find that the Court of Chancery followed the correct legal standards and made no errors of law in its sanctions ruling. Shawe’s behavior was ‘unusually deplorable,’ and thus the Court of Chancery acted well within its discretion by sanctioning him for his bad faith conduct.”

So, what do you think?  Did the actions merit such a stiff sanction?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

In Below v. Yokohama Tire Corp., No. 15-cv-529 (W.D. Wisc. Feb. 27, 2017), Wisconsin District Judge William M. Conley, deciding on several pre-trial motions, granted (to an extent) the defendants’ motion for relief due to spoliation of evidence for failing to preserve the truck involved in a crash, stating that “defendants persuasively argue that the absence of this evidence should at minimum preclude plaintiffs from using it as a sword, even if defendants cannot use it as a shield.”

Case Background

In this product liability case related to a truck crash due to an alleged defective tire produced by the defendants that left the plaintiff severely injured, the defendants contended that the plaintiff’s pickup truck was destroyed at a salvage yard before plaintiffs filed this lawsuit.  The defendants argued that destruction of the truck hampered their defense because they were unable to evaluate, among other things, the suspension and steering systems, the seatbelt, the electronic data recorder and the other three tires.  Asserting that the plaintiffs or their “agents” sold the plaintiff’s pickup truck to a salvage yard with the knowledge that it would be destroyed after inspecting it, taking photographs and preserving the failed tire, defendants moved for a spoliation instruction.  Because of the plaintiffs’ actions, as well as receipt of $22,000 in insurance proceeds from the sale of the truck to the plaintiffs, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs’ bad faith could be inferred.

The plaintiffs asserted that the salvage yard agreed to the request from an investigator (retained by plaintiffs’ counsel) to preserve the truck in October 2013 (about a month and a half after the accident). In May of 2014, another of its investigators (Tom Malone) followed-up with the salvage yard to ask them to continue to preserve the truck and to notify him about any storage charges. Despite these efforts, plaintiffs’ counsel later “discovered” in the fall of 2015 that the truck had been destroyed on October 23, 2014.

Judge’s Ruling

Judge Conley noted that “A spoliation instruction is only obtainable if the proponent shows an intentional act or bad faith by the party in possession of the destroyed evidence.”

With regard to the plaintiffs’ failure to preserve all but the allegedly defective tire from the truck, Judge Conley stated: “Left unexplained is how plaintiffs ended up with the single, allegedly defective tire without preserving the other three; why other steps were not taken to preserve similar evidence, including possible electronic evidence that must be preserved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e); and perhaps most important, why plaintiffs waited another, two full years after the accident without notifying Yokohama of the availability of this piece of key evidence, despite knowing that it was the focus of plaintiffs’ liability claims within months of the accident itself. These questions are all the more troubling because plaintiffs were represented by a sophisticated personal injury law firm, who know full well of their duty to maintain evidence relevant to likely litigation, to provide notice of a possible claim, and notice of ‘the existence of evidence relevant to that claim.’…Plus, Malone’s letter to the salvage yard presents many more questions than it answers, as to timing and whether any agreement ever existed with the salvage yard.”

As a result, Judge Conley ruled, as follows: “Based on this record, plaintiffs’ counsel certainly should have taken additional steps to ensure that the truck (or at least potentially key evidence) was preserved, as well as notified likely defendants timely of the opportunity to inspect it. The failure to do so falls somewhere between negligence and gross negligence, but perhaps short of bad faith or intentional conduct requiring an adverse inference instruction. Even so, defendants persuasively argue that the absence of this evidence should at minimum preclude plaintiffs from using it as a sword, even if defendants cannot use it as a shield. Therefore, the defendants motion is GRANTED to the extent that (1) defendants may explore how information from an inspection of Below’s truck could have affected the experts’ opinions at trial; and (2) plaintiffs may not argue that defendants or their experts failed to explore or prove something if prevented from doing so by plaintiffs’ negligence in preserving evidence. Defendants’ motion is otherwise RESERVED pending a further proffer and argument at the final pretrial conference, including defendants request for a spoliation instruction.”

So, what do you think?  Did the judge go far enough in addressing the spoliation of truck evidence?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

In Archer et. al. v. York City School District, et. al., No. 13-2826 (M.D. Pa., Dec. 28, 2016), Pennsylvania District Judge John E. Jones, III ruled that the plaintiffs had presented no evidence showing that the defendants acted with intent when they deleted the email account of the former Assistant Superintendent, nor had a duty to preserve arose prior to the deletion of the account.

Case Background

In this case brought forward in November 2013 by a group of students and parents suing the defendants to protest the decision not to renew their school’s charter based upon the performance of the school and the hardship on the city’s budget, the defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.  In their opposition to the summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants spoliated evidence when they deleted the email account of former assistant superintendent Perry-Cross, who retired in February 2012.  Her email account was deleted afterward, with the defendants suggesting that this may have occurred as soon as ninety days after, while the plaintiffs alleging that her emails were “purged sometime after 2012” (though they failed to provide any evidence that pointed to this timeline).

The parties agreed that the first two elements of spoliation – that the emails were within the defendants’ control and they were relevant to the claims of the instant case – were not at issue.  But, the defendants disagreed with the last two elements, arguing that the emails were deleted as a matter of course, so the defendants were not attempting to suppress evidence and further arguing that at the time the emails were deleted, there was no reasonably foreseeable duty to preserve the account.

Judge’s Ruling

With regard to intent to destroy evidence, Judge Jones stated: “Plaintiffs here have presented no factual basis whatsoever in support of their allegations that Defendants’ intended to destroy evidence helpful to Plaintiffs’ claims. Rather, the District’s policy of purging former employees’ email accounts within ninety days, and the fact that litigation did not commence until well over a year after Defendant Perry-Cross left the District and potentially over a year after the deletion occurred amounts to evidence supporting the opposite conclusion. Defendants also point to their swift and prompt reaction to turn over newly discovered evidence in the form of another District employee’s email account after previously believing it was deleted…This compilation of evidence, taken as a whole, leads the Court to conclude that Plaintiffs have failed to support their allegation that Defendants acted with intent to spoil evidence when they deleted Defendant Perry-Cross’s email account.”

With regard to the defendants’ duty to preserve, Judge Jones stated: “Plaintiffs attempt to persuade the Court that ‘[t]here can be no credible argument that the defendants were not aware that the disruption of 700-800 children and tens of millions of dollars would not produce litigation’ such that Defendants should have been on notice of their duty to preserve Defendant Perry-Cross’ email account…We disagree. Plaintiffs’ argument that by the simple act of doing their jobs, Defendants should have been on notice of litigation that would not commence until nearly a full year later does not create knowledge that litigation is ‘pending or probable.’”

Finding that the plaintiffs “have failed to establish both the third and fourth elements of spoliation”, Judge Jones found that their allegation of spoliation had no merit and granted the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety.

So, what do you think?  When did the duty to preserve data begin?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

As we noted yesterday, Tuesday and Monday, eDiscovery Daily published 74 posts related to eDiscovery case decisions and activities over the past year, covering 62 unique cases!  Yesterday, we looked back at cases related to social media discovery, technology assisted review and the first part of the cases relating to sanctions and spoliation.  Today, let’s take a look back at the remaining cases related to sanctions and spoliation.

We grouped those cases into common subject themes and will review them over the next few posts.  Perhaps you missed some of these?  Now is your chance to catch up!

But first, if you want to learn more about what every attorney should know about eDiscovery in 2017, click here.

SPOLIATION / SANCTIONS

As we mentioned yesterday, once again, the topic with the largest number of case law decisions related to eDiscovery are those related to sanctions and spoliation issues (24 out of 62 total cases for 38.7% of all cases covered).  Here are the remaining sixteen cases related to spoliation and sanctions that we covered last year, including one where the spoliating party received punitive sanctions of $3,000,000:

Beep, Beep! Terminating Sanctions against Defendant for Spoliation Affirmed on Appeal: In Roadrunner Transportation Services, Inc. v. Tarwater, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s entry of default judgment and award of attorneys’ fees in favor of the plaintiff, ruling that the district court did not abuse its discretion by entering default judgment as a sanction for the defendant’s deletion of data from his laptop computers.  The Ninth Circuit also affirmed the district court’s award of $325,000 in attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff and also affirmed the lower court ruling to limit the plaintiff’s compensatory damages to the four customers specifically identified in the First Amended Complaint.

Defendant Sanctioned for Loss of Emails During Provider Switch, But No Sanction For Wiped Hard Drive: In Core Laboratories LP v. Spectrum Tracer Services, LLC et. al., Oklahoma District Judge Vicki Miles-LaGrange granted the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions for emails that were not preserved during an email provider switch via an adverse inference instruction, but denied the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions for deleting files and for wiping the computer of one of its employees.

Failure to Extend Preservation Hold to Headquarters Does Not Lead To Adverse Inference Sanction: In Botey v. Green, et. al., Pennsylvania District Judge Robert D. Mariani denied the plaintiff’s request for an adverse inference sanction for the defendants’ failure to preserve trucking logs related to an accident between the plaintiff and a truck driver working for the defendant’s company, but did agree not to allow the defendants to prove the contents of the destroyed documents by other means or argue their contents in dispositive motions or at trial.

Court Rules Lack of Bad Faith in Denying Sanctions for Defendants’ Deletion of ESI: In Martin v. Stoops Buick, Inc. et. al., Indiana Chief District Judge Richard L. Young ruled that the plaintiff did not carry her burden of proving that the defendants’ deliberately destroyed evidence in bad faith; therefore, he denied her Motion for Sanctions Against Defendants for the Spoliation of Evidence.

Defendant Requests Terminating Sanctions for Plaintiff, but Court Opts for Lesser Sanctions: In Applied Underwriters, Inc. v. American Employer Group, Tennessee Magistrate Judge C. Clifford Shirley, Jr., ruling on several motions, granted in part and denied in part the defendant’s motion for sanctions, agreeing that the plaintiff’s numerous discovery deficiencies warranted sanctions, but not the dismissal that the defendant requested, opting instead to require the plaintiff to pay attorney’s fees for filing the motion.

Court Sanctions Plaintiff for Failing to Preserve Customer Communications: In Matthew Enterprise, Inc. v. Chrysler Group, LLC, California Magistrate Judge Paul S. Grewal, in one of his last orders before leaving the bench, determined that there was “no question that spoliation has occurred” and granted the defendant’s motion for sanctions for spoliation, “in its entirety, except for the proposed remedy”, opting for a middle ground between the parties’ proposals on what the remedy should be.

Appeals Court Reverses Terminating Sanctions Against Plaintiff for Deletion of Emails: In Flagship Theatres of Palm Desert, LLC v. Century Theatres, Inc. et. al., the Court of Appeals of California, Second District determined that the trial court “abused its discretion” by “granting terminating sanctions in a case in which the prejudice to the non-offending party can be ameliorated by a more limited remedy”.  As a result, the appeals court reversed the judgment and remanded it back to the trial court with a lesser sanction, prohibiting the plaintiff “from offering evidence of acts, events, or communications occurring during the period” when one of the plaintiffs deleted emails.

Court Assesses $3 Million Punitive Sanction to Defendant for “Bad Faith” Deletion of Emails: In GN Netcom, Inc. v. Plantronics, Inc., Delaware District Judge Leonard P. Stark, finding a high degree of fault, bad-faith intent to deprive the plaintiff of responsive documents and prejudice caused to the plaintiff’s case, imposed several sanctions against the defendant, including “punitive sanctions in the amount of $3,000,000” for the “intentional and admitted deletion of emails” by the defendant’s Senior Vice President of Sales.

Court Declines to Sanction Defendant for Deletion of Former Employee’s Email Account: In Moore v. Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC, Washington District Judge Robert J. Bryan denied without prejudice the plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions for Defendant’s Willful Spoliation of Evidence for deleting her email account after she was terminated, finding a lack of duty preserve or bad faith on the defendant’s part and minimal (if any) prejudice to the plaintiff.

Defendant Receives Terminating Sanctions and More for “Persistent Contemptuous Behavior”: In Teledyne Technologies Inc. v. Shekar, Illinois District Judge Ronald A. Guzmàn, finding that the defendant “has failed to purge himself of contempt for the repeated refusal to comply with this Court’s orders”, entered judgment against the defendant, dismissed his counterclaims, and directed him to pay the plaintiff’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred as a result of having to pursue relief for the defendant’s “persistent contemptuous behavior”.

Appeals Court Upholds Default Judgment for Discovery Violations, Including Wiping Files from Laptop: In Trude et. al. v. Glenwood State Bank, et. al., a Minnesota Appeals Court affirmed the trial court’s entry of default judgment for repeated discovery violations, including using data wiping software to permanently delete more than 20,000 files from a laptop just hours before it was turned over for forensic examination.

Dropped Cell Phone Does Not Lead to Spoliation Sanctions Under Amended Rule 37(e): In Shaffer v. Gaither, North Carolina District Judge Max O. Cogburn, Jr. ruled that the sanction of dismissal requested by the defendant for the plaintiff’s lost text messages was disproportionate and denied the defendant’s Motion for Sanctions.

Searching Only File Names is Not the “Safe Way” to Avoid Sanctions: In Rodman v. Safeway, California District Judge Jon S. Tigar ordered the defendant to pay plaintiff’s Class Counsel $688,646 as a discovery sanction under Rule 26(g), ruling that “failure to search within the contents of the legacy drive constituted an unreasonable inquiry”, but denied without prejudice the plaintiff’s request for a negative jury instruction.

With No Proof of Duty to Preserve or Bad Faith, Plaintiffs’ Request for Sanctions is Denied: In Reyes et. al. v. Julia Place Condominiums Homeowners Association, Inc., et. al., Louisiana District Judge Carl J. Barbier, in denying the plaintiffs’ request for sanctions, stated that the plaintiffs “have failed to produce sufficient evidence proving that [defendant] Parkview had a duty to preserve the ledgers, that Parkview acted in bad faith in destroying the ledgers, and that the destroyed evidence was relevant to Plaintiffs’ claim”.

Defendant Sanctioned for Spoliation of Physical Evidence, But Not ESI: In Reed v. Kindercare Learning Centers et. al., Washington District Judge Benjamin H. Settle (yes, that’s his real name!) granted the plaintiff’s motion for discovery sanctions with respect to spoliation of physical evidence in the form of the facility where the plaintiff worked, but denied the plaintiff’s motion with regard to spoliation of ESI.

Was Spoliation Intentional? Court Will Let Jury Decide: In Cahill v. Dart, Illinois District Judge John Z. Lee adopted, with modifications, the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Cox regarding the plaintiff’s motion to sanction the defendants for destruction of evidence, indicating that Judge Cox’s proposed sanction would be imposed and also that the jury would be informed that the defendants failed to meet their duty to preserve video, giving the plaintiff the option to argue to the jury that the failure to preserve the video was intentional.

Want to take a look at cases we covered the previous five years?  Here they are:

• 2015: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4
• 2014: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4
• 2013: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4
• 2012: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4
• 2011: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4

So, what do you think?  Did you miss any of these?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

In Cahill v. Dart, No. 13-cv-361 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2016), Illinois District Judge John Z. Lee adopted, with modifications, the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Cox regarding the plaintiff’s motion to sanction the defendants for destruction of evidence, indicating that Judge Cox’s proposed sanction would be imposed and also that the jury would be informed that the defendants failed to meet their duty to preserve video, giving the plaintiff the option to argue to the jury that the failure to preserve the video was intentional.

Case Background

In this case involving state claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution and a federal claim for violation of the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff was initially arrested on December 15, 2011 by police officers with the Cook County Sheriff’s Office, for driving on a suspended license.  He was transferred to the lockup for processing and patted down by one of the officers, who claimed that he saw the plaintiff drop a small, tissue-wrapped, white package to the floor which turned out to be cocaine.  The plaintiff denied that he dropped the package and denied that he was ever in possession of cocaine, but was charged with possession based on the officers’ accounts.

There were surveillance cameras present and the plaintiff’s criminal defense attorney acted quickly after the arrest to attempt to obtain all video footage of his client’s time at the lockup, sending a subpoena to the Sheriff’s Office and also the County legal department.  A lieutenant with the Sheriff’s Office also took action to preserve the video, submitting a hold request shortly before the video was scheduled to be destroyed.  Despite that, the video was initially thought to have been destroyed, but some of it was preserved, but only after the package had already been dropped.  After viewing the video, the Assistant Cook County State’s Attorney handling the case concluded that the state would not be able to prove the charges against the plaintiff and dismissed the charges. The plaintiff then brought this lawsuit.

In his Motion for Sanctions for Spoliation of Evidence, the plaintiff contended that the defendants had a duty to preserve the entire video footage and intentionally failed to do so because the video would have proven his innocence, by showing that someone other than him dropped the cocaine.  The plaintiff’s motion proposed sanctions ranging from default judgment to an adverse inference instruction, a prohibition on defendants’ use of certain evidence and attorney fees related to the filing of the motion.

Magistrate Judge Cox held a hearing on the motion and heard from numerous witnesses, including James Collins, the technician who had provided a copy of the video.  In her Report and Recommendation, Judge Cox concluded that (1) Defendants were under a duty to preserve the evidence; (2) their allowing the video to be destroyed was grossly negligent, though not intentional based on the evidence presented; (3) Cahill “suffered substantial prejudice” from the loss of this “essential” evidence; and (4) a sanction was appropriate, which was determined to be to bar Defendants “from making any arguments or presenting evidence stating that the lost portion of the videotape showed Plaintiff dropping cocaine on the Maywood Lockup floor, including, but not limited to, Collins’s notes or any testimony from Collins relating to what he saw on the video other than the portion of the video that was preserved.”  In response, the plaintiff filed timely objections, arguing that the sanction Judge Cox recommended was insufficient to counter the prejudice he will suffer from the loss of video that he says would have shown someone else dropping the cocaine.

Judge’s Ruling

Judge Lee indicated that the defendants proposed that the jury should be informed simply “that only a portion of the video exists,” and each party should then be allowed to present “their theory of what is on the missing video”, but that suggestion was at odds with Judge Cox’s Report and Recommendation.  So, “having conducted an independent review”, Judge Lee adopted Judge Cox’s Report and Recommendation “with modifications”, concluding that, “at the very least, the jury should be informed that the video is missing because Defendants failed to fulfill their duty to preserve it.”

As for whether the plaintiff was entitled to the adverse inference instruction he seeks, Judge Lee stated that “[a]lthough the Court disagrees with Judge Cox that Cahill presented no evidence of intent, the question is a close one.”  Because “evidence not directly tied to the fate of the video could nevertheless illuminate Defendants’ intent regarding the video”, Judge Lee decided that “that the best course is for the jury to decide the question of intent.”

As a result, Judge Lee adopted, with modifications, the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Cox regarding the plaintiff’s motion to sanction the defendants for destruction of evidence, indicating that Judge Cox’s proposed sanction would be imposed and also that the jury would be informed that the defendants failed to meet their duty to preserve video, giving the plaintiff the option to argue to the jury that the failure to preserve the video was intentional.

So, what do you think?  Should juries be left to decide whether spoliation of evidence is intentional?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

In Reed v. Kindercare Learning Centers et. al., No. 15-5634 (W.D. Wash., Nov. 17, 2016), Washington District Judge Benjamin H. Settle (yes, that’s his real name!) granted the plaintiff’s motion for discovery sanctions with respect to spoliation of physical evidence in the form of the facility where the plaintiff worked, but denied the plaintiff’s motion with regard to spoliation of ESI.

Case Background

In this disability discrimination case, the plaintiff had previously filed a Motion to Compel production of documents, which had been granted by the court (with certain limitations). After the defendants did not comply with the order, the plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions as well as a motion to compel entry upon land to inspect the facility where the plaintiff worked.  The plaintiff argued that, after she served the defendants with a notice of entry upon land to inspect the center where the plaintiff had worked, the defendants closed the center without notice and informed the plaintiff that the center had closed and that an inspection would not be possible, eventually informing the plaintiff that the fixtures/furniture were removed from the center and an inspection would not be possible, offering another center with a similar layout as an alternative.

The plaintiff also argued that Defendants “(a) failed to secure relevant email accounts prior to destruction; (b) searched for email and other records for the first time in response to this motion; and (c) possess dozens of relevant documents that were never produced or listed on a privilege log.”

The defendants filed a response to the motion for sanctions and also filed a motion for clarification or reconsideration of the granted motion to compel.

Judge’s Ruling

With regard to the request for the Court to clarify or reconsider its order based on the scope of the production and the deadline for production, Judge Settle, in denying the request, stated that “Defendants do not show a manifest error of law and, at most, submit new evidence that could have been brought to the Court’s attention earlier. Defendants previously argued, without support, that the requested production would not be proportional to the needs of the case. The Court dismissed this argument because it declined to evaluate proportionality in the absence of actual evidence. Thus, the fact that production may be disproportionate to the needs of the case is not an issue the Court will reconsider.”

With regard to the request for sanctions regarding spoliation of physical evidence (i.e., the center where the plaintiff had worked), Judge Settle stated “These facts show that Defendants have acted in at least a grossly negligent, irresponsible and cavalier manner with regard to the Notice of Entry upon the Lakewood center. Accordingly, the Court finds that an adverse instruction may be appropriate. The language of any instruction will be determined after Reed collects evidence from KinderCare’s other centers because, at this time, the Court is unable to properly weigh the prejudice Reed has suffered.”  Judge Settle also granted the plaintiff’s motion to inspect two other defendant locations, rejecting the defendant’s objection that the motion was untimely.

With regard to the request for sanctions for spoliation of ESI, Judge Settle stated that “[w]hile Defendants could have implemented better retention policies and more actively searched for electronically stored information, Reed has failed to show that Defendants have spoiled any evidence. In fact, Defendants have recently discovered and produced a relevant employee file.”

So, what do you think?  Was the Court’s argument for denying the ESI spoliation claim sufficient?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

In Reyes et. al. v. Julia Place Condominiums Homeowners Association, Inc., et. al., No. 12-2043 (E.D.L.A., Oct. 7, 2016), Louisiana District Judge Carl J. Barbier, in denying the plaintiffs’ request for sanctions, stated that the plaintiffs “have failed to produce sufficient evidence proving that [defendant] Parkview had a duty to preserve the ledgers, that Parkview acted in bad faith in destroying the ledgers, and that the destroyed evidence was relevant to Plaintiffs’ claim”.

Case Background

In this class action lawsuit brought by condominium owners throughout New Orleans against their various condo associations alleging debt collection practices that violate state and federal law, the Court had previously certified a “a class of past and present condominium owners who have paid allegedly usurious late fees”.  During the course of the litigation, one of the defendants (Parkview Condominium Homeowners Association) filed a motion for summary judgment, stating that that the plaintiffs had not introduced any evidence that a current or former Parkview unit owner paid an allegedly usurious fee, so Parkview should be dismissed from the lawsuit.

In response, the plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to an adverse inference sanction due to Parkview’s “intentional” destruction of ledgers that would have proven Parkview condominium unit owners paid allegedly usurious late fees.  The plaintiffs had made a similar request for these ledgers and an adverse inference sanction in a motion to compel in Magistrate Court and that motion was denied.

Here, the plaintiffs claimed that they first requested this information in September 2012 and, in response to this request, “Parkview threatened sanctions . . . but never provided this critical evidence.”  The plaintiffs also argued that Parkview did not initially contend that the documents were lost or otherwise unavailable, but simply refused to comply with the plaintiffs’ request.  In response, Parkview stated it informed the plaintiffs that it was not in possession of that information, because the documents were “inadvertently destroyed prior to the commencement of this litigation. There were no backups of any of the files that were located on the damaged computer and hard drive.”  Parkview also contended that it had no duty to preserve that information, noting that it was unreasonable to believe that the originally named plaintiff, who was never an owner at Parkview, would sue Parkview and seek ledgers for the two years preceding the litigation.

Judge’s Ruling

In ruling on the plaintiff’s request for sanctions, Judge Barbier stated:

“Plaintiffs have failed to produce sufficient evidence proving that Parkview had a duty to preserve the ledgers, that Parkview acted in bad faith in destroying the ledgers, and that the destroyed evidence was relevant to Plaintiffs’ claim. Plaintiffs ask this Court to infer that Parkview intentionally, and in bad faith, destroyed its ledgers solely because Parkview did not initially tell Plaintiffs that it had inadvertently destroyed the ledgers prior to litigation…This is a leap this court is unwilling to make. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are not entitled to an adverse inference for purposes of this motion nor trial.”

Also, observing that “[n]otably absent from Plaintiffs’ evidence is anything demonstrating that a past or present condominium unit owner has paid an allegedly usurious late fee”, Judge Barbier granted Parkview’s Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing Parkview from the case.

So, what do you think?  Did the plaintiff make too big a leap in assuming “intentional” destruction of the ledgers?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.