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Case Law

eDiscovery Case Law: Better Late Than Never? Not With Discovery.
 

In Techsavies, LLC v. WFDA Mktg., Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152833 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2012), Magistrate Judge Bernard Zimmerman of the United States District Court for the District of Northern California sanctioned the defendant for repeated failures to produce responsive documents in a timely manner because of their failure to identify relevant data sources in preparing its initial disclosures.

The defendant produced approximately 32,000 documents in response to production requests on August 20, 2010. Five days later, the defendant sent plaintiffs a supplemental production of 1,100 documents, and notified them by letter that its document production was complete.  Over the next three months, the plaintiffs informed the defendant multiple times that there were omissions in their production, including following up with another production request on November 1.  On November 29, two days before the close of discovery, defendants produced roughly an additional 87,000 documents, yet the plaintiff still noticed that some documents were missing and notified the defendants.

Following the second incomplete production, defendants investigated and discovered that several data backup files were never provided to the eDiscovery vendor.  They also discovered a 4 to 6 inch stack of relevant documents in the basement of a former office building that had been forgotten.  Those additional documents were produced approximately ten days after the close of discovery.  The plaintiffs sought sanctions for the late production including “establishing that the minimum gross revenues attributable to Project632 are twice the credit card transactions through the site since its inception, given WDFA's failure to produce complete information regarding the co-payments received from MetroPCS”, as well as barring them “from offering any evidence of deduction or offset from that figure” and precluding their experts from using the late produced documents.

With regard to the late production, Judge Zimmerman noted:

“Pretrial Scheduling Order (Docket No. 20) also requires that ‘[t]hirty days prior to the close of non-expert discovery, lead counsel for each party shall serve and file a certification that all supplementation has been completed.’ WDFA did not file such a certification. Instead, WDFA improperly produced its late documents as well as its interrogatory response after fact discovery closed and without obtaining leave from the Court…[I]t appears to be an issue of first impression whether a party can correct its discovery responses after the close of discovery without seeking leave of Court. In my opinion, absent an approved stipulation, allowing one party to correct prior discovery responses without seeking leave of Court undermines the Court's ability to control the timely production of documents and assure that discovery issues are resolved in a timely fashion so as not to interfere with the impending trial.”

Judge Zimmerman also noted, however, that sanctions sought by the plaintiffs were “too broad” and “would be tantamount to giving Techsavies a directed verdict on many if not all of the damages issues”.  The court did grant the following sanctions against the defendant:

“1. WDFA is barred from introducing, either in defense of plaintiff's claims or in support of its counterclaims, any document which it should have produced in response to plaintiff's first set of document requests and which was not produced until after plaintiff filed its second set of document requests.”

“2. WDFA's expert witnesses cannot rely on any document, or information contained in any document, that is precluded by this Order unless WDFA can show that the information on which the witness relied was provided timely to Techsavies in some other form of discovery.”

So, what do you think?  Should the judge have allowed the late production?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Judge Peck Responds to Plaintiff’s Request for Recusal
 

Normally, we make one post per business day to the blog.  However, we decided to make a second post for this important case (that has been discussed so intently in the industry) today as we couldn’t wait until after the holiday to report on it.

A few weeks ago, in Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe & MSL Group, No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC) (AJP) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012), Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion making it likely the first case to accept the use of computer-assisted review of electronically stored information (“ESI”) for this case.  However, on March 13, District Court Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. granted plaintiffs’ request to submit additional briefing on their February 22 objections to the ruling.  In that briefing (filed on March 26), the plaintiffs claimed that the protocol approved for predictive coding “risks failing to capture a staggering 65% of the relevant documents in this case” and questioned Judge Peck’s relationship with defense counsel and with the selected vendor for the case, Recommind.

On Monday, Judge Peck issued an order in response to Plaintiffs’ request for his recusal, which, according to Judge Peck, was contained in a letter dated March 28, 2012 (not currently publicly available).  Here is what the Order said:

“The Court is in receipt of plaintiffs' March 28, 2012 letter requesting my recusal.  Plaintiffs shall advise as to whether they wish to file a formal motion or for the Court to consider the letter as the motion (in which case defendants will have 14 days to respond, from the date of plaintiffs' confirmation that the letter constitutes their motion).”

“The Court notes that my favorable view of computer assisted review technology in general was well known to plaintiffs before I made any ruling in this case, and I have never endorsed Recommind's methodology or technology, nor received any reimbursement from Recommind for appearing at any conference that (apparently) they and other vendors sponsored, such as Legal Tech. I have had no discussions with Mr. Losey about this case, nor was I aware that he is working on the case. It appears that after plaintiffs' counsel and vendor represented to me that they agreed to the use of predictive coding, plaintiffs now claim that my public statements approving generally of computer assisted review make me biased. If plaintiffs were to prevail, it would serve to discourage judges (and for that matter attorneys) from speaking on educational panels about ediscovery (or any other subject for that matter). The Court suspects this will fall on deaf ears, but I strongly suggest that plaintiffs rethink their "scorched earth" approach to this litigation.”

So, what do you think?  What will happen next?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Tennessee Court Orders Split eDiscovery Costs, Plaintiff Bond for Additional Discovery
 

In considering the allocation of costs in this contentious business dispute, Tennessee Magistrate Judge Joe B. Brown (not to be confused with TV’s Judge Joe Brown) ordered the parties to split the expenses related to material they had not already produced in Lubber Inc. v. Optari, LLC, No. 3:11-0042, (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 15, 2012).

The defendants asked the court to enter a protective order that did not require them to search for electronically stored information (ESI) outside the set period of October 4, 2010 through February 8, 2011; in the alternative, they asked the court to require the plaintiff to pay for the costs of the discovery. The defendants complained that the costs of the additional searches the plaintiff requested might “run at least $10,000 and produce gigabytes of ESI material.”

Judge Brown observed that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) allows for “a great deal of latitude in controlling discovery.” He also noted that the general rule of discovery is that the producing party bears the costs of discovery. Even so, Judge Brown continued by offering the following commentary on discovery costs:

“One of the concerns of discovery is the allocation of costs. In general, costs are borne by the producing party. While this works in the vast majority of cases, the requesting parties have little incentive not to ask for everything possible. This leads to interrogatories and requests for production that are expressed in the broadest possible terms.

It is the Magistrate Judge’s experience and the view of a number of economists who have studied this issue that where the requesting party bears a part of the cost of producing what they request, the amount of material requested drops significantly. When a party has to contemplate whether the last possible bit of information will cost them more than it is worth, they quit asking for items of marginal relevance. As long as requesting the last bit of information costs them nothing they have little, if any, incentive not to request it. Even if they choose never to look at it, they have put the opposing party to the cost of production. In some cases discovery becomes a tool with which to bludgeon the other side into submission. The Magistrate Judge believes that both sides are doing that in this case.”

Judge Brown denied the defendants’ motion and required each party to bear one-half of the costs of producing materials going forward.

So, what do you think?  Was the ruling to share discovery costs and the bond for compelling discovery appropriate?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case Summary Source: Applied Discovery (free subscription required).

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Two Pages Inadvertently Disclosed Out of Two Million May Still Waive Privilege
 

In Jacob v. Duane Reade, Inc., 11 Civ. 0160 (JMO) (THK), Magistrate Judge Theodore Katz of the US District Court for the Southern District of New York found that a privileged, two-page email that was inadvertently produced did not have to be returned and that the privilege had been waived because the producing party, Duane Reade, had failed to request its return in a timely manner.  According to Defendants' counsel, the ESI production involved the review of over two million documents in less than a month; that review was accomplished with the assistance of an outside vendor and document review team.

The Plaintiffs in this matter are Assistant Store Managers pursuing a collective action for overtime wages, under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), against the Defendant, Duane Reade.  The email that was inadvertently produced (on November 8, 2011 and subsequently used in deposition) related to a meeting among several individuals within Human Resources, including an in-house attorney at Duane Reade (assumed to be Julie Ko). The defendants discovered the inadvertent production on January 17 of this year when Duane Reade’s HR Manager (an attendee at the meeting) was noticed for deposition.  The defendants argued that the email was inadvertently produced because it was neither from nor to an attorney, and only included advice received at a meeting from an in-house attorney, identified in the email only by the first name “Julie.”

With regard to whether the email was privileged, the court examined the email and found that the first half, where Ko received information from business managers and, in her role as legal counsel, gave legal advice on the requirements of the FLSA, was privileged.  However, the second half of the email, consisting of proposals that came out of the meeting, to get the Store Managers and Assistant Store Managers to view and treat the ASM's as managers, contained no legal advice and, therefore, was not privileged.

As to whether the Defendant’s waived attorney-client privilege when inadvertently producing the email, the Court referenced a summary of the law in this subject provided by Judge Shira Scheindlin, as follows:

“Although the federal courts have differed as to the legal consequences of a party's inadvertent disclosure of privileged information, the general consensus in this district is that the disclosing party may demonstrate, in appropriate circumstances, that such production does not constitute a waiver of the privilege or work-product immunity and that it is entitled to the return of the mistakenly produced documents. In determining whether an inadvertent disclosure waives privilege, courts in the Second Circuit have adopted a middle of the road approach. Under this flexible test, courts are called on to balance the following factors: (1) the reasonableness of the precautions to prevent inadvertent disclosure; (2) the time taken to rectify the error; (3) "the scope of the discovery;" (4) the extent of the disclosure; and (5) an over[arching] issue of fairness.”

The Court ruled that the production of the email was inadvertent and that Duane Reade had employed reasonable precautions to prevent inadvertent disclosures (such as drafting lists of attorney names, employing search filters and quality control reviews). However, given the over two month time frame for the Defendants to request return of the email, the Court determined that the privilege was waived because the Defendants did not act “promptly to rectify the disclosure of the privileged email.”

So, what do you think?  Was waiver of privilege fair for this document?  Or should the Defendants have been able to claw it back?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Da Silva Moore Plaintiffs Question Predictive Coding Proposal, Judge Peck’s Activities
 

A few weeks ago, in Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe & MSL Group, No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC) (AJP) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012), Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion making it likely the first case to accept the use of computer-assisted review of electronically stored information (“ESI”) for this case.  However, on March 13, District Court Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. granted plaintiffs’ request to submit additional briefing on their February 22 objections to the ruling.  In that briefing (filed last Monday, March 26), the plaintiffs claimed that the protocol approved for predictive coding “risks failing to capture a staggering 65% of the relevant documents in this case” and questioned Judge Peck’s relationship with defense counsel and with the selected vendor for the case, Recommind.

While the plaintiffs noted that “the use of predictive coding may be appropriate under certain circumstances”, they made several contentions in their brief, including the following:

  • That the protocol approved for predictive coding “was adopted virtually wholesale from Defendant MSLGroup”;
  • That “Judge Peck authored an article and made no fewer than six public appearances espousing the use of predictive coding” during “the ten months between the filing of the Amended Complaint and the February 24 written opinion”;
  • That Judge Peck appeared on several of these panels (three alone with Ralph Losey, Jackson Lewis’ ediscovery counsel in this case (and a previous thought leader on this blog) who the plaintiff refers to as “another outspoken predictive coding advocate whom Judge Peck ‘know[s] very well’”;
  • That “defense counsel Losey and Judge Peck cited each other’s positions on predictive coding with approval in their respective articles, which came out just four months before Judge Peck issued his ESI opinion”;
  • That, to promote its predictive coding technology, “Recommind is a frequent sponsor of the e-discovery panels on which Judge Peck and Defense counsel Losey sit” and “Judge Peck’s February 24 e-discovery ruling is expected to be a boon not only to the predictive coding industry, but also to Recommind’s bottom line”;
  • That, with regard to the defendants’ proposed protocol, “Judge Peck failed to hold an evidentiary hearing or obtain expert testimony as to its reliability and accuracy”; and
  • That, “in the same preliminary study MSL relies on to tout the quality of the technology to be used in its predictive coding protocol, the technology’s “recall,” was very low, on average 35%”, so the defendants’ proposed protocol “risks failing to capture up to 65% of the documents material to Plaintiffs’ case”.

In a declaration supplementing the plaintiffs’ filing, Paul J. Neale, chief executive officer at DOAR Litigation Consulting and the plaintiffs’ eDiscovery consultant, contended that Judge Peck approved a predictive coding process that “does not include a scientifically supported method for validating the results”. He also contended in the declaration that Peck relied on “misstatements” by two Recommind employees (Eric Seggebruch and Jan Puzicha) that misrepresent the effectiveness and accuracy of the Recommind predictive coding process and also noted that Recommind did not perform as well at the 2011 Text Retrieval Conference (TREC) as its marketing materials and experts assert.

Now, the ball is back in Judge Carter’s court.  Will he hold an evidentiary hearing on the eDiscovery issues raised by the plaintiff?  Will he direct Judge Peck to do so?  It will be interesting to see what happens next?

So, what do you think?  Do the plaintiff’s objections have merit?  Will Judge Carter give the defendants a chance to respond?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Daily Is Eighteen! (Months Old, That Is)
 

Eighteen months ago yesterday, eDiscovery Daily was launched.  A lot has happened in the industry in eighteen months.  We thought we might be crazy to commit to a daily blog each business day.  We may be crazy indeed, but we still haven’t missed a business day yet.

The eDiscovery industry has grown quite a bit over the past eighteen months and is expected to continue to do so.   So, there has not been a shortage of topics to address; instead, the challenge has been selecting which topics to address.

Thanks for noticing us!  We’ve more than doubled our readership since the first six month period, had two of our biggest “hit count” days in the last month and have more than quintupled our subscriber base since those first six months!  We appreciate the interest you’ve shown in the topics and will do our best to continue to provide interesting and useful eDiscovery news and analysis.  And, as always, please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic!

We also want to thank the blogs and publications that have linked to our posts and raised our public awareness, including Pinhawk, The Electronic Discovery Reading Room, Unfiltered Orange, Atkinson-Baker (depo.com), Litigation Support Technology & News, Next Generation eDiscovery Law & Tech Blog, InfoGovernance Engagement Area, Justia Blawg Search, Learn About E-Discovery, Ride the Lightning, Litigation Support Blog.com, ABA Journal, Law.com and any other publication that has picked up at least one of our posts for reference (sorry if I missed any!).  We really appreciate it!

As we’ve done in the past, we like to take a look back every six months at some of the important stories and topics during that time.  So, here are some posts over the last six months you may have missed.  Enjoy!

eDiscovery Trends: Is Email Still the Most Common Form of Requested ESI?

eDiscovery Trends: Sedona Conference Provides Guidance for Judges

eDiscovery Trends: Economy Woes Not Slowing eDiscovery Industry Growth

eDiscovery Law: Model Order Proposes to Limit eDiscovery in Patent Cases

eDiscovery Case Law: Court Rules 'Circumstantial Evidence' Must Support Authorship of Text Messages for Admissibility

eDiscovery Best Practices: Cluster Documents for More Effective Review

eDiscovery Best Practices: Could This Be the Most Expensive eDiscovery Mistake Ever?

eDiscovery 101: Simply Deleting a File Doesn’t Mean It’s Gone

eDiscovery Case Law: Facebook Spoliation Significantly Mitigates Plaintiff’s Win

eDiscovery Best Practices: Production is the “Ringo” of the eDiscovery Phases

eDiscovery Case Law: Court Grants Adverse Inference Sanctions Against BOTH Sides

eDiscovery Trends: ARMA International and EDRM Jointly Release Information Governance White Paper

eDiscovery Trends: The Sedona Conference International Principles

eDiscovery Trends: Sampling within eDiscovery Software

eDiscovery Trends: Small Cases Need Love Too!

eDiscovery Case Law: Court Rules Exact Search Terms Are Limited

eDiscovery Trends: DOJ Criminal Attorneys Now Have Their Own eDiscovery Protocols

eDiscovery Best Practices: Perspective on the Amount of Data Contained in 1 Gigabyte

eDiscovery Case Law: Computer Assisted Review Approved by Judge Peck in New York Case

eDiscovery Case Law: Not So Fast on Computer Assisted Review

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Not So Fast On eDiscovery Cost Reimbursement
 

Yesterday, we noted a potential reversal in the case approving computer-assisted review of electronically stored information (“ESI”) in the Southern District of New York.  Today, we look at another eDiscovery ruling where a significant reduction in award amount was ruled.

One of the emerging trends for 2011 was the growing number of cases where the prevailing party was awarded reimbursement of eDiscovery costs, including this case and this case.  Another case of eDiscovery cost reimbursement reported in this blog was Race Tires Amer., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire, Corp., No. 2:07-cv-1294, 2011 WL 1748620 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 2011), where U.S. District Judge Terrence F. McVerry in Pittsburgh ruled that the winning defendants in an antitrust case were entitled to reimbursement of more than $367,000 in eDiscovery costs. 

The plaintiff had argued previously that the costs should be disallowed because "electronic document collection, hard drive imaging and indexing and searching, commonly referred to as 'eDiscovery charges,' are not enumerated under Section 1920(4), and thus are not properly deemed recoverable costs."  But Judge McVerry found that Congress, in the Judicial Administration and Technical Amendments Act of 2008, modified the wording of Section 1920(4), changing the phrase "fees for exemplifications and copies of papers" to read "fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials."  Since that amendment, Judge McVerry said, "no court has categorically excluded eDiscovery costs from allowable costs."

Given the extent of the defendant’s eDiscovery activities, including copying nearly 500 gigabytes of data in response to over 400 search terms and creation of a litigation database, the court awarded $367,000 of the $389,000 eDiscovery costs requested by the defendants.

Naturally, the plaintiffs appealed that ruling to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

In a ruling that will undoubtedly not be popular with corporate defendants, the Third Circuit ruled that only an isolated portion of eDiscovery costs was taxable. As noted by the appeals court:

“The decisions that allow taxation of all, or essentially all, electronic discovery consultant charges, such as the District Court‘s ruling in this case, are untethered from the statutory mooring. Section 1920(4) does not state that all steps that lead up to the production of copies of materials are taxable. It does not authorize taxation merely because today‘s technology requires technical expertise not ordinarily possessed by the typical legal professional. It does not say that activities that encourage cost savings may be taxed.”

As a result, the appeals court significantly reduced the eDiscovery costs that the plaintiffs would have owed Hoosier and DMS under the lower court’s decision:

“We conclude that of the numerous services the vendors performed, only the scanning of hard copy documents, the conversion of native files to TIFF, and the transfer of VHS tapes to DVD involved copying, and that the costs attributable to only those activities are recoverable under § 1920(4)‘s allowance for the costs of making copies of any materials. Those costs total $30,370.42. We find that none of the charges imposed by DMS‘s vendor are taxable, and that the award in favor of Hoosier should be reduced by $95,210.13, the difference between the  electronic discovery vendors‘ charges awarded by the District Court ($125,580.55) and the charges of Hoosier‘s electronic discovery vendors we find taxable ($30,370.42).” {emphasis added}

So, what do you think?  Do you agree with the narrow ruling of taxable eDiscovery costs or do you think the original, more expansive ruling was correct?  Will this lead to more cases settling?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Not So Fast on Computer Assisted Review
 

A few weeks ago, in Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe & MSL Group, No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC) (AJP) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012), Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion approving of the use of computer-assisted review of electronically stored information (“ESI”) for this case, making it likely the first case to recognize that “computer-assisted review is an acceptable way to search for relevant ESI in appropriate cases.”  However, last Tuesday (March 13), District Court Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. granted plaintiffs’ request to submit additional briefing on their objections to the ruling.

On February 8, the parties attended a hearing to discuss their discovery protocol, and in particular the use of computer-assisted review (also referenced as “predictive coding”).  At the hearing, Judge Peck issued a ruling, approving the use of computer-assisted review, and instructed the parties to submit a draft protocol for court approval.  Judge Peck approved the proposed protocol on February 22 that had been submitted, over the plaintiffs’ objections.  On February 24, Judge Peck issued his written opinion detailing his rulings from the February 8th hearing.

On February 22 (the same day the protocol was approved, but before Judge Peck’s written opinion), the plaintiffs filed their 24 page objections to the February 8th discovery rulings, indicating their argument that the “Magistrate’s decision to adopt MSL’s predictive coding protocol is clearly erroneous and contrary to law.”  The plaintiffs specifically argued that “sanctioning the use of predictive coding in this employment discrimination case violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26” and also argued that the court’s adoption of a “novel discovery methodology” without “supporting evidence” or “standards for assessing reliability” was “clearly erroneous and contrary to law”.  On March 7, the defendant filed its opposition to plaintiffs’ objections.

Then, on March 9, the plaintiffs submitted a letter to District Judge Carter, requesting an opportunity to “file a ten-page reply brief” to the defendant’s response.  In the letter, the plaintiffs argued that Judge Peck’s written ruling, issued two days after their objections were filed, “expanded on the reasoning for the rulings he had made from the bench,” including relying on “a number of articles that were not addressed in the parties’ submissions” and making observations about plaintiffs’ objections.  As a result, the plaintiffs requested the opportunity to “squarely address Magistrate Judge Peck’s complete rulings.”  In addition, the plaintiffs argued that allowing their reply would not result in prejudice where the defendant had “the benefit” of filing its opposition to plaintiffs’ objections after the written ruling was issued and thus had the opportunity to consider Magistrate Judge Peck’s analysis when crafting their response.

Which brings us to last Tuesday (March 13), Judge Carter granted plaintiffs’ request and ordered their reply be submitted by March 19 (that’s today!).  Then, we’ll see what happens next.

So, what do you think?  Do the plaintiff’s objections have merit?  If Judge Carter throws out predictive coding, will there be hand wringing and wailing from the predictive coding vendors?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery History: A Look Back at Zubulake
 

Yesterday, we discussed a couple of cases within a month’s time where the New York Appellate Division has embraced the federal standards of Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 FRD 212.  Those of us who have been involved in litigation support and discovery management for years are fully aware of the significance of the Zubulake case and its huge impact on discovery of electronic data.  Even if you haven’t been in the industry for several years, you’ve probably heard of the case and understand that it’s a significant case.  But, do you understand just how many groundbreaking opinions resulted from that case?  For those who aren’t aware, let’s take a look back.

The plaintiff, Laura Zubulake, filed suit against her former employer UBS Warburg, alleging gender discrimination, failure to promote, and retaliation. Southern District of New York Judge Shira Sheindlin's rulings in this case are the most often cited in the area of electronic discovery, and were issued prior to the 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That’s somewhat like establishing laws before the Ten Commandments!  The important opinions related to eDiscovery are commonly known as Zubulake I, Zubulake III, Zubulake IV and Zubulake V.  Here is a summary of each of those opinions:

Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 217 F.R.D. 309 (Zubulake I) and Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake III)

The plaintiff argued that key evidence was located in various emails exchanged among employees of UBS, the defendant. Initially, the defendant produced about 350 pages of documents, including approximately 100 pages of email, but the plaintiff produced approximately 450 pages of email correspondence on her own. To address the discrepancy, the plaintiff requested for UBS to locate the documents that existed in backup tapes and other archiving media.

The defendant, arguing undue burden and expense, requested the court to shift the cost of production to the plaintiff, citing Rowe Entertainment v. The William Morris Agency, 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). In May 2003, the court ruled stating that whether the production of documents is unduly burdensome or expensive "turns primarily on whether it is kept in an accessible or inaccessible format". The court determined that the issue of accessibility depends on the media on which data are stored. It described five categories of electronic media, as follows:

  1. Online data, including hard disks;
  2. Near-line data, including optical disks;
  3. Offline storage, such as magnetic tapes;
  4. Backup tapes;
  5. Fragmented, erased and damaged data.

The last two categories were considered inaccessible as they were not readily available and thus subject to cost-shifting. Discussing the Rowe decision, the court concluded that it needed modification and created a new seven factor balance test for cost-shifting:

  1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant information;
  2. The availability of such information from other sources;
  3. The total cost of production, compared to the amount in controversy;
  4. The total cost of production, compared to the resources available to each party;
  5. The relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do so;
  6. The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and
  7. The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.

The defendant was ordered to produce, at its own expense, all responsive email existing on its servers, optical disks, and five backup tapes as selected by the plaintiff. The court would only conduct a cost-shifting analysis after the review of the contents of the backup tapes.

In July 2003, Zubulake III applied the cost-shifting test outlined in Zubulake I based on the sample recovery of data from five backup tapes.  After the results of the sample restoration, both parties wanted the other to fully pay for the remaining backup email. The sample cost the defendant about $19,003 for restoration but the estimated costs for production was $273,649, including attorney and paralegal review costs. After applying the seven factor test, it determined that the defendant should account for 75 percent of the restoration and searching costs, excluding attorney review costs.

Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake IV)

During the restoration effort, the parties discovered that some backup tapes were no longer available. The parties also concluded that relevant emails created after the initial proceedings had been deleted from UBS's email system and were only accessible on backup tapes. The plaintiff then sought an order requiring UBS to pay for the total costs of restoring the remaining backup tapes and also sought an adverse inference instruction against UBS and the costs for re-deposing some individuals required because of the destruction of evidence.

In October 2003, Judge Scheindlin found that the defendant had a duty to preserve evidence since it should have known that it would be relevant for future litigation. However, at the time, she concluded that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the lost evidence supported the adverse inference instruction claim. But, she did order the defendant to cover the costs as claimed by the plaintiff.

Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 2004 WL 1620866 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2004) (Zubulake V)

In July 2004, Judge Scheindlin ruled that UBS had failed to take all necessary steps to guarantee that relevant data was both preserved and produced, and granted the plaintiff's motion for adverse inference instruction sanctions, sought in Zubulake IV, due to the deleted evidence (emails and tapes) and inability to recover key documents during the course of the case.

The court also indicated that defense counsel was partly to blame for the document destruction because it had failed in its duty to locate and preserve relevant information. In addressing the role of counsel in litigation, the court stated that "[c]ounsel must take affirmative steps to monitor compliance so that all sources of discoverable information are identified and searched" by ensuring all relevant documents are discovered, retained, and produced and that litigators must guarantee that relevant documents are preserved by instituting a litigation hold on key data, and safeguarding archival media.

In the final instructions to the jury Judge Scheindlin instructed in part, "[i]f you find that UBS could have produced this evidence, the evidence was within its control, and the evidence would have been material in deciding facts in dispute in this case, you are permitted, but not required, to infer that the evidence would have been unfavorable to UBS." In addition, monetary sanctions were awarded to the plaintiff for reimbursement of costs of additional re-depositions and of the motion leading to this opinion, including attorney fees. The jury found in the plaintiff’s favor on both claims awarding compensatory and punitive awards totaling $29.2 million.

Judge Scheindlin’s opinions in Zubulake, including definitions of accessible and inaccessible data, the seven factor balance test for cost shifting and definition of counsel’s obligation for preserving data, have been referenced in numerous cases since and have provided guidance to organizations preparing for litigation.  For any of you who may not have fully understood the significance of the case, I hope this look back was helpful.

So, what do you think?  Did you learn something new about Zubulake?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: The Zubulake Rules of Civil Procedure
 

As noted in Law Technology News (N.Y. Appellate Division Continues to Press 'Zubulake' EDD Standard) recently, the New York Appellate Division has embraced the federal standards of Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 FRD 212 in two case rulings within a month’s time.

In Voom HD Holdings v. EchoStar Satellite LLC, 600292/08, the decision, written by Justice Sallie Manzanet-Daniels, was the first by a New York state appellate court to apply the standard for spoliation of electronic evidence applied by Judge Shira Scheindlin in Zubulake in 2003.  As defined by Judge Scheindlin, the Zubulake standard asserts that "once a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine document retention/destruction policy and put in place a 'litigation hold' to ensure the preservation of relevant documents."

The case relates to a 2005 contract dispute between EchoStar and Cablevision subsidiary Voom HD Holdings, within which Voom agreed to provide EchoStar rights to broadcast Voom's programming.  Once the case was filed by Voom in February 2008, EchoStar put a litigation hold in place, instructing employees to save anything that they deemed potentially relevant to the litigation, but did not extend this hold to stopping automatic deletion of eMails from EchoStar's computers until four months later in June 2008.

Voom moved for spoliation sanctions against EchoStar for failing to preserve its eMails and Manhattan Supreme Court Justice Richard Lowe granted the motion, citing Zubulake, finding that EchoStar should have put in place a litigation hold (including a stop to automatic deletion of e-mails) in June 2007, when its corporate counsel sent Voom a letter containing a notice of breach, a demand and an explicit reservation of rights (i.e., reasonably anticipated litigation).  Therefore, EchoStar was given an adverse inference sanction (they had also received a similar sanction in 2005 in Broccoli v. EchoStar Communications Corp., 229 FRD 506).

EchoStar appealed and requested the appellate court to adopt a rule that a company must preserve documents when litigation is pending or when it has "notice of a specific claim."  However, that argument was rejected by The First Department, which ruled that “EchoStar and amicus's approach would encourage parties who actually anticipate litigation, but do not yet have notice of a 'specific claim' to destroy their documents with impunity” and upheld the sanction.

In U.S. Bank National Association v. GreenPoint Mortgage Funding Inc., 600352/09, the First Department held that the producing party should bear the initial costs of "searching for, retrieving and producing discovery," but that lower courts may permit cost shifting based on the factors set forth in Zubulake.  The case was filed by U.S. Bank, NA (indenture trustee for the insurers and holders of the mortgage-backed notes issued by GreenPoint Mortgage Funding Inc., a now defunct mortgage lender specializing in "no-doc" and "low-doc" loans) against GreenPoint.

U.S. Bank served its first document production request on GreenPoint along with its original complaint; however, GreenPoint did not produce the requested documents.  Instead, they moved for a protective order arguing that U.S. Bank should pay the costs associated with its document requests including the cost of attorney review time for confidentiality and privilege assertions.  The court upheld GreenPoint's argument that the "party seeking discovery bears the costs incurred in its production" but rejected GreenPoint's request for U.S. Bank to also bear the attorney costs for privilege and confidentiality determinations.

Upon appeal, the First Department reversed the lower court's conclusion that the requesting party bear the cost of production, finding that, per the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Zubulake, the producing party should “bear the cost of the searching for, retrieving, and producing documents, including electronically stored information.”  In the February 28 ruling, Justice Rolando Acosta wrote that the court was “persuaded that Zubulake should be the rule in this Department.”  However, the court also ruled that the lower court could order cost shifting under CPLR Article 31 between the parties by considering the seven factors set forth in Zubulake.

What are those seven factors?  Tune in tomorrow, when we will provide a refresher to the Zubulake case and its various opinions!

So, what do you think?  Is the Zubulake standard appropriate for these two cases?  Is it appropriate for cases in general?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.