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Preservation

In No Small Ruling, Court Takes Defendant to Task for Discovery Violations: eDiscovery Case Law

In Small v. Univ. Med. Ctr., No. 2:13-cv-0298-APG-PAL (D. Nev. Aug. 9, 2018), Nevada Magistrate Judge Peggy A. Leen, in a lengthy ruling so large it included a table of contents, accepted and adopted in part and overruled in part the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation and Final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.  Judge Leen sanctioned the defendant with an adverse inference instruction to the jury instead of the default judgment sanction recommended by the special master.

Case Background

In this case involving claims against the defendant for unpaid wages and overtime which followed a Department of Labor (“DOL”) investigation that addressed issues about uncompensated time for hourly employees related to uncompensated meal breaks, the court “reluctantly” appointed a special master after “a series of hearings over many months made it painfully apparent” that the defendant, its counsel, and consultants were failing in their efforts to produce ESI responsive to plaintiffs’ discovery requests, including issuing a production to the plaintiffs that was mostly “unintelligible” with extracted text in pages of undecipherable codes complete with Japanese and Korean characters.

In special master Daniel Garrie’s report (covered by us nearly four years ago here), he found that “Not a single UMC executive took any of the steps necessary to ensure the preservation of evidence. No UMC executive took responsibility for instituting or enforcing a ‘litigation hold,’ or otherwise acting to ensure the preservation of documents in this case.”  Calling the defendant’s widespread failure to preserve data a “mockery of the orderly administration of justice”, he recommended sanctions, stating, “Defendant UMC’s extraordinary misconduct and substantial and willful spoliation of relevant ESI in this case resulted in substantial prejudice to Plaintiffs and the classes, and misled Plaintiffs, the Court, and the Special Master on numerous discovery issues…The level of intentional destruction of evidence by UMC shocks the conscious. As such, as to the 613 Opt-In Plaintiffs, default judgment should be entered against UMC pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(iii) & (vi) and the Court’s inherent powers.”

Judge’s Ruling

In a lengthy ruling that re-capped in detail the complaint, the various hearings regarding eDiscovery issues and various declarations during the special master proceedings, Judge Leen stated the following findings and conclusions:

  • “Special Master Garrie was Professional, Neutral, Possessed Specialized Knowledge and Expertise, and Remedied Much of UMC’s ESI Deficiencies” (despite the defendant’s contentions to the contrary);
  • “UMC Failed to Comply with the Court’s Orders to Preserve and Produce ESI”;
  • “UMC Had No Preservation Policy or Litigation Hold Policy and Failed to Timely Implement One”;
  • “UMC Executives Failed to Accept Responsibility for Ensuring that ESI was Preserved and Failed to Notify Key Custodians and IT Staff to Preserve, and Prevent Loss, or Destruction of Relevant, Responsive ESI”;
  • “UMC Failed to Disclose the Existence of Relevant ESI Repositories, Including Multiple Timekeeping Systems and the Q-Drive (drive with files containing human resources, corporate compliance, employee grievance, payroll, and DOL investigation data) Until Late in the Special Master Proceedings”;
  • “UMC Modified, Lost, Deleted and/or Destroyed ESI Responsive to Plaintiffs’ Discovery Requests”;
  • “UMC’s Failure to Comply with its Legal Duty to Preserve, Failure to Put in Place a Timely Litigation Hold, Failure to Comply with Multiple Court Orders to Preserve and Produce Responsive ESI, and Loss and Destruction of Responsive ESI (1) Necessitated the Appointment of a Special Master, (2) Caused Substantial Delay of these Proceedings, and (3) Caused Plaintiffs to Incur Needless Monetary Expenses”; and
  • “The Special Master Correctly Concluded UMC Repeatedly Misrepresented the Completeness of its Production of Documents Produced to DOL; However, UMC Was Not Ordered to Produce Kronos Payroll Data in Spreadsheet Format”.

With regard to sanctions for the defendant, Judge Leen stated “There is no question UMC failed to implement a timely litigation hold and failed to communicate its legal preservation duties to key custodians of discoverable evidence. There is no question that UMC failed to preserve discoverable ESI. There is no question data was lost or destroyed as a result. There is no question sanctions are warranted. UMC concedes they are. The only question is what sanctions are appropriate and proportional for the violations.”

Ruling “it is ‘just and practicable’ to apply the amended version of Rule 37(e)”, Judge Leen ultimately determined “Although the court finds plaintiffs have been prejudiced by the loss of data from key repositories and custodians, the loss has not threatened to interfere with the rightful decision of the case on its merits given the large volume of ESI the special master was able to ensure that UMC produced. For these reasons, the court finds that lesser sanctions are appropriate, proportional, and no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice caused by the loss of ESI uncovered by the special master.”

As a result, Judge Leen, while accepting and adopting the special master’s report, overruled the Special Master’s recommendation of case dispositive sanctions and instead stated: “UMC is sanctioned in the form of an instruction to the jury that the court has found UMC failed to comply with its legal duty to preserve discoverable information, failed to comply with its discovery obligations, and failed to comply with a number of the court’s orders. The instruction will provide that these failures resulted in the loss or destruction of some ESI relevant to the parties’ claims and defenses and responsive to plaintiffs’ discovery requests, and that the jury may consider these findings with all other evidence in the case for whatever value it deems appropriate.”  She also imposed monetary sanctions against the defendant in the form of “reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees unnecessarily incurred by plaintiffs”.

So, what do you think?  Did the court go far enough with sanctions against the defendant?  Please let us know if any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

For more about this case, check out this Above the Law article written by Mike Quartararo.

Case opinion link courtesy of eDiscovery Assistant.

Also, if you’re going to be in Houston this Thursday, September 27, just a reminder that I will be speaking at the second annual Legal Technology Showcase & Conference, hosted by the Women in eDiscovery (WiE), Houston Chapter, South Texas College of Law and the Association of Certified E-Discovery Specialists (ACEDS).  I’ll be part of the panel discussion AI and TAR for Legal: Use Cases for Discovery and Beyond at 3:00pm and CloudNine is also a Premier Platinum Sponsor for the event (as well as an Exhibitor, so you can come learn about us too).  Click here to register!

Sponsor: This blog is sponsored by CloudNine, which is a data and legal discovery technology company with proven expertise in simplifying and automating the discovery of data for audits, investigations, and litigation. Used by legal and business customers worldwide including more than 50 of the top 250 Am Law firms and many of the world’s leading corporations, CloudNine’s eDiscovery automation software and services help customers gain insight and intelligence on electronic data.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Houston, We Have an Adverse Inference Finding: eDiscovery Case Law

In Hernandez, et al. v. City of Houston, No. 4:16-CV-3577 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2018), Texas District Judge Kenneth M. Hoyt, finding that the defendant “intentionally destroyed” evidence by wiping the hard drives of several custodians no longer employed by the City, determined “that entering an adverse inference finding is appropriate” against the defendant.

Case Background

In this case regarding alleged illegal detainment of the plaintiffs in City jail where each of the plaintiffs contends that he was held in the City’s jail for more than 48 hours without a judicial determination or a probable cause hearing, the Court entered an agreed ESI order in November 2017, which promoted cooperation between the parties (including agreement on search terms) and designated thirteen specific custodians, whose records the plaintiffs were seeking.  Weeks after the ESI Order, the defendant had still not supplemented missing metadata from an earlier production to bring the production into compliance with the Court’s Order and, after several meet and confers by phone, defendant’s counsel requested an in-person meeting.

On December 13, 2017, during that in-person meeting, the defendant represented that (i) it had not interviewed any of the custodians listed in the ESI Order, (ii) it had not collected documents from any of the custodians listed in the ESI Order and (iii) it had “wiped” the hard drives of six of those custodians no longer employed by the defendant.  At that meeting, the plaintiffs offered to provide names of vendors to help with document processing and review and offered to pay a substantial portion, if not all, of the costs that might be incurred. The defendant refused this offer and missed its December 15, 2017 deadline to certify document production was complete.

In January 2018, the defendant represented that it had collected 72,000 documents, but had yet to review them, despite the passage of the discovery deadline. By February 28, 2018, when the plaintiffs moved to compel production, the defendant had only produced 126 files from the Mayor’s office – all of which was unresponsive to the plaintiffs’ document requests.  In April 2018, the defendant claimed it had collected 2.6 million documents by running “word searches based on the ESI Protocol” and it would take 17,000 hours to review all of those documents.  Based on these representations, the plaintiffs agreed to provide a narrower set of search terms.  On April 10, 2018, the Court ordered the defendant to “produce all non-privileged documents responsive to the plaintiffs’ requests for production nos. 1-4, 8 and 9 in accordance with the Court’s November 8, 2017, ESI Order” and also notified the defendant that “[f]ailure to comply with this Order will result in sanctions, including but not limited to monetary sanctions and an adverse inference instruction”.

When the defendant ran the plaintiffs’ narrowed search terms, it retrieved 48,976 documents.  However, it then proceeded to unilaterally apply its own search terms, which retrieved 9,992 documents, which were reviewed for responsiveness.  The defendant produced only 368 responsive documents in response to the April 10 court order.

Judge’s Ruling

With regard to the wiped drives for the six custodians no longer employed by the defendant, Judge Hoyt stated: “Those hard drives contained ESI that should have been preserved by the City as soon as it anticipated litigation, and definitely after the instant lawsuit was filed. The City acknowledged its “clear obligation” to preserve all responsive documents after the litigation was pending. Yet the City failed to take reasonable steps to preserve the data on the hard drives and intentionally wiped the drives. The Court determines that the information on the hard drives cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery.”

Judge Hoyt also found that the defendant had “Made Misrepresentations to the Court About Its Flawed Discovery Process”, indicating that it: 1) “represented that it needed to review 2.6 million documents”, 2) “did not review the 78,702 documents generated by the plaintiff’s April 2018 search terms”, 3) “represented that it had issued a litigation hold” and 4) “obfuscated the status of the hard drives”.

As a result, Judge Hoyt ruled, as follows:

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) provides that an order establishing contested facts as true is an appropriate remedy when a party violates a discovery order. See Rule 37(b)(2)(i)-(ii). This type remedy cures the violation without inflicting additional costs on the parties, and for that reason, the Court determines, in its discretion that entering an adverse inference finding is appropriate…

Therefore, the Court HOLDS that the following inference is appropriate based on the City’s conduct:

It is established that (a) throughout the class period, the City of Houston had a policy of not releasing warrantless arrestees who had not received neutral determinations of probable cause within the constitutionally required period of time; (b) throughout the class period, the City’s policymakers were aware of this policy; and (c) the City’s policymakers acted with deliberate indifference to the unconstitutional policy and the constitutional violations that resulted.”

So, what do you think?  Was the adverse inference sanction appropriate in this case?  Please let us know if any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Also, if you’re going to be in Houston on Thursday, September 27, just a reminder that I will be speaking at the second annual Legal Technology Showcase & Conference, hosted by the Women in eDiscovery (WiE), Houston Chapter, South Texas College of Law and the Association of Certified E-Discovery Specialists (ACEDS).  I’ll be part of the panel discussion AI and TAR for Legal: Use Cases for Discovery and Beyond at 3:00pm and CloudNine is also a Premier Platinum Sponsor for the event (as well as an Exhibitor, so you can come learn about us too).  Click here to register!

Sponsor: This blog is sponsored by CloudNine, which is a data and legal discovery technology company with proven expertise in simplifying and automating the discovery of data for audits, investigations, and litigation. Used by legal and business customers worldwide including more than 50 of the top 250 Am Law firms and many of the world’s leading corporations, CloudNine’s eDiscovery automation software and services help customers gain insight and intelligence on electronic data.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

As Blockchain Joins the Healthcare Profession, Are Legal Departments Prepared to Keep Up?: eDiscovery Trends

When we hear the word blockchain, most of us still think of Bitcoin, that mysterious new currency that seems to equally enthrall forward thinking investors and less-than-savory entrepreneurs who lurk around the darkest parts of the Dark Web. But blockchain technology is finding more and more practical uses, most recently in the healthcare industry.

In a recent Wall Street Journal Article, blockchain is presented as a low-cost, highly secure way to unify healthcare records, which to date has been a huge obstacle. As the article puts it, “In the current tangle of incompatible records systems that typifies U.S. health care, incorrect information can creep in when patient data gets re-entered multiple times by doctors’ offices, insurers and hospital staff. Big errors can seriously affect the quality of care that patients receive, small discrepancies can result in wrongful denials of insurance coverage, and errors of all types add to the system’s cost.”

In very simplified terms, Blockchain works like a giant Google Sheet: a single ledger that can be added to simultaneously by all users in the system, with each “transaction” creating an audit trail so that its data is nearly infallible. For healthcare records systems, this can put patients, insurers, and providers literally on the same page, providing secure and accurate information for all stakeholders across the board.

In January, Nashville-based Change Healthcare (a network of 800,000 physicians, 117,000 dentists and 60,000 pharmacies) introduced a blockchain system for processing insurance claims. The shared ledger of encrypted data gives providers a “single source of truth,” according to Emily Vaughn, blockchain product development director at Change Healthcare.

All parties can see the same information about a claim in real time, so that a patient or provider won’t have to call multiple parties to verify information. Each time data is changed, a record is shown on the digital ledger, identifying the responsible party. Any changes also require verification by each party involved, ensuring record’s accuracy.

Change Healthcare won’t reveal actual numbers about how much the new system (which processes roughly 50 million events daily) cuts costs, but the efficiencies, accuracy, and security will no doubt bring huge savings.

The question regarding the eDiscovery implications with this type of move are clear: How will this data be preserved, collected, and prepared for review? It’s not so much a question of a technical nature (though that will have to be answered by someone, but I’ll leave it to the software engineers to properly answer it). What I mean to say, is that anytime a new data source is introduced into the organization’s landscape, the question of preservation, collection, and production should already be on the minds of the legal department. Often, changes in a company’s technology infrastructure are driven by departments outside of legal: usually a combination of IT and business units looking for efficiency, security, and cost savings. Many times, large decisions will be made, leaving the legal team in the position of playing catch up when it comes to discovery should litigation arise.

So, even if your company isn’t moving to blockchain anytime in the near future, this story of what is happening in the healthcare space is important to consider, because, to quote the poet William Blake, “What is now real, was once only imagined.” And the potential uses for blockchain technology lately seems to be on everyone’s mind.

So, what do you think?  How do you see the increased use of blockchain technology affecting eDiscovery?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Sponsor: This blog is sponsored by CloudNine, which is a data and legal discovery technology company with proven expertise in simplifying and automating the discovery of data for audits, investigations, and litigation. Used by legal and business customers worldwide including more than 50 of the top 250 Am Law firms and many of the world’s leading corporations, CloudNine’s eDiscovery automation software and services help customers gain insight and intelligence on electronic data.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Grants Adverse Inference Sanction Against Infringing Author: eDiscovery Case Law

In Nunes v. Rushton, No. 2:14-cv-00627-JNP-DBP (D. Utah May 14, 2018), Utah District Judge Jill N. Parrish, ruling that the plaintiff was prejudiced by the deletion of one of the defendant’s Google “sock puppet” accounts, granted the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions in part, ordering an adverse instruction to the jury regarding the “bad faith” deletion of that account.  Judge Parrish denied the motion with regard to several other accounts, ruling that the plaintiff was not prejudiced by deletion of those accounts (as most of the information was still available or recoverable).

Case Background

In this case, the defendant infringed the plaintiff’s copyright in her novel by copying protected elements of the book and distributing copies of the infringing work to reviewers and bloggers for promotional purposes. Around this time, the defendant created a number of “sock puppet” accounts on Google and Yahoo by registering these accounts under usernames that did not identify her as the individual controlling the accounts and used these accounts to create several sock puppet accounts on Facebook, Goodreads, and Amazon. The defendant then used the Goodreads and Amazon sock puppet accounts to post positive reviews of her own books and negative reviews of the plaintiff’s books. The defendant also created a Twitter account and a Blogspot account under her pen name to promote her books.

In August 2014, the plaintiff became aware of the potential infringement, attempted to obtain an advance copy of the infringing novel and discover the true identity of the defendant’s pen name. The defendant used her sock puppet social media accounts to anonymously criticize the plaintiff’s efforts to investigate the infringing novel. Sometime in August or September of 2014, after the plaintiff had discovered the defendant’s identity, The defendant deleted most of her sock puppet accounts. The defendant also deleted her pen name Twitter and Blogspot accounts. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit on August 28, 2014.

During litigation, the plaintiff made a discovery request for documents stored on the defendant’s various Google and Yahoo accounts. On August 12, 2015, while this discovery request was pending, the defendant deleted one of her Google sock puppet accounts.  When the court granted a motion to compel the defendant to produce documents from her Google and Yahoo accounts, counsel for the defendant represented that she had lost the passwords to the accounts, leading to subpoenas to those services.  The defendant deleted all of the remaining accounts on March 21, 2016, asserting that she did so because she believed that all of the documents associated with the accounts had been or would be produced by Google and Yahoo pursuant to the subpoenas.  Google stated that the account deleted on August 12, 2015 could not be recovered because too much time had passed, but preserved the accounts that had been deleted on March 21, 2016.

Judge’s Ruling

In analyzing the defendants’ motion, Judge Parrish denied the motion for sanctions regarding most of the accounts, determining that the plaintiff suffered no prejudice because the information pertaining to those accounts either remained, was saved by the plaintiff before the accounts were deleted or could be recovered by Google and Yahoo.

As for the August 12, 2015 deletion of one of the Google accounts, Judge Parrish stated: “At the time of the deletion, Rushton had a duty to preserve this account because litigation was pending. The court also finds that Nunes was prejudiced by the deletion because any documents or emails stored on this account were irretrievably lost… Given that litigation had been pending for almost a year, that Rushton was represented by counsel, and that Nunes had requested the production of documents associated with this Google account, the court infers that Rushton’s August 12, 2015 deletion of one of her Google accounts was done in bad faith.”

As a result, Judge Parrish ordering an adverse instruction to the jury regarding the “bad faith” deletion of that account.

So, what do you think?  Was an advance inference sanction a severe enough punishment?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case opinion link courtesy of eDiscovery Assistant.

Sponsor: This blog is sponsored by CloudNine, which is a data and legal discovery technology company with proven expertise in simplifying and automating the discovery of data for audits, investigations, and litigation. Used by legal and business customers worldwide including more than 50 of the top 250 Am Law firms and many of the world’s leading corporations, CloudNine’s eDiscovery automation software and services help customers gain insight and intelligence on electronic data.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Former Employee Sanctioned for Lying Under Oath, Destruction of ESI: eDiscovery Case Law

In Heggen v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., No. 1:16-cv-00440-TLS-SLC (N.D. Ind. April 27, 2018), Indiana Magistrate Judge Susan Collins ruled that the plaintiff’s destruction of requested cellphone recordings, as well as lying under oath, were sanctionable under FRCP Rule 37.

Case Background

The plaintiff filed the case against her former employer – a provider of temporary medical staffing, home health care, and wellness services – with claims of sexual harassment and retaliation. The plaintiff stated under oath that she chose to leave these employers “voluntarily” because the two clients with whom she worked were going into a nursing home.

However, the defendant pointed out that records show that the plaintiff was terminated after she refused to discuss a complaint that the plaintiff stole $300 from a client under her care, as well as mismanagement of the client’s financial assets. A discovery request to the Indiana Department of Workforce Development revealed that the plaintiff had worked for Interim Health Care immediately prior to joining the defendant, even though she responded to the first request for production with a different former employer, and then stated a second employer during her deposition. Based on the records from Interim, the defendant claimed that the circumstances of the plaintiff’s departure from Interim were “strikingly similar” to the plaintiff’s time at the defendant, including that a patient’s medications went missing – the plaintiff then tested positive for the missing medications on a drug test, and the plaintiff failed to return to work after the complaint.

The clearest contention that the defendant brought is that the plaintiff destroyed key evidence in at least three different ways and this, along with the other actions by the plaintiff, the defendant contended was grounds for a dismissal sanction. The plaintiff testified at her deposition that she made about seven recordings of unidentified defendant employees and said these recordings supported her claims against the defendant, she also testified that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) had the recordings, because she deleted the recordings from her cell phone since she “didn’t want them to have [her] phone lost and have them be out there.” She claimed she had emailed the recordings to the EEOC, but couldn’t find any copy of the emails transmitting the recordings. After sending the emails, she performed a factory reset of her phone (an older Apple model) that basically had “broke[n] down,” and that she was trying to get working again. The reset deleted all of the data stored on it, including the recordings.

She felt that emailing the recordings to EEOC was a form of preservation and “thought it was okay to get rid of them[.]” Copies of three of the recordings were found, and the plaintiff submitted transcripts of these recordings with her response brief, and she also provided a copy of the recordings and transcripts to the defendant. However, there was no explanation for the other missing recordings.

The defendant had sought the recordings from the plaintiff for months through traditional discovery and because it did not have the recordings when it deposed the plaintiff, it felt that resulted in prejudice against them. They also argued that there was a significant difference between original recordings and copies of recordings. What the plaintiff submitted appeared to be at least two different layers of recorded conversations: “an ongoing face-to-face interaction between individuals who are supposedly simultaneously listening to and participating in a different interaction by telephone, all recorded on top of each other.”  Also, because they were copies, there was no way to delve into the original metadata of the recordings. Further, while the original recordings were made on an iPhone, the files produced were in 3GP format, a format generally used by Android phones, raising even more questions.

Judge’s Ruling

Judge Collins ruled that the defendant’s failure under oath to disclose Interim as a prior employer and for her destruction of the original cell phone recordings was sanctionable. But noted that a sanction for discovery abuse must be “a proportionate response to the circumstances.”

Judge Collins stated, “The draconian sanction of dismissal is not presently warranted here. Rather, the present circumstances warrant the imposition of lesser sanctions in the form of a monetary penalty—that is, ordering Heggen to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, that Maxim incurred in filing the motion to compel [See FRCP Rule 37]. The Court has no reason, at least at this juncture, to conclude that the imposition of this monetary penalty would be fruitless. The Court will also consider a spoliation instruction upon a pretrial motion by counsel should this case go to trial. The motion for sanctions is otherwise denied. Heggen is duly warned that any additional discovery transgressions may result in further sanctions against her, up to and including dismissal of this case.”

So, what do you think?  Was the ruling correct or was a sanction of dismissal warranted in this case?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case opinion link courtesy of eDiscovery Assistant.

Sponsor: This blog is sponsored by CloudNine, which is a data and legal discovery technology company with proven expertise in simplifying and automating the discovery of data for audits, investigations, and litigation. Used by legal and business customers worldwide including more than 50 of the top 250 Am Law firms and many of the world’s leading corporations, CloudNine’s eDiscovery automation software and services help customers gain insight and intelligence on electronic data.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Judge Recommends Jury Decision on Impact of Spoliation of Emails: eDiscovery Case Law

In BankDirect Capital Fin., LLC v. Capital Premium Fin., Inc., No. 15 C 10340 (N.D. Ill. April 4, 2018), Illinois Magistrate Judge Jeffrey Cole recommended that the court follow the decision in Cahill v. Dart and “allow the appropriate evidence to be presented to the jury” to enable it to determine the “impact, if any, the non-production of the challenged emails has on the merits of the parties’ claims”.  If the court was not inclined to let the matter go to the jury, Judge Cole recommended that the court give a permissive spoliation instruction to the jury informing them of the destruction of the requested emails and that they could consider the deletion of the emails to be evidence in considering claims and counter-claims of the parties.

Case Background

In this case regarding breach of a marketing collaboration agreement between the parties and a counter-claim against the owner of the plaintiff, alleging the marketing agreement was negotiated in bad faith, the defendant raised concerns that the plaintiff had produced no emails from Fall 2010 through November 2011 (the period in which the parties were negotiating their Agreement).  The plaintiff indicated that it changed servers in November 2011 and no longer had possession of any emails prior to then.  In response to the suggestion that the loss of the pre-November 2011 emails might have been deliberate, the plaintiff claimed that the server change was “years before any party could have foreseen litigation”.  Though the parties agreed to a declaration by an employee of the plaintiff regarding this, the plaintiff never provided one.

In May 2017, the defendant served a notice for the deposition of a corporate representative of the plaintiff to cover a number of topics related to the missing emails, but the parties continued to dispute the production of a plaintiff witness before finally agreeing to depose an employee of the bank owner company of the plaintiff.  He testified that the new email archive system was not fully installed at the plaintiff’s organization until July 2012, that five years of emails were kept at the time and that emails were kept until automatically deleted once they aged five years.  This meant that emails going back to November 2010 were in existence and obtainable as of November 2015 when the Complaint was filed, not purged when the plaintiff changed servers.

In addition, the President and CEO of the plaintiff admitted he maintained a separate electronic or computerized “folder” for emails regarding the agreement, this folder would have contained all the communications related to it as of July 2012 when the migration to the new archive was complete and he knew of no reason why he would have deleted them.  Acknowledging that he was “personally responsible for putting in place a litigation hold”, he also admitted that neither he nor anyone else at the plaintiff or its owner company ordered the suspension of the automatic deletion of archived emails until at least October of 2016, nearly a year after the defendant filed suit, noting that he didn’t think there were any bad emails, so their deletion wasn’t problematic.  The chain of events led to the defendant filing a Motion for Spoliation Sanctions seeking the entry of a default judgment or, alternatively, an adverse inference sanction against the plaintiff.

Judge’s Ruling

In providing his recommendation, Judge Cole stated that the plaintiff CEO testimony “is simply not credible”.  Continuing, he said, “No reasonable, successful businessman would be so naive as to think that prior, positive exchanges of emails with one’s present accuser had no capacity to help prove that Capital’s charges were baseless and pretextual.”

Summing up his observations, Judge Cole stated that “there can be no serious doubt that the now unavailable emails ought to have been preserved, and that BankDirect, despite its admitted knowledge that documents were not to be destroyed, intentionally chose not to take reasonable (and quite easy) steps to preserve them.”  As a result, Judge Cole offered the following recommendation:

“Accordingly, it is recommended that the court follow Cahill and, as a matter of its inherent discretion, allow the appropriate evidence to be presented to the jury, which, under proper instructions, will determine the reasons for the non-production and the impact, if any, the non-production of the challenged emails has on the merits of the parties’ claims. Alternatively, if the court is not inclined to let the matter go to the jury, it is recommended that the court give a permissive spoliation instruction to the jury informing them of the destruction of the requested emails and that they could consider the deletion “of the emails to be evidence (not conclusive of course)” in considering BankDirect’s claim and Capital’s counterclaim.”

So, what do you think?  Should the judge have recommended a default judgment sanction in this case?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case opinion link courtesy of eDiscovery Assistant.

Sponsor: This blog is sponsored by CloudNine, which is a data and legal discovery technology company with proven expertise in simplifying and automating the discovery of data for audits, investigations, and litigation. Used by legal and business customers worldwide including more than 50 of the top 250 Am Law firms and many of the world’s leading corporations, CloudNine’s eDiscovery automation software and services help customers gain insight and intelligence on electronic data.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

No Sanctions for Failing to Preserve Cell Phone Records and Call Logs: eDiscovery Case Law

In Dotson, et al. v. Edmonson, et. al., No. 16-15371 (E.D. La. Jan. 22, 2018), Louisiana District Judge Susie Morgan denied the plaintiff’s motion in limine seeking sanctions for spoliation of evidence, finding that the plaintiff had “not met his burden of establishing that the Trooper Defendants had a duty to preserve” cell phone records and call logs from the evening of October 7, 2015 from Louisiana State Police (LSP) issued cell phones that were used that night by LSP officers during an undercover operation, or that their destruction of the evidence was intentional.

Case Background

In this case related to a civil suit over a drug bust involving the plaintiff, the defendants provided interrogatory responses deposition testimony which indicated that LSP troopers relied on their LSP-issued (or LSP-funded) cell phones to communicate during the course of operations in general, and specifically on the night of October 7, 2015.  The plaintiff asserted that this “establishes the existence of electronically stored information such as call logs and text messages on those cell phones” and argued that, as early as October 7, 2016, when the defendants were named in an article on nola.com and the case was filed, the defendants and the LSP were on notice that litigation was pending, and thus should have known that any ESI relating to the investigatory stop and arrest of the plaintiff was required to be preserved. Nonetheless, Defendants traded in their cell phones one month after Plaintiff filed his suit.

The plaintiff issued multiple discovery requests and subpoenas, and filed several motions to compel in efforts to obtain the call logs and text messages and develop an understanding of the officers’ movements and observations on the night of the arrest to no avail and claimed the loss of these records prejudiced his case, because the movements and communications among these officers were crucial to establishing whether reasonable suspicion existed to stop the plaintiff.  In response, the defendants argued that the plaintiff’s proposed remedy unfairly targeted Defendant Bodet (one of the Trooper Defendants), “as the Fifth Circuit makes clear that sanctions for spoliation should be taken against the alleged spoliator” and argued there is no evidence to suggest that Bodet acted in bad faith, or that he should have known of a need to preserve any electronically stored information on his phone.

Judge’s Ruling

Citing Rule 37(e), Judge Morgan stated: “The Plaintiff has not met his burden of establishing that the Trooper Defendants had a duty to preserve the electronically stored information related to the cell phone records from October 7, 2015 at the time the information was destroyed or that their destruction of the evidence was intentional. The Court will not provide the requested instruction to the jury based on an adverse inference.”

However, Judge Morgan excluded the Trooper Defendants from speculating at trial that they “may have” called a particular trooper based on deposition testimony to the contrary.  She also stated that “the Court’s ruling does not preclude the Plaintiff from eliciting testimony regarding the loss of the cell phone records and text messages”, nor did it prohibit questioning “regarding the cell phone record preservation policies of the Louisiana State Police, as such testimony is relevant and its relevance is not outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice.”

So, what do you think?  Should the defendants have received some sanctions?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case opinion link courtesy of eDiscovery Assistant.

Sponsor: This blog is sponsored by CloudNine, which is a data and legal discovery technology company with proven expertise in simplifying and automating the discovery of data for audits, investigations, and litigation. Used by legal and business customers worldwide including more than 50 of the top 250 Am Law firms and many of the world’s leading corporations, CloudNine’s eDiscovery automation software and services help customers gain insight and intelligence on electronic data.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

No Sanctions for Failing to Preserve Videos and Photos of Prisoner Accident: eDiscovery Case Law

In Hernandez v. Tulare Cnty. Correction Center, et al., No. 1:16-cv-00413-EPG (PC) (E.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2018), the California Magistrate Judge denied the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions, ruling that the defendants did not act with the intent to deprive there was no prejudice to the plaintiff from loss of videos and photos of an accident suffered by the plaintiff, a state prisoner at the defendant’s correctional facility.

Case Background

In this case, the plaintiff tripped and fell when going through an x-ray scanning machine while shackled, suffering injuries – as a result, he filed a personal injury lawsuit against the defendants.  In August 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion to compel claiming that Tulare County failed to preserve relevant videos as well as photos (stored on a memory card) of the accident.  In a discovery hearing held in September 2017, defendant’s counsel confirmed that relevant ESI had, in fact, been mistakenly deleted by Tulare County officials and could not be replaced. The motion to compel was denied because there was nothing to produce and the plaintiff was instructed on the procedure to file a motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  He filed the motion for sanctions a few days later, requesting monetary sanctions and entry of default judgment based upon intentional deprivation of relevant evidence and serious prejudice suffered to his case that cannot be cured.  Defendant Tulare County filed a response in opposition arguing that the loss of the ESI was inadvertent and did not prejudice the plaintiff.

Judge’s Ruling

Noting that Subdivision (e)(1) of Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) applies only “upon finding prejudice to another party from loss of the information” and that Subdivision (e)(2) applies “only upon finding that the party acted with the intent to deprive another party of the information’s use in the litigation”, the court proceeded to consider those two factors with respect to the plaintiff’s motion.

With regard to the intent to deprive consideration, the Court stated: “While the Court is troubled by the the failure to preserve the relevant video, there is no indication from the evidence in the record that Tulare County acted with intent to deprive Plaintiff of use of the video in this case. Upon consideration of the evidence in the record, it appears that this failure was a result of Tulare County either being misinformed about the relevant scope of this litigation or that the staff responsible for the preservation were poorly trained. However, the record does not contain any evidence suggesting that the failure to preserve the video was a result of bad faith or intent to deprive.”

With regard to the claim of prejudice suffered, the Court noted that “Tulare County does not dispute that: 1) Plaintiff was in shackles and other detainees were not; 2) Plaintiff tripped and fell when stepping onto the platform of the body scanner; or 3) others assisted Plaintiff to his feet after he fell.”  The Court also noted that “the video surveillance in question does not capture sound so the footage would not have been helpful regarding Plaintiff’s allegations that he informed correctional staff about his disability and the information was ignored”, that “Tulare County has produced relevant documents in this case, including photos of Plaintiff’s injuries” and “Plaintiff has also located eye-witnesses of the April 21, 2015 incident, who have reportedly agreed to provide testimony in support of his case.”  As a result, the Court ruled that the plaintiff was not prejudiced by loss of the information and denied the motion for sanctions.

So, what do you think?  Should the defendants have received at least some level of sanctions?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

February 19 has always been an important day to me, as this was my dad’s birthday (he would have been 89 today) and it’s my wife Paige’s birthday now!  Happy birthday, honey!

Case opinion link courtesy of eDiscovery Assistant.

Sponsor: This blog is sponsored by CloudNine, which is a data and legal discovery technology company with proven expertise in simplifying and automating the discovery of data for audits, investigations, and litigation. Used by legal and business customers worldwide including more than 50 of the top 250 Am Law firms and many of the world’s leading corporations, CloudNine’s eDiscovery automation software and services help customers gain insight and intelligence on electronic data.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Befuddled by BYOD? The Sedona Conference Has a New Set of Principles to Guide You: eDiscovery Best Practices

Many organizations are permitting (or even encouraging) their employees to use their own personal devices to access, create, and manage company related information – a practice commonly referred to as Bring Your Own Device (BYOD).  But, how can those organizations effectively manage those BYOD devices to meet their discovery obligations?  To help with that issue, The Sedona Conference® (TSC) has published an initial Public Comment Version of a Commentary to help.

In late January, TSC and its Working Group 1 on Electronic Document Retention and Production (WG1) rolled out the Public Comment version of its Commentary on BYOD: Principles and Guidance for Developing Policies and Meeting Discovery Obligations.  The Commentary is designed to help organizations develop and implement workable – and legally defensible – BYOD policies and practices. This Commentary also addresses how creating and storing an organization’s information on devices owned by employees impacts the organization’s discovery obligations.  It focuses specifically to mobile devices that employees “bring” to the workplace (not on other “BYO” type programs) and does not specifically address programs where the employer provides the mobile device.

The Commentary begins with five principles related to the use of BYOD programs and continues with commentary for each.  Here are the five principles:

  • Principle 1: Organizations should consider their business needs and objectives, their legal rights and obligations, and the rights and expectations of their employees when deciding whether to allow, or even require, BYOD.
  • Principle 2: An organization’s BYOD program should help achieve its business objectives while also protecting both business and personal information from unauthorized access, disclosure, and use.
  • Principle 3: Employee-owned devices that contain unique, relevant ESI should be considered sources for discovery.
  • Principle 4: An organization’s BYOD policy and practices should minimize the storage of––and facilitate the preservation and collection of––unique, relevant ESI from BYOD devices.
  • Principle 5: Employee-owned devices that do not contain unique, relevant ESI need not be considered sources for discovery.

The Commentary weighs in at a tidy 40 page PDF file, which includes a couple of appendices.  So, it’s a fairly light read, at least by TSC standards.  :o)

TSC is encouraging public comment on the Commentary on BYOD, which can be downloaded free from their website here (whether you’re a TSC member or not). They encourage Working Group Series members and others to spread the word and share the link (you’re welcome!) so they can get comments in before the public comment period closes on March 26. Questions and comments may be sent to comments@sedonaconference.org.  So, you have a chance to be heard!

Speaking of mobile devices, I’m excited to be speaking this year for the first time at the University of Florida Law E-Discovery Conference on March 29.  I’m on a panel discussion in a session titled Getting Critical Information From The Tough Locations – Cloud, IOT, Social Media, And Smartphones! with Craig Ball, Kelly Twigger, and with The Honorable Amanda Arnold Sansone, Magistrate Judge in Florida, moderating.  As always, the conference will be conducted in Gainesville, FL (as well as being livestreamed), with CLE-accredited sessions all day from 8am to 5:30pm ET, with an all-star collection of speakers.  I’ll have more to say about the conference as we get closer to it.  Click here to register!

So, what do you think?  Does your organization have a BYOD policy?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Sponsor: This blog is sponsored by CloudNine, which is a data and legal discovery technology company with proven expertise in simplifying and automating the discovery of data for audits, investigations, and litigation. Used by legal and business customers worldwide including more than 50 of the top 250 Am Law firms and many of the world’s leading corporations, CloudNine’s eDiscovery automation software and services help customers gain insight and intelligence on electronic data.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

No Sanctions for Spoliation of ESI Against Plaintiff Leads to Summary Judgment Against Defendant: eDiscovery Case Law

We just completed our four part review of case law for 2017 and Tom O’Connor and I discussed important cases for 2017 in our webcast yesterday (click here to check it out).  Now, on to cases to cover for this year…

In IBM v. Naganayagam, No. 15 Civ. 7991 (NSR) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2017), New York District Judge Nelson S. Romàn, finding that no intent to deprive by the plaintiff and no prejudice against the defendant for spoliation of ESI, denied the defendant’s motion for spoliation sanctions, which facilitated granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment against the defendant by Judge Romàn.

Case Background

In this action against the defendant (a former employee of the plaintiff who had received several Equity Award Agreements (EAAs) during his employment which the plaintiff sought to rescind once the defendant left his employment to join a competitor), the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment in the case and the defendant filed a cross-motion pursuant to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for spoliation sanctions.

On October 31, 2016, the defendant filed a motion to compel production of the plaintiff’s strategic plans for Australia and New Zealand, e-mails related to the defendant’s departure from the plaintiff that were referenced the deposition of the defendant’s former supervisor, a list of the defendant’s accounts, and the defendant’s own e-mails from the course of his employment with the plaintiff.  The court issued an Opinion and Order on December 9, 2016, denying the defendant’s request to compel the production of both his own emails and client account information as well as his supervisor’s emails, finding that the defendant had failed to establish the relevance of these materials. However, the court did rule that the plaintiff was required to produce the strategic plans generated by the plaintiff delineating their competitors.  After the plaintiff indicated it was unable to locate the strategy plans, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment in January 2017 and the defendant filed a cross-motion for adverse inference spoliation sanctions ten days later.

Judge’s Ruling

When considering the defendant’s request for sanctions, Judge Romàn noted that “Although the more lenient sanctions standard under Rule 37(e) did not go into effect until after Plaintiff filed the Complaint in the present action, the amended Rule 37(e) can apply retroactively”, observing that the Order included by Chief Justice Roberts (when transmitting the new Rule to Congress) indicated that it would govern “insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings then pending.”

Noting that “amended Rule 37(e) only allows for adverse inference sanctions where the non-movant acted intentionally to deprive another party use of the ESI during litigation”, Judge Romàn, observing that “Defendant merely alleges that Plaintiff acted negligently rather than intentionally”, denied the request for adverse inference sanctions against the plaintiff.  Also, determining that a lack of prejudice against the defendant for any potential spoliation, Judge Romàn ruled that “less severe spoliation sanctions are similarly unwarranted” and denied the defendant’s motion for spoliation sanctions.  With that considered, Judge Romàn found that “there is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding Defendant’s breach of the Plan and EAAs”, and granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

So, what do you think?  Should the court have ruled it differently?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case opinion link courtesy of eDiscovery Assistant.

Sponsor: This blog is sponsored by CloudNine, which is a data and legal discovery technology company with proven expertise in simplifying and automating the discovery of data for audits, investigations, and litigation. Used by legal and business customers worldwide including more than 50 of the top 250 Am Law firms and many of the world’s leading corporations, CloudNine’s eDiscovery automation software and services help customers gain insight and intelligence on electronic data.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.