Sanctions

Court Orders Sanctions Against Defendant for Spoliation of Emails and Other Documents: eDiscovery Case Law

Now, that we’ve recapped last year’s cases, let’s start covering cases for this year…

In Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Ohio Public Employees Retirement System, No. 654586/2012 (Supreme Court of New York, New York County, December 7, 2015), the Court, determining that the defendant had spoliated data, found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated sufficient facts to warrant striking the defendant’s affirmative defenses, but opted to order an adverse inference instruction and also ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and costs in preparing the instant motion for sanctions.

Case Background

In this action to recover principal distributions from the defendant, the defendant, at the direction of in-house counsel, distributed a written litigation hold notice to certain employees who were deemed likely to possess documents relevant to the dispute.  In addition, the defendant’s IT department saved emails in an enterprise email archiving system.  Despite the preservation, the defendant objected to the plaintiff’s discovery requests and did not produce any responsive documents during a period where disputes over the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment were happening, until sometime after the court instructed the parties to go forward with discovery.  The defendant ultimately produced documents responsive to the plaintiff’s discovery requests.

However, several months into discovery, the defendant revealed that due to a “synchronization error,” emails that were preserved in the email archiving system that were subject to the ligation hold were accidentally purged, resulting in the content of 101 responsive emails being lost (though the defendant was able to recover and produce metadata from the lost emails).  Due to that issue and other instances of supposed spoliation by the defendant (including one email that was ultimately produced by another party that had communicated with the defendant), the plaintiff filed an instant motion for sanctions, asking the Court to strike the defendant’s affirmative defense of detrimental reliance, or, in the alternative, order a preclusion sanction or adverse inference.

Court’s Ruling

Finding that the duty to preserve began as early as April 2011 and no later than May 2011, the Court found “that OPERS’ had control of – and access to” lost or destroyed ESI in May 2011” and that the defendant wiped the computer of a key retired employee after the plaintiff had rejected a settlement offer from the defendant.  The court also found that the plaintiff had shown that at least some of the deleted ESI was relevant to the case.

Despite this, the court opted for the lesser sanction sought by the plaintiff, noting:

“Here, Ocwen has demonstrated prejudice as a result of OPERS’ failure to preserve France’s ESI and Bloomberg messages. However, the “extreme sanction” of striking OPERS’ affirmative defense is not appropriate in this case because Ocwen was able to obtain some evidence to disprove detrimental reliance, namely the August 2009 message sent from Gleacher to France…Since the loss of potentially relevant ESI is not fatal to Ocwen’s rebuttal of OPERS’ sixth affirmative defense, the imposition of an adverse inference as to that charge is appropriate and ‘reflects an appropriate balancing under the circumstances.’”

As a result, the court ordered an adverse inference instruction against the defendant and also ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and costs in preparing the instant motion for sanctions.

So, what do you think?  Was that the appropriate sanction?  Or should the defendant have been sanctioned at all?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

2015 eDiscovery Case Law Year in Review, Part 4

As we noted yesterday, Wednesday and Tuesday, eDiscovery Daily published 89 posts related to eDiscovery case decisions and activities over the past year, covering 72 unique cases!  Yesterday, we looked back at cases related to cooperation issues, social media and mobile phone discovery, technology assisted review and the first part of the cases relating to sanctions and spoliation.  Today, let’s take a look back at the rest of the cases relating to sanctions and spoliation.

We grouped those cases into common subject themes and will review them over the next few posts.  Perhaps you missed some of these?  Now is your chance to catch up!

SPOLIATION / SANCTIONS

We covered the first ten cases related to requests for sanctions yesterday, here are the remaining eighteen cases that we covered last year:

Court Denies Plaintiff’s Request for Spoliation Sanctions, as Most Documents Destroyed Before Duty to Preserve: In Giuliani v. Springfield Township, et al., Pennsylvania District Judge Thomas N. O’Neill, Jr. denied the plaintiffs’ motion for spoliation sanctions, finding that the duty to preserve began when the case was filed and finding that “plaintiffs have not shown that defendants had any ill motive or bad intent in failing to retain the documents which plaintiffs seek”.

Judge Recommends Default Judgment Sanctions Against Defendants, Even Though Some Deleted Files Were Recoverable: In Malibu Media, LLC v. Tashiro, Indiana Magistrate Judge Mark J. Dinsmore issued a Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions, recommending that the Court grant the plaintiff’s motion against the defendants for spoliation of evidence and perjury and enter default judgment against the defendants.

Similar Spoliation Case, Somewhat Different Outcome: In Malibu Media, LLC v. Michael Harrison (with the same plaintiff and issues as the case above in this list), Indiana District Judge William T. Lawrence denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, upholding the magistrate judge’s ruling which found an adverse inference instruction for destroying a hard drive with potentially responsive data on it to be not warranted, and ruled that “it will be for a jury to decide” if such a sanction is appropriate.

Plaintiff Once Again Sanctioned with an Adverse Inference Instruction, But Still No Complete Dismissal: In Lynn M. Johnson v. BAE Systems, Inc. et. al., District of Columbia District Judge Robert L. Wilkins granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff’s claims for negligence, battery, and defamation, but chose to “impose lesser, but nonetheless severe, sanctions” in the form of an adverse inference instruction for her remaining claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

New York Supreme Court Sanctions Two Attorney Defendants for “Egregious Misconduct” in Spoliation of Data: In HMS Holdings Corp. v. Arendt, et al., the New York Supreme Court in Albany County ordered a mandatory adverse inference instruction so that the trier of fact could “draw the strongest possible adverse inference from defendants’ bad faith and intentional destruction, deletion and failure to produce relevant evidence”. The court also awarded attorney fees, and forwarded a copy of the order regarding Defendant Lange to the New York State Committee on Professional Standards for attorneys.

Court Sanctions Plaintiff for Failing to Preserve Audio Recording: In Compass Bank v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, California Magistrate Judge William V. Gallo ruled that the plaintiff “wilfully engaged in the spoliation of relevant evidence”, and “has demonstrated a pattern of recalcitrant behavior during discovery in this litigation” and awarded an adverse inference jury instruction sanction against the plaintiff as well as defendant’s attorney fees and costs.

Court Orders Deposition of Expert to Evaluate Issues Resulting from Plaintiff’s Deletion of ESI: In Procaps S.A. v. Patheon Inc., Florida District Judge Jonathan Goodman ordered the deposition of a third-party computer forensic expert, who had previously examined the plaintiff’s computers, to be conducted in part by a Special Master that had been appointed to examine the eDiscovery and forensic issues in the case. The purpose of the ordered deposition was to help the Court decide the issues related to files deleted by the plaintiff and assist the defendant to decide whether or not to file a sanctions motion.

Tired of the “Crap”, Court Sanctions Investors and Lawyers for Several Instances of Spoliation: In Clear-View Technologies, Inc., v. Rasnick et al, California Magistrate Judge Paul S. Grewal sanctioned the defendants $212,320 and also granted a permissive adverse jury instruction that allows the presumption that the defendants’ spoliated documents due to a series of “transgressions” by the defendants and their prior counsel.

Appeals Court Upholds “Death Penalty Order” Sanction That Leads to Multi-Million Dollar Judgment: In Crews v. Avco Corp., a Washington Court of Appeals upheld a “death penalty order” against the defendant for discovery violations, including the failure to produce relevant information, but remanded for amendment of the final judgment of over $17.28 million to reflect any offsets for settlements with other defendants.

Denial of Motion for Spoliation Sanctions Leaves Plaintiff Less Than Glad: In Gladue v. Saint Francis Medical Center, Missouri District Judge Carol E. Jackson denied the plaintiff’s motion for evidentiary and monetary sanctions due to spoliation of evidence, finding that the defendant did not have a duty to preserve emails deleted as part of routine IT operations, had diligently attempted to recover deleted emails and that the plaintiff failed to show that any of the unrecovered emails were relevant to her claims.

How Blue Was My Valley? Not Blue Enough to Cite the Defendant for Discovery Violations: In Malone v. Kantner Ingredients, Nebraska Magistrate Judge Cheryl R. Zwart denied the plaintiffs’ motion to show cause, finding that the defendant “the plaintiffs have presented no evidence” that the defendant “destroyed, hid, or purposefully (or even recklessly) failed to produce responsive ESI” in the case.

Discarding a Relevant Computer Results in Adverse Inference Sanctions, Not Default Judgment: In Grady v. Brodersen, Colorado Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang granted the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions against the defendant in part for failing to produce a computer that the defendant ultimately acknowledged that he discarded, but denied the plaintiff’s request for a default judgment sanction, opting for the less severe adverse inference instruction sanction.

Defendant Does Not Take the Fall for Spoliation in Slip and Fall Case: In Harrell v. Pathmark et al., Pennsylvania District Judge Gene E. K. Pratter, after a hearing to consider whether to draw an adverse inverse instruction due to the defendant’s possible spoliation of video evidence, determined that “a spoliation inference would not be appropriate here”. Finding that the plaintiff had presented no evidence that the defendant had constructive notice of a dangerous condition resulting in her slip and fall, Judge Pratter also granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Court Rules that Australian Company’s Duty to Preserve Only Begins when US Court Has Jurisdiction: In Lunkenheimer Co. v. Tyco Flow Control Pacific Party Ltd., Ohio District Judge Timothy S. Black ruled that the duty to preserve for the defendant (an Australian company with offices and facilities only in Australia) did not begin until the complaint was filed in US courts in December 2011, denying the assertion of the intervenor/counter defendant that the duty to preserve arose in 2002.

Court Awards Attorney Fees to Defendant After Delayed Production by Plaintiff: In Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Westport Insurance Corp., Michigan Magistrate Judge Phillip J. Green awarded some (but not all) of the attorney fees requested by the defendant after the plaintiff “made repeated promises to produce the subject documents”, but “failed to do so for nearly three months after the deadline for responding to Westport’s Rule 34 request” and “compliance was obtained only after Westport filed its motion to compel”.

Plaintiffs Not Sanctioned for Late Production, Citing Their $29,000 Expense to Hire Experts to Assist: In Federico et al. v. Lincoln Military Housing LLC, et al., Virginia Magistrate Judge Douglas E. Miller, concluding that the defendants had not established that the plaintiffs had acted in bad faith when failing to meet production deadlines, declined to impose “any further sanction against Plaintiffs beyond the $29,000 expense associated with their expert’s production of the Facebook records”, except for a portion of the reasonable attorney’s fees associated with the original motion to compel.

Plaintiff Sanctioned for Late Production, But Not for Failure to Produce Data Held by Outside Vendor: In Ablan v. Bank of America, Illinois Magistrate Judge Daniel G. Martin recommended that the defendant’s Motion for Sanctions should be granted in part and denied in part, recommending that the plaintiffs be barred from using any new information at summary judgment or at trial that was contained on eight CD-ROMs produced late, but recommending no sanctions for failing to produce or make available documents held by the plaintiff’s outside vendor.

Payday Loan Company Sanctioned for Discovery Violations: In James v. National Financial LLC, Delaware Vice Chancellor Laster granted the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions after determining that the defendant’s “discovery misconduct calls for serious measures”. However, the plaintiff’s request for a default judgment was not granted, but lesser sanctions that included attorneys’ fees and a ruling that the lack of information contained in the requested document resulted in an admission.

Hope you enjoyed our recap of last year’s cases.  Next year, we’ll do it again for this year’s cases!

Want to take a look at cases we covered the previous four years?  Here they are:

So, what do you think?  Did you miss any of these?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

2015 eDiscovery Case Law Year in Review, Part 3

As we noted yesterday and Tuesday, eDiscovery Daily published 89 posts related to eDiscovery case decisions and activities over the past year, covering 72 unique cases!  Yesterday, we looked back at cases related to disputes about discovery, eDiscovery cost reimbursement and issues related to privilege and confidentiality assertions.  Today, let’s take a look back at cases related to cooperation issues, social media and mobile phone discovery, technology assisted review and the first part of the cases relating to sanctions and spoliation.

We grouped those cases into common subject themes and will review them over the next few posts.  Perhaps you missed some of these?  Now is your chance to catch up!

COOPERATION

Why can’t we all just get along?  There were several instances where parties couldn’t agree and had to kick issues up to the court for resolution, here are four such cases:

Judge Shows Her Disgust via “Order on One Millionth Discovery Dispute”: In Herron v. Fannie Mae, et al., DC District Judge Rosemary M. Collyer issued an order titled “Order on One Millionth Discovery Dispute” where she decided that “[c]ontrary to its usual practice, the Court will rule immediately, in writing” on the latest discovery disputes between the plaintiff and defendant.

Court’s “New and Simpler Approach to Discovery” Identifies Search Terms for Plaintiff to Use: In Armstrong Pump, Inc. v. Hartman, New York Magistrate Judge Hugh B. Scott granted in part the defendant’s motion to compel discovery responses and fashioned a “new and simpler approach” to discovery, identifying thirteen search terms/phrases for the plaintiff to use when searching its document collection.

Court Agrees to Allow Defendant to Use Search Terms to Identify ESI to Preserve: In You v. Japan, California District Judge William Alsup granted the defendant’s motion to limit preservation of articles to those that contain one of several relevant search terms, as long as the defendant’s proposal was amended to include one additional term requested by the plaintiffs.

Court Orders Defendant to Supplement Data Used for Statistical Sampling: In United States ex rel Guardiola v. Renown Health, Nevada Magistrate Judge Valerie P. Cooke agreed with the relator’s contention that the data used to finalize the relator’s proposed statistical sampling plan was incomplete due to how data was identified within one of two billing systems used by the defendant. As a result, she ordered the defendant to “EXPEDITIOUSLY PRODUCE” the additional data (and, yes, she used all caps).

SOCIAL MEDIA

Requests for social media data in litigation continue, so here are three cases related to requests for social media data:

Court Rejects Defendants Motion Seeking Limitless Access to Plaintiff’s Facebook Account: In the class action In re Milo’s Kitchen Dog Treats Consolidated Cases, Pennsylvania Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly denied the defendants’ Motion to Compel Unredacted Facebook Data File and Production of Username and Password, disagreeing that the discovery of one highly relevant Facebook entry justified the defendants to be “somehow entitled to limitless access to her Facebook account”. Judge Kelly did order the plaintiff to produce previously produced redacted Facebook pages to the Court unredacted so that an in camera inspection could be conducted to confirm that the redacted information was truly privileged.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash Subpoena of Text Messages Granted by Court: In Burdette v. Panola County, Mississippi Magistrate Judge S. Allan Alexander granted the plaintiff’s Motion to Quash Subpoena where the defendant subpoenaed the plaintiff’s text messages and call log records from his mobile provider.

When Claiming Workplace Injury, Facebook Posts Aren’t Handy, Man: In the case In Newill v. Campbell Transp. Co., Pennsylvania Senior District Judge Terrence F. McVerry ruled on the plaintiff’s motion in limine on miscellaneous matters by allowing the defendant to introduce Facebook posts into evidence that related to the plaintiff’s physical capabilities, but not those that related to his employability.

TECHNOLOGY ASSISTED REVIEW

Believe it or not, we only covered one technology assisted review case last year, at least officially.  Though, we did at least cover it twice.  Here is the case:

Judge Peck Wades Back into the TAR Pits with ‘Da Silva Moore Revisited’: In Rio Tinto Plc v. Vale S.A., New York Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck approved the proposed protocol for technology assisted review (TAR) presented by the parties, but made it clear to note that “the Court’s approval ‘does not mean. . . that the exact ESI protocol approved here will be appropriate in all [or any] future cases that utilize [TAR].’”  Later on, Judge Peck assigned a well-respected industry thought leader as special master to the case.

SPOLIATION / SANCTIONS

I’ll bet that you won’t be surprised that, once again, the topic with the largest number of case law decisions related to eDiscovery are those related to sanctions and spoliation issues.  Of the 72 cases we covered this past year, 39 percent of them (28 total cases) related to sanctions and spoliation issues.  Sometimes requests for sanctions are granted, sometimes they’re not.  Here are the first ten cases:

Appeals Court Upholds Default Judgment Sanctions for Defendant’s Multiple Discovery Violations: In Long Bay Management Co., Inc. et. al. v. HAESE, LLC et. al., the Appeals Court of Massachusetts found that the default judge had not abused her discretion in ordering sanctions and assessing damages and ordered that the plaintiffs could submit a petition for appellate attorneys’ fees incurred in responding to the appeal.

Court Grants Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Plaintiff’s Use of Spoliation Evidence: In West v. Talton, Georgia District Judge C. Ashley Royal granted the defendants’ Motion in Limine to exclude all evidence and argument regarding spoliation, reserving its ruling on the remaining issues in the Motion in Limine.

Not Preserving Texts Results in Adverse Inference Sanctions for Plaintiff: In NuVasive, Inc. v. Madsen Med., Inc., California Chief District Judge Barry Ted Moskowitz granted the defendants’ motion for adverse inference sanctions for failure to preserve text messages from four custodial employees that were key to the case.

Court States that Duty to Meet and Confer is Not an “Empty Formality”, Denies Request for Sanctions: In Whitesell Corporation v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc. et. al., Georgia District Judge J. Randal Hall denied the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions against the defendant for identifying a deponent that (according to the plaintiff) had no particularized information regarding the defendant’s efforts to produce documents, stating that he was “unimpressed” by the plaintiff’s effort to confer on the matter and stating that the “duty-to-confer is not an empty formality”.

Despite Failure to Implement a Litigation Hold, Defendant Escapes Sanctions: In Flanders v. Dzugan et. al., despite the fact that the defendant failed to implement a litigation hold, Pennsylvania District Judge Nora Barry Fischer denied the plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions alleging the defendants failed to preserve evidence relevant to the case, finding that the plaintiff “cannot show any evidence was actually lost or destroyed”, “cannot show that if evidence was lost or destroyed, it would have been beneficial to his case” and “[n]or can Plaintiff show bad faith”.

Court Denies Motion for Sanctions Against Veterinary Hospital for Spoliation of ESI: In Grove City Veterinary Service, LLC et. al. v. Charter Practices International, LLC, Oregon Magistrate Judge John V. Acosta concluded that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of showing they are entitled to sanctions for spoliation of evidence by deleting one of the veterinarian’s archived work emails.

Defendant Gets Summary Judgment, Not Dismissal, Due to Plaintiff’s Wiping of Hard Drive: In Watkins v. Infosys, Washington District Judge John C. Coughenour denied the defendant’s Motion for the Sanction of Dismissal but granted the defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment against the plaintiff for spoliation of data due to her use of “Disk Wiping” software to delete ESI.

Court Rules that State Agency is Not Responsible for Emails Deleted via the Retention Policy of Another State Agency: In Wandering Dago, Inc. v. N.Y. State Office of Gen. Servs., New York Magistrate Judge Randolph F. Treece denied the plaintiff’s request for sanctions, stating that “that neither the individual Defendants nor their Attorney had a duty to preserve” the emails of the Deputy Secretary of Gaming and Racing to the President of the New York Racing Authority (“NYRA”).

Apparently, in Discovery, Delta is Not Ready When You Are and It Has Cost Them Millions: A few years ago, we covered a case law decision in the Delta/Air Tran Baggage Fee Antitrust Litigation, where Delta was ordered to pay plaintiff attorney’s fees and costs for eDiscovery issues in that litigation. Apparently, Delta’s difficulties in this case have continued, as they have been ordered this week to pay over $2.7 million in sanctions for failing to turn over ESI, to go along with more than $4.7 million in sanctions for earlier discovery violations.

Court Denies Request for Sanctions for Routine Deletion of Files of Departed Employees: In Charvat et. al. v. Valente et. al., Illinois Magistrate Judge Mary M. Rowland denied the plaintiff’s request for spoliation sanctions for the defendant’s admitted destruction of computer files belonging to two departed employees, finding that the plaintiff did not provide any evidence that the defendant acted in bad faith.

Tomorrow, we will cover the remaining cases relating to sanctions and spoliation.  Stay tuned!

Want to take a look at cases we covered the previous four years?  Here they are:

So, what do you think?  Did you miss any of these?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Appeals Court Upholds Default Judgment Sanctions for Defendant’s Multiple Discovery Violations: eDiscovery Case Law

In Long Bay Management Co., Inc. et. al. v. HAESE, LLC et. al., No. 14-P-991 (Mass. App. Ct., Nov. 17, 2015), the Appeals Court of Massachusetts found that the default judge had not abused her discretion in ordering sanctions and assessing damages and ordered that the plaintiffs could submit a petition for appellate attorneys’ fees incurred in responding to the appeal.

In this case, the plaintiffs sued their former legal counsel for overbilling after a former associate of the counsel firm notified the plaintiffs that his billing records had been altered without his knowledge.  The default judge found that throughout the proceedings, the defendants repeatedly abused the discovery process in various ways, including inappropriate subpoena of individuals for deposition who were not “relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action,” seeking information not “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”

The defendants were also found to have “repeatedly stymied” the plaintiff’s efforts to gather discoverable information, by failing to respond to the plaintiff’s discovery requests and never producing the underlying metadata of the billing records despite court orders, using delay tactics and claiming several excuses such as privilege, the inability to separate the metadata from other client files, and missing multiple hearing dates without excuse.  In addition to the numerous discovery violations, the default judge determined that there was also strong evidence, albeit circumstantial, establishing spoliation.

On appeal, the defendant argued that the default judge should have allowed both his motion to stay and motion for reconsideration because the appearance of his new counsel required more time to brief the court why spoliation did not occur, that the damages judge erred in holding the assessment of damages hearing despite becoming aware that the plaintiff had litigated the case under a name that was not the real party in interest and that the default judge erred in preventing him from introducing specific expert testimony.  In response to each argument, the appeals court found that the default and damages judges did not abuse their discretion in ordering sanctions and assessing damages.  The appeals court also ordered that the plaintiffs could submit a petition for appellate attorneys’ fees incurred in responding to the appeal.

So, what do you think?  Did the defendants’ actions warrant a default judgment against them?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Grants Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Plaintiff’s Use of Spoliation Evidence: eDiscovery Case Law

In West v. Talton, No. 13-338 (M.D. Ga., Nov. 2, 2015), Georgia District Judge C. Ashley Royal granted the defendants’ Motion in Limine to exclude all evidence and argument regarding spoliation, reserving its ruling on the remaining issues in the Motion in Limine.

Case Background

In this employment discrimination case, during a deposition of defendants’ representatives in June 2014, the plaintiff discovered that the defendants failed to search and preserve some e-mail accounts as requested during discovery.  Based on this information, the Court granted the plaintiff’s motion to reopen discovery in September 2014. During the additional discovery period, the plaintiff discovered one individual defendant’s email account was deleted shortly after his resignation and backup tapes of the defendants’ server were written over as part of an automatic backup performed every six months which erased any backup of his email account.

Ultimately, the defendants were still able to retrieve the departed employee’s old computer and hire a third-party company to preserve and search the hard drive, from which they were eventually able to produce over a thousand documents and emails.  Nonetheless, the plaintiff sought a spoliation instruction to the jury regarding the deletion of emails, or in the alternative, an opportunity to present evidence of the defendants’ failure to preserve emails to the jury, claiming that he would have discovered more emails to support his claim had the defendants preserved the backup tapes and Holt’s email account.  The defendants argued that this evidence should be excluded because the emails were not deleted in bad faith, and they still retrieved the employee’s hard drive, which included the evidence the plaintiff requested.

Judge’s Ruling

After conducted a hearing to consider the arguments, Judge Royal stated:

“Based on the evidence presented during the hearing, it is not clear that Defendants’ failure to preserve Holt’s email account and the server’s backup tapes was a malicious act or done in bad faith. On the contrary, it appears Holt’s email was deleted pursuant to a routine procedure to delete an employee’s email account shortly after the employee left the Sheriff’s Department and to rewrite over the backup tapes of the server every six months. Plaintiff contends this procedure was more than just “mere negligence” because Defendants were on notice after receiving an EEOC complaint. However, even assuming Plaintiff’s contention is true, it is completely speculative Plaintiff was prejudiced by these events in any way. Defendants hired an outside company to restore Holt’s hard drive and recovered over 70,000 documents from the hard drive. The search terms used were broad and extensive and produced 1,205 hits. Indeed, Plaintiff received more information based on these search terms than what was originally requested during discovery. Further, the third-party company stated there was no evidence on the hard drive of any ‘mass destruction’ or ‘wiping.’”

Judge Royal rejected the plaintiff’s use of Woodward v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP as an analogous case, noting in that case, the plaintiff did not have other evidence to replace a lost video tape.  Stating that “[t]he Court finds the danger of confusing the issues and misleading the jury outweighs the probative value of such evidence”, Judge Royal granted the defendants’ Motion in Limine to exclude all evidence and argument regarding spoliation.

So, what do you think?  Should the court have allowed for a spoliation instruction to the jury or was the defendant’s efforts to provide ESI for the departed employee sufficient?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Not Preserving Texts Results in Adverse Inference Sanctions for Plaintiff: eDiscovery Case Law

In NuVasive, Inc. v. Madsen Med., Inc., No. 13cv2077 BTM(RBB) (S.D. Cal. July 22, 2015), California Chief District Judge Barry Ted Moskowitz granted the defendants’ motion for adverse inference sanctions for failure to preserve text messages from four custodial employees that were key to the case.

Case Background

In this contractual dispute, the defendants sought sanctions in the form of an adverse inference jury instruction for the plaintiff’s failure to preserve evidence, specifically, text messages from four employees.  The defendants contended that these text messages could have been evidence of secret coordination between the plaintiff and former employees of the defendants to effect the termination of the defendants’ contractual relationship with the plaintiff and then have the plaintiff hire the defendants’ sales personnel as its own employees.

With regard to the four employees, each had a different level of failure to preserve the text messages.  One former employee turned over his current phone for imaging instead of the phone used during the relevant time period, which he wiped clean before turning it over to his son. A second employee was not asked to turn in his phone until 2014 (after being notified of a litigation hold in August 2012 and again in September 2013) and when he did, all text messages prior to September 20, 2012 were missing (which the plaintiff attributed to an iPhone iOS 6 software update released on September 19, 2012). The third employee had his phone wiped when he turned it in for an upgrade on two separate occasions, pursuant to company policy.  The fourth employee did not provide the phone he used in 2012 until sometime in 2013 and testified that he may have deleted some relevant messages.

Judge’s Ruling

Judge Moskowitz stated that “In light of all of the text messages that were lost or deleted, the Court concludes that NuVasive was at fault for not enforcing compliance with the litigation hold. Although it is true that Defendants should have taken steps to preserve the text messages of Orlando and Kordonowy while they were still working for MMI, NuVasive still had a duty to preserve the evidence and failed to do so.”

Rejecting the plaintiff’s claims that the defendants had obtained most of the deleted/lost text messages through other individuals, Judge Moskowitz also found that “Defendants have made a sufficient showing of prejudice”, noting from other texts that the defendants provided that it could “reasonably be inferred from these texts, viewed together with other evidence, that the MMI sales representatives were talking to NuVasive about plans to terminate MMI and have the sales representatives work directly for NuVasive. Accordingly, texts during the relevant time period to or from Moore, Kordonowy, Graubart, and Orlando might have furthered MMI’s claims.”

As a result, Judge Moskowitz found that “a properly tailored adverse inference instruction is appropriate and will not cause ‘substantial unfairness’ to NuVasive” and decided to give the following instruction:

“NuVasive has failed to prevent the destruction of evidence for MMI’s and Ms. Madsen’s use in this litigation after its duty to preserve the evidence arose. After considering all of the pertinent facts and circumstances, you may, but are not obligated to, infer that the evidence destroyed was favorable to MMI and unfavorable to NuVasive.”

Judge Moskowitz denied the defendants’ request for attorney’s fees and costs “because Defendants were also partially at fault for not taking steps to preserve text messages of Kordonowy and Orlando while they were still working for MMI.”

So, what do you think?  Was the sanction appropriate for this case?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Despite Failure to Implement a Litigation Hold, Defendant Escapes Sanctions: eDiscovery Case Law

Is this case is one example of Craig Ball’s contention that “you are more likely to be hit by lightning than to be sanctioned for non-preservation of ESI”?  You decide.

In Flanders v. Dzugan et. al., 12-1481 (W.D. Pa., August 24, 2015), despite the fact that the defendant failed to implement a litigation hold, Pennsylvania District Judge Nora Barry Fischer denied the plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions alleging the defendants failed to preserve evidence relevant to the case, finding that the plaintiff “cannot show any evidence was actually lost or destroyed”, “cannot show that if evidence was lost or destroyed, it would have been beneficial to his case” and “[n]or can Plaintiff show bad faith”.

Case Background

In this case where the plaintiff sued the defendants for constitutional violations related to their building permit approval process, the parties filed a Joint ESI Protocol Status Report with the Court in October 2014, agreeing that they would “initially focus their search” on the email of four employees of the defendant.  From these four individuals, the defendants turned over a total of 33 emails relating to the plaintiff and the litigation.  In one of these emails between two of the individuals, Defendant Dzugan stated, referring to the plaintiff, that he is “[g]etting tired of him.”  The plaintiff asserted that there must have been other similar emails that were not produced.

The Court ordered the defendants to file evidence of any litigation hold they had put in place for this lawsuit, but the defendants never filed any such evidence, and as Judge Fischer noted “it appears to be undisputed that they never put a litigation hold in place.” In its Motion for Sanctions, the plaintiff provided two arguments for a charge of spoliation for lack of a litigation hold: 1) arguing that the emails recovered from the email accounts that were searched cannot possibly be all the emails relating to the plaintiff and 2) arguing that additional email accounts were never searched at all.

Judge’s Ruling

Judge Fischer stated that “Plaintiff is correct that Defendants should have put a litigation hold in place”, but determined that “other elements of a spoliation claim, however, are not satisfied here”.  Continuing, Judge Fischer stated:

“Here, the only thing Plaintiff can say with any specificity is that Defendants do not appear to have put a litigation hold in place. Plaintiff cannot show any evidence was actually lost or destroyed. Plaintiff also cannot show that if evidence was lost or destroyed, it would have been beneficial to his case. Instead, Plaintiff’s Brief relies on inferences that such evidence must have existed, and thus must have been lost as a result of Defendants’ failure to institute a litigation hold.”

Referencing Bull v. UPS, Judge Fischer also stated that “[w]ith respect to actual suppression of evidence, the Third Circuit has clarified that a court must determine that the relevant actor suppressed or withheld the evidence in bad faith…A finding of bad faith is therefore ‘pivotal’ to a spoliation determination.”  She found the defendant’s handling of discovery to be “sloppy”, but stated that “in the Court’s estimation, this does not rise to the level of bad faith, particularly given the size and resources of Ford City and the fact that Solicitor is a part-time position.”  As a result, Judge Fischer found the spoliation motion “lacking in specificity and a showing of bad faith” and denied the motion.

So, what do you think?  Should the defendant have been held more accountable for the lack of a litigation hold?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Denies Motion for Sanctions Against Veterinary Hospital for Spoliation of ESI: eDiscovery Case Law

In Grove City Veterinary Service, LLC et. al. v. Charter Practices International, LLC, 13-02276 (Aug. 18, 2015), Oregon Magistrate Judge John V. Acosta concluded that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of showing they are entitled to sanctions for spoliation of evidence by deleting one of the veterinarian’s archived work emails.

Case Background

In this breach of contract case between veterinarians and a veterinary hospital, during discovery for this case, one of the plaintiffs was required to search for and produce emails stored in his email archive responsive to the defendant’s requests for production.  In August 2014, the plaintiff attempted to access old emails stored in his email archive, but was unable to locate more than one-hundred folders of archived emails.  Later that month, the plaintiff contacted the defendant’s IT department for help finding the “missing” emails.  A member of the defendant’s IT department requested a time when he could come and assist the plaintiff. In the plaintiff’s response, he disclosed that he sought the emails “[r]egarding a legal matter”. Because the plaintiff’s request was in furtherance of a legal matter, the IT department referred the issue to the defendant’s legal department, which refused further assistance and advised the plaintiffs that the defendant was not responsible for locating documents responsive to its own discovery requests (eventually, however, the plaintiff noted that “some,” but not all, of the missing folders had repopulated to his archive inbox).

Based on the defendant’s refusal to perform the search, the plaintiffs moved for spoliation.  The defendant denied it was responsible for “missing” emails, and in their response, requested an award of attorney fees because of the plaintiffs’ “unjustified” motion for sanctions.

Judge’s Ruling

Noting that a defendant “may be subject to sanctions, particularly dispositive sanctions, only if it committed ‘willful’ spoliation of evidence”, Judge Acosta stated: “Here, Plaintiffs do not establish that the emails were willfully destroyed by CPI, or even that the emails were destroyed at all.”

The plaintiffs relied on a report by its computer forensic analyst to request sanctions for spoliation, but Judge Acosta disputed the reliability of his report, noting that he “produces no evidence which shows CPI’s IT department remotely accessed Baltzell’s computer without permission or tampered with Baltzell’s archived emails in any way”, that he “fails to disclose that, during his analysis of Baltzell’s computer, the computer was not logged into the CPI’s servers where the archived emails are stored” (which meant he wouldn’t have been able to access the files anyway) and that an “excerpt of the activity log showed that CPI IT last remotely accessed Baltzell’s computer on July 2, 2014, well before Baltzell had difficultly(sic) finding the emails in question.”  In addition, the defendant produced evidence that the missing emails were accessible in the plaintiff’s email archive, but that they had been “dragged and dropped” into a folder not typically associated with archived emails.  Judge Acosta concluded that the “absence of the activity log in the record is telling and suggests Jorgensen found no direct evidence of knowing wrongdoing by CPI.”

As a result, Judge Acosta denied the plaintiff’s request for sanctions.  He also denied the defendant’s attorney fees, because “the court cannot conclude Plaintiffs motion was ‘unjustified.’”

So, what do you think?  Was this an open and shut case?  Should the defendant have been awarded attorney fees?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Defendant Gets Summary Judgment, Not Dismissal, Due to Plaintiff’s Wiping of Hard Drive: eDiscovery Case Law

In Watkins v. Infosys, 14-0247 (W.D. Wa., July 23, 2015), Washington District Judge John C. Coughenour denied the defendant’s Motion for the Sanction of Dismissal but granted the defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment against the plaintiff for spoliation of data due to her use of “Disk Wiping” software to delete ESI.

Case Background

In this discrimination case, the defendant’s forensic expert determined that the plaintiff performed a Bing search for the term “disk wipe” and downloaded and installed file wiping software onto the hard drive of her work computer around October 20, 2013, and ran the program to wipe files.  In addition, eleven external media drives had been connected to the plaintiff’s laptop in the days prior to the disk wipe.  Furthermore, the plaintiff perjured herself when she stated that “she did not `remove’ things from Defendant’s premises,” and that she “followed procedures typical with such litigation . . . to avoid the alteration or deletion of documents, in addition to preserving data back-ups relating to her employment.”

The plaintiff ultimately admitted in her deposition that she wiped the files, claiming that she did so out of concern for information preservation and client confidentiality.  In a supplemented response filed on the last day of discovery, the plaintiff again refused to turn over the wiped contents of her work computer, claiming that all of the files passed through the defendant’s servers (so the defendant presumably had copies), that the unproduced files were “vast and irrelevant to the claims or controversies in this case” and that she was “in the process of replicating all documents that she retained and will provide the same to Defendant upon their soonest availability.”

Judge’s Ruling

Judge Coughenour stated that he found the plaintiff’s responses “both illogical and unbelievable”, noting that her “brief in response to Defendant’s motion for the sanction of dismissal only exacerbates the problem…There, Plaintiff regurgitates flimsy justifications for wiping her disk drive, doubles-down on her unsupported argument about the irrelevance of the wiped files, and asserts blankly that “there has been no actual suppression or withholding of evidence since the entire content of Plaintiff’s computer has been produced to Defendant.”

With the spoliation (and associated perjury) clear, Judge Coughenour then turned his attention to determining the appropriate sanctions.  To consider dismissal, he noted the requirement to weigh five factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation, (2) the court’s need to manage its dockets, (3) the risk of prejudice to the party seeking sanctions, (4) the public policy favoring the disposition of cases on their merits, and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.  Reviewing the five factors, Judge Coughenour found “that three weigh in favor of dismissal and two do not” and, while describing it as “an incredibly close call”, he stated that “the Court prefers to address this case, finally, on its merits.”  Therefore, he denied the defendant’s motion for dismissal, opting instead to grant a motion for summary judgment.  Judge Coughenour also ordered plaintiff’s counsel to show cause as to why sanctions should not be issued against them.

So, what do you think?  Should the court have granted the motion for dismissal?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Rules that State Agency is Not Responsible for Emails Deleted via the Retention Policy of Another State Agency: eDiscovery Case Law

In Wandering Dago, Inc. v. N.Y. State Office of Gen. Servs., No. 1:13-CV-1053 (MAD/RFT), (N.D.N.Y. May 29, 2015), New York Magistrate Judge Randolph F. Treece denied the plaintiff’s request for sanctions, stating that “that neither the individual Defendants nor their Attorney had a duty to preserve” the emails of the Deputy Secretary of Gaming and Racing to the President of the New York Racing Authority (“NYRA”).

Case Background

In this First Amendment case where the plaintiff contended that a set of NYRA Defendants and another set of state actors violated the First (Free Speech Clause) and Fourteenth (Equal Protection Clause) Amendments of the United States Constitution for denying its food trucks to provide services at the Saratoga Race Course and an outdoor lunch program based on the plaintiff company’s name.  The plaintiff’s exclusion from the race track occurred after several complaints were received, including an email from the Deputy Secretary at the NYRA, concerned that “the fallout from authorizing this truck will inevitably land on NYRA”.

After the media reported that “an unidentified state official” complained, the Deputy Secretary emailed the Governor’s Executive Chamber identifying himself as that official and he was eventually identified in court as that “unidentified state official”. However, the NYRA eventually settled and the Deputy Secretary was never named as a defendant, leaving the employees of the Office of General Services (“OGS”), who had denied the plaintiff’s applications for the outdoor lunch program, as the remaining defendants.

During discovery, the plaintiff requested production of the non-party Deputy Secretary’s emails, but they had been automatically destroyed pursuant to New York State’s Email Retention Policy. As a result, the plaintiff thereafter sought an adverse inference (as well as further discovery, costs and attorneys’ fees) against the remaining OGS defendants and their litigation counsel – an Assistant Attorney General – for the deletion of the Deputy Secretary’s emails.  The defendants objected, citing that they had no control over the Deputy Secretary’s emails and litigation counsel did not represent the nonparty Deputy Secretary at the time of the automatic deletions and had no legal authority to direct a preservation hold.

Judge’s Ruling

Judge Treece, agreeing with the defendants, stated that “the individual Defendants correctly assert that they have no control over {the Deputy Secretary’s} emails, the Executive Chamber’s emails, or over other emails pertaining to NYRA. Instead, when litigation was commenced against them, they and their agency, OGS, met their obligation by preserving those documents that were within their control and possession, and ultimately disclosed 1000 pages of documents relevant to the Empire Plaza Summer Program, including emails.”

Continuing, Judge Treece stated that the “Plaintiff suffers under the erroneous notion that when a governmental agency and its officials are defendants in any litigation, they and their counsel are required to preserve and produce documents belonging to another governmental agency.”  He also stated that “[c]onsidering that hundreds of lawsuits are filed daily against New York State,” that “requiring each agency and thousands of officials to institute a litigation hold every time a party contemplates or even commences litigation against another agency would paralyze the State.”  Finding that the plaintiff had also failed to prove a culpable state of mind and also failed to prove that the missing evidence would have been favorable to it, Judge Treece found that the plaintiff had failed to meet its burden and denied its request for sanctions, as well as its request for additional discovery and costs and attorney fees.

So, what do you think?  Should each state agency have its own separate duty to preserve or should the entire state be responsible to preserve data?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.