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Preservation

Court Rules Plaintiff’s Duty to Preserve Did Not Extend to Employee’s Internet History: eDiscovery Case Law

In Marten Transport, Ltd. V. Plattform Advertising, Inc., No. 14-02464 (D. Kansas, Feb. 8, 2016), Kansas Magistrate Judge Teresa J. James denied the defendant’s Motion for Spoliation Sanctions, ruling that, although the plaintiff had a duty to preserve relevant ESI as of Fall 2013, that duty to preserve did not extend to the internet history of one of its employees until June 2015, and by then the internet history was lost.

Case Background

In this action under the Lanham Act for trademark infringement and unfair competition, the plaintiff accused the defendant of making unauthorized job postings to the defendant’s sites using the plaintiff’s trademarks and information after the plaintiff terminated its agreement with the defendant.  Plaintiff’s counsel sent a cease and desist letter in September 2013 and ultimately filed suit in September 2014.

In January 2015, the plaintiff served its Rule 26 disclosures identifying one of its employees (Jolene Vinck), as an individual “believed to have discoverable information relating to the matter.”  In June 2015, Defendant’s counsel sent a letter to the plaintiff alleging that after the defendant removed all of the plaintiff’s job postings from its website on September 17, 2013, the plaintiff logged back in and created six job postings on five separate dates.

In September 2015, as part of its first supplemental production, the plaintiff produced a December 2013 email to Vinck from a third party informing her that the relationship with the defendant had been terminated, which included Vinck’s response that she didn’t know and “had been posting on there all along”.  After the defendant requested Vinck’s internet history in its second request for production, the plaintiff advised the defendant that Vinck’s internet history was no longer available as she received a new work station in February 2015 in the ordinary course of business, and the plaintiff did not have access to any web browsing history relating to any computer assigned to her prior to February 2015.  After attempting to confer, the defendant filed a motion seeking spoliation sanctions due to the plaintiff’s failure to preserve Vinck’s internet history on the previous computer.

Judge’s Ruling

As directed by the Court during the hearing on the subject motion, the plaintiff subsequently filed Declarations regarding its unsuccessful efforts to search for and locate the previous computer and regarding whether it otherwise had the capability to retrieve Vinck’s internet history.  As a result of those efforts, Judge James indicated that “the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has made thorough and reasonable good faith efforts to locate Computer 1, but it cannot be located”, concluding that “the internet history on Computer 1 is lost and cannot be restored or retrieved by other means”.

While finding that “Plaintiff had a duty to preserve relevant information, and that duty commenced in Fall 2013”, Judge James assessed the scope of that duty and determined that there was “nothing in this record to support a conclusion that Plaintiff knew or should have known that Vinck’s Fall 2013 internet history would be relevant in this case until Plaintiff received the June 16, 2015 letter from Defendant’s counsel.”  In denying the defendant’s motion for spoliation sanctions, Judge James stated:

“The stated reasons behind the 2015 amendments to Rule 37(e) further support the Court’s conclusions in this case. The general intent of amended Rule 37(e) was to address the excessive effort and money being spent on ESI preservation as a result of the continued exponential growth in the volume of ESI, along with the uncertainty caused by significantly differing standards among the federal circuits for imposing sanctions or curative measures on parties who failed to preserve ESI.  In revising Rule 37(e), the Advisory Committee expressly instructed that ‘reasonable steps’ to preserve ESI suffice; the Rule ‘does not call for perfection.’”

So, what do you think?  Should the plaintiff’s duty to preserve have extended to employees’ internet histories?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Happy St. Patrick’s Day!!

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Ex-Employee Sues Volkswagen Claiming He Was Fired for Refusing to Spoliate Documents: eDiscovery Trends

The troubles for Volkswagen continue into the electronic discovery arena.  According to the Courthouse News Service, an ex-employee of the company has filed suit, claiming that he was fired for refusing to take part in an alleged three-day purge of documents related to the automaker’s emissions-cheating scandal known as “Dieselgate”.

According to the article, Daniel Donovan (who worked in the Volkswagen Group of America’s Office of General Counsel as its Electronic Discovery Manager) says he had seven years under his belt at VW in Sept. 18, 2015, when the Environmental Protection Agency forced a recall of cars it found had been outfitted with “defeat-device” software that had been hoodwinking emissions inspectors for years.

Though the EPA’s case necessitated a legal hold on Volkswagen’s data, Donovan claimed in his March 8 lawsuit that VW’s “information technology department did not stop all deletion jobs until Sept. 21” (which was three days after they should have stopped).  Donovan also alleged that the company’s IT department was adamant about limiting access to Volkswagen data for the accounting firm conducting the independent investigation and knew it was violating the Justice Department hold by not preserving back-up disks.

Worried about “significant legal sanctions” Volkswagen could see for evidence spoliation and obstruction of justice, Donovan refused to take part in such actions and reported his concerns to a supervisor, according to the complaint.  “Donovan also asserts that he was fired because VWGoA [short for Volkswagen Group of America] believed that Donovan was about to report the spoliation of evidence and obstruction of justice to the EPA and/or the United States Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or some other public body,” the complaint states.

Volkswagen told the Associated Press that Donovan’s claim of wrongful termination is without merit, claiming that his departure from the company was unrelated to the emissions scandal.

Facing penalties of up to $37,500 per day for Clean Air Act violations, Volkswagen is expected to face billions of dollars in fines.  The scandal, now widely known as “Dieselgate”, also led to the resignation of CEO Martin Winterkorn, hundreds of federal class actions consolidated in San Francisco, plus multiple investigations and congressional hearings.

So, what do you think?  Could Volkswagen have fired its Electronic Discovery Manager because he was “far from purgin”? (sorry, I couldn’t resist)  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Craig Ball of Craig D. Ball, P.C.: eDiscovery Trends

This is the fifth of the 2016 LegalTech New York (LTNY) Thought Leader Interview series.  eDiscovery Daily interviewed several thought leaders at LTNY this year to get their observations regarding trends at the show and generally within the eDiscovery industry.  Unlike previous years, some of the questions posed to each thought leader were tailored to their position in the industry, so we have dispensed with the standard questions we normally ask all thought leaders.

Today’s thought leader is Craig Ball.  A frequent court appointed special master in electronic evidence, Craig is a prolific contributor to continuing legal and professional education programs in the United States and abroad, having delivered over 1,700 presentations and papers.  Craig’s articles on forensic technology and electronic discovery frequently appear in the national media and he teaches E-Discovery and Digital Evidence at the University of Texas School of Law.  He currently blogs on eDiscovery topics at ballinyourcourt.com.

What are your general observations emerging eDiscovery trends for 2016?

{Interviewed Craig after LTNY, as he did not make it to the show this year}

I skipped LegalTech this year – first time in twenty years – because Mardi Gras was early this year, I chose the circus on the Mississippi over the one on the Hudson.  Still, I got lots of feedback from those who attended LTNY while I was catching beads at 29 parades.  I wanted to see if I’d missed anything of note.  The only trend that emerged was lack of change in the focus of the show.  LTNY is still dominated by electronic discovery as it has been for almost a decade; but, there are continued signs of consolidation within the industry as organizations fold into one another.

Not surprisingly, we don’t see outright failure in this space.  Companies don’t disappear, but instead reach a point where whatever is left is absorbed by a national brand for its equipment or core technology.  So, we’ve seen steady consolidation within the industry, and that trend continues.  As the broader economy goes, so goes litigation and discovery.

Another trend that I’ve observed is an increased focus on eDiscovery automation and considerable growth of, and investment in, eDiscovery automation providers.  What are your thoughts about that trend?

The term “automation” has gotten some play lately.  I’m trying to figure out what each usage means because it’s still in the buzzword phase as marketers deploy the term in the never-ending struggle to differentiate their products. Automated workflows are key to Cloud SaaS offerings.  Hosted systems must be capable of programmatic routines to ingest and process data, effecting ready hand-off of data across processing and review.    An automated SaaS offering should be sufficiently autonomous to facilitate workflow across multiple stages of the EDRM with little manual intervention.

Assuming “automation” means  we can put something into the hopper and it will emerge ready for review or production in forms we were expecting, then automation is a necessary precursor to growth and cost effectiveness in hosted products.  That’s positive for consumers if it means price reductions and commoditization of features of electronic discovery.  It may not be so great for the vendor community unless they can scale up the volume.

In the case Nuvasive v. Madsen Medical, the Court recently vacated an adverse inference instruction sanction previously applied against the plaintiff because of the amendment to Rule 37(e).  Do you see that as a trend for other cases and do you expect that other parties that have been sanctioned will file motions to have their sanctions re-considered?

I don’t think it signals a trend. There are relatively few cases that fall into the transition point.  I don’t expect to see a rash of sanctions being reconsidered by virtue of the latest amendments.

Nuvasive is interesting because it goes to the issue of whether it’s fundamentally fair to impose the new Rules retroactively.  The Rules speak to that issue and make it clear that they can be applied retroactively as long as they operate fairly.  The amendments to the Rules make clear that serious sanctions (such as adverse inference instructions) require proof of an intent to deprive a discovering party of the particular information.  Nuvasive involved serious sanctions, so I can see why the Court might want to weigh amended Rule 37(e).  Still, I’m not sure why the parties and the Court failed to anticipate the Rule changes, as the amendment process was pretty far along in July 2015, when sanctions were imposed.  The tenor of the Court’s opinion in reversing himself was that it was just ‘bad luck’ that the amended rules kicked in when they did.

I think that we will see judicial action once termed “sanctions” couched in less-loaded terms.  After Rule 37(e), Courts will distinguish punitive responses from remedial actions designed to rectify unwarranted failure to preserve relevant information. New Rule 37(e) won’t tie the hands of jurists determined to rectify discovery abuse.  We’re already seeing push back from jurists unwilling to surrender discretionary authority when the facts demand fairness.   As well, we’ve seen at least one case where the Court reversed himself, citing 37(e) as the basis for reconsideration.  As is apparent in Nuvasive and in Judge Francis’ recent order in Cat 3, the Rules are tools, and they can be turned this way and that in determined hands.

Sanctions aren’t going away, and that’s a good thing.  We are mired in the last century when it comes to discovery.  Lawyers need direction, and sanctions opinions supply guidance.  There is little in the way of a “carrot” for eDiscovery – all we have is the “stick.”  If courts fail to sanction incompetence and abuse, then lawyers won’t pursue competence, and parties will continue to “twiddle their thumbs” until evidence disappears.  Few lawyers maliciously hide damaging evidence; but, they’re expert at rationalizing it away or, in the case of e-discovery, content to let their ignorance serve as their armor.  “What you don’t know, can’t hurt me,” is their credo.

What are you working on that you’d like our readers to know about?

I’m going back to basics.  Last year was about trying to develop a core curriculum and re-engineer my teaching to make it an engaging foundation in information technology for lawyers.  I hope 2016 will bring an increased ability to push out more information and reach more people.  I’m doing a project for the DC Bar where I will be providing evening CLE programs by live semi-weekly webcasts.  Small groups of motivated people are my sweet spot.  As always, I’m looking forward to this year’s Georgetown University Law School eDiscovery Training Academy, during the first full week in June.  Both the faculty and the students are delightful.  I’ve come to recognize that anyone willing to work at it can learn the technology they need to be formidable in e-discovery in just three solid days.  That’s less time than most of us spend at Starbucks each year.

I’m using the California ethics decision (which we covered here when it was still a Proposed Opinion) as a jumping off point for the concept of core competencies for lawyers.  As you know, the State Bar of California issued an advisory opinion last year identifying nine areas in which lawyers must either be competent in order to accept a case involving eDiscovery or must associate competent counsel or decline representation. That courageous opinion serves as an effective touchstone for talking to lawyers– not just in California, but all over– about the skills they must embrace to be competent to accept a case involving eDiscovery.

There are virtually no cases without electronic evidence, only cases where the lawyers choose to ignore it.  And there is so much more coming!  Never in history have advocates had so much powerful evidence at their disposal, and never have they been so content to look away.  Three days per advocate could change all that—a long weekend.  But, finding the time is only half the battle.  The other half is finding the course that doesn’t give short shrift to the “e” in e-discovery.

Candidly, 2016 is also about taking some time for me.  I’ve been doing 50 to 70 presentations a year for twenty years.  I average about four flights a week; so, I’m hoping to cut all that down by half.  I’m saying “no” more and stopping to smell the roses.  That’s why I’ve gotten a second home in New Orleans, and will spend more time reading, thinking and working on fewer projects with greater focus.  Every teacher needs a sabbatical, right?

Thanks, Craig, for participating in the interview!

And to the readers, as always, please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic!

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Our Nation’s Largest City is Not Immune to eDiscovery Sanctions: eDiscovery Case Law

In Stinson v. City of New York, 10 Civ. 4228 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2016), New York District Judge Robert W. Sweet granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs’ motion seeking sanctions for spoliation of evidence against the defendants for failure to issue a litigation hold, opting for a permissive inference rather than a mandatory adverse inference sanction against the defendants.

Case Background

In this civil rights class action against the City of New York, it was determined that the City did not issue any litigation hold until August 8, 2013, more than three years after the filing of the Complaint in this case and the litigation hold was not effectively communicated, and none of the officers who were named in the City’s initial disclosures acknowledged receiving it.

At the time of the litigation hold, the document destruction processes at the NYPD were governed by Operations Order 44, which specified the length of time the Department would be required to retain various categories of documents.  Order 44 authorized the destruction of most bureau chief memos after three years, police officers’ monthly performance reports after four years, and criminal court summonses after four years.  With regard to emails, the City’s 30(b)(6) witness stated that “although the NYPD did not have a specific policy with regards to the destruction of email communications, it did impose a hard size limit on officers’ inboxes, and that when officers hit that limit, ‘they delete.’”  The City also did not dispute that it had not made any effort to preserve or produce text messages between NYPD officers.

With regard to the defendants’ production, the Court noted that they produced fewer than 25 emails from key players, with no emails produced from the former Commissioner, the former Chief of the department, and three other key custodians. The defendants explained the lack of email production by contending that the “Police Department on the whole did not operate via email”, but that contention was countered by email communications with the city that the plaintiffs acquired from third parties.

Judge’s Ruling

Citing Chin v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Judge Sweet stated that:

“In order to merit an adverse inference, the party seeking sanctions must establish 1) that the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it at the time it was destroyed, 2) that the records were destroyed with a culpable state of mind, and 3) that the destroyed evidence was relevant to the party’s claim or defense such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it would support that claim or defense.”

  • With regard to the defendants’ obligation, Judge Sweet rejected the defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs’ preservation requests were overbroad, stating “Plaintiffs’ putative overbroad demands do not excuse the City’s failure to issue a litigation hold, to properly supervise its implementation, or to suspend document retention policies that would foreseeably lead to the spoliation of evidence.”
  • With regard to the defendants’ culpable state of mind, Judge Sweet stated that “the City’s conduct shows a broad failure to take its preservation obligations seriously rather than any deliberate attempt to lie or mislead”, but noted that the “City’s conduct does, however, support a finding of gross negligence”.
  • With regard to the relevance of the destroyed documents, Judge Sweet determined that the “evidence adduced thus far indicates that at least some of the destroyed documents will be relevant to the Plaintiffs’ claims”, though he did note that the showing of relevance by the plaintiffs was “relatively limited”.

As sanctions for the defendants’ spoliation, the plaintiffs requested a set of sixteen adverse inferences touching on almost every aspect of their case, but Judge Sweet opted for a lesser level of sanctions, stating:

“Given the City’s lack of bad faith in its spoliation of evidence and the relatively limited showing of relevance made by the Plaintiffs, a permissive, rather than a mandatory adverse inference is warranted…A permissive inference will ensure that the City faces consequences for its failure to take its preservation obligations seriously, but will not result in an unwarranted windfall for the Plaintiffs. The jury will be instructed that the absence of documentary evidence does not in this case establish the absence of a summons quota policy.”

So, what do you think?  Was that a sufficient sanction for the defendants’ “gross negligence” in failing to issue a litigation hold?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Alteration of Domain in Produced Emails Leads to Sanctions for Plaintiffs: eDiscovery Case Law

In CAT3, LLC v. Black Lineage, Inc., No. 14 Civ. 5511 (AT) (JCF) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2016), New York Magistrate Judge James C. Francis IV, ruling that emails produced by the plaintiffs were “intentionally altered”, ordered that the plaintiffs would be precluded from relying on their version of those emails to demonstrate their case and that the plaintiffs would bear the “costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees, incurred by the defendants in establishing the plaintiffs’ misconduct and in securing relief.”

Case Background

One of the key issues in this case regarding trademark infringement regarded similarity between the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ trademarks and whether the defendants developed their trademark (FLASHXHYPE) mark independently or after learning of the plaintiffs’ development of their trademark (SLAMXHYPE).  In a deposition of the defendant company’s president, communication between the defendant and plaintiff companies was provided (which had been produced as PDF images) that showed the plaintiffs’ employee’s address as having the email domain “@slamxhype.com.”  However, on cross examination, the deponent testified that the email he received was identical, except that it showed the plaintiffs’ employee’s address with the email domain “@ecko.com.”

The defendants’ counsel then sought to explore the discrepancy, and in May 2015, they demanded production of the plaintiffs’ emails in native form.  The plaintiffs did not initially respond and, ultimately, their attorneys withdrew and were replaced by new counsel.  In July 2015, the Court ordered the plaintiffs to comply with the defendants’ request and the plaintiffs produced a USB drive containing a PST file, a zip file, and several separate PDFs of relevant emails.

The defendants subjected that production to a forensic analysis which determined that there were two versions of each email message: a “top” level version and, behind each email message, a “near-duplicate copy of the message containing the identical message,” but with different email domains appearing for a number of the senders and recipients.  The underlying near-duplicate versions were the original emails, which had been deleted, albeit not without leaving a digital imprint.

Relying largely on the forensic analysis, the defendants then moved for sanctions consisting of some combination of dismissal of the complaint, imposition of an adverse inference, an order of preclusion, and assessment of attorneys’ fees and costs.

Judge’s Ruling

In considering the application of the amended Rule 37(e) to the situation, Judge Francis determined that “because the amendment is in some respects more lenient as to the sanctions that can be imposed for violation of the preservation obligation, there is no inequity in applying it.”

With regard to the plaintiffs’ claim that “there has been no destruction or loss of any evidence, and there certainly has not been both (i) loss of evidence AND (ii) “such evidence cannot be restored or replaced” as required by Rule 37, Judge Francis, citing Victor Stanley (the first case ever covered by this blog), stated “the plaintiffs argue that even if they are the ‘gang that couldn’t spoliate straight,’ they cannot be sanctioned because their misdeeds were discovered and the information recovered. They are incorrect.”  Elaborating, Judge Francis said that “it cannot be said that the information lost has been ‘restored or replaced’”, noting that “as the plaintiffs themselves suggest, the fact that there are near-duplicate emails showing different addresses casts doubt on the authenticity of both”.

Regarding the plaintiffs’ contention that the manipulation of the emails was unintentional and possibly due to the migration of the plaintiffs’ emails from one system to another, Judge Francis refuted that notion, stating that the “evidence supports the defendants’ allegation that the plaintiffs intentionally altered the emails at issue”.

With regard to relief, Judge Francis, while considering dismissal of the action or imposition of an adverse inference as possible sanctions, stated “such drastic sanctions are not mandatory”.  Therefore, he ordered a “two-fold remedy”, ordering that the plaintiffs would be “precluded from relying upon their version of the emails at issue to demonstrate notice to the defendants of use of the SLAMXHYPE mark” and that the plaintiffs would bear the “costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees, incurred by the defendants in establishing the plaintiffs’ misconduct and in securing relief.”

So, what do you think?  Were those sanctions warranted?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Changes in Federal Rules Result in Reversal of Adverse Inference Sanction: eDiscovery Case Law

In Nuvasive, Inc. v. Madsen Med. Inc., No. 13cv2077 BTM(RBB) (S.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2016), California Chief District Judge Barry Ted Moskowitz, considering new standards imposed under recently amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e), granted the plaintiff’s motion for an order vacating the Court’s previous order granting (in part) the defendants’ Motion for Sanctions for Spoliation of Evidence.

Case Background

In a previous ruling (which we covered here), Judge Moskowitz granted the defendants’ motion for adverse inference sanctions for failure to preserve text messages from four custodial employees that were key to the case.  The plaintiff sought relief under Rule 60(b) based on an amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e), which went into effect on December 1, 2015.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing that it was untimely and also argued that it was neither “just” nor “practicable” to apply the new rule because: (1) the mere fact that trial was postponed to February 2016 due to the Court’s schedule should not have the effect of absolving the plaintiff of its discovery misconduct; (2) application of the amended rule would cause substantial prejudice to the defendant, which took discovery and filed its spoliation motion under the standard applicable at the time; and (3) there is no alternative sanction that would remedy the prejudice to the defendants caused by the plaintiff’s destruction of evidence.

Judge’s Ruling

In assessing the new Rule 37(e) language, Judge Moskowitz stated that “It is clear from the language of (e)(2) as well as the Committee Notes that the adverse inference instruction that the Court was going to give falls within the measures that are not permissible absent a finding of intent. The Committee Notes explain: ‘Subdivision (e)(2) applies to jury instructions that permit or require the jury to presume or infer that lost information was unfavorable to the party that lost it. Thus, it covers any instruction that directs or permits the jury to infer from the loss of information that it was in fact unfavorable to the party that lost it.’”

Continuing, Judge Moskowitz observed that “In its prior orders, the Court did not make any finding that NuVasive intentionally failed to preserve the text messages so that Defendants could not use them in this litigation. Instead, the Court found that NuVasive was at fault for not enforcing compliance with the litigation hold. The record does not support a finding of intentional spoliation by NuVasive. Therefore, under Rule 37(e), as amended, it would not be proper for the Court to give the adverse inference instruction.”

Judge Moskowitz rejected the defendants’argument that the motion was untimely, noting that the plaintiff brought its motion on December 10, 2015, just nine days after the new rule went into effect.  While acknowledging that “NuVasive has had a bit of good luck in that trial is scheduled for February, after the effective date of the new rule”, Judge Moskowitz indicated that he was “not convinced that there is any prejudice” to the defendant, noting that, “even under the standard applied by the Court in initially ruling upon Defendants’ motion for sanctions, intent was relevant”.

Judge Moskowitz did indicate he would allow both parties “to present evidence to the jury regarding the loss of electronically stored information and will instruct the jury that the jury may consider such evidence along with all other evidence in the case in making its decision.”

So, what do you think?  Should sanction orders be vacated because of the amendment to Rule 37(e)?  Will this create a wave of motions requesting that courts vacate similar orders in other cases?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Appeals Court Upholds Terminating Sanctions For Wipe of Cell Phone: eDiscovery Case Law

In Woodell v. Bernstein, et. al., No. 14-2836 (Cal. App., Dec. 30, 2015), the California Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, which imposed terminating sanctions against the plaintiff for spoliation of evidence and dismissed his lawsuit with prejudice after the plaintiff had wiped his cell phone, which was key to the case.

Case Background

In this defamation case, the plaintiff claimed to have lost his cell phone while out walking his dog. One of the defendants found the cell phone on his front lawn near an uprooted sign endorsing his co-defendant for public office. The defendants notified the media and the police that they found the cell phone near the sign and claimed that the plaintiff must have removed the sign, which he denied and, eventually, sued the defendants for defamation.

During deposition of the plaintiff when he was asked for a photo that he had taken the night he lost his phone, he admitted that he had since wiped the phone, stating that “I’ve completely wiped the phone, as I do – did many times working for Google, putting new operating systems on. So whatever photo is – if I have it, I’ll be happy to produce it, but it’s certainly not on the phone anywhere.”  He ultimately indicated that he wiped out the contents of the phone “[s]ometime in early 2012.” He said he did that because the phone was “broken” and he “had to reinstall the operating system”.  When the defendants requested to inspect the phone and arranged to do so, the phone was provided uncharged with the charging connector damaged so that it could not be connected and charged.  In April 2014, the defendants filed a joint motion for terminating sanctions.

Trial Court’s Ruling

The trial court observed that the defendants provided “ample evidence” to show that the plaintiff delayed and obstructed their ability to inspect the phone and, when finally allowed to inspect it, the phone battery was dead and the charging mechanism had been irreparably damaged preventing the phone from being plugged into a charger.  The court added: “What is most disconcerting, however, is the action taken by [Woodell] prior to filing the lawsuit, which included allegedly capturing for his own purpose information from the phone favorable to his position, and then completely wiping clean the operating system such that all potentially relevant information retained on the phone was destroyed.”

The trial court also noted that the plaintiff, in his deposition, stated that he “wiped clean” the phone because he had done that “many times working for Google” but in his declaration he stated that Google instructed him to wipe out the “corrupted system.” In assessing the contradictory evidence, the court found that the plaintiff “was contemplating legal action in 2011, well before he destroyed the contents of the phone in 2012.”  As a result, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for terminating sanctions, determining that it was “patently unjust” to force the defendants to continue to defend an action when they had been denied potentially exculpatory evidence, and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.

The plaintiff appealed the ruling, arguing that terminating sanctions were not appropriate because there was no pattern of conduct with regard to discovery and that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it made factual and credibility findings without holding an evidentiary hearing.

Appellate Court’s Ruling

Regarding the plaintiff’s argument that sanctions were not appropriate because there was no pattern of conduct with regard to discovery, the appellate court stated “It is undisputed that the phone Woodell produced no longer contained the critical data, and the production of the phone was of no value to defendants. Woodell’s argument that the law prevented the trial court from imposing terminating sanctions when there was no pattern of discovery abuse or no violation of a prior discovery order is incorrect.”  The appellate court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding – without holding an evidentiary hearing – that the defendants met their burden of showing that the plaintiff deliberately removed the data from the phone in anticipation of litigation.  As a result, the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s ruling to dismiss the lawsuit.

So, what do you think?  Did the spoliation warrant termination sanctions?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Gives Plaintiff 21.5 Million Reasons for Not Spoliating Emails: eDiscovery Case Law

When you spoliate data, you can lose even after you’ve won…  :o)

In Hausman v. Holland America Line-U.S.A., et al., No. CV13-0937 BJR (W.D. Wa., Jan 5, 2016), Washington District Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein vacated a $21.5 million verdict awarded to a man injured by a closing cruise-ship door in 2011 and ordered a new trial, after the plaintiff’s former assistant alleged that he deleted emails that could hurt his case.

Case Background

The plaintiff sued the defendant in 2013, stating that he suffered dizziness and seizures after an automatic sliding glass door improperly closed and struck his head as the vessel approached Honolulu. After a two-week trial in October, a jury awarded him $21.5 million.

However, the matter did not end there. Approximately two weeks after the trial concluded, the defendants were approached by the plaintiff’s former personal assistant who informed them that the plaintiff had deliberately sabotaged the defendants’ pre-trial discovery efforts, alleging that he: (1) Deleted and/or failed to disclose the existence of emails that he knew were relevant to this lawsuit, (2) Tampered with witness testimony, (3) Fabricated and/or exaggerated the extent of his alleged injuries, and (4) Testified falsely at trial.

Through witness testimony and supporting documents from the personal assistant at an evidentiary hearing held in December, the following allegations were made:

  • The plaintiff panicked when he learned that he would have to produce emails responsive to certain terms and began searching for and deleting those emails over “several days”;
  • He instructed her to delete all email correspondence between the two of them from her computer and phone, which she proceeded to do;
  • He discussed hiring someone to “scrub” his computer and that claimed he had used a large magnet to damage his home office computer’s hard drive; and
  • He had a second personal email account that he used while she was employed as his personal assistant, but that he did not disclose this account to the defendants.

In support of her testimony, the defendants produced copies of 60 emails that she was able to recover from her computer and/or phone after she deleted them, approximately 1/3 of which contained search terms that should have triggered their production.  In one of the deleted emails, the plaintiff wrote to his assistant to say he was sore after spending most of the day on a 10-foot ladder using a fire ax to chop ice that had built up over the front porch of his house, contrary to his claim of vertigo after the incident.

The plaintiff conceded that he did not produce those emails and that nearly one-third of the emails contain the Court-ordered search terms, but claimed the failure to produce these emails was not the result of misconduct on his part, but simply as part of his routine practice of clearing out his inbox.

Judge’s Ruling

In making her ruling, Judge Rothstein stated that “the credibility of Ms. Mizeur and Mr. Hausman is at the heart of this motion: Ms. Mizeur charges that Mr. Hausman intentionally sabotaged Defendants’ discovery efforts and is lying to cover his misconduct; Mr. Hausman charges that Ms. Mizeur is a bitter ex-employee who is lying because she wants to wreak havoc on his life. Thus, this Court must assess the credibility of Ms. Mizeur and Mr. Hausman.”

Finding the former assistant’s explanation regarding a check that she wrote to herself from the plaintiff’s account as an approved expense as “credible”, Judge Rothstein stated “[i]n short, this Court finds Ms. Mizeur to be a truthful witness.”

As for the plaintiff, not so much.

“The same cannot be said for Mr. Hausman”, Judge Rothstein stated. “As a witness, he came across evasive and untrustworthy. He appeared to weigh each answer, not for its truthfulness, but to assess whether it would damage his case. Mr. Hausman also seemed to capitalize on his alleged brain injury when it was convenient for him. He was confused or claimed memory loss when confronted with a question or exhibit that appeared to undermine his claims, yet was animated and full of information when his testimony supported his case.”

Finding “that Plaintiff did not meet his burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the withheld information was inconsequential”, Judge Rothstein concluded “that a miscarriage of justice occurred in this case”, vacated the judgment entered in the case and ordered a new trial.

So, what do you think?  Was this sanction excessive?  Is it ever too late to sanction a party for intentional spoliation of data?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Thanks, as always, to Sharon Nelson’s excellent Ride the Lightning blog for the tip!

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Orders Sanctions Against Defendant for Spoliation of Emails and Other Documents: eDiscovery Case Law

Now, that we’ve recapped last year’s cases, let’s start covering cases for this year…

In Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Ohio Public Employees Retirement System, No. 654586/2012 (Supreme Court of New York, New York County, December 7, 2015), the Court, determining that the defendant had spoliated data, found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated sufficient facts to warrant striking the defendant’s affirmative defenses, but opted to order an adverse inference instruction and also ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and costs in preparing the instant motion for sanctions.

Case Background

In this action to recover principal distributions from the defendant, the defendant, at the direction of in-house counsel, distributed a written litigation hold notice to certain employees who were deemed likely to possess documents relevant to the dispute.  In addition, the defendant’s IT department saved emails in an enterprise email archiving system.  Despite the preservation, the defendant objected to the plaintiff’s discovery requests and did not produce any responsive documents during a period where disputes over the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment were happening, until sometime after the court instructed the parties to go forward with discovery.  The defendant ultimately produced documents responsive to the plaintiff’s discovery requests.

However, several months into discovery, the defendant revealed that due to a “synchronization error,” emails that were preserved in the email archiving system that were subject to the ligation hold were accidentally purged, resulting in the content of 101 responsive emails being lost (though the defendant was able to recover and produce metadata from the lost emails).  Due to that issue and other instances of supposed spoliation by the defendant (including one email that was ultimately produced by another party that had communicated with the defendant), the plaintiff filed an instant motion for sanctions, asking the Court to strike the defendant’s affirmative defense of detrimental reliance, or, in the alternative, order a preclusion sanction or adverse inference.

Court’s Ruling

Finding that the duty to preserve began as early as April 2011 and no later than May 2011, the Court found “that OPERS’ had control of – and access to” lost or destroyed ESI in May 2011” and that the defendant wiped the computer of a key retired employee after the plaintiff had rejected a settlement offer from the defendant.  The court also found that the plaintiff had shown that at least some of the deleted ESI was relevant to the case.

Despite this, the court opted for the lesser sanction sought by the plaintiff, noting:

“Here, Ocwen has demonstrated prejudice as a result of OPERS’ failure to preserve France’s ESI and Bloomberg messages. However, the “extreme sanction” of striking OPERS’ affirmative defense is not appropriate in this case because Ocwen was able to obtain some evidence to disprove detrimental reliance, namely the August 2009 message sent from Gleacher to France…Since the loss of potentially relevant ESI is not fatal to Ocwen’s rebuttal of OPERS’ sixth affirmative defense, the imposition of an adverse inference as to that charge is appropriate and ‘reflects an appropriate balancing under the circumstances.’”

As a result, the court ordered an adverse inference instruction against the defendant and also ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and costs in preparing the instant motion for sanctions.

So, what do you think?  Was that the appropriate sanction?  Or should the defendant have been sanctioned at all?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

2015 eDiscovery Case Law Year in Review, Part 4

As we noted yesterday, Wednesday and Tuesday, eDiscovery Daily published 89 posts related to eDiscovery case decisions and activities over the past year, covering 72 unique cases!  Yesterday, we looked back at cases related to cooperation issues, social media and mobile phone discovery, technology assisted review and the first part of the cases relating to sanctions and spoliation.  Today, let’s take a look back at the rest of the cases relating to sanctions and spoliation.

We grouped those cases into common subject themes and will review them over the next few posts.  Perhaps you missed some of these?  Now is your chance to catch up!

SPOLIATION / SANCTIONS

We covered the first ten cases related to requests for sanctions yesterday, here are the remaining eighteen cases that we covered last year:

Court Denies Plaintiff’s Request for Spoliation Sanctions, as Most Documents Destroyed Before Duty to Preserve: In Giuliani v. Springfield Township, et al., Pennsylvania District Judge Thomas N. O’Neill, Jr. denied the plaintiffs’ motion for spoliation sanctions, finding that the duty to preserve began when the case was filed and finding that “plaintiffs have not shown that defendants had any ill motive or bad intent in failing to retain the documents which plaintiffs seek”.

Judge Recommends Default Judgment Sanctions Against Defendants, Even Though Some Deleted Files Were Recoverable: In Malibu Media, LLC v. Tashiro, Indiana Magistrate Judge Mark J. Dinsmore issued a Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions, recommending that the Court grant the plaintiff’s motion against the defendants for spoliation of evidence and perjury and enter default judgment against the defendants.

Similar Spoliation Case, Somewhat Different Outcome: In Malibu Media, LLC v. Michael Harrison (with the same plaintiff and issues as the case above in this list), Indiana District Judge William T. Lawrence denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, upholding the magistrate judge’s ruling which found an adverse inference instruction for destroying a hard drive with potentially responsive data on it to be not warranted, and ruled that “it will be for a jury to decide” if such a sanction is appropriate.

Plaintiff Once Again Sanctioned with an Adverse Inference Instruction, But Still No Complete Dismissal: In Lynn M. Johnson v. BAE Systems, Inc. et. al., District of Columbia District Judge Robert L. Wilkins granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff’s claims for negligence, battery, and defamation, but chose to “impose lesser, but nonetheless severe, sanctions” in the form of an adverse inference instruction for her remaining claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

New York Supreme Court Sanctions Two Attorney Defendants for “Egregious Misconduct” in Spoliation of Data: In HMS Holdings Corp. v. Arendt, et al., the New York Supreme Court in Albany County ordered a mandatory adverse inference instruction so that the trier of fact could “draw the strongest possible adverse inference from defendants’ bad faith and intentional destruction, deletion and failure to produce relevant evidence”. The court also awarded attorney fees, and forwarded a copy of the order regarding Defendant Lange to the New York State Committee on Professional Standards for attorneys.

Court Sanctions Plaintiff for Failing to Preserve Audio Recording: In Compass Bank v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, California Magistrate Judge William V. Gallo ruled that the plaintiff “wilfully engaged in the spoliation of relevant evidence”, and “has demonstrated a pattern of recalcitrant behavior during discovery in this litigation” and awarded an adverse inference jury instruction sanction against the plaintiff as well as defendant’s attorney fees and costs.

Court Orders Deposition of Expert to Evaluate Issues Resulting from Plaintiff’s Deletion of ESI: In Procaps S.A. v. Patheon Inc., Florida District Judge Jonathan Goodman ordered the deposition of a third-party computer forensic expert, who had previously examined the plaintiff’s computers, to be conducted in part by a Special Master that had been appointed to examine the eDiscovery and forensic issues in the case. The purpose of the ordered deposition was to help the Court decide the issues related to files deleted by the plaintiff and assist the defendant to decide whether or not to file a sanctions motion.

Tired of the “Crap”, Court Sanctions Investors and Lawyers for Several Instances of Spoliation: In Clear-View Technologies, Inc., v. Rasnick et al, California Magistrate Judge Paul S. Grewal sanctioned the defendants $212,320 and also granted a permissive adverse jury instruction that allows the presumption that the defendants’ spoliated documents due to a series of “transgressions” by the defendants and their prior counsel.

Appeals Court Upholds “Death Penalty Order” Sanction That Leads to Multi-Million Dollar Judgment: In Crews v. Avco Corp., a Washington Court of Appeals upheld a “death penalty order” against the defendant for discovery violations, including the failure to produce relevant information, but remanded for amendment of the final judgment of over $17.28 million to reflect any offsets for settlements with other defendants.

Denial of Motion for Spoliation Sanctions Leaves Plaintiff Less Than Glad: In Gladue v. Saint Francis Medical Center, Missouri District Judge Carol E. Jackson denied the plaintiff’s motion for evidentiary and monetary sanctions due to spoliation of evidence, finding that the defendant did not have a duty to preserve emails deleted as part of routine IT operations, had diligently attempted to recover deleted emails and that the plaintiff failed to show that any of the unrecovered emails were relevant to her claims.

How Blue Was My Valley? Not Blue Enough to Cite the Defendant for Discovery Violations: In Malone v. Kantner Ingredients, Nebraska Magistrate Judge Cheryl R. Zwart denied the plaintiffs’ motion to show cause, finding that the defendant “the plaintiffs have presented no evidence” that the defendant “destroyed, hid, or purposefully (or even recklessly) failed to produce responsive ESI” in the case.

Discarding a Relevant Computer Results in Adverse Inference Sanctions, Not Default Judgment: In Grady v. Brodersen, Colorado Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang granted the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions against the defendant in part for failing to produce a computer that the defendant ultimately acknowledged that he discarded, but denied the plaintiff’s request for a default judgment sanction, opting for the less severe adverse inference instruction sanction.

Defendant Does Not Take the Fall for Spoliation in Slip and Fall Case: In Harrell v. Pathmark et al., Pennsylvania District Judge Gene E. K. Pratter, after a hearing to consider whether to draw an adverse inverse instruction due to the defendant’s possible spoliation of video evidence, determined that “a spoliation inference would not be appropriate here”. Finding that the plaintiff had presented no evidence that the defendant had constructive notice of a dangerous condition resulting in her slip and fall, Judge Pratter also granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Court Rules that Australian Company’s Duty to Preserve Only Begins when US Court Has Jurisdiction: In Lunkenheimer Co. v. Tyco Flow Control Pacific Party Ltd., Ohio District Judge Timothy S. Black ruled that the duty to preserve for the defendant (an Australian company with offices and facilities only in Australia) did not begin until the complaint was filed in US courts in December 2011, denying the assertion of the intervenor/counter defendant that the duty to preserve arose in 2002.

Court Awards Attorney Fees to Defendant After Delayed Production by Plaintiff: In Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Westport Insurance Corp., Michigan Magistrate Judge Phillip J. Green awarded some (but not all) of the attorney fees requested by the defendant after the plaintiff “made repeated promises to produce the subject documents”, but “failed to do so for nearly three months after the deadline for responding to Westport’s Rule 34 request” and “compliance was obtained only after Westport filed its motion to compel”.

Plaintiffs Not Sanctioned for Late Production, Citing Their $29,000 Expense to Hire Experts to Assist: In Federico et al. v. Lincoln Military Housing LLC, et al., Virginia Magistrate Judge Douglas E. Miller, concluding that the defendants had not established that the plaintiffs had acted in bad faith when failing to meet production deadlines, declined to impose “any further sanction against Plaintiffs beyond the $29,000 expense associated with their expert’s production of the Facebook records”, except for a portion of the reasonable attorney’s fees associated with the original motion to compel.

Plaintiff Sanctioned for Late Production, But Not for Failure to Produce Data Held by Outside Vendor: In Ablan v. Bank of America, Illinois Magistrate Judge Daniel G. Martin recommended that the defendant’s Motion for Sanctions should be granted in part and denied in part, recommending that the plaintiffs be barred from using any new information at summary judgment or at trial that was contained on eight CD-ROMs produced late, but recommending no sanctions for failing to produce or make available documents held by the plaintiff’s outside vendor.

Payday Loan Company Sanctioned for Discovery Violations: In James v. National Financial LLC, Delaware Vice Chancellor Laster granted the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions after determining that the defendant’s “discovery misconduct calls for serious measures”. However, the plaintiff’s request for a default judgment was not granted, but lesser sanctions that included attorneys’ fees and a ruling that the lack of information contained in the requested document resulted in an admission.

Hope you enjoyed our recap of last year’s cases.  Next year, we’ll do it again for this year’s cases!

Want to take a look at cases we covered the previous four years?  Here they are:

So, what do you think?  Did you miss any of these?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine. eDiscovery Daily is made available by CloudNine solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscovery Daily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.