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Proportionality

eDiscovery Trends: Delaware Has a New Standard for eDiscovery
 

On Dec. 8 of last year, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware revised the "Default Standard for Discovery, Including Discovery of Electronically Stored Information (ESI)" for the third time to reflect recent changes in technology and to address concerns of attorneys regarding the discovery of ESI.  The new Default Standard expects the parties to reach agreements cooperatively on how to conduct discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-36. If the parties are unable to agree on the parameters and/or timing of discovery, the default standards will apply until further order of the Court or the parties reach agreement (which is why it’s a default standard).

The Revised Default Standard addresses several provisions for conducting discovery of ESI, including:

  • Proportionality: Parties are expected to preserve, identify and produce relevant information in a proportional manner.
  • Preservation: Each party’s normal policies and procedures in place for the preservation and backup of information will not be altered unless the party requesting the information provides good cause and that information current when the request is made must be preserved by the producing party. The preservation requirement doesn’t extend to data only discoverable by forensics, voice mails, information stored on mobile devices, RAM, and data from obsolete systems.
  • Privilege: The parties are expected to confer on the nature and scope of privilege logs for the case, including whether categories of information may be excluded from any logging requirements and whether alternatives to document-by-document logs can be exchanged.
  • Initial Discovery Conference: The new Default Standard provides guidelines for the timing (before the "Rule 16 Conference”) and content (issues, sources of potentially relevant ESI, production formats, handling of privileged information, categories of ESI to preserve, etc.) of the Initial Discovery Conference.
  • Initial Disclosures: Within 30 days after the Rule 16 Conference, each party is required to disclose a ranked list of the 10 custodians most likely to have discoverable information in their possession, a ranked list of the non-custodial data sources that are most likely to contain non-duplicative discoverable information and any issues related to ESI, third-party discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 and production of information subject to privacy protections.
  • Patent Litigation Discovery Requirements: The timing, starting within 30 days after the Rule 16 Conference, for the plaintiff and defendant obligations are detailed.  In patent litigation proceedings, discovery is limited to 6 years before the complaint unless the information in question relates to the conception of the invention in question.
  • On-Site Inspection of Electronic Media:  Not permitted without good cause.
  • Search Methodology: Producing parties must disclose their search terms to the requesting party and the requesting party may request no more than ten additional terms which must not be overbroad (e.g., product and company names).
  • Format: ESI and non-ESI should be produced to the requesting party as text searchable image files (e.g., PDF or TIFF) unless they are not easily converted to image files (e.g., Excel and Access files).
  • Metadata Fields: The only fields required to be produced (if available) are – Custodian, File Path, Email Subject, Conversation Index, From, To, CC, BCC, Date Sent, Time Sent, Date Received, Time Received, Filename, Author, Date Created, Date Modified, MD5 Hash, File Size, File Extension, Control Number Begin, Control Number End, Attachment Range, Attachment Begin, and Attachment End (or the equivalent thereof).

So, what do you think?  How do these standards compare to those in your state?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Da Silva Moore Plaintiffs Question Predictive Coding Proposal, Judge Peck’s Activities
 

A few weeks ago, in Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe & MSL Group, No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC) (AJP) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012), Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion making it likely the first case to accept the use of computer-assisted review of electronically stored information (“ESI”) for this case.  However, on March 13, District Court Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. granted plaintiffs’ request to submit additional briefing on their February 22 objections to the ruling.  In that briefing (filed last Monday, March 26), the plaintiffs claimed that the protocol approved for predictive coding “risks failing to capture a staggering 65% of the relevant documents in this case” and questioned Judge Peck’s relationship with defense counsel and with the selected vendor for the case, Recommind.

While the plaintiffs noted that “the use of predictive coding may be appropriate under certain circumstances”, they made several contentions in their brief, including the following:

  • That the protocol approved for predictive coding “was adopted virtually wholesale from Defendant MSLGroup”;
  • That “Judge Peck authored an article and made no fewer than six public appearances espousing the use of predictive coding” during “the ten months between the filing of the Amended Complaint and the February 24 written opinion”;
  • That Judge Peck appeared on several of these panels (three alone with Ralph Losey, Jackson Lewis’ ediscovery counsel in this case (and a previous thought leader on this blog) who the plaintiff refers to as “another outspoken predictive coding advocate whom Judge Peck ‘know[s] very well’”;
  • That “defense counsel Losey and Judge Peck cited each other’s positions on predictive coding with approval in their respective articles, which came out just four months before Judge Peck issued his ESI opinion”;
  • That, to promote its predictive coding technology, “Recommind is a frequent sponsor of the e-discovery panels on which Judge Peck and Defense counsel Losey sit” and “Judge Peck’s February 24 e-discovery ruling is expected to be a boon not only to the predictive coding industry, but also to Recommind’s bottom line”;
  • That, with regard to the defendants’ proposed protocol, “Judge Peck failed to hold an evidentiary hearing or obtain expert testimony as to its reliability and accuracy”; and
  • That, “in the same preliminary study MSL relies on to tout the quality of the technology to be used in its predictive coding protocol, the technology’s “recall,” was very low, on average 35%”, so the defendants’ proposed protocol “risks failing to capture up to 65% of the documents material to Plaintiffs’ case”.

In a declaration supplementing the plaintiffs’ filing, Paul J. Neale, chief executive officer at DOAR Litigation Consulting and the plaintiffs’ eDiscovery consultant, contended that Judge Peck approved a predictive coding process that “does not include a scientifically supported method for validating the results”. He also contended in the declaration that Peck relied on “misstatements” by two Recommind employees (Eric Seggebruch and Jan Puzicha) that misrepresent the effectiveness and accuracy of the Recommind predictive coding process and also noted that Recommind did not perform as well at the 2011 Text Retrieval Conference (TREC) as its marketing materials and experts assert.

Now, the ball is back in Judge Carter’s court.  Will he hold an evidentiary hearing on the eDiscovery issues raised by the plaintiff?  Will he direct Judge Peck to do so?  It will be interesting to see what happens next?

So, what do you think?  Do the plaintiff’s objections have merit?  Will Judge Carter give the defendants a chance to respond?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Daily Is Eighteen! (Months Old, That Is)
 

Eighteen months ago yesterday, eDiscovery Daily was launched.  A lot has happened in the industry in eighteen months.  We thought we might be crazy to commit to a daily blog each business day.  We may be crazy indeed, but we still haven’t missed a business day yet.

The eDiscovery industry has grown quite a bit over the past eighteen months and is expected to continue to do so.   So, there has not been a shortage of topics to address; instead, the challenge has been selecting which topics to address.

Thanks for noticing us!  We’ve more than doubled our readership since the first six month period, had two of our biggest “hit count” days in the last month and have more than quintupled our subscriber base since those first six months!  We appreciate the interest you’ve shown in the topics and will do our best to continue to provide interesting and useful eDiscovery news and analysis.  And, as always, please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic!

We also want to thank the blogs and publications that have linked to our posts and raised our public awareness, including Pinhawk, The Electronic Discovery Reading Room, Unfiltered Orange, Atkinson-Baker (depo.com), Litigation Support Technology & News, Next Generation eDiscovery Law & Tech Blog, InfoGovernance Engagement Area, Justia Blawg Search, Learn About E-Discovery, Ride the Lightning, Litigation Support Blog.com, ABA Journal, Law.com and any other publication that has picked up at least one of our posts for reference (sorry if I missed any!).  We really appreciate it!

As we’ve done in the past, we like to take a look back every six months at some of the important stories and topics during that time.  So, here are some posts over the last six months you may have missed.  Enjoy!

eDiscovery Trends: Is Email Still the Most Common Form of Requested ESI?

eDiscovery Trends: Sedona Conference Provides Guidance for Judges

eDiscovery Trends: Economy Woes Not Slowing eDiscovery Industry Growth

eDiscovery Law: Model Order Proposes to Limit eDiscovery in Patent Cases

eDiscovery Case Law: Court Rules 'Circumstantial Evidence' Must Support Authorship of Text Messages for Admissibility

eDiscovery Best Practices: Cluster Documents for More Effective Review

eDiscovery Best Practices: Could This Be the Most Expensive eDiscovery Mistake Ever?

eDiscovery 101: Simply Deleting a File Doesn’t Mean It’s Gone

eDiscovery Case Law: Facebook Spoliation Significantly Mitigates Plaintiff’s Win

eDiscovery Best Practices: Production is the “Ringo” of the eDiscovery Phases

eDiscovery Case Law: Court Grants Adverse Inference Sanctions Against BOTH Sides

eDiscovery Trends: ARMA International and EDRM Jointly Release Information Governance White Paper

eDiscovery Trends: The Sedona Conference International Principles

eDiscovery Trends: Sampling within eDiscovery Software

eDiscovery Trends: Small Cases Need Love Too!

eDiscovery Case Law: Court Rules Exact Search Terms Are Limited

eDiscovery Trends: DOJ Criminal Attorneys Now Have Their Own eDiscovery Protocols

eDiscovery Best Practices: Perspective on the Amount of Data Contained in 1 Gigabyte

eDiscovery Case Law: Computer Assisted Review Approved by Judge Peck in New York Case

eDiscovery Case Law: Not So Fast on Computer Assisted Review

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Not So Fast On eDiscovery Cost Reimbursement
 

Yesterday, we noted a potential reversal in the case approving computer-assisted review of electronically stored information (“ESI”) in the Southern District of New York.  Today, we look at another eDiscovery ruling where a significant reduction in award amount was ruled.

One of the emerging trends for 2011 was the growing number of cases where the prevailing party was awarded reimbursement of eDiscovery costs, including this case and this case.  Another case of eDiscovery cost reimbursement reported in this blog was Race Tires Amer., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire, Corp., No. 2:07-cv-1294, 2011 WL 1748620 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 2011), where U.S. District Judge Terrence F. McVerry in Pittsburgh ruled that the winning defendants in an antitrust case were entitled to reimbursement of more than $367,000 in eDiscovery costs. 

The plaintiff had argued previously that the costs should be disallowed because "electronic document collection, hard drive imaging and indexing and searching, commonly referred to as 'eDiscovery charges,' are not enumerated under Section 1920(4), and thus are not properly deemed recoverable costs."  But Judge McVerry found that Congress, in the Judicial Administration and Technical Amendments Act of 2008, modified the wording of Section 1920(4), changing the phrase "fees for exemplifications and copies of papers" to read "fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials."  Since that amendment, Judge McVerry said, "no court has categorically excluded eDiscovery costs from allowable costs."

Given the extent of the defendant’s eDiscovery activities, including copying nearly 500 gigabytes of data in response to over 400 search terms and creation of a litigation database, the court awarded $367,000 of the $389,000 eDiscovery costs requested by the defendants.

Naturally, the plaintiffs appealed that ruling to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

In a ruling that will undoubtedly not be popular with corporate defendants, the Third Circuit ruled that only an isolated portion of eDiscovery costs was taxable. As noted by the appeals court:

“The decisions that allow taxation of all, or essentially all, electronic discovery consultant charges, such as the District Court‘s ruling in this case, are untethered from the statutory mooring. Section 1920(4) does not state that all steps that lead up to the production of copies of materials are taxable. It does not authorize taxation merely because today‘s technology requires technical expertise not ordinarily possessed by the typical legal professional. It does not say that activities that encourage cost savings may be taxed.”

As a result, the appeals court significantly reduced the eDiscovery costs that the plaintiffs would have owed Hoosier and DMS under the lower court’s decision:

“We conclude that of the numerous services the vendors performed, only the scanning of hard copy documents, the conversion of native files to TIFF, and the transfer of VHS tapes to DVD involved copying, and that the costs attributable to only those activities are recoverable under § 1920(4)‘s allowance for the costs of making copies of any materials. Those costs total $30,370.42. We find that none of the charges imposed by DMS‘s vendor are taxable, and that the award in favor of Hoosier should be reduced by $95,210.13, the difference between the  electronic discovery vendors‘ charges awarded by the District Court ($125,580.55) and the charges of Hoosier‘s electronic discovery vendors we find taxable ($30,370.42).” {emphasis added}

So, what do you think?  Do you agree with the narrow ruling of taxable eDiscovery costs or do you think the original, more expansive ruling was correct?  Will this lead to more cases settling?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Not So Fast on Computer Assisted Review
 

A few weeks ago, in Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe & MSL Group, No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC) (AJP) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012), Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion approving of the use of computer-assisted review of electronically stored information (“ESI”) for this case, making it likely the first case to recognize that “computer-assisted review is an acceptable way to search for relevant ESI in appropriate cases.”  However, last Tuesday (March 13), District Court Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. granted plaintiffs’ request to submit additional briefing on their objections to the ruling.

On February 8, the parties attended a hearing to discuss their discovery protocol, and in particular the use of computer-assisted review (also referenced as “predictive coding”).  At the hearing, Judge Peck issued a ruling, approving the use of computer-assisted review, and instructed the parties to submit a draft protocol for court approval.  Judge Peck approved the proposed protocol on February 22 that had been submitted, over the plaintiffs’ objections.  On February 24, Judge Peck issued his written opinion detailing his rulings from the February 8th hearing.

On February 22 (the same day the protocol was approved, but before Judge Peck’s written opinion), the plaintiffs filed their 24 page objections to the February 8th discovery rulings, indicating their argument that the “Magistrate’s decision to adopt MSL’s predictive coding protocol is clearly erroneous and contrary to law.”  The plaintiffs specifically argued that “sanctioning the use of predictive coding in this employment discrimination case violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26” and also argued that the court’s adoption of a “novel discovery methodology” without “supporting evidence” or “standards for assessing reliability” was “clearly erroneous and contrary to law”.  On March 7, the defendant filed its opposition to plaintiffs’ objections.

Then, on March 9, the plaintiffs submitted a letter to District Judge Carter, requesting an opportunity to “file a ten-page reply brief” to the defendant’s response.  In the letter, the plaintiffs argued that Judge Peck’s written ruling, issued two days after their objections were filed, “expanded on the reasoning for the rulings he had made from the bench,” including relying on “a number of articles that were not addressed in the parties’ submissions” and making observations about plaintiffs’ objections.  As a result, the plaintiffs requested the opportunity to “squarely address Magistrate Judge Peck’s complete rulings.”  In addition, the plaintiffs argued that allowing their reply would not result in prejudice where the defendant had “the benefit” of filing its opposition to plaintiffs’ objections after the written ruling was issued and thus had the opportunity to consider Magistrate Judge Peck’s analysis when crafting their response.

Which brings us to last Tuesday (March 13), Judge Carter granted plaintiffs’ request and ordered their reply be submitted by March 19 (that’s today!).  Then, we’ll see what happens next.

So, what do you think?  Do the plaintiff’s objections have merit?  If Judge Carter throws out predictive coding, will there be hand wringing and wailing from the predictive coding vendors?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery History: A Look Back at Zubulake
 

Yesterday, we discussed a couple of cases within a month’s time where the New York Appellate Division has embraced the federal standards of Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 FRD 212.  Those of us who have been involved in litigation support and discovery management for years are fully aware of the significance of the Zubulake case and its huge impact on discovery of electronic data.  Even if you haven’t been in the industry for several years, you’ve probably heard of the case and understand that it’s a significant case.  But, do you understand just how many groundbreaking opinions resulted from that case?  For those who aren’t aware, let’s take a look back.

The plaintiff, Laura Zubulake, filed suit against her former employer UBS Warburg, alleging gender discrimination, failure to promote, and retaliation. Southern District of New York Judge Shira Sheindlin's rulings in this case are the most often cited in the area of electronic discovery, and were issued prior to the 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That’s somewhat like establishing laws before the Ten Commandments!  The important opinions related to eDiscovery are commonly known as Zubulake I, Zubulake III, Zubulake IV and Zubulake V.  Here is a summary of each of those opinions:

Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 217 F.R.D. 309 (Zubulake I) and Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake III)

The plaintiff argued that key evidence was located in various emails exchanged among employees of UBS, the defendant. Initially, the defendant produced about 350 pages of documents, including approximately 100 pages of email, but the plaintiff produced approximately 450 pages of email correspondence on her own. To address the discrepancy, the plaintiff requested for UBS to locate the documents that existed in backup tapes and other archiving media.

The defendant, arguing undue burden and expense, requested the court to shift the cost of production to the plaintiff, citing Rowe Entertainment v. The William Morris Agency, 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). In May 2003, the court ruled stating that whether the production of documents is unduly burdensome or expensive "turns primarily on whether it is kept in an accessible or inaccessible format". The court determined that the issue of accessibility depends on the media on which data are stored. It described five categories of electronic media, as follows:

  1. Online data, including hard disks;
  2. Near-line data, including optical disks;
  3. Offline storage, such as magnetic tapes;
  4. Backup tapes;
  5. Fragmented, erased and damaged data.

The last two categories were considered inaccessible as they were not readily available and thus subject to cost-shifting. Discussing the Rowe decision, the court concluded that it needed modification and created a new seven factor balance test for cost-shifting:

  1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant information;
  2. The availability of such information from other sources;
  3. The total cost of production, compared to the amount in controversy;
  4. The total cost of production, compared to the resources available to each party;
  5. The relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do so;
  6. The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and
  7. The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.

The defendant was ordered to produce, at its own expense, all responsive email existing on its servers, optical disks, and five backup tapes as selected by the plaintiff. The court would only conduct a cost-shifting analysis after the review of the contents of the backup tapes.

In July 2003, Zubulake III applied the cost-shifting test outlined in Zubulake I based on the sample recovery of data from five backup tapes.  After the results of the sample restoration, both parties wanted the other to fully pay for the remaining backup email. The sample cost the defendant about $19,003 for restoration but the estimated costs for production was $273,649, including attorney and paralegal review costs. After applying the seven factor test, it determined that the defendant should account for 75 percent of the restoration and searching costs, excluding attorney review costs.

Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake IV)

During the restoration effort, the parties discovered that some backup tapes were no longer available. The parties also concluded that relevant emails created after the initial proceedings had been deleted from UBS's email system and were only accessible on backup tapes. The plaintiff then sought an order requiring UBS to pay for the total costs of restoring the remaining backup tapes and also sought an adverse inference instruction against UBS and the costs for re-deposing some individuals required because of the destruction of evidence.

In October 2003, Judge Scheindlin found that the defendant had a duty to preserve evidence since it should have known that it would be relevant for future litigation. However, at the time, she concluded that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the lost evidence supported the adverse inference instruction claim. But, she did order the defendant to cover the costs as claimed by the plaintiff.

Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 2004 WL 1620866 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2004) (Zubulake V)

In July 2004, Judge Scheindlin ruled that UBS had failed to take all necessary steps to guarantee that relevant data was both preserved and produced, and granted the plaintiff's motion for adverse inference instruction sanctions, sought in Zubulake IV, due to the deleted evidence (emails and tapes) and inability to recover key documents during the course of the case.

The court also indicated that defense counsel was partly to blame for the document destruction because it had failed in its duty to locate and preserve relevant information. In addressing the role of counsel in litigation, the court stated that "[c]ounsel must take affirmative steps to monitor compliance so that all sources of discoverable information are identified and searched" by ensuring all relevant documents are discovered, retained, and produced and that litigators must guarantee that relevant documents are preserved by instituting a litigation hold on key data, and safeguarding archival media.

In the final instructions to the jury Judge Scheindlin instructed in part, "[i]f you find that UBS could have produced this evidence, the evidence was within its control, and the evidence would have been material in deciding facts in dispute in this case, you are permitted, but not required, to infer that the evidence would have been unfavorable to UBS." In addition, monetary sanctions were awarded to the plaintiff for reimbursement of costs of additional re-depositions and of the motion leading to this opinion, including attorney fees. The jury found in the plaintiff’s favor on both claims awarding compensatory and punitive awards totaling $29.2 million.

Judge Scheindlin’s opinions in Zubulake, including definitions of accessible and inaccessible data, the seven factor balance test for cost shifting and definition of counsel’s obligation for preserving data, have been referenced in numerous cases since and have provided guidance to organizations preparing for litigation.  For any of you who may not have fully understood the significance of the case, I hope this look back was helpful.

So, what do you think?  Did you learn something new about Zubulake?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: The Zubulake Rules of Civil Procedure
 

As noted in Law Technology News (N.Y. Appellate Division Continues to Press 'Zubulake' EDD Standard) recently, the New York Appellate Division has embraced the federal standards of Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 FRD 212 in two case rulings within a month’s time.

In Voom HD Holdings v. EchoStar Satellite LLC, 600292/08, the decision, written by Justice Sallie Manzanet-Daniels, was the first by a New York state appellate court to apply the standard for spoliation of electronic evidence applied by Judge Shira Scheindlin in Zubulake in 2003.  As defined by Judge Scheindlin, the Zubulake standard asserts that "once a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine document retention/destruction policy and put in place a 'litigation hold' to ensure the preservation of relevant documents."

The case relates to a 2005 contract dispute between EchoStar and Cablevision subsidiary Voom HD Holdings, within which Voom agreed to provide EchoStar rights to broadcast Voom's programming.  Once the case was filed by Voom in February 2008, EchoStar put a litigation hold in place, instructing employees to save anything that they deemed potentially relevant to the litigation, but did not extend this hold to stopping automatic deletion of eMails from EchoStar's computers until four months later in June 2008.

Voom moved for spoliation sanctions against EchoStar for failing to preserve its eMails and Manhattan Supreme Court Justice Richard Lowe granted the motion, citing Zubulake, finding that EchoStar should have put in place a litigation hold (including a stop to automatic deletion of e-mails) in June 2007, when its corporate counsel sent Voom a letter containing a notice of breach, a demand and an explicit reservation of rights (i.e., reasonably anticipated litigation).  Therefore, EchoStar was given an adverse inference sanction (they had also received a similar sanction in 2005 in Broccoli v. EchoStar Communications Corp., 229 FRD 506).

EchoStar appealed and requested the appellate court to adopt a rule that a company must preserve documents when litigation is pending or when it has "notice of a specific claim."  However, that argument was rejected by The First Department, which ruled that “EchoStar and amicus's approach would encourage parties who actually anticipate litigation, but do not yet have notice of a 'specific claim' to destroy their documents with impunity” and upheld the sanction.

In U.S. Bank National Association v. GreenPoint Mortgage Funding Inc., 600352/09, the First Department held that the producing party should bear the initial costs of "searching for, retrieving and producing discovery," but that lower courts may permit cost shifting based on the factors set forth in Zubulake.  The case was filed by U.S. Bank, NA (indenture trustee for the insurers and holders of the mortgage-backed notes issued by GreenPoint Mortgage Funding Inc., a now defunct mortgage lender specializing in "no-doc" and "low-doc" loans) against GreenPoint.

U.S. Bank served its first document production request on GreenPoint along with its original complaint; however, GreenPoint did not produce the requested documents.  Instead, they moved for a protective order arguing that U.S. Bank should pay the costs associated with its document requests including the cost of attorney review time for confidentiality and privilege assertions.  The court upheld GreenPoint's argument that the "party seeking discovery bears the costs incurred in its production" but rejected GreenPoint's request for U.S. Bank to also bear the attorney costs for privilege and confidentiality determinations.

Upon appeal, the First Department reversed the lower court's conclusion that the requesting party bear the cost of production, finding that, per the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Zubulake, the producing party should “bear the cost of the searching for, retrieving, and producing documents, including electronically stored information.”  In the February 28 ruling, Justice Rolando Acosta wrote that the court was “persuaded that Zubulake should be the rule in this Department.”  However, the court also ruled that the lower court could order cost shifting under CPLR Article 31 between the parties by considering the seven factors set forth in Zubulake.

What are those seven factors?  Tune in tomorrow, when we will provide a refresher to the Zubulake case and its various opinions!

So, what do you think?  Is the Zubulake standard appropriate for these two cases?  Is it appropriate for cases in general?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Law: Texas Model Order for Patent eDiscovery Now In the Public Comment Phase
 

In a blog post last October, we discussed the new model order proposed by Federal Circuit Chief Judge Randall Rader as a measure against the "excesses" of eDiscovery production. At that time, the "Model Order on E-Discovery in Patent Cases" had been unanimously voted on by the Federal Circuit Advisory Council and, as a result, could significantly alter the way discovery materials are used in such cases.  This version of the model order is included in proposed local rule amendment GO-12-06 for the Eastern District of Texas.  The amendment has been approved by the judges of the district, subject to public comment, the deadline for which is March 23, a little over two weeks from now.

Reviewed by a working group of the Eastern District's Local Rules Advisory Committee at the court's request to determine whether it should be included in the district's local rules, the working group recognized the "substantial work that went into the [Federal Circuit's] Model Order" and used it as its "baseline." The district created a redlined version of the Federal Circuit model order and provides detailed commentary explaining the reasons for the changes to the Federal Circuit model.  It has some fairly significant changes, some of which include:

  • Cost Shifting: Item #3, addressing circumstances for considering cost shifting, was stricken;
  • ESI Production Parameters: A new item #5 has been added to address production parameters, including document image format in TIFF, text-searchable documents, and native files (the way it’s currently written, you can apparently only request native files after receiving a TIFF production, absent agreement of the parties).  This section also notes that backup preservation and collection and preservation from voice mail and mobile devices is not necessary (absent a showing of good cause);
  • Email Production Requests: Item #7, indicating that email production requests will be only propounded for specific issues instead of general discovery, was stricken.  The next item, related to specifics of email production requests was expanded quite a bit to address information to be exchanged prior to email production and also allow one deponent per producing party to determine “the proper custodians, proper search terms, and proper time frame for e-mail production requests”;
  • Email Production Scope: Language was added to indicate that email requests will “identify the custodian, search terms, and time frame”.  It also bumped up the limit from five to eight custodians per producing party for each request and bumped up the limit from five to ten search terms per custodian per party.

It will be interesting to see whether any additional modifications are implemented as a result of the public comment period.

So, what do you think?  Will model orders become popular as a way to limit the eDiscovery in other types of cases?  Are model orders a good idea or are they too limiting? Please share any comments you might have or if you'd like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Best Practices: Perspective on the Amount of Data Contained in 1 Gigabyte
 

Often, the picture used to introduce the blog post is a whimsical (but public domain!) representation of the topic at hand.  However, today’s picture is intended to be a bit instructional.

As we work with more data daily and we keep buying larger hard drives to store that data, one gigabyte (GB) of data seems smaller and smaller.  Today, you can buy a portable 1 terabyte (TB) drive for less than $100 in some places.  Is the GB smaller than it used to be?  Last I checked, it’s still about a billion bytes (1024 x 1024 x 1024 or 1,073,741,824 bytes, to be exact).

From a page standpoint, most estimates that I’ve heard have estimated 1 GB to be 50,000 to 75,000 pages.  Of course, that can vary widely, depending on the file types comprising that GB.  A GB of 1 megabyte (MB) one-page, high-resolution image files will only take about 1,000 pages to equal a GB, whereas a collection of 5 kilobyte (KB) text file and small emails (with minimal attachments) could take as much as 200,000 pages to equal a GB.  So, 50,000 to 75,000 is probably a good average.

A ream of copy paper is 500 pages and a case holds 10 reams (5,000 pages).  So, a GB is the equivalent of 100 to 150 reams of paper (10 to 15 cases), which is enough paper to fill a small truck.  Hence, today’s picture shows a truck full of paper.

There was a Gartner report that re-published Anne Kershaw’s analysis on the cost to manually review 1 TB of data.  Quoting from the report, as follows:

“Considering that one terabyte is generally estimated to contain 75 million pages, a one-terabyte case could amount to 18,750,000 documents, assuming an average of four pages per document. Further assuming that a lawyer or paralegal can review 50 documents per hour (a very fast review rate), it would take 375,000 hours to complete the review. In other words, it would take more than 185 reviewers working 2,000 hours each per year to complete the review within a year. Assuming each reviewer is paid $50 per hour (a bargain), the cost could be more than $18,750,000.”

If it costs $18.75 million to review 1 TB, one could extrapolate that to approximately $18,750 to review each GB.  Dividing by 1,000 (ignoring the 24), that extrapolates to: 75,000 pages / 4 = 18,750 documents / 50 documents reviewed per hour = 375 review hours x $50 per hour = $18,750.  I’ve mentioned that figure to clients and prospects and they almost always seem surprised that the figure is so high.  Then, I ask them how many hours does it take them to review a truckload of paper to determine relevancy to the case?  😉

Bottom line: each GB effectively culled out through technology (such as early case assessment, first pass review tools like FirstPass™, powered by Venio) can save approximately $18,750 in review costs.  That’s why technology based assisted review approaches have become so popular and why it’s important to remember how expensive each additional GB can be.

So, what do you think?  Did you realize that each GB was so large or so expensive?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Case Law: Computer Assisted Review Approved by Judge Peck in New York Case
 

In Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe & MSL Group, No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC) (AJP) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012), Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion on last Friday (February 24), approving of the use of computer-assisted review of electronically stored information (“ESI”) for this case, making it likely the first case to recognize that “computer-assisted review is an acceptable way to search for relevant ESI in appropriate cases.”  As noted in our previous blog post about the case, the parties had been instructed to submit draft protocols by February 16th.

After providing a background of the Title VII gender discrimination case, Judge Peck went on to reference his article (Search, Forward: Will manual document review and keyword searches be replaced by computer-assisted coding?) to explain computer-assisted review.  He then detailed the parties’ negotiation of an agreed protocol for the computer-assisted review for this case.  The Court accepted the defendants’ proposal, which included seven iterative “seeding” reviews, but included the following caveat:

“But if you get to the seventh round and [plaintiffs] are saying that the computer is still doing weird things, it’s not stabilized, etc., we need to do another round or two, either you will agree to that or you will both come in with the appropriate QC information and everything else and [may be ordered to] do another round or two or five or 500 or whatever it takes to stabilize the system.”

The opinion also included a section entitled “Further Analysis and Lessons for the Future” in which several, more general topics surrounding computer-assisted review were addressed.  Judge Peck recognized that “computer-assisted review is not a magic, Staples-Easy-Button, solution appropriate for all cases” and noted that “[t]he goal is for the review method to result in higher recall and higher precision than another review method, at a cost proportionate to the ‘value’ of the case” (referenced in the article Technology-Assisted Review in E-Discovery Can Be More Effective and More Efficient Than Exhaustive Manual Review, written by Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack).

In his conclusion, Judge Peck noted:

“This Opinion appears to be the first in which a Court has approved of the use of computer-assisted review.  That does not mean computer-assisted review must be used in all cases, or that the exact ESI protocol approved here will be appropriate in all future cases that utilize computer-assisted review.  Nor does this Opinion endorse any vendor … nor any particular computer-assisted review tool.  What the Bar should take away from this Opinion is that computer-assisted review is an available tool and should be seriously considered for use in large-data-volume cases where it may save the producing party (or both parties) significant amounts of legal fees in document review.  Counsel no longer have to worry about being the “first” or “guinea pig” for judicial acceptance of computer-assisted review.  As with keywords or any other technological solution to e-discovery, counsel must design an appropriate process, including use of available technology, with appropriate quality control testing, to review and produce relevant ESI while adhering to Rule 1 and Rule 26(b)(2)(C) proportionality.  Computer-assisted review now can be considered judicially-approved for use in appropriate cases.”

For those in the industry yearning for case law that addresses the approved use of technology assisted review methodologies, Judge Peck’s in-depth discussion of the topic and conclusion appears to address that need.  It will be interesting to see how this case continues and whether additional discussion of the methodology will be discussed in case filings!

So, what do you think?  Is it high time for courts to recognize and approve computer-assisted review or is the court system still not ready for technology based approaches?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.