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Apple Wins Case, But Loses its Bid to Have Most of its Costs Covered – eDiscovery Case Law

In Ancora Technologies, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2013), California District Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers granted in part and denied in part Ancora’s Motion for Review of Clerks’ Order on the Bill of Costs of prevailing party Apple, reducing the awarded amount from $111,158.23 down to $20,875.48, including disallowing over $71,000 in storage and hosting costs.

On May 13 of this year, after the court granted Apple summary judgment in the case, Apple filed with the Clerk of the Court a Bill of Costs seeking $116,366.87 in costs, including $94,400.71 for “fees exemplification and the costs of making copies.”  On May 28, Ancora filed objections to that Bill of Costs.  Ancora specifically objected to recovery of many of Apple’s fees based on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd, 132 S. Ct. 1997, 182 L. Ed. 2d 903 (2012), which had reversed the Ninth’s Circuit’s decisions reading the items of recoverable costs under Rule 54(d)(1) and Section 1920 broadly.  On June 24, the Clerk of the Court issued an order awarding Apple $111,158.23, leading to the motion by Ancora discussed in this ruling.

In its motion, Ancora sought review of the Clerk’s Order on Apple’s Bill of Costs as to six categories of costs.  Here are the categories and the judge’s ruling regarding each:

  1. Conversion of documents produced by Ancora in eDiscovery: As Judge Gonzalez noted, “Ancora produced many documents in a format that was not ‘text searchable’ and did not provide the associated load files or OCR data in a .TXT file format”, which was contrary to their own production format agreement.  So, the judge denied the motion and upheld Apple’s request for $3,471.61 for conversion costs.
  2. Storage and hosting of electronic documents: Apple sought “online hosting costs for several hundred gigabytes (GB) of electronic document storage, though it only produced documents amounting to around 3.5 GB of data”. Finding that “Taniguchi did not directly address the issue of taxing e-discovery costs, it did establish the principle that section 1920 does not cover all costs that are necessarily incurred in litigation, but only a narrow subset”, Judge Gonzalez upheld Ancora’s motion and reduced Apple’s award by $71,611.52.
  3. “Custom work” and “replacement” costs for electronic documents: Apple claimed costs incurred for “replacing corrupted electronic documents and resolving technical issues during the processing of documents for production”, but Judge Gonzalez found no support or justification for the costs and reduced Apple’s award by $5,375.46.
  4. Printing of documents in connection with deposition preparation and Markman hearing: Finding that “Local Rule 54-3(d)(3) allows the ‘cost of reproducing disclosure of formal discovery documents when used for any purpose in the case’”, Judge Gonzalez upheld Apple’s request for $3,998.05 for those costs.
  5. Costs related to visual aids, including equipment rental and graphics services: Again, adopting the narrow interpretation of Taniguchi, Judge Gonzalez denied $13,097.75 of the $13,227.95 requested.
  6. Costs associated with deposition transcripts: With regard to deposition transcripts, because “Local Rule 54-3(c)(1) allows costs for an original and a copy”, Judge Gonzalez upheld Apple’s request for $4,891.95, which included a second copy.

So, what do you think?  Were the correct decisions made regarding cost reimbursement?   Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Leaving Your Hard Drives in a Rental House is Negligent, Court Rules – eDiscovery Best Practices

In Net-Com Services, Inc. v. Eupen Cable USA, Inc., No. CV 11-2553 JGB (SSx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2013), the plaintiff’s destruction of evidence was negligent where its principal failed to take steps to preserve evidence he had stored in a home he rented to nonaffiliated lessees.

A principal of the plaintiff, Steve Moffatt, had custody and control over the company’s documents, which included its financial information. The company was using one accounting system but switched to another when it moved into a new location. When the employee looked for this data and could not find it, he assumed it had been “lost or stolen.” However, he did not report the loss to the company’s insurer or to the police.

Over the previous three years that the company was in operation, it was based in Moffatt’s home office. The company went out of business in October 2011, and as the company wound down, Moffatt stored all of the company’s computer hardware and software in his garage. Around that same time, in September or October 2011, Moffatt rented his home. The only precaution he took was to instruct his lessees not to throw any equipment or software away. Despite this instruction, he drove by the home either in September or October and noticed that the renters “had put a ‘big pile of office equipment and everything else in the front yard’” and were throwing them in dumpsters. As associate retrieved the computers’ hard drives from the renters’ trash in September 2011. The hard drives stored the company’s most recent accounting system; another back-up drive stored the same information, but it was most likely thrown out as well.

In 2012, during discovery, the court granted Eupen’s motion to compel “production of ‘missing accounting information,’ including financial data believed to be stored on purportedly ‘dead’ hard drives. Net-Com responded that the data “may no longer exist” and that its principals had had “no luck” accessing the information on the drives. The court ordered Net-Com to produce the missing information, aside from the company’s federal and state tax returns. It also required Net-Com “to produce ‘the computer hard drives containing potentially relevant ESI that Net-Com has been unable to restore’ to allow Eupen USA ‘to test Net-Com’s assertion that the information is inaccessible.’”

In July 2013, Eupen filed a motion for sanctions based on the loss of data and suggested that Net-Com “be precluded from offering evidence of its damages because its production of financial data was incomplete and insufficient due to the loss of information ‘allegedly contained on a computer hard drive that was apparently no longer functional.’” In response, Net-Com argued that no evidence existed that he hard drives had been “‘irreparably damaged’ such that their contents [were] irretrievable.’” The court declined to preclude the evidence but ordered Net-Com to send the hard drives to a vendor for forensic analysis.

Net-Com complied and submitted the drives to a vendor, Ai Networks. The vendor found “‘recoverable data on at least one of the hard drives,’” said it could retrieve it within three weeks, and estimated the cost to recover it would be between $2,000 and $3,000.

The court found that Net-Com’s duty to preserve arose at least by February 8, 2011, when it filed the lawsuit. The complaint alleged that Net-Com’s damages amounted to “millions of dollars”; therefore, the complaint placed the company’s financial and accounting data at issue. But “seven months after filing suit, Moffatt effectively abandoned the hardware and software containing Net-Com’s financial records by leaving the equipment and data in a garage in a house he rented out to third parties. Even if the eventual loss and destruction of evidence was not intentional, it was definitely negligent.”

The court found sanctions appropriate, noting that an adverse inference instruction is “‘adverse to the destroyer not because of any finding of moral culpability, but because the risk that the evidence would have been detrimental rather than favorable should fall on the party responsible for its loss.’” Although the court could not yet determine whether Eupen had been prejudiced, it ruled that Net-Com had to “bear the full cost of restoring and producing data on the hard drives” and ordered the company “to restore and produce any relevant data from the subject hard drives within fourteen days of the date of this Order.”

So, what do you think?  Were the sanctions severe enough?   Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case Summary Source: Applied Discovery (free subscription required).  For eDiscovery news and best practices, check out the Applied Discovery Blog here.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Despite Missing and Scrambled Hard Drives, Court Denies Plaintiff’s Request for Sanctions – eDiscovery Case Law

In Anderson v. Sullivan, No. 1:07-cv-00111-SJM (W.D. Pa. 08/16/2013), a Pennsylvania court found “that no sanctions are warranted” despite the disappearance of one hard drive, “scrambling” of another hard drive and failure to produce several e-mails because the evidence was not relevant to the underlying claims and because there was no showing the defendants intentionally destroyed evidence.

In the underlying lawsuit, the plaintiff alleged that she was retaliated against by officials employed by, or associated with, the Millcreek Township School District (“MTSD”) because she made several whistleblower reports against the District and its top administrators, including Dean Maynard (MTSD’s former Superintendent) for violation of her First Amendment rights and the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Act.  In January of 2007, Maynard inadvertently sent an email to an MTSD teacher, instead of to the intended recipient.  The email allegedly revealed previously undisclosed personal relationships that Maynard had with two people he had recommended for employment with the District.  Maynard disclosed this letter to the School Board and an investigation ensued, where several computers were examined, including those of Maynard and the plaintiff.

As part of this examination, MTSD’s IT department removed the original hard drives from the targeted employees’ computers and replaced them with a new hard drive onto which the employee’s active files would be copied so that the laptop would function without interruption; however, the original hard drive from Maynard’s computer was lost.

When the new hard drive that was installed in Maynard’s computer was examined by Anderson’s expert in approximately June 2011, the expert discovered the hard drive was “scrambled” possibly by some type of wiping software.

At summary judgment, the court concluded that the plaintiff’s claims did not qualify as whistleblower reports under the PWA because they did not disclose any non-technical violation of law.  After her claims were dismissed on summary judgment, the plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions due to the disappearance of one hard drive, “scrambling” of a second hard drive, and withholding 44 pages of e-mails from a 10,000-page production to conceal that one of the hard drives was missing.  Although this court entered summary judgment in favor of all defendants, they retained jurisdiction to adjudicate the motion for sanctions.

Because the plaintiff’s claims were dismissed as a matter of law, the court found that sanctions were not warranted on either hard drive because they could not have contained relevant evidence.  The court also determined that there was a lack of evidence suggesting that evidence was intentionally destroyed.  With regard to the 44 pages of e-mails that were not produced, the court found there was nothing in the record to suggest they were intentionally withheld or even were relevant to the plaintiff’s claims.  So, the court denied the motion for sanctions.

So, what do you think?  Should the motion for sanctions have been granted?   Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Rejects Defendant’s “Ultra-Broad” Request, Denies Motion to Compel Production – eDiscovery Case Law
 

In NOLA Spice Designs, LLC v. Haydel Enters., Inc., No. 12-2515 (E.D. La. Aug. 2, 2013), Louisiana Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr. denied a motion to compel a plaintiff and its principal (a third-party defendant) to produce their passwords and usernames for all websites with potentially relevant information and to compel a forensic examination of its computers.

In this trademark infringement case under the Lanham Act, the defendant moved to compel the plaintiff and its principal to produce “‘passwords and user names to all online websites related to the issues in this litigation, including social media, weblogs, financial information and records,’” and to “submit their computers to an exhaustive forensic examination . . . with ‘access to full electronic content [including] online pages and bank accounts, including without limitation, online postings, weblogs, and financial accounts, for a time period from October 13, 2009 to the present, including deleted and archived content.”  

The plaintiff and its principal refused to disclose passwords and user names based on “privacy and confidentiality objections.”  While acknowledging that the defendant is correct in stating that “there is no protectable privacy or confidentiality interest in material posted or published on social media”, Judge Wilkinson noted that the defendant’s citation and arguments “miss the point”.  Judge Wilkinson stated that “ultra-broad request for computer passwords and user names poses privacy and confidentiality concerns that go far beyond published social media matters and would permit Haydel to roam freely through all manner of personal and financial data in cyberspace pertaining to” the plaintiff and its principal.

With regard to the request for forensic examination of the computers of the plaintiff and its principal, Judge Wilkinson acknowledged that such an examination is “within the scope of ESI discovery contemplated by Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1)(A).”  However, “such requests are also subject to the proportionality limitations applicable to all discovery under Rule 26(b)(2)(C), including the prohibition of discovery that is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative or that could be obtained from some more convenient, less burdensome or less expensive source, or the benefit of which is outweighed by its burden or expense, when considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake and the importance of the proposed discovery to those issues.”  {emphasis added}

While “restrained and orderly computer forensic examinations” have been permitted when it’s been demonstrated that the producing party “has defaulted in its discovery obligations by unwillingness or failure to produce relevant information by more conventional means”, a party’s “mere skepticism that an opposing party has not produced all relevant information is not sufficient to warrant drastic electronic discovery measures”, added Judge Wilkinson.

As a result, Judge Wilkinson ruled that “this overly broad request seeking electronically stored information (ESI), which far exceeds the proportionality limits imposed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C) – expressly made applicable to ESI by Rule 26(b)(2)(B) – is denied.” {emphasis added}

So, what do you think?  Did the defendant’s request exceed proportionality limits?   Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Is a Blended Document Review Rate of $466 Per Hour Excessive? – eDiscovery Case Law

Remember when we raised the question as to whether it is time to ditch the per hour model for document review?  One of the cases we highlighted for perceived overbilling was ruled upon last month.

In the case In re Citigroup Inc. Securities Litigation, No. 09 MD 2070 (SHS), 07 Civ. 9901 (SHS) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2013), New York District Judge Sidney H. Stein rejected as unreasonable the plaintiffs’ lead counsel’s proffered blended rate of more than $400 for contract attorneys—more than the blended rate charged for associate attorneys—most of whom were tasked with routine document review work.

In this securities fraud matter, a class of plaintiffs claimed Citigroup understated the risks of assets backed by subprime mortgages. After the parties settled the matter for $590 million, Judge Stein had to evaluate whether the settlement was “fair, reasonable, and adequate and what a reasonable fee for plaintiffs’ attorneys should be.” The court issued a preliminary approval of the settlement and certified the class. In his opinion, Judge Stein considered the plaintiffs’ motion for final approval of the settlement and allocation and the plaintiffs’ lead counsel’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs of $97.5 million. After approving the settlement and allocation, Judge Stein decided that the plaintiffs’ counsel was entitled to a fee award and reimbursement of expenses but in an amount less than the lead counsel proposed.

One shareholder objected to the lead counsel’s billing practices, claiming the contract attorneys’ rates were exorbitant.

Judge Stein carefully scrutinized the contract attorneys’ proposed hourly rates “not only because those rates are overstated, but also because the total proposed lodestar for contract attorneys dwarfs that of the firm associates, counsel, and partners: $28.6 million for contract attorneys compared to a combined $17 million for all other attorneys.” The proposed blended hourly rate was $402 for firm associates and $632 for firm partners. However, the firm asked for contract attorney hourly rates as high as $550 with a blended rate of $466. The plaintiff explained that these “contract attorneys performed the work of, and have the qualifications of, law firm associates and so should be billed at rates commensurate with the rates of associates of similar experience levels.” In response, the complaining shareholder suggested that a more appropriate rate for contract attorneys would be significantly lower: “no reasonable paying client would accept a rate above $100 per hour.” (emphasis added)

Judge Stein rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the contract attorneys should be billed at rates comparable to firm attorneys, citing authority that “clients generally pay less for the work of contract attorneys than for that of firm associates”:

“There is little excuse in this day and age for delegating document review (particularly primary review or first pass review) to anyone other than extremely low-cost, low-overhead temporary employees (read, contract attorneys)—and there is absolutely no excuse for paying those temporary, low-overhead employees $40 or $50 an hour and then marking up their pay ten times for billing purposes.”

Furthermore, “[o]nly a very few of the scores of contract attorneys here participated in depositions or supervised others’ work, while the vast majority spent their time reviewing documents.” Accordingly, the court decided the appropriate rate would be $200, taking into account the attorneys’ qualifications, work performed, and market rates.

For this and other reasons, the court found the lead counsel’s proposed lodestar “significantly overstated” and made a number of reductions. The reductions included the following amounts:

  • $7.5 million for document review by contract attorneys that happened after the parties agreed to settle; 20 of the contract attorneys were hired on or about the day of the settlement.
  • $12 million for reducing the blended hourly rate of contract attorneys from $466 to $200 for 45,300 hours, particularly where the bills reflected that these attorneys performed document review—not higher-level work—all day.
  • 10% off the “remaining balance to account for waste and inefficiency which, the Court concludes, a reasonable hypothetical client would not accept.”

As a result, the court awarded a reduced amount of $70.8 million in attorneys’ fees, or 12% of the $590 million common fund.

So, what do you think?  Was the requested amount excessive?   Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case Summary Source: Applied Discovery (free subscription required).  For eDiscovery news and best practices, check out the Applied Discovery Blog here.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Daily is Three Years Old!

We’ve always been free, now we are three!

It’s hard to believe that it has been three years ago today since we launched the eDiscoveryDaily blog.  We’re past the “terrible twos” and heading towards pre-school.  Before you know it, we’ll be ready to take our driver’s test!

We have seen traffic on our site (from our first three months of existence to our most recent three months) grow an amazing 575%!  Our subscriber base has grown over 50% in the last year alone!  Back in June, we hit over 200,000 visits on the site and now we have over 236,000!

We continue to appreciate the interest you’ve shown in the topics and will do our best to continue to provide interesting and useful posts about eDiscovery trends, best practices and case law.  That’s what this blog is all about.  And, in each post, we like to ask for you to “please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic”, so we encourage you to do so to make this blog even more useful.

We also want to thank the blogs and publications that have linked to our posts and raised our public awareness, including Pinhawk, Ride the Lightning, Litigation Support Guru, Complex Discovery, Bryan College, The Electronic Discovery Reading Room, Litigation Support Today, Alltop, ABA Journal, Litigation Support Blog.com, Litigation Support Technology & News, InfoGovernance Engagement Area, EDD Blog Online, eDiscovery Journal, Learn About E-Discovery, e-Discovery Team ® and any other publication that has picked up at least one of our posts for reference (sorry if I missed any!).  We really appreciate it!

As many of you know by now, we like to take a look back every six months at some of the important stories and topics during that time.  So, here are some posts over the last six months you may have missed.  Enjoy!

Rodney Dangerfield might put it this way – “I Tell Ya, Information Governance Gets No Respect”

Is it Time to Ditch the Per Hour Model for Document Review?  Here’s some food for thought.

Is it Possible for a File to be Modified Before it is Created?  Maybe, but here are some mechanisms for avoiding that scenario (here, here, here, here, here and here).  Best of all, they’re free.

Did you know changes to the Federal eDiscovery Rules are coming?  Here’s some more information.

Count Minnesota and Kansas among the states that are also making changes to support eDiscovery.

By the way, since the Electronic Discovery Reference Model (EDRM) annual meeting back in May, several EDRM projects (Metrics, Jobs, Data Set and the new Native Files project) have already announced new deliverables and/or requested feedback.

When it comes to electronically stored information (ESI), ensuring proper chain of custody tracking is an important part of handling that ESI through the eDiscovery process.

Do you self-collect?  Don’t Forget to Check for Image Only Files!

The Files are Already Electronic, How Hard Can They Be to Load?  A sound process makes it easier.

When you remove a virus from your collection, does it violate your discovery agreement?

Do you think that you’ve read everything there is to read on Technology Assisted Review?  If you missed anything, it’s probably here.

Consider using a “SWOT” analysis or Decision Tree for better eDiscovery planning.

If you’re an eDiscovery professional, here is what you need to know about litigation.

BTW, eDiscovery Daily has had 242 posts related to eDiscovery Case Law since the blog began!  Forty-four of them have been in the last six months.

Our battle cry for next September?  “Four more years!”  🙂

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

If Production is Small, Does that Mean ESI is Being Withheld? – eDiscovery Case Law

In American Home Assurance Co. v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., No. 8:11CV270 (D. Neb. Sept. 11, 2013), Nebraska District Judge Lyle E. Strom ruled (among other things) that the defendants must disclose the sources it has searched (or intends to search) for electronically stored information (ESI) to the plaintiffs and, for each source, identify the search terms used.

The case arose from the sale of some raw beef trim by defendant (GOPAC) to the plaintiffs (Cargill), which the plaintiffs claimed was contaminated with the bacterium known as “E. coli 0157:H7.”  The defendants filed a counterclaim related to a New York Times article that allegedly contained false information supplied by the plaintiffs that caused the defendants to lose existing and potential customers.

Among the issues addressed in this ruling was a motion to compel from the plaintiffs for “the production of e-mails and other electronically stored information that have allegedly been withheld”.  Regarding the motion, Judge Strom noted that the plaintiff “has failed to identify a specific e-mail or electronic record that GOPAC is refusing to produce. Rather, Cargill argues that the small number of e-mails produced (25) evidences a lack of diligence in production.”  With regard to the size of the production, Judge Strom stated that “the Court cannot compel the production of information that does not exist.”

The defendant provided assurances that it had turned over all ESI that its searches produced and continues to supplement as it finds additional information, offering to search available sources using search terms provided by the plaintiff, but the plaintiff “has refused to supply any additional terms”.

So, Judge Strom gave the defendant a chance to show the extent of its discovery efforts, as follows:

“It is unclear to the Court why ESI that has presumably been in GOPAC’s possession since the start of discovery has not been fully produced. To provide Cargill an adequate opportunity to contest discovery of ESI, the Court will order GOPAC to disclose the sources it has searched or intends to search and, for each source, the search terms used. The Court will also order all ESI based on the current search terms be produced by November 1, 2013. However, given Cargill’s failure to point to any specific information that has been withheld or additional sources that have not been searched, no further action by the Court is appropriate at this time.”

Judge Strom gave the defendant until September 30 to disclose its sources and search terms.  Perhaps more to come…

So, what do you think?  Should the judge have done more or was this an appropriate first step?   Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Awards Sanctions, But Declines to Order Defendants to Retain an eDiscovery Vendor – Yet – eDiscovery Case Law

In Logtale, Ltd. v. IKOR, Inc., No. C-11-05452 CW (DMR) (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2013), California Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu granted the plaintiff’s motion to compel responses to discovery and awarded partial attorney’s fees as a result of defendants’ conduct.  The judge did not grant the plaintiff’s request to order Defendants to retain an eDiscovery vendor to conduct a thorough and adequate search for responsive electronic documents, but did note that the court would do so “if there are continuing problems with their document productions”.

Case Background

The plaintiff, a shareholder in pharmaceutical company IKOR, Inc. (“IKOR”), a filed suit against the defendant and two of its officers, Dr. James Canton and Dr. Ross W. Tye, accusing the defendant of misrepresentations to induce the plaintiff to invest, breach of fiduciary duties, breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The defendant brought counterclaims for breach of a licensing agreement, theft of intellectual property, and interference with prospective economic advantage.

In the motion to compel, the plaintiff sought to compel the defendants’ compliance with a prior court order to compel the production of all responsive documents as well as to compel production from Dr. Canton, who objected to several of Plaintiff’s discovery requests.  The plaintiff contended that Defendants’ document productions were incomplete and that they “failed to adequately search for all responsive electronic documents”, asserting that all three defendants had produced a total of only 121 emails, 109 of which were communications with the plaintiff (including only three pages in response to a request seeking all documents relating to the defendant’s communications with a company run by three of IKOR’s principals. The “dearth of responsive documents, as well as the lack of emails from at least one key individual”, caused the plaintiff to “raise concerns about the quality of Defendants’ document preservation and collection efforts” and express concerns about possible “evidence spoliation through the deletion of emails”. The plaintiff also contended that Dr. Canton waived his objections by failing to serve a timely response.

Judge’s Ruling

Judge Nyu agreed with the plaintiff’s, noting that “Given the paucity of documents produced by Defendants to date, as well as counsel’s own acknowledgment that Defendants’ productions have been incomplete, the court shares Plaintiff’s concerns about the inadequacy of Defendants’ search for responsive documents. Defense counsel has not been sufficiently proactive in ensuring that his clients are conducting thorough and appropriate document searches, especially in light of obvious gaps and underproduction. Under such circumstances, it is not enough for counsel to simply give instructions to his clients and count on them to fulfill their discovery obligations. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure place an affirmative obligation on an attorney to ensure that a client’s search for responsive documents and information is complete.”  She also agreed with the plaintiff regarding Dr. Canton’s objections, since he “offered no reason for his late responses”.

Judge Nyu ordered the defendants to “produce all remaining responsive documents by no later than August 26, 2013”, noting that “if there are continuing problems with their document productions, the court will order them to retain the services of an e-discovery vendor”.  Judge Nyu also granted attorney’s fees for the plaintiff’s activities “as a result of Defendants’ conduct”, albeit at a reduced amount of $5,200.

So, what do you think?  Was the sanction warranted?   Should the judge have ordered the defendants to retain an eDiscovery vendor?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Imagine if the Zubulake Case Turned Out Like This – eDiscovery Case Law

You’ve got an employee suing her ex-employer for discrimination, hostile work environment and being forced to resign.  During discovery, it was determined that a key email was deleted due to the employer’s routine auto-delete policy, so the plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions.  Sound familiar?  Yep. Was her motion granted?  Nope.

In Hixson v. City of Las Vegas, No. 2:12-cv-00871-RCJ-PAL (D. Nev. July 11, 2013), Nevada Magistrate Judge Peggy A. Leen ruled that the duty to preserve had not yet arisen when the plaintiff sent an internal email complaining she was being subjected to a hostile work environment and discrimination and that the failure to suspend its then-existing practice of automatically purging emails after 45 days did not warrant sanctions.

Here’s the timeline:

  • In March 2010, the plaintiff sent an email to a City of Las Vegas Personnel Analyst in the Employee Relations Division complaining she was being subjected to a hostile work environment and discrimination.
  • A chain of correspondence took place between April 6 and 7 of 2010 between the union representative assisting the plaintiff and a city employee.
  • In July 2010, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant constructively terminated her by forcing her to submit her resignation.
  • In September 2010, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission.

The plaintiff and the defendant both produced the chain of correspondence from April 6 and 7 of 2010, but the defendant’s production omitted an email from the city employee (Dan Tarwater) to the union representative (Michael Weyland) commenting that “perhaps Weyland will have the good sense to have the Plaintiff retract her hostile work environment claim”.  Thus, the plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions.

The defendant indicated that their email system permanently deleted all messages after 45 days unless a sender or a recipient affirmatively saved the document to a folder, which didn’t happen with this particular email and also argued that “because Plaintiff has a copy of the email, any failure to disclose it is harmless”.

Judge Leen ruled that the “record in this case is insufficient to support a finding that the City was on notice Ms. Hixson contemplated litigation sufficient to trigger a duty to preserve electronically stored information by suspending its then-existing practice of automatically purging emails after 45 days.”  She also stated that “Plaintiff resigned July 15, 2010, and asserts she was constructively discharged. Nothing in the record suggests that on or before the date of her resignation, the Plaintiff threatened litigation, or informed the City that she had retained counsel about her employment disputes…By July 15, 2010, when Plaintiff resigned, the email system the City used as the time would have already purged Mr. Tarwater’s April 7, 2010, email unless it was saved to a folder.”

As a result, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions.

So, what do you think?  Did the defendant have a duty to preserve the email and, if so, should the motion for sanctions have been granted?   Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Judge Says “Dude, Where’s Your CAR?” – eDiscovery Case Law

Ralph Losey describes a unique case this week in his e-Discovery Team ® blog (Poor Plaintiff’s Counsel, Can’t Even Find a CAR, Much Less Drive One).  In Northstar Marine, Inc. v. Huffman, Case 1:13-cv-00037-WS-C (Ala. S.D., 08/27/13), the defendant’s motion to enforce the parties’ document production agreement was granted after Alabama Magistrate Judge William E. Cassady rejected the plaintiff’s excuse that “it is having difficulty locating an inexpensive provider of electronic search technology to assist with discovery”.

On June 10 of this year, the parties entered into an agreement for handling electronically stored information (“ESI”) that noted:

“Both parties have or will immediately arrange to use computer-assisted search technology that permits efficient gathering of documents, de-duplication, maintaining the relationship between emails and attachments, full text Boolean searches of all documents in one pass, segregation or tagging of the search results, and export of all responsive files without cost to the other party. Both parties shall share with the other party the specific capabilities of their proposed computer-assisted search technology, and will endeavor to agree on the technology to be deployed by the other party.”

Sounds like a forward thinking plan, right?

As the order also noted, “In addition, the parties agreed to use certain search terms and agreed that ‘[a]ll documents in the search result sets shall be produced immediately to the other side in native format including all metadata.’”  On June 11, the court entered a Supplemental Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order adopting the parties’ plan with regard to ESI.

The defendants were ready quickly, informing the plaintiff on July 3 that they had “collected their ESI and were ready to produce the collected documents” and “inquired as to the method that plaintiff was using to collect its documents for production”.  The defendants sent subsequent inquiries on July 8 and July 24.  On August 6, plaintiff’s counsel notified defendants’ counsel that the plaintiff’s IT provider could not perform the tasks necessary to collect the ESI and that the plaintiff was “trying to locate outside providers of electronic search technology to assist with plaintiff’s ESI production”.  The next day, the defendants filed their motion to compel.

On August 21, the plaintiff filed a response to the defendants’ motion, not objecting to the defendants’ discovery requests, but rather stating that it was “having difficulty locating an inexpensive provider of electronic search technology to assist with discovery” and did not provide a date to complete its production obligation.

Noting that a Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order “is not a frivolous piece of paper, idly entered, which can be cavalierly disregarded by counsel without peril”, Judge Cassady called the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Court’s scheduling order and supplemental orders “unacceptable”.  He also stated that “Plaintiff’s attempts to find an inexpensive provider certainly do not constitute due diligence” and granted the defendants’ motion to compel.

Ralph notes in his observations the perils of agreeing to search terms that have not been tested in advance.  I experienced that very issue with a client that had already agreed to search terms before I was brought in to assist – as a result, one term alone retrieved over 300,000 files with hits because they got “wild” with wildcards.  Always test your search terms before agreeing to them!

So, what do you think?  Do you test your search terms before agreement with opposing counsel?   Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Photo by Tracy Bennett– ©2000 – 20th Century Fox – All Rights Reserved

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.