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Court Awards Sanctions, But Declines to Order Defendants to Retain an eDiscovery Vendor – Yet – eDiscovery Case Law

In Logtale, Ltd. v. IKOR, Inc., No. C-11-05452 CW (DMR) (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2013), California Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu granted the plaintiff’s motion to compel responses to discovery and awarded partial attorney’s fees as a result of defendants’ conduct.  The judge did not grant the plaintiff’s request to order Defendants to retain an eDiscovery vendor to conduct a thorough and adequate search for responsive electronic documents, but did note that the court would do so “if there are continuing problems with their document productions”.

Case Background

The plaintiff, a shareholder in pharmaceutical company IKOR, Inc. (“IKOR”), a filed suit against the defendant and two of its officers, Dr. James Canton and Dr. Ross W. Tye, accusing the defendant of misrepresentations to induce the plaintiff to invest, breach of fiduciary duties, breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The defendant brought counterclaims for breach of a licensing agreement, theft of intellectual property, and interference with prospective economic advantage.

In the motion to compel, the plaintiff sought to compel the defendants’ compliance with a prior court order to compel the production of all responsive documents as well as to compel production from Dr. Canton, who objected to several of Plaintiff’s discovery requests.  The plaintiff contended that Defendants’ document productions were incomplete and that they “failed to adequately search for all responsive electronic documents”, asserting that all three defendants had produced a total of only 121 emails, 109 of which were communications with the plaintiff (including only three pages in response to a request seeking all documents relating to the defendant’s communications with a company run by three of IKOR’s principals. The “dearth of responsive documents, as well as the lack of emails from at least one key individual”, caused the plaintiff to “raise concerns about the quality of Defendants’ document preservation and collection efforts” and express concerns about possible “evidence spoliation through the deletion of emails”. The plaintiff also contended that Dr. Canton waived his objections by failing to serve a timely response.

Judge’s Ruling

Judge Nyu agreed with the plaintiff’s, noting that “Given the paucity of documents produced by Defendants to date, as well as counsel’s own acknowledgment that Defendants’ productions have been incomplete, the court shares Plaintiff’s concerns about the inadequacy of Defendants’ search for responsive documents. Defense counsel has not been sufficiently proactive in ensuring that his clients are conducting thorough and appropriate document searches, especially in light of obvious gaps and underproduction. Under such circumstances, it is not enough for counsel to simply give instructions to his clients and count on them to fulfill their discovery obligations. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure place an affirmative obligation on an attorney to ensure that a client’s search for responsive documents and information is complete.”  She also agreed with the plaintiff regarding Dr. Canton’s objections, since he “offered no reason for his late responses”.

Judge Nyu ordered the defendants to “produce all remaining responsive documents by no later than August 26, 2013”, noting that “if there are continuing problems with their document productions, the court will order them to retain the services of an e-discovery vendor”.  Judge Nyu also granted attorney’s fees for the plaintiff’s activities “as a result of Defendants’ conduct”, albeit at a reduced amount of $5,200.

So, what do you think?  Was the sanction warranted?   Should the judge have ordered the defendants to retain an eDiscovery vendor?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Scheindlin Reverses Magistrate Judge Ruling, Orders Sanction for Spoliation of Data – eDiscovery Case Law

If you’re hoping to get away with failing to preserve data in eDiscovery, you might want to think again if your case appears in the docket for the Southern District of New York with Judge Shira Scheindlin presiding.

As reported in by Victor Li in Law Technology News, (Scheindlin Not Charmed When Revisiting Spoliation a Third Time), Judge Scheindlin, who issued two of the most famous rulings with regard to eDiscovery sanctions for spoliation of data – Zubulake v. UBS Warburg and Pension Committee of the Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America Securities – sanctioned Sekisui America Corp. and Sekisui Medical Co. with an adverse inference jury instruction for deleting emails in its ongoing breach of contract case, as well as an award of “reasonable costs, including attorneys’ fees, associated with bringing this motion”.

Last year, the plaintiffs sued two former executives, including CEO Richard Hart of America Diagnostica, Inc. (ADI), a medical diagnostic products manufacturer acquired by Sekisui in 2009, for breach of contract.  While the plaintiffs informed the defendants in October 2010 that they intended to sue, they did not impose a litigation hold on their own data until May 2012. According to court documents, during the interim, thousands of emails were deleted in order to free up server space, including Richard Hart’s entire email folder and that of another ADI employee (Leigh Ayres).

U.S. Magistrate Judge Frank Maas of the Southern District of New York, while finding that the actions could constitute gross negligence by the plaintiffs, recommended against sanctions because:

  • There was no showing of bad faith, and;
  • The defendants could not prove that the emails would have been beneficial to them, or prove that they were prejudiced by the deletion of the emails.

The defendants appealed.  Judge Scheindlin reversed the ruling by Magistrate Judge Maas, finding that “the destruction of Hart’s and Ayres’ ESI was willful and that prejudice is therefore presumed” and the “Magistrate Judge’s Decision denying the Harts’ motion for sanctions was therefore ‘clearly erroneous.’”

With regard to the defendants proving whether the deleted emails would have been beneficial to them, Judge Scheindlin stated “When evidence is destroyed intentionally, such destruction is sufficient evidence from which to conclude that the missing evidence was unfavorable to that party.  As such, once willfulness is established, no burden is imposed on the innocent party to point to now-destroyed evidence which is no longer available because the other party destroyed it.”

Judge Scheindlin also found fault with the proposed amendment to Rule 37(e) to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which would limit the imposition of eDiscovery sanctions for spoliation to instances where the destruction of evidence caused substantial prejudice and was willful or in bad faith, stating “I do not agree that the burden to prove prejudice from missing evidence lost as a result of willful or intentional misconduct should fall on the innocent party.  Furthermore, imposing sanctions only where evidence is destroyed willfully or in bad faith creates perverse incentives and encourages sloppy behavior.”

As a result, Judge Scheindlin awarded the defendants’ request for an adverse inference jury instruction and also awarded “reasonable costs, including attorneys’ fees, associated with bringing this motion”.  To see the full opinion order (via Law Technology News), click here.

So, what do you think?  Should sanctions have been awarded?   Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Permissive Adverse Inference Instruction Upheld on Appeal – eDiscovery Case Law

In Mali v. Federal Insurance Co., Nos. 11-5413-cv, 12-0174-cv (XAP) (2d Cir. June 13, 2013), the Second Circuit explained the distinctions between two types of adverse inference instructions: a sanction for misconduct versus an explanatory instruction that details the jury’s fact-finding abilities. Because the lower court opted to give a permissive adverse inference instruction, which is not a punishment, the court did not err by not requiring the defendant to show that the plaintiffs acted with a culpable state of mind.

After a fire destroyed a barn converted into a residence, the plaintiffs sought to recover $1.3 to $1.5 million from their insurance policy. The insurance company made three payments before becoming skeptical of the plaintiffs’ claim. In particular, the company balked at the plaintiffs’ statement that they had high-end amenities, such as four refrigerators and copper gutters, and their sketch of the barn’s layout, which showed fourteen rooms, a second floor with four rooms and a bathroom, and four skylights. During discovery, the plaintiffs claimed they had no photographs of the barn, but at trial, an appraiser testified that the plaintiffs had shown her photographs of items in the barn and of the barn, which she testified only had one floor, not two as the plaintiffs claimed.

The defendants asked the court to impose an adverse inference instruction on the plaintiffs as a sanction for destroying the photographic evidence. Over the plaintiffs’ objection, the court instructed the jury that it could draw an adverse inference from the plaintiffs’ failure to produce the photographs. The jury agreed with the defendant and found the plaintiffs had submitted fraudulent claims that forfeited their insurance coverage.

On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the jury’s verdict should be vacated and that a new trial was required because the court did not make findings to justify this sanction. However, the appellate court ruled that the plaintiffs’ argument was “based on a faulty premise” because the trial court “did not impose a sanction on the Plaintiffs.” Therefore, no findings were required. It also found the plaintiffs’ reliance on a prior Second Circuit decision, Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Financial Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2002), where the court ruled that a trial court “must find facts that justify” an adverse inference instruction based on spoliation, inapposite. In Residential Funding, the plaintiff failed to meet its discovery obligations because it did not produce e-mails or backup tapes. The court refused to impose the defendant’s requested sanction, which was an instruction to the jury that it “‘should presume the e-mails . . . which have not been produced, would have disproved [Residential]’s theory of the case,’” because the defendant had not provided facts sufficient to support the sanction.

Here, the Second Circuit explained the distinction between the two types of adverse inferences in these cases: (1) one that punishes “misconduct that occurred outside the presence of the jury during the pretrial discovery proceedings, often consisting of a party’s destruction of, or failure to produce, evidence properly demanded by the opposing party,” and (2) one that “simply explains to the jury, as an example of the reasoning process known in law as circumstantial evidence, that a jury’s finding of certain facts may (but need not) support a further finding that other facts are true.” The court ruled that the latter instruction “is not a punishment” but instead is “an explanation to the jury of its fact-finding powers.”

The Mali court found the trial court’s instructions did not “direct the jury to accept any fact as true” or “instruct the jury to draw any inference against the Plaintiffs.” Because “the court left the jury in full control of all fact finding,” it fell within the explanatory classification of instructions.

So, what do you think?  Was the permissive adverse inference instruction warranted?   Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case Summary Source: Applied Discovery (free subscription required).  For eDiscovery news and best practices, check out the Applied Discovery Blog here.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Default Judgment Sanction Upheld on Appeal – eDiscovery Case Law

In Stooksbury v. Ross, Nos. 12-5739/12-6042/12-6230, No. 13a0575n.06 (6th Cir. June 13, 2013), the Sixth Circuit upheld the entry of default judgment as a sanction against defendants that repeatedly failed to comply with discovery obligations, including producing a “document dump” of tens of thousands of pages of nonresponsive information that prejudiced the plaintiffs.

At trial in this RICO action, the court found the defendants engaged in “contumacious conduct” and intentionally delayed discovery. Although the defendants had provided a document “dump” of 40,000 pages of documents in response to document requests, the information was not responsive to the requests, lacked important financial information, was not Bates stamped, and prejudiced the plaintiff. The plaintiffs asked the court to sanction the defendants, and the magistrate judge recommended default judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The judge found that the defendant had a “‘total lack of forthrightness’” in refusing to comply and explain their noncompliance; this conduct “‘amount[ed] to bad faith and a willful decision not to cooperate in discovery.’” The district court subsequently adopted the magistrate judge’s findings but awarded costs and fees instead of a default judgment. The court also afforded the defendants 10 more days to comply with the discovery order, warning them that noncompliance could result in further sanctions.

Despite the additional time and warning, the defendants still failed to provide responsive discovery: “[T]hey included boilerplate objections and failed to provide basic accounting documents or Bates stamp references for the earlier document dump.” As a result, when the plaintiff renewed his motion for a default judgment, the court granted it. The district court relied on four findings: “(1) the defendants intentionally failed to comply with the discovery orders, (2) they failed to heed the court’s warning, (3) the plaintiff suffered prejudice as a result of their noncompliance, and (4) less drastic sanctions would not be effective.” The defendants later objected, but the court refused to reconsider its motion, finding there was no evidence that the defendants’ actions stemmed from excusable neglect.

The defendants appealed this decision. The court reviewed the district court’s four findings for an abuse of discretion. The Sixth Circuit approved the lower court’s decision for the following reasons:

  • First, the defendants met the standard for “willful conduct and bad faith” because they “lacked forthrightness, failed to directly respond to the Court’s inquiries about the discovery matters, offered no explanation for their lack of compliance, and demonstrated ‘bad faith and a willful decision not to cooperate in discovery.’”
  • Second, the plaintiff was prejudiced because the dispute had continued for more than a year, despite judicial intervention and two continuances. Further, the “discovery abuses imposed excessive costs on Plaintiff, who had to sort through the document dump, and undermined Plaintiff’s proof on the issue of liability.”
  • Third, the defendants were fairly warned about the possibility of sanctions, including a default judgment, by the magistrate judge and district court.
  • Fourth, the court first issued a less severe sanction and warned the defendants of the possibility of the default if they did not meet their discovery obligations. Nevertheless, the defendants “forced the district court’s hand in ordering the default judgment.”

Accordingly, the court ruled there was no abuse of discretion.

So, what do you think?  Was the default judgment sanction warranted?   Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case Summary Source: Applied Discovery (free subscription required).  For eDiscovery news and best practices, check out the Applied Discovery Blog here.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Plaintiff Needs More Than “Mere Hope” to Discover Defendant’s Personal Info – eDiscovery Case Law

We’ve seen several cases where social media or personal data was requested – with some requests granted (including this one, this one, this one, this one and this one) and other requests denied (including this one, this one, this one and this one).  Here is another recent case where the request was denied.

In Salvato v. Miley, No. 5:12-CV-635-Oc-10PRL (M.D. Fla. June 11, 2013), a wrongful death action, Florida Magistrate Judge Philip R. Lammens denied the plaintiff’s motion to compel the defendant’s responses to discovery requests “based on Plaintiff’s very limited showing as to the relevance of the requested discovery and the broadly drafted discovery requests”.

In this case, the plaintiff sued two police officers for causing their son’s death by using excessive force and failing to provide medical treatment. During discovery, the plaintiff filed a motion to compel one officer’s responses to the discovery requests. The interrogatories in question sought information about the defendant’s cell phone numbers, e-mail addresses, social media accounts, and list-serve or message board membership. The contested requests for production sought cell phone records, including all text messages; e-mails; social media messages and other communications; and comments made on websites or message boards that related to the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint. The defendant objected, arguing that the requests sought confidential information and invaded his privacy, sought irrelevant information and amounted to a fishing expedition, and were intended to annoy, embarrass, and oppress him.

Judge Lammens found the plaintiff “failed to make a threshold showing that the requested information is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” The plaintiff’s argument in support of the relevancy of the requests was that they seek “‘information about statements that Defendant Brown made about the incident at issue in this case, which could include admissions against interest, and could certainly lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’” Judge Lammens ruled that the “mere hope” that the texts, e-mails, and other communications might contain an admission is not enough to allow the plaintiff “open access to [the defendant’s] private communications with third parties.” Accordingly, the judge rejected the plaintiff’s attempt “to conduct ‘a fishing expedition’” because he did “‘not have a generalized right to rummage at will through information that Plaintiff has limited from public view.’”

So, what do you think?  Should the motion to compel have been granted?   Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case Summary Source: Applied Discovery (free subscription required).  For eDiscovery news and best practices, check out the Applied Discovery Blog here.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Compels Discovery of Plaintiff’s Facebook Posts as Relevant – eDiscovery Case Law

In Moore v. Miller, No.: 10-cv-651-JLK, 2013 (D. Colo. June 6, 2013), Colorado Senior District Judge John L. Kane ruled (over the plaintiff’s privacy objections) that the plaintiff’s Facebook posts and activity log must be produced because they related to his claims of physical injury and emotional distress and because the plaintiff put his posts directly at issue by discussing the incident giving rise to the lawsuit online.

In this case, the defendants filed a motion to enforce the court’s order to compel the plaintiff’s production of “writings related to his arrest, his tax records, and his employment records.” As part of those writings, the defendants asked for his Facebook records and activity log and documents he posted on his websites. The defendants claimed that the plaintiff did not comply because he only partially produced writings, including “‘an incomplete and highly-redacted printout of Plaintiff’s Facebook wall posts’” and he did not produce an activity log.

The plaintiff relied on his interpretation of “about his arrest” to narrow the scope of the order compelling production. The court remarked that narrowing the scope to this extent would “exclude writings relevant to the arrest such as writings relating to Mr. Moore’s bias, emotional and physical states before and after the arrest and his alleged physical and mental injuries.” Moreover, the court noted that the defendants’ request for Facebook information extended to “all of his missing Facebook posts” and the activity log.

The plaintiff argued that this expanded scope sought irrelevant evidence and would invade his privacy. But the court found the plaintiff’s allegations of physical injury and emotional distress warranted a more in-depth review of his social media account. His “Facebook activity is relevant to his claims of emotional pain and suffering (for which he claims $750,000 in damages) as well as his claims of physical pain ($750,000) and humiliation ($500,000).” Moreover, the plaintiff “reputedly has chosen to share his version of events online often and in many different forums, including detailed and specific descriptions of what he alleges happened to him on March 25, 2008, as well as the injuries he allegedly suffers to this day.” {emphasis added}

Although the plaintiff requested that the data be reviewed in camera, the court found its protective order would protect the plaintiff’s privacy.

The court also granted the defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees related to the motion, noting “how unfortunate it is that the parties’ differing interpretations about the scope of ordered discovery spawned a chain of hostile emails and ultimately the instant motion. Where the nature or scope of an Order is contested, the best course of action is for the disputing parties jointly to file a motion for clarification.” In addition, the motion sought the defendant’s current address, tax returns, and employment history: “No party should have to resort to motion practice to obtain information as elemental as a party opponent’s address.”

So, what do you think?  Was the judge right to allow discovery of the plaintiff’s Facebook information?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case Summary Source: Applied Discovery (free subscription required).  For eDiscovery news and best practices, check out the Applied Discovery Blog here.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Appellate Court Denies Sanctions for Routine Deletion of Text Messages – eDiscovery Case Law

In PTSI, Inc. v. Haley, No. 684 WDA 2012, 2013 Pa. Super. (Pa. Super. Ct. May 24, 2013), the appellate court denied a motion for spoliation sanctions where the defendants routinely deleted text messages and other data to “clean up” their personal electronic devices: the volume of messages and limited amount of phone storage made it difficult to retain all data and still use the phone for messaging.

Here, the plaintiff filed claims of conversion, breach of the duty of loyalty, and breach of fiduciary duty against its former at-will employees and their new competing business. The trial court dismissed all claims at summary judgment. It also denied PTSI’s motion seeking sanctions for spoliation, because the deletion of electronically stored information, including text messages, was not relevant to the summary judgment decision.

During discovery, PTSI filed a motion seeking sanctions based on its two former employees’ deletion of electronic records from their computers and phones, including text messages. The company claimed the information was “vital to the prosecution of this case” and could not be “feasibly reconstructed or retrieved without enormous time and expense to PTSI, if at all.”

Under Pennsylvania law, the court had to evaluate three factors to determine the appropriate sanction: “(1) the degree of fault of the party who altered or destroyed the evidence; (2) the degree of prejudice suffered by the opposing party; and (3) whether there is a lesser sanction that will avoid substantial unfairness to the opposing party and, where the offending party is seriously at fault, will serve to deter such conduct by others in the future.”

To determine the level of fault, the court considered the extent of the duty to preserve the evidence, based on whether litigation is foreseeable and whether the evidence might be prejudicial to the opposing party, and whether the evidence was destroyed in bad faith. The court also considered proportionality in making decisions, including five factors spelled out in the comments to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure:

  • the nature and scope of the litigation, including the importance and complexity of the issues and the amounts at stake;
  • the relevance of electronically stored information and its importance to the court’s adjudication in the given case;
  • the cost, burden and delay that may be imposed on the parties to deal with electronically stored information;
  • the ease of producing electronically stored information and whether substantially similar information is available with less burden; and
  • any other factors relevant under the circumstances.

Here, the amount in controversy and the importance of the issues involving the data did not support awarding a discovery sanction. Moreover, PTSI could not show that its former employees’ “innocent clean up of personal electronic devices to allow them to function was unusual, unreasonable or improper under the circumstances.” Because the defendants “routinely deleted text messages, often on a daily basis, so as not to unduly encumber their iPhones” and because of “the volume of text messages that are frequently exchanged by cell phone users and the limited amount of storage on cell phones, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to save all text messages and to continue to use the phone for messaging.” Furthermore, the order of preservation was entered well after any relevant data would have already been created and deleted. In addition, similar information was available from other sources and custodians; the forensic examiner in the case unearthed more than 1,000 e-mails from the employees’ computers. Finally, any spoliation inference could not defeat the summary judgment motion.

The appellate court agreed with the trial court’s reasoning and found no abuse of discretion.

So, what do you think?  Should the sanctions have been granted?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case Summary Source: Applied Discovery (free subscription required).  For eDiscovery news and best practices, check out the Applied Discovery Blog here.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Judge Rules Against Spoliation Sanctions when the Evidence Doesn’t Support the Case – eDiscovery Case Law

In Cottle-Banks v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., No. 10cv2133-GPC (WVG) (S.D. Cal. May 21, 2013), California District Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel denied the plaintiff’s motion for spolation sanctions because the plaintiff was unable to show that deleted recordings of customer calls would have likely been relevant and supportive of her claim.

The defendant provides services and products such as set-top cable boxes and customers call in to order these services and products.  The plaintiff alleged a practice of charging customers for boxes without disclosing, and obtaining approval for equipment charges – a violation of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 543(f).  The plaintiff’s discovery requests included copies of recording of her own calls with the defendant, and the defendant began preserving tapes when the plaintiff notified the defendant that she would seek call recordings in discovery, not before that.  As a result, the plaintiff filed a motion for spoliation sanctions, requesting an adverse inference and requesting that the defendant be excluded from introducing evidence that it’s call recordings complied with 47 U.S.C. § 543(f).

From the call recordings still available, a sample of recordings was provided to the plaintiff – in those calls, it was evident that the defendant did, in fact, get affirmative acceptance of the additional charges as a matter of practice.

Judge Curiel ruled that the defendant “had an obligation to preserve the call recordings when the complaint was filed in September 2010” and that the defendant “had an obligation to preserve the call recording, [so] Defendant was negligent in failing to preserve the back up tapes. Thus, Defendant had a culpable state of mind.”  However, because the “Plaintiff cited only two call recordings out of 280 call recordings produced to support her position”, the judge concluded “that the deleted call recordings would not have been supportive of Plaintiff’s claim.”  Because “Plaintiff has not demonstrated all three factors to support an adverse inference sanction”, Judge Curiel denied the plaintiff’s motion as to adverse inference and preclusion.

So, what do you think?  Should the sanction request have been denied?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Adverse Inference Sanction for Defendant who Failed to Stop Automatic Deletion – eDiscovery Case Law

Remember the adverse inference instructions in the Zubulake v. UBS Warburg and Apple v. Samsung cases?  This case has characteristics of both of those.

In Pillay v. Millard Refrigerated Servs., Inc., No. 09 C 5725 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2013), Illinois District Judge Joan H. Lefkow granted the plaintiff’s motion for an adverse inference jury instruction due to the defendant’s failure to stop automatic deletion of employee productivity tracking data used as a reason for terminating a disabled employee.

Case Background

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant is liable for retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) for terminating his employment after the plaintiff opposed the defendant’s decision to terminate another employee because of a perceived disability.  The defendant employed a labor management system (“LMS”) to track its warehouse employees’ productivity and performance.  Shortly after hiring the employee and telling him that his LMS numbers were great, the defendant fired the employee when it was determined that a prior work injury he suffered rendered him with a disability rating of 17.5 percent by the Illinois Industrial Commission, which prompted the senior vice president to send an email to the general manager stating “We have this all documented right? … Let’s get him out asap.”  The employee (and the plaintiff, for objecting to the termination) was terminated in August 2008 and the defendant contended that the employee’s termination resulted from his unacceptable LMS performance rating of 59 percent.

Deletion of LMS Data

In August 2009, the raw data used to create the employee’s LMS numbers were deleted because the LMS software automatically deleted the underlying data after a year. Before the information was deleted, the plaintiff and other terminated employee provided several notices of the duty to preserve this information, including:

  • A demand letter from the plaintiff in September 2008;
  • Preservation notices from the plaintiff and other terminated employee in December 2008 reminding the defendant of its obligations to preserve evidence;
  • Charges filed by both terminated employees with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) in January 2009.

Also, the defendant’s 30(b)(6) witness testified that supervisors could lower an LMS performance rating by deleting the underlying data showing that an employee worked a certain number of jobs for a given period of time, which the plaintiff contended happened in this case.  As a result, the plaintiff filed a motion for the adverse inference jury instruction.

Judge’s Ruling

Noting that the defendant “relied on this information when responding to the EEOC charges, which occurred before the deletion of the underlying LMS data” and that “[i]nformation regarding the underlying LMS data would have been discoverable to challenge Millard’s explanation for Ramirez’s termination”, Judge Lefkow found that the defendant had a duty to preserve the LMS data (“A party must preserve evidence that it has notice is reasonably likely to be the subject of a discovery request, even before a request is actually received.”).

With regard to the defendant’s culpability in deleting the data, Judge Lefkow stated “[t]hat Millard knew about the pending lawsuit and that the underlying LMS data would be deleted but failed to preserve the information was objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, even without a finding of bad faith, the court may craft a proper sanction based on Millard’s failure to preserve the underlying LMS data.”

So, Judge Lefkow granted the plaintiff’s request for an adverse inference sanction with the following instruction to be given to the jury:

“Pillay contends that Millard at one time possessed data documenting Ramirez’s productivity and performance that was destroyed by Millard. Millard contends that the loss of the data was accidental. You may assume that such evidence would have been unfavorable to Millard only if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) Millard intentionally or recklessly caused the evidence to be destroyed; and (2) Millard caused the evidence to be destroyed in bad faith.”

So, what do you think?  Should the adverse inference sanction have been awarded?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Capturing Memory and Obtaining Protected Files with FTK Imager – eDiscovery Best Practices

Over the past few weeks, we have talked about the benefits and capabilities of Forensic Toolkit (FTK) Imager from AccessData (and obtaining your own free copy), how to create a disk image, how to add evidence items for the purpose of reviewing the contents of those evidence items (such as physical drives or images that you’ve created) and how to export files and create a custom content image of a targeted collection of files with FTK Imager.  This week, let’s discuss how to Capture Memory and Obtain Protected Files to collect a user’s account information and possible passwords to other files.

Capture Memory

If you’re trying to access the contents of memory from an existing system that’s running, you can use a runtime version of FTK Imager from a flash drive to access that memory.  From the File menu, you can select Capture Memory to capture data stored in memory within the system.

Capturing memory can be useful for a number of reasons.  For example, if TrueCrypt is running to encrypt the contents of the drive, the password could be stored in memory – if it is, Capture Memory enables you to capture the contents of memory (including the password) before it is lost.

Simply specify the destination path and filename to capture memory to the specified file.  You can also include the contents of pagefile.sys, which is a Windows system file that acts as a swap file for memory; hence, it can contain useful memory information as well.  Creating an AD1 file enables you to create an AD1 image of the memory contents – then you can add it as an evidence item to review the contents.

Obtain Protected Files

Because Windows does not allow you to copy or save live Registry files, you would have to image the hard drive and then extract the Registry files, or boot the computer from a boot disk and copy the Registry files from the inactive operating system on the drive. From the File menu, you can select Obtain Protected Files to circumvent the Windows operating system and its file locks, thus allowing you to copy the live Registry files.  If the user allows Windows to remember his or her passwords, that information can be stored within the registry files.

Specify the destination path for the obtained files, then select the option for which files you would like to obtain.  The Minimum files for login recovery option retrieves Users, System, and SAM files from which you can recover a user’s account information.  The Password recovery and all Registry files option is more comprehensive, retrieving Users, System, SAM, NTUSER.DAT, Default, Security, Software, and Userdiff files from which you can recover account information and possible passwords to other files, so it’s the one we tend to use.

For more information, go to the Help menu to access the User Guide in PDF format.

So, what do you think?  Have you used FTK Imager as a mechanism for eDiscovery collection?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.