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Court Forces Defendant to Come to Terms with Plaintiff Search Request – eDiscovery Case Law

In Robert Bosch LLC v. Snap-On, Inc., No. 12-11503, (D. ED Mich. Mar. 14, 2013), Michigan District Judge Robert H. Cleland granted the plaintiff’s motion to compel with regard to specific search terms requested for the defendant to perform.  The judge denied the plaintiff’s request for sanctions to award attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred in bringing its motion to compel.

The plaintiff filed a motion to compel the defendant to perform the following two search terms for discovery purposes (where “!” is a wildcard character):

  • (diagnostic! and test!), and
  • ([ECU or “electronic control unit”] and diagnostic!)

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1)(A), a party must produce relevant documents and electronically stored information. While the defendant did not dispute that the search terms are relevant, they argued that the terms were so broad and commonly used in day-to-day business that searching the terms would be burdensome and result in overproduction by including large portions of their business unrelated to the case.  The defendant’s arguments were twofold:

  1. Overbroad: The defendant claimed that “the word ‘diagnostics’ is included in at least one custodian’s email signature and that ‘the vast majority of documents in Snapon’s Diagnostic Group include the word `Diagnostics,’ thereby effectively reducing the disputed terms to `test!’ and `(ECU or “electronic control unit”).’”
  2. More Appropriate Alternatives: The defendant contended that the term “diagnostic” would be sufficiently searched by already agreed upon searches which pair “diagnostic” with “more narrowly tailored conjunctive terms, such as ‘plug’ and ‘database,’ that are not as common as ‘test’ and ‘ECU.’” The defendant also claimed that the search terms were unnecessary because they agreed to run searches of all of the variations of the names of the accused products.

Judge Cleland stated that he found the defendant’s arguments “unpersuasive”, stating that “[e]ven though Snap-on has agreed to search all variations of the names of the accused products, the disputed search terms may uncover relevant documents that do not contain the accused products’ names. The court is not convinced that the terms “test” and “ECU” are significantly more common than “plug” and “database” such that searching (diagnostic! and plug) is reasonable but searching (diagnostic! and test!) is burdensome.”

Judge Cleland also suggested techniques “to limit any overproduction”, including not producing emails in which the term “diagnostic” was found only in the signature portion and using proximity connectors (agreed-upon with the plaintiff) in the searches.  He also recommended that the defendant “should communicate the proposed techniques to Bosch prior to running the searches” and that the “parties should discuss and agree upon the details of the techniques so that the searches are conducted without generating further motion practice on the matter.”

The judge, however, denied the plaintiff’s request for sanctions in the form of reimbursement of attorneys’ fees and expenses for filing the motion to compel, indicating that the defendant “has provided logical reasons for objecting to the disputed search terms”.

It’s interesting that the defendant didn’t provide document retrieval counts and try to argue on the basis of proportionality.  Perhaps providing the counts would reveal too much strategy?  Regardless, it seems that the wildcard search for “test” could be argued as potentially overbroad – there are 60 words in the English language that begin with “test”.  It looks like somebody is getting “wild” with wildcards!

So, what do you think?  Could the defendant have made a more effective argument, based on proportionality?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Plaintiffs’ Objections to Defendant’s Use of Keyword Search before Predictive Coding Rejected – eDiscovery Case Law

Is it possible to produce documents for discovery too early?  At least one plaintiff’s group says yes.

In the case In Re: Biomet M2a Magnum Hip Implant Products Liability Litigation (MDL 2391), thhttps://cloudnine.com/ediscoverydaily/ralph-losey-of-jackson-lewis-llp-ediscovery-trends-part-1/e Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee in a Multi District Litigation objected to the defendant’s use of keyword searching prior to performing predictive coding and requested that the defendant go back to its original set of 19.5 million documents and repeat the predictive coding without performing keyword searching.  Indiana District Judge Robert L. Miller, Jr. denied the request.

Defendant’s Discovery Efforts to Date

In this dispute over hip implant products, the defendant began producing documents in cases that were eventually centralized, despite (sometimes forceful) requests by plaintiffs’ counsel not to begin document production until the decision whether to centralize was made.  The defendant used keyword culling to reduce the universe of documents and attachments from 19.5 million documents to 3.9 million documents, and removing duplicates left 2.5 million documents and attachments. The defendant performed statistical sampling tests, with a 99 percent confidence rate, to determine that between .55% and 1.33% of the unselected documents would be responsive and (with the same confidence level) that between 1.37% and 2.47% of the original 19.5 million documents were responsive.  The defendant’s approach actually retrieved 16% of the original 19.5 million.  The defendant then performed predictive coding to identify responsive documents to be produced from the set of 2.5 million documents.

According to the order, the defendant’s eDiscovery costs “are about $1.07 million and will total between $2 million and $3.25 million.” {emphasis added}  The defendant “invited the Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee to suggest additional search terms and offered to produce the rest of the non-privileged documents from the post-keyword 2.5 million”, but they declined, “believing they are too little to assure proper document production”.

Plaintiffs’ Objections

The plaintiffs’ Steering Committee objected, claiming that the defendant’s use of keyword searching “has tainted the process”, pointing to an article which “mentioned unidentified ‘literature stating that linear review would generate a responsive rate of 60 percent and key word searches only 20 percent, and [the defendants in the case being discussed] proposed that predictive coding at a 75 percent responsive rate would be sufficient.’” {emphasis added}  They requested that the defendant “go back to its 19.5 million documents and employ predictive coding, with plaintiffs and defendants jointly entering the ‘find more like this’ commands.”  In response to the defendant’s objections that virtually starting over would cost additional millions, the Steering Committee blamed the defendant for spending millions on document production despite being warned not to begin until the cases had been centralized.

Judge’s Ruling

Noting that “[w]hat Biomet has done complies fully with the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b) and 34(b)(2)”, Judge Miller noted that “the Steering Committee’s request that Biomet go back to Square One…and institute predictive coding at that earlier stage sits uneasily with the proportionality standard in Rule 26(b)(2)(C).”  Continuing, Judge Miller stated:

“Even in light of the needs of the hundreds of plaintiffs in this case, the very large amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake, and the importance of this discovery in resolving the issues, I can’t find that the likely benefits of the discovery proposed by the Steering Committee equals or outweighs its additional burden on, and additional expense to, Biomet.”

Judge Miller also rejected the Steering Committee’s position that the defendant can’t rely on proportionality arguments because they proceeded with document production while the centralization decision was pending: “The Steering Committee hasn’t argued (and I assume it can’t argue) that Biomet had no disclosure or document identification obligation in any of the cases that were awaiting a ruling on (or even the filing of) the centralization petition.”  As a result, he ruled that the Steering Committee would have to bear the expense for “production of documents that can be identified only through re-commenced processing, predictive coding, review, and production”.

So, what do you think?  Was the judge correct to accept the defendant’s multimodal approach to discovery?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Plaintiff Receives Adverse Inference Sanction for Deleting Facebook Profile – eDiscovery Case Law

Unlike last week’s case law summary about a case where a request for social media data was denied, this week’s case law summary relates to sanctions for deleting a social media data profile.

In Gatto v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 10-cv-1090-ES-SCM, (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2013), New Jersey Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion issued an adverse inference sanction against the plaintiff for failing to preserve data due to the fact that he either, deactivated his Facebook account and allowed the account to be automatically deleted after fourteen days, or that he deleted the account outright.  Judge Mannion denied the defendant’s request for attorney’s fees and costs for “the time and effort it was forced to expend in an effort to obtain discovery”.

Case Background

In this personal injury action, a ground operations supervisor alleged injuries after vehicles operated by the defendants did “crash into him”.  The defendants served a production request to the plaintiff in July 2011 which included a request for documents and information related to social media accounts maintained by the plaintiff.  In November 2011, the plaintiff provided the defendants with signed authorizations for the release of information from sites such as eBay and PayPal, but did not include an authorization for the release of records from Facebook.  In a settlement conference in December 2011, the judge ordered the plaintiff to execute an authorization for the release of documents and information from Facebook and the plaintiff agreed to change his password and provide it to the defendants.

However, the parties disputed whether it was agreed that defense counsel would directly access the plaintiff’s Facebook account.  The defendants subsequently accessed the account and the plaintiff received an alert from Facebook that his account was logged onto from an unfamiliar IP address.  After, in January 2012, the plaintiff’s counsel agreed to download the Facebook account information and provide a copy to the parties, it was determined that the plaintiff’s Facebook account had been deactivated back on December 16, 2011 (after he received the alert from Facebook), and that all of the plaintiff’s account data was lost.  As a result, the defendants requested the adverse inference instruction and monetary sanctions.

Judge’s Evaluation and Ruling

Judge Mannion noted four factors in considering an adverse inference instruction sanction:

  1. the evidence was within the party’s control;
  2. there was an actual suppression or withholding of evidence;
  3. the evidence was destroyed or withheld was relevant to the claims or defenses; and
  4. it was reasonably foreseeable that the evidence would be discoverable.

Judge Mannion stated, “Here, the deletion of Plaintiff’s Facebook account clearly satisfies the first, third, and fourth of the aforementioned factors.  Plaintiff’s Facebook account was clearly within his control, as Plaintiff had authority to add, delete, or modify his account’s content…It is also clear that Plaintiff’s Facebook account was relevant to the litigation.”  With regard to the second factor and the plaintiff’s claim that the deletion was unintentional, Judge Mannion ruled that “Even if Plaintiff did not intend to permanently deprive the defendants of the information associated with his Facebook account, there is no dispute that Plaintiff intentionally deactivated the account. In doing so, and then failing to reactivate the account within the necessary time period, Plaintiff effectively caused the account to be permanently deleted.”  Finding all four factors satisfied, Judge Mannion granted the adverse inference instruction sanction.  With regard to the request for fees and costs, Judge Mannion ruled that “such a decision is left to the discretion of the court” and denied the request.

So, what do you think?  Was the sanction appropriate?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Appeals Court Upholds Decision Not to Recuse Judge Peck in Da Silva Moore – eDiscovery Case Law

As reported by IT-Lex, the Second Circuit of the US Court of Appeals rejected the Plaintiff’s request for a writ of mandamus recusing Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck from Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe SA.

The entire opinion is stated as follows:

“Petitioners, through counsel, petition this Court for a writ of mandamus compelling the recusal of Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck. Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED that the mandamus petition is DENIED because Petitioners have not ‘clearly and indisputably demonstrate[d] that [Magistrate Judge Peck] abused [his] discretion’ in denying their district court recusal motion, In re Basciano, 542 F. 3d 950, 956 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1312-13 (2d Cir. 1988)), or that the district court erred in overruling their objection to that decision.”

Now, the plaintiffs have been denied in their recusal efforts in three courts.

Since it has been a while, let’s recap the case for those who may have not been following it and may be new to the blog.

Last year, back in February, Judge Peck issued an opinion making this case likely the first case to accept the use of computer-assisted review of electronically stored information (“ESI”) for this case.  However, on March 13, District Court Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. granted the plaintiffs’ request to submit additional briefing on their February 22 objections to the ruling.  In that briefing (filed on March 26), the plaintiffs claimed that the protocol approved for predictive coding “risks failing to capture a staggering 65% of the relevant documents in this case” and questioned Judge Peck’s relationship with defense counsel and with the selected vendor for the case, Recommind.

Then, on April 5, Judge Peck issued an order in response to Plaintiffs’ letter requesting his recusal, directing plaintiffs to indicate whether they would file a formal motion for recusal or ask the Court to consider the letter as the motion.  On April 13, (Friday the 13th, that is), the plaintiffs did just that, by formally requesting the recusal of Judge Peck (the defendants issued a response in opposition on April 30).  But, on April 25, Judge Carter issued an opinion and order in the case, upholding Judge Peck’s opinion approving computer-assisted review.

Not done, the plaintiffs filed an objection on May 9 to Judge Peck’s rejection of their request to stay discovery pending the resolution of outstanding motions and objections (including the recusal motion, which has yet to be ruled on.  Then, on May 14, Judge Peck issued a stay, stopping defendant MSLGroup’s production of electronically stored information.  On June 15, in a 56 page opinion and order, Judge Peck denied the plaintiffs’ motion for recusal.  Judge Carter ruled on the plaintiff’s recusal request on November 7, denying the request and stating that “Judge Peck’s decision accepting computer-assisted review … was not influenced by bias, nor did it create any appearance of bias”.

So, what do you think?  Will this finally end the recusal question in this case?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Yet Another Request for Facebook Data Denied – eDiscovery Case Law

We’ve seen several cases where social media data was requested – with some requests granted (including this one, this one, this one and this one) and other requests denied (including this one, this one, this one and this one).  Here is a recent case where the request was denied.

In Potts v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-01180, (D. MD Tenn. Mar. 20, 2013), Tennessee District Judge William Haynes ruled that the defendant “lacks any evidentiary showing that Plaintiff’s public Facebook profile contains information that will reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” and, therefore, denied the defendant’s motion to compel regarding same.

In this harassment and discrimination case, the defendant, after serving requests for production on the plaintiff in April 2012, deposed the plaintiff on February 7 of this year, where she testified that she and her counsel possessed several other documents that they did not produce for the defendant.  The defendant filed a motion to compel several types of data including “Facebook and/or other social media data”.  Since the motion to compel, the plaintiff produced the following items:

  • Plaintiff’s day planner;
  • 8-10 pages of documentation concerning “write-ups” and “store visits” from Plaintiff’s employment at the Dollar Tree Store;
  • All saved or exchanged emails between Plaintiff, Trowery and/or any other representatives of Dollar Tree, or involving anything relevant to Plaintiff’s claim in Plaintiff’s possession, including the email containing a draft of Plaintiff’s statement to the EEOC in support of Trowery.

With regard to the request for Facebook data, the plaintiff objected, citing “other court’s holdings that the discovery of Facebook is allowed only where “the defendant makes a threshold showing that publicly available information on [Facebook] undermines the Plaintiff’s claims.”

Judge Haynes noted that while the Sixth Circuit has not yet ruled on the scope of discovery of private Facebook pages, other courts hold that:

“[M]aterial posted on a `private Facebook page, that is accessible to a selected group of recipients but not available for viewing by the general public, is generally not privileged, nor is it protected by common law or civil law notions of privacy. Nevertheless, the Defendant does not have a generalized right to rummage at will through information that Plaintiff has limited from public view. Rather, consistent with Rule 26(b) . . . [and decisional law] . . . there must be a threshold showing that the requested information is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Otherwise, the Defendant would be allowed to engaged in the proverbial fishing expedition, in the hope that there might be something of relevance in Plaintiff’s Facebook account.”

In this case, Judge Haynes ruled that “The Defendant lacks any evidentiary showing that Plaintiff’s public Facebook profile contains information that will reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence…Thus, the Court concludes that Defendant has not made the requisite showing for full access to Plaintiff’s private Facebook or other social media pages.”

The defendant also requested reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in preparing the motion to compel, but Judge Haynes ruled “Given that Plaintiff had justifiable reasons for her discovery objections, the Court concludes that Defendant is not entitled to attorneys’ fees for its motion to compel.”

So, what do you think?  Was the judge correct to deny the Facebook request?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

The Hammer Comes Down on Losing Plaintiff for Spoliation of Data – eDiscovery Case Law

Apparently, having your case dismissed isn’t the worst that can happen to you for egregious spoliation of data.  You can also be ordered to pay the winning party over $200,000 in fees and costs for the case.

In Taylor v. Mitre Corp., No. 1:11-cv-1247, 2013 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2013), Virginia District Judge Liam O’Grady partially granted the prevailing defendant’s motion for fees and costs after the court dismissed the case due to the plaintiff’s spoliation of evidence. The court refused to grant the costs of image processing because the defendant did not adequately explain the services involved; it granted the costs of forensic analysis of the plaintiff’s laptop and made a partial award of attorneys’ fees given the difficulty in litigating this issue.

In November 2012 (as discussed on this blog here), Judge O’Grady dismissed the plaintiff’s employment-related claims against his former employer, Mitre. Taylor had used a sledgehammer to destroy a computer and data wiping programs to eliminate data from his laptop, prompting case-ending spoliation remedies. When the court ruled in favor of Mitre, it also ruled that Taylor should pay for Mitre’s fees and costs associated with its motion for sanctions.

Mitre claimed fees in the amount of $378,480 and costs in the amount of $49,245. The fees included the costs of forensic analysis of Taylor’s computer and image processing. Noting the “scant case law on the issue of image processing,” Judge O’Grady declined to award costs for this service and also referenced Mitre’s failure to explain “what these image processing services entailed (for example, what does it mean to ‘blow back TIFF images,’ why does it cost $686.00, and why did it need to be performed twice?), but Mitre [made] no claim that the resulting images were ever admitted into evidence.” Although rejecting more than $5,000 of Mitre’s claim, the court permitted Mitre to submit an additional motion to explain these fees.

Mitre also claimed costs of more than $32,000 to analyze Taylor’s laptop. Finding that “Taylor’s intentional destruction of evidence no doubt made forensic analysis of his computer more time consuming and expensive,” Judge O’Grady awarded the fee. However, he partially rejected the request for costs because “the Taxation Guidelines do not entitle Mitre to expert witness fees beyond the $40 per day, plus travel and incidentals, afforded to lay witnesses.” Accordingly the court awarded Mitre the costs of the forensic analysis, minus the costs of $3,200 charged for “‘testimony preparation’ and ‘expert testimony.’”

In addition, Mitre’s attorneys sought compensation for the work they did “as a result of Mr. Taylor’s spoliation. The bill is for 649.2 hours of attorney time and 245.4 hours of paralegal time, for a grand total of $378,480.00 in fees.” The court reduced the hours of the attorneys to 487 hours, finding that some of the time would have been spent regardless of the spoliation, with the rest acceptable because the “spoliation issue was, however, contentious and much ink was spilled.” The court rejected the request for paralegal time, finding the tasks they performed either administrative or attorney work. Ultimately, the court awarded fees of $163,882.18.  Including the awarded costs, the total came to $202,399.66 in fees and costs awarded – a hefty price for using a sledgehammer and data wiping software on two discoverable computers.

So, what do you think?  Were the awarded costs appropriate?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Case Summary Source: Applied Discovery (free subscription required).  For eDiscovery news and best practices, check out the Applied Discovery Blog here.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Says Scanning Documents to TIFF and Loading into Database is Taxable – eDiscovery Case Law

Awarding reimbursement of eDiscovery costs continues to be a mixed bag.  Sometimes, reimbursement of costs is awarded, such as in this case and this case.  Other times, those requests have been denied (or reversed) by the courts, including this case, this case and this case.  This time, reimbursement of eDiscovery costs was approved.

In Amana Society, Inc. v. Excel Engineering, Inc., No. 10-CV-168-LRR, (N.D. Iowa Feb. 4, 2013), Iowa District Judge Linda R. Reade found that “scanning [to TIFF format] for Summation purposes qualifies as ‘making copies of materials’ and that these costs are recoverable”.

With regard to the plaintiff’s claims of negligent misrepresentation and professional negligence, the defendant obtained partial summary judgment from the court on one claim and prevailed at trial on the other claim. The defendant subsequently filed a bill of costs asking the court to tax $51,233.51 in fees against the plaintiff, including “fees and disbursements for printing.” Last October, the plaintiff filed an objection to the bill of costs; in its response, the defendant withdrew its requests for certain costs and reduced the total amount requested to $50,050.61.

The requested costs included $6,000 in copying costs, including almost $5,000 in costs for uploading documents to Summation, the popular litigation support software application. The plaintiff claimed the costs were not taxable because “(1) the costs were incurred for the convenience of counsel; and (2) the costs were discovery related and were not necessary for use at trial.” On the other hand, the defendant asserted “‘[t]he electronic scanning of documents is the modern-day equivalent of exemplification and copies of paper and therefore can be taxed pursuant to§ 1920(4).’”  Taxable costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920, includes “[f]ees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case.”

Judge Reade cited Race Tires America, Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp. (where the winning defendants were originally awarded $367,000 as reimbursement for eDiscovery costs, but that amount was reduced to $30,370 on appeal), and found “the conversion of native files to TIFF . . . and the scanning of documents to create digital duplicates are generally recognized as the taxable ‘making copies of material.’”  Approving reimbursement for these expenses “in light of the facts and document-intensive nature of this case”, the judge rejected the plaintiff’s claim that $2,435.68 of the Summation costs awarded should be disallowed because “they were incurred for discovery purposes”, noting that “[t]here is no absolute bar to recovering costs for discovery-related copying and scanning.”

Judge Reade refused to reimburse some other document related costs, noting that “Bates match, OCR and document utilization are used to organize documents and make them searchable, activities that would traditionally be done by attorneys or support staff, and therefore, are not taxable.”

So, what do you think?  Should the costs have been awarded?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Defendants Sanctioned, Sort Of, for Failure to Preserve Text Messages – eDiscovery Case Law

In Christou v. Beatport, LLC, Civil Action No. 10-cv-02912-RBJ-KMT, (D. Colo. Jan. 23, 2013), Colorado District Judge R. Brooke Jackson ruled that the plaintiffs could introduce evidence at trial to show the defendants failure to preserve text messages after the key defendant’s iPhone was lost.  However, the judge also ruled that the defendants could present “evidence in explanation…and argue that no adverse inference should be drawn”.

The defendant had worked for the plaintiff in his Denver nightclubs booking disc jockeys and received both financial and promotional support from the plaintiff in launching an online marketplace (Beatport) for promoting and selling Electronic Dance Music.  Beatport became enormously successful and grew to become the largest online site that caters essentially exclusively to producers and consumers of Electronic Dance Music.  When the plaintiff left the defendant’s employment, he went on to found his own competing nightclub in Denver and the plaintiff claimed that the defendant has been threatening A-List DJ’s that their tracks will not be promoted on Beatport if they perform in the plaintiff’s clubs.

When the case was filed, plaintiffs served a litigation hold letter on the defendants, directing them to preserve several categories of documents, including text messages. However, defendants took no steps to preserve the text messages on the plaintiff’s iPhone, but did not produce any text messages in response to plaintiffs’ first discovery requests served in May 2011. The defendant indicated that he lost his iPhone in August 2011, and with it any text messages saved on it. Plaintiffs contended that this “spoliation” of evidence should be sanctioned by an adverse jury instruction.  The defendants noted that Roulier testified that he did not use text messages to book DJ’s and argued that “it is sheer speculation” that his text messages contained relevant evidence, also noting that they responded fully to the May 2011 discovery, indicating that there was nothing responsive in the text messages.

Noting that the defendant’s testimony that he did not use text messages to book DJ’s was “hardly proof that his text messages did not contain relevant evidence”, Judge Jackson also noted that “although defendants state that defendants ‘found no responsive text messages,’ they do not indicate that defense counsel reviewed Mr. Roulier’s text messages”.

Noting that “Spoliation sanctions are proper when ‘(1) a party has a duty to preserve evidence because it knew, or should have known, that litigation was imminent, and (2) the adverse party was prejudiced by the destruction of the evidence.’”, Judge Jackson stated that “Defendants had a duty to preserve Mr. Roulier’s text messages as potential evidence, but they did not do it. Those text messages, few as they might have been, should have been preserved and either provided to the plaintiffs or potentially made the subject of further proceedings before the Court.”

Nonetheless, Judge Jackson found “no basis to assume that the loss of the phone was other than accidental, or that the failure to preserve the text messages was other than negligent” – therefore, the judge found an adverse jury instruction to be “too harsh”.  Instead, Judge Jackson ordered that “plaintiffs will be permitted to introduce evidence at trial…of the litigation hold letter” and defendant’s “failure to preserve Mr. Roulier’s text messages”. The defendants were allowed to “present evidence in explanation, assuming of course that the evidence is otherwise admissible, and argue that no adverse inference should be drawn.”

So, what do you think?  Should the sanction have been harsher?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

eDiscovery Daily Is Thirty! (Months Old, That Is)

Thirty months ago yesterday, eDiscovery Daily was launched.  It’s hard to believe that it has been 2 1/2 years since our first three posts that debuted on our first day.  635 posts later, a lot has happened in the industry that we’ve covered.  And, yes we’re still crazy after all these years for committing to a daily post each business day, but we still haven’t missed a business day yet.  Twice a year, we like to take a look back at some of the important stories and topics during that time.  So, here are just a few of the posts over the last six months you may have missed.  Enjoy!

In addition, Jane Gennarelli has been publishing an excellent series to introduce new eDiscovery professionals to the litigation process and litigation terminology.  Here is the latest post, which includes links to the previous twenty one posts.

Thanks for noticing us!  We’ve nearly quadrupled our readership since the first six month period and almost septupled (that’s grown 7 times in size!) our subscriber base since those first six months!  We appreciate the interest you’ve shown in the topics and will do our best to continue to provide interesting and useful eDiscovery news and analysis.  And, as always, please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic!

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

JP Morgan Chase Sanctioned for a Failure to Preserve Skill Codes – eDiscovery Case Law

Last week, we discussed how the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was sanctioned for failing to comply with a motion to compel production of social media data that they had been previously ordered to produce.  Now, the “shoe is on the other foot” as their opponent in another case has been sanctioned for spoliation of data.

In EEOC v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 2:09-cv-864 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2013), District Judge Gregory L. Frost granted the EEOC’s motion for sanctions for spoliation of data, entitling the plaintiff to “a permissive adverse jury instruction related to the spoliation if this litigation proceeds to a jury trial”, and denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

In this gender discrimination case, the plaintiff requested skill codes from the defendant that determined how calls were routed, contending that statistical analysis of the skill code data would reveal discrimination by illustrating that skill codes resulted in the more lucrative calls being directed to male employees.  When defendant did not provide the plaintiff with select skill code data records and other information, the plaintiff filed a motion to compel, which was granted (for most of the requested date range).  When the defendant again failed to produce the data, the plaintiff filed a second motion to compel, then withdrew it after the parties appeared to agree to resolve issues (documented in the Magistrate Judge’s order), then filed the motion for sanctions after the defendant failed to comply, indicating that the defendant had purged data from July 8, 2006 through March 10, 2007.

Noting that it is “curious to this Court that defendant began to preserve some other electronic information shortly thereafter” class notices from the plaintiff in 2008 and 2009, “but not all skill login data until late 2010”, Judge Frost stated that “Defendant’s failure to establish a litigation hold is inexcusable. The multiple notices that should have triggered a hold and Defendant’s dubious failure if not outright refusal to recognize or accept the scope of this litigation and that the relevant data reaches beyond the statutory period present exceptional circumstances that remove the conduct here from the protections provided by Rule 37(e).”

As a result, indicating that “Defendant’s conduct constitutes at least negligence and reaches for willful blindness bordering on intentionality”, Judge Frost granted the EEOC’s motion for sanctions for spoliation of data, entitling the plaintiff to “a permissive adverse jury instruction related to the spoliation if this litigation proceeds to a jury trial”, and denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

So, what do you think?  Did the defendant’s conduct warrant the sanctions?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

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