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When Reviewing and Producing Documents, Don’t Forget the “Mother and Child Reunion” – eDiscovery Best Practices

I love Paul Simon’s music.  One of my favorite songs of his is Mother and Child Reunion.  Of course, I’m such an eDiscovery nerd that every time I think of that song, I think of keeping email and attachment families together.  If you don’t remember the Mother and Child Reunion, you might provide an incomplete production to opposing counsel.

BTW, here’s a little known fact: Paul Simon took the title of the song Mother and Child Reunion from the name of a chicken-and-egg dish he noticed on a Chinese restaurant’s menu.

Like the rest of us, attorneys don’t like to feel shortchanged, especially in discovery.  While there are exceptions, in most cases these days when an email or attachment is deemed to be responsive, the receiving party expects to also receive any “family” members of the responsive file.  Attorneys like to have the complete family when reviewing the production from the other side, even if some of the individual files aren’t responsive themselves.  Receiving an email without its corresponding attachments or receiving some, but not all, of the attachments to an email tends to raise suspicions.  Most attorneys don’t want to give opposing counsel a reason to be suspicious of their production, so parties typically agree to produce the entire email “family” in these cases.  Here’s a scenario:

The case involves a dispute over negotiated gas rate agreements between energy companies and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approval of those rate agreements.  A supervisor at the company verbally requests a copy of a key contract from one of his employees, along with the latest FERC filings and the employee emails a copy of the contract and FERC filing summary attached to an email with the subject “Requested files” and the body stating “Here you go…” (or something to that effect).  A search for “negotiated w/2 (gas or rate or agreement)” retrieves the contract attachment, but not the email, which doesn’t really have any pertinent information on it, or the FERC filing summary.  Only part of the email “family” is responsive to the search.

If it’s important to produce all communications between parties at the company regarding negotiated gas agreements, this communication could be missed – unless your review protocol includes capturing the family members of responsive files and your review software provides an option to view the family members of responsive files and include them in search results.  I underlined “option” because there are still a few cases where parties agree to limit production to actual responsive files and not produce the families (though, in my recent experience, those cases are exceptions).

If your case isn’t one of the exceptions, make sure you have a well thought out protocol and robust software for including family members in your search results and in your document reviews for responsiveness, as well as automated and manual Quality Assurance (QA) and Quality Control (QC) checks to ensure your production contains complete family groups.

So, what came first, the chicken or the egg?  It doesn’t matter, as long as the family group is intact.  🙂

So, what do you think?  How do you handle family groups in discovery?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Denies Sanctions for Deletion of “Smoking Gun” Email, Grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment – eDiscovery Case Law
 

In the case In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 08 C 7082, MDL No. 1997 (N.D. Ill. May 19, 2014), Illinois District Judge Matthew F. Kennelly not only denied the plaintiffs’ request for an adverse inference sanction against the defendants for destroying emails, but also granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, as the plaintiffs failed to provide any supporting circumstantial evidence to meet their burden of proof.

The plaintiffs filed this suit on behalf of all those who purchased text-messaging services from AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile, and Verizon Wireless, alleging that these providers, along with defendant CTIA-The Wireless Association, conspired to fix prices for Text Messaging Services in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.  On September 9, 2008, shortly after the last carrier increased text messaging rates, Senator Herbert Kohl, chairman of the antitrust subcommittee of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, sent a two-page letter to the chief executive officers of the four carrier defendants "to express my concern regarding what appear to be sharply rising rates your companies have charged to wireless phone customers for text messaging”. 

A day later, The Wall Street Journal published an article (Text-Messaging Rates Come Under Scrutiny) regarding Senator Kohl’s investigation.  That same day a T-Mobile employee sent the text of the article via email to several individuals, including T-Mobile employees Adrian Hurditch, then the company's vice president of services and strategic pricing, and Lisa Roddy, then the company's director of marketing planning and analysis, but the subsequent thread of emails between Hurditch and Roddy was deleted.  The plaintiffs claimed that once Senator Kohl began contacting wireless carriers, T-Mobile had a duty to preserve all relevant electronically stored information and their failure to preserve and produce the emails reflected its “willfulness, bad faith, or fault” and warranted sanctions.

Judge Kennelly “agree[d] that plaintiffs have shown that T-Mobile's employees likely deleted the e-mail(s) intentionally and that they did so for the purpose of concealing the e-mail's contents. Nonetheless, plaintiffs have not shown that the actions of the T-Mobile personnel involved concealment of information that meets the requirement of being ‘adverse’ to T-Mobile. Specifically, the record does not reflect that Hurditch, the sender of the original e-mail that was deleted and the person who called T-Mobile's price increase ‘collusive,’ was in a position to have knowledge of or participate in any collusion between the wireless carriers.”  As a result, Judge Kennelly declined to order sanctions against T-Mobile for deletion of the e-mail or e-mails.

The plaintiffs also claimed that another defendant, CTIA destroyed emails and cleared the laptop profile of CTIA’s Head of Wireless Internet Development, but, because the plaintiffs did not provide any evidence that would support an inference that the missing information was adverse, their request for sanctions was again denied.

With regard to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs argued that Hurditch’s email to Roddy on September 10, 2008, with a reference to collusion, is a “smoking gun.”  However, Judge Kennelly stated that “Hurditch's status as well informed within his company and as ‘an active mentor’ to Roddy do not qualify him as having knowledge of a conspiracy”; therefore, “there are too many unsupported steps in the logic required to permit a reasonable inference that Hurditch was aware of a conspiracy”.  With no other supporting circumstantial evidence, the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof to survive the motion for summary judgment; therefore, Judge Kennelly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

So, what do you think?  Should a spoliation sanction have been issued against the defendant who “likely deleted the e-mail(s) intentionally”?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Orders Sharing of Costs for Forensic Examination of Plaintiff’s Emails – eDiscovery Case Law

In Zeller v. So. Central Emergency Med. Servs. Inc., 1:13-CV-2584 (M.D. Pa. May 20, 2014), Pennsylvania Magistrate Judge Karoline Mehalchick used the Zubulake seven factor test to rule that the costs for restoring and searching the plaintiff’s emails should be shared, up to a maximum contribution by $1,500 by the plaintiff.

In this wrongful termination case based on plaintiff’s claims of retaliation by the defendant after the plaintiff took a leave of absence under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the parties began the eDiscovery process to recover the plaintiff’s emails and asked the Court to resolve the issue of “first review” of documents identified as a result of an agreed upon search of Plaintiff’s emails, and the matter of cost-sharing.

The plaintiff asserted that he is entitled to a “first review” of all documents to be produced while the defendants asserted that after forensic retrieval of emails from Plaintiff’s email account, all non-potentially privileged documents should be forwarded directly to the defendants to save time.  Noting that “Plaintiff has no obligation to produce emails that are wholly irrelevant to either party’s claim or defense” and that broad search terms such as the plaintiff’s wife’s name was used, Judge Mehalchick ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to a “first review” of the results of the forensic examination of his email account.

Regarding the cost sharing request by the defendants, Judge Mehalchick referenced Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B) and determined that the data requested was inaccessible without the forensic examination and used the seven factor balance test below for cost-shifting from Zubulake v. UBS Warburg to decide whether forensic examination costs should be shifted.  The factors are:

  1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant information;
  2. The availability of such information from other sources;
  3. The total cost of production, compared to the amount in controversy;
  4. The total cost of production, compared to the resources available to each party;
  5. The relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do so;
  6. The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and
  7. The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.

Judge Mehalchick stated that “the parties were unable to identify the total cost of production of the search, compared to the amount in controversy and the resources to each party”.  However, with regard to the other five factors, she ruled that “the request is specifically tailored to discovery relevant information”, that “there is no other source which could possibly be available”, that since the parties have agreed on a forensic examiner “neither party has any more ability than the other to control the cost”, that “the information sought is important to the issues at stake in the litigation” and that “it is to the benefit of both parties to obtain the information sought”.

As a result, Judge Mehalchick found “that some cost-shifting is appropriate” and ruled “Plaintiff and Defendant should share equally in the cost of restoring and searching Plaintiff’s emails, up to a maximum contribution by Plaintiff of One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1500.00).”

So, what do you think?  Was the Zubulake test applied appropriately?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Court Denies Defendant’s Request to Image Plaintiff’s PCs Three Years after Termination – eDiscovery Case Law
 

Here’s an interesting case courtesy of Virginia Lawyer’s Weekly…

In Downs v. Virginia Health Systems, Civil No. 5:13cv00083, (W.D. Va. June 2, 2014), Virginia Magistrate Judge James G. Welsh, citing proportionality and privacy concerns, denied the defendant’s motion to compel the mirror imaging of the Plaintiff’s personal computers nearly three years after she had been terminated.

The plaintiff brought an employee discrimination case against the defendant following being terminated after nearly seventeen years of employment as an executive secretary.  Among the reasons the defendant gave to justify her discharge was that that she had accessed her supervisor’s e-mail account without authority (she disputed that the access was not authorized) and that she had similarly forwarded information from that account to her personal email accounts and her home computers without permission.

The plaintiff represented that she had deleted all material she sent to her home computers following her August 2011 termination; therefore, the defendant requested to have the plaintiff’s two family computers mirror-imaged “to ensure against any further spoliation or destruction of evidence”.  The plaintiff objected to that request as “overly broad, burdensome, ‘personally intrusive,’ and ‘would necessarily invade’ the attorney-client privilege”.  She also argued that the defendants’ in-house IT experts and its own computer logs and reports would provide the same information being requested by the defendant to be mirror-imaged.

Judge Welsh stated that “On its face, the discovery issue presented by the defendants’ request for an exhaustive forensic examination of the plaintiff’s computers is also directly within the scope of ESI discovery contemplated by the inspection, copying, testing and sampling provisions of Rule 34(a)(1)(A).”  Ultimately, however, he also stated as follows:

“Consideration of the defendants’ ESI motion in a manner consistent with the forgoing discovery rules, standards and principles, compels the following findings and conclusions:

(1) nothing in the record suggests any willful failure, fault or bad faith by the plaintiff on her discovery obligations that would justify the requested computer forensics examination;

(2) the “mirror-imaging” of the plaintiff’s family computers three years after her termination raises significant issues of confidentiality and privacy;

(3) there was no duty on the part of the plaintiff to preserve her family computers as evidence,

(4) principles of proportionality direct that the requested discovery is not sufficiently important to warrant the potential burden or expense in this case; and

(5) on the current record that the defendants have failed to justify a broad, and frankly drastic, forensic computer examination of the plaintiff’s two family computers.”

As a result, “even though the defendants have demonstrated a connection between the plaintiff’s two family computers and the issues this lawsuit”, Judge Welsh stated that “the court’s consideration of the several other relevant factors, including the proportionality balance required by Rule 26(b)(2), all weigh heavily against permitting the exhaustive and intrusive computer forensic examination the defendants seek” and denied the defendant’s motion to compel.

So, what do you think?  Should the drives have been imaged or did the defendant’s request fail the proportionality test?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Plaintiffs Triumph in Second Motion to Enforce Court Ordered Production of Email Attachments – eDiscovery Case Law
 

In Skepnek v. Roper & Twardowsky, LLC, 11-4102-KHV (D. Kan. Jan. 27, 2014), Kansas Magistrate Judge James P. O’Hara ruled on a second motion filed by the plaintiffs to enforce a discovery order that was not followed completely by the defendants – specifically, the plaintiffs sought to compel the production of email attachments that were not produced along with the emails themselves.

The defendants opposed the motion to enforce, first by claiming that the plaintiffs had failed to meet and confer with them regarding the production of the Electronically Stored Information (ESI). While federal rules state that a party filing a motion has a duty to confer with opposing counsel, the local rules for this district expand upon that duty, specifically stating that “a ‘reasonable effort’ to confer means more than mailing or faxing a letter to the opposing party” and that the parties must in good faith “converse, confer, compare views, consult and deliberate, or in good faith attempt to do so.”

Judge O’Hara noted that the opposing parties had exchanged correspondence and held a telephone conference in attempt to resolve this discovery dispute without the court’s intervention, and ruled that the plaintiffs had made a reasonable effort to confer with regard to producing email attachments.

The defendants also objected that the plaintiffs had waived their right to object to the form of production, which was at issue in that it resulted in emails being produced with the attachments missing. The defendants had been ordered to produce “all internal communications among defendants…that pertain to Requests for Production Nos. 6, 7, 10, and 11,” as well as “all electronic communications between Angela Roper, Kenneth Thyne or anyone else associated with Roper & Twardowsky, LLC and the fifteen individuals listed by defendants in their motion.” These emails had been produced in PDF format, which did not result in the attachments being produced.

The plaintiffs suggested that if the ESI had been produced in native format, the attachments would have been included in production. Here, the defendants countered that they have always produced documents in PDF format, including emails, and that it would be “duplicative and burdensome to comply with plaintiffs’ request.” Further, the defendants had claimed that their “e-mail server search was not capable of producing the attachments to the e-mails,” but offered to produce specific attachments requested by the plaintiffs.

Judge O’Hara noted that producing attachments that have not previously been produced is not duplicative, and questioned why the defendants would be able to “produce specific attachments upon request,” when they claimed it was “impossible” to include all of the attachments. Additionally, the defendants did not offer evidence that producing the attachments would be burdensome, and the plaintiffs had not requested re-production of all documents. Instead, they “point[ed] out that one way defendants could [produce the missing attachments] is by producing the e-mails in their native format.”

Stating that the defendants “do not have the leisure of picking and choosing what responsive documents to produce,” Judge O’Hara ordered the defendants to produce all relevant communications, including attachments. No sanctions were imposed, since “both parties are at fault to some degree for failing to adequately confer early on regarding the production of ESI,” but the defendants’ request to have the plaintiffs pay for their production time was denied.

So, what do you think? Should a phone conference constitute a reasonable effort to confer with regard to the production format of ESI? Is PDF ever an appropriate format to produce email communications when attachments are relevant to the litigation at issue? Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Definition of “Electronic Storage” Considered in Invasion of Privacy Lawsuit – eDiscovery Case Law
 

In Cheng v. Romo, No. 11-10007-DJC (D. Mass. Dec. 20, 2013), the interpretation of laws enacted prior to the modern Internet age served as a deciding factor in the outcome of this invasion of privacy lawsuit, which alleged a violation of the Stored Communications Act (SCA).

The plaintiff in this case had sued the defendant for violating the SCA by accessing his web-based emails without his authorization or consent. Here, the question was not whether the emails were read, as the defendant admitted to accessing the plaintiff’s emails. However, the defendant argued that because the plaintiff had previously opened the emails, they did not meet the definition of being in “electronic storage” as described by the SCA.

The question of whether these emails met the qualifications for “electronic storage” under the SCA was therefore addressed accordingly.

The definition of electronic storage as set forth under the SCA is “(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such communication[.]” The plaintiff argued that the emails at issue were covered by at least the second prong, (B), of the definition under the SCA.

In considering this case, Massachusetts District Judge Denise J. Casper recognized that a clear precedent had not been established by previous cases that dealt with similar issues. Several courts have addressed the question of web-based emails as “electronic storage” with consideration of the SCA, with mixed results. Two competing findings in particular were referred to, e.g., Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2003), which found that web-based emails were in electronic storage under this statute; and United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 770-73 (C.D. III. 2009), which found that “[p]reviously opened emails stored by Microsoft for Hotmail [email system] users are not in electronic storage” in the context of a criminal subpoena.

The decision was further influenced by the fact that the SCA was enacted in 1986, and that the statute employed “vague language” in which the definition for electronic storage has not changed since the laws were enacted. For context, it was noted that in 1986, “the process of network communication was still in its infancy; the World Wide Web, and the Internet as we know it, did not arrive until 1990.”

At contention as well was the term “backup storage” in the SCA, which the defendant contended did not apply to the plaintiff’s emails, as he had not made copies of the emails to store elsewhere, and therefore the web-based emails were the only copies existent and were not backups. However, because the statute was written at a time before the modern email system, Judge Casper reasoned that since the defendant “used her web browser to access [plaintiff’s] emails, the text of those emails were transmitted to her own Internet browser, which is how she was able to see, and later print, [plaintiff’s] emails.” Therefore, it was reasonably inferenced that regardless of the number of times the emails were viewed through downloads of web page representations into web browsers, the web-based service “continued to store copies of those same emails” and were held in “storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such communication” – meeting the “electronic storage” definition of the SCA.

In this jury trial, a verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant’s movement to judge as a matter of law was denied, and the case closed.

So, what do you think? Should the court have significant leeway for interpretation of statutes referring to electronic information that date back to pre-Internet periods? Should web-based emails automatically be considered a form of backup storage, in light of the way these services are used today? Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Dispute over Production Format and Search Terms for Electronic Discovery Highlights the Need for Cooperation – eDiscovery Case Law
 

In Saliga v. Chemtura Corp., No. 3:12cv832 (RNC), 2013 U.S. Dist. (D. Conn. Nov. 25, 2013), a discrimination case heard by Connecticut Magistrate Judge Donna F. Martinez, the plaintiff and the defendants had spent a year arguing over the format of production for Electronically Stored Information (ESI) to be used in discovery, as well as relevant search terms, before the plaintiff filed a motion to compel.

Prior to this motion, Judge Martinez had held a status conference and chastised both parties concerning the issue of cooperation, noting that discussions about ESI should begin early in the case under Rule 26(f), which requires that both parties confer in order to develop a discovery plan that addressed “any issues about disclosure or discovery of [ESI], including the form or forms in which it should be produced.” However, it was determined that given the current state of impasse, another meeting between parties would not reach a resolution, necessitating court intervention.

The format for production was the first matter addressed. Originally, the plaintiff had asked that the defendant produce emails for discovery in native format, which would contain application metadata and could also contain system metadata relevant to the litigation, such as file creation dates or the identity of the computer on which the email was created. The defendants’ objection stated that “standard practice is to produce ESI in searchable PDF or TIFF and there is ‘no basis or need’ to produce the emails in native format.”

However, the defendants did not claim any undue burden or expense with regards to the requested production format, nor did they offer a reason why they were unable to comply. Therefore according to Rule 34(b)(1)(c), which states that the requesting party, in this case the plaintiff, may “specify the form or forms in which electronically stored information is to be produced,” Judge Martinez ordered the defendant to produce the requested emails in native format.

The next issue addressed was a complaint by the defendant that two of the requests for production from the plaintiff were overly broad, and therefore unduly burdensome. The plaintiff listed 14 employees to search, and the defendant stated that search results for the employees’ emails yielded more than 925,000 hits. In addition, the complaint claimed this request was a duplicate of the plaintiff’s requested search terms, which caused similar problems.

Prior to the complaint, the parties had failed to agree on the search terms to be used, or how the search should proceed. The unresolved dispute necessitated Judge Martinez’s intervention, despite the fact that the court was “loath to decide the search terms to be used because the parties are far better positioned to do so.” In the discovery request, the plaintiff asked for the defendants to use 12 relevant words and phrases, variously combined with versions of the custodians’ names to create 37 search terms in total. The defendants objected to one of the 12 base search terms, “India Audit,” and claimed that inclusion of the custodians’ names would be “cumulative and unnecessary.”

Judge Martinez agreed that it would be “superfluous” to incorporate the names of the custodians into the search terms, but denied the defendants’ request to discard the contested search term “India Audit” and ordered that it be included.

Finally, the plaintiff’s request for information on the defendants’ data collection process was considered, in light of a letter the plaintiff had submitted to the defendants three months prior that contained “three pages of technical questions about the defendant’s system configuration, acquisition methods and data extraction” and told the defendant “not to produce any ESI discovery until the plaintiff was satisfied that her concerns and questions were resolved.” Judge Martinez rejected this request, stating that “the plaintiff’s questions may not impede the defendant’s production, which must take place immediately.” The plaintiff was advised to address the opposing counsel should she have any legitimate concerns about the procedures for data collection.

So, what do you think? Should the court step in to define search terms when both parties fail to agree on them? Should the plaintiff’s right to specify a production form for ESI supersede standard practices? Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

2013 eDiscovery Year in Review: eDiscovery Case Law, Part 4

As we noted on Thursday, Friday and yesterday, eDiscoveryDaily published 78 posts related to eDiscovery case decisions and activities over the past year, covering 62 unique cases!  Yesterday, we looked back at cases related to proportionality and the first half of the cases related to sanctions (yes, there were that many).  Today, here are the rest of the cases related to sanctions.

We grouped those cases into common subject themes and have been reviewing them over the previous three posts.  Today is the last post in the series.  Perhaps you missed some of these cases?  Now is your chance to catch up!

SANCTIONS

Of the 62 cases we covered this past year, over 40% of them (26 total cases) related to sanctions, either due to spoliation issues or inadequate or untimely productions, many of which were granted, but some were denied.  Oh, and, apparently, having your case dismissed isn’t the worst that can happen to you for spoliation of data.  Here are the remaining 13 cases:

Judge Rules Against Spoliation Sanctions when the Evidence Doesn’t Support the Case.  In Cottle-Banks v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., California District Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel denied the plaintiff’s motion for spolation sanctions because the plaintiff was unable to show that deleted recordings of customer calls would have likely been relevant and supportive of her claim.

Spoliation of Data Can Get You Sent Up the River.  Sometimes, eDiscovery can literally be a fishing expedition. I got a kick out of Ralph Losey’s article on E-Discovery Law Today (Fishing Expedition Discovers Laptop Cast into Indian River) where the defendant employee in a RICO case in Simon Property Group, Inc. v. Lauria threw her laptop into a river. Needless to say, given the intentional spoliation of evidence, the court imposed struck all of the defenses raised by the defendant and scheduled the case for trial on the issue of damages.

Adverse Inference Sanction for Defendant who Failed to Stop Automatic Deletion.  Remember the adverse inference instructions in the Zubulake v. UBS Warburg and Apple v. Samsung cases? This case has characteristics of both of those. In Pillay v. Millard Refrigerated Servs., Inc., Illinois District Judge Joan H. Lefkow granted the plaintiff’s motion for an adverse inference jury instruction due to the defendant’s failure to stop automatic deletion of employee productivity tracking data used as a reason for terminating a disabled employee.

Appellate Court Upholds District Court Discretion for Determining the Strength of Adverse Inference Sanction.  In Flagg v. City of Detroit, the Sixth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a permissive rather than mandatory adverse inference instruction for the defendant’s deletion of emails, noting that the district court has discretion in determining the strength of the inference to be applied.

eDiscovery Vendors Are Not Immune to eDiscovery Sanctions.  In Nuance Communications Inc. v. Abbyy Software House et al., California District Judge Jeffrey S. White refused Wednesday to dismiss Nuance Communications Inc.’s patent infringement suit against Lexmark International Inc. and Abbyy Software House, and awarded reimbursement of plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and costs in excess of $130,000 as part of discovery abuse sanctions resulting from the late production of relevant documents from Abbyy.

Hard Drive Turned Over to Criminal Defendant – Eight Years Later.  If you think discovery violations by the other side can cause you problems, imagine being this guy. As reported by WRAL.com in Durham, North Carolina, the defense in State of North Carolina v. Raven S. Abaroa filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case for Discovery Violations after the state produced a forensic image of a hard drive (in the middle of trial) that had been locked away in the Durham Police Department for eight years.

When Lawyers Get Sued, They Have Preservation Obligations Too.  In Distefano v. Law Offices of Barbara H. Katsos, PC., New York Magistrate Judge A. Kathleen Tomlinson found that the defendant (an attorney who was being sued by the plaintiff she previously represented for breach of contract, negligence/legal malpractice, and breach of fiduciary duty/duty of care) had a duty to preserve information from a discarded computer and ordered a hearing for the defendant to address a number of questions to determine the potential relevance of the destroyed data and whether the defendant had a sufficiently culpable state of mind.

Plaintiff Receives Adverse Inference Sanction for Deleting Facebook Profile.  In Gatto v. United Air Lines, Inc., New Jersey Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion issued an adverse inference sanction against the plaintiff for failing to preserve data due to the fact that he either, deactivated his Facebook account and allowed the account to be automatically deleted after fourteen days, or that he deleted the account outright. Judge Mannion denied the defendant’s request for attorney’s fees and costs for “the time and effort it was forced to expend in an effort to obtain discovery”.

The Hammer Comes Down on Losing Plaintiff for Spoliation of Data.  Apparently, having your case dismissed isn’t the worst that can happen to you for egregious spoliation of data. You can also be ordered to pay the winning party over $200,000 in fees and costs for the case. In Taylor v. Mitre Corp., Virginia District Judge Liam O’Grady partially granted the prevailing defendant’s motion for fees and costs after the court dismissed the case due to the plaintiff’s spoliation of evidence.

Defendants Sanctioned, Sort Of, for Failure to Preserve Text Messages.  In Christou v. Beatport, LLC, Colorado District Judge R. Brooke Jackson ruled that the plaintiffs could introduce evidence at trial to show the defendants failure to preserve text messages after the key defendant’s iPhone was lost. However, the judge also ruled that the defendants could present “evidence in explanation…and argue that no adverse inference should be drawn”.

JP Morgan Chase Sanctioned for a Failure to Preserve Skill Codes.  In EEOC v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, District Judge Gregory L. Frost granted the EEOC’s motion for sanctions for spoliation of data, entitling the plaintiff to “a permissive adverse jury instruction related to the spoliation if this litigation proceeds to a jury trial”, and denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

EEOC Sanctioned for Failing to Comply with Motion to Compel Production.  As noted previously in this blog, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was ordered to turn over social media information related to a class action case alleging sexual harassment and retaliation. Apparently, they were less than cooperative in complying with that order. In EEOC v. Original Honeybaked Ham Co. of Georgia, Colorado Magistrate Judge Michael E. Hegarty sanctioned the EEOC for failing to provide discovery of social media content.

Blind Reliance on Vendor for Discovery Results in Sanctions.  In Peerless Indus., Inc. v. Crimson AV, LLC, Illinois Magistrate Judge Susan E. Cox sanctioned the defendant for a “hands off approach” to discovery by relying on a vendor for conducting the discovery from a closely related non-party to the suit.

That’s our eDiscovery case review for 2013.  Let’s do it again next year!

So, what do you think?  Did you miss any of these?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

2013 eDiscovery Year in Review: eDiscovery Case Law, Part 1

It’s time for our annual review of eDiscovery case law!  We had more than our share of sanctions granted and denied, as well as disputes over admissibility of electronically stored information (ESI), eDiscovery cost reimbursement, production formats and search parameters, among other things.  So, as we did last year and also the year before, let’s take a look back at 2013!

Last year, eDiscoveryDaily published 78 posts related to eDiscovery case decisions and activities over the past year, covering 62 unique cases!  And, believe it or not, we still didn’t cover every case that had eDiscovery impact.  Sometimes, you want to cover other topics too.

Nonetheless, for the cases we did cover, we grouped them into common subject themes and will review them over the next few posts (a few of them could be categorized in more than one category, so we took our best shot).  Perhaps you missed some of these?  Now is your chance to catch up!

ADMISSIBILITY AND DUTY TO PRESERVE AND PRODUCE

Admissibility of ESI, and the duty to preserve and produce it, is more at issue than ever.  As always, there are numerous disputes about data being produced and not being produced.  Here are ten cases related to admissibility and the duty to preserve and produce ESI:

Court Rules Defendant Doesn’t Have Controls of PCs of Former Members, Denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel.  To require a party to produce evidence in discovery, the party must have “possession, custody, or control” of the evidence. In Kickapoo Tribe of Indians of the Kickapoo Reservation in Kansas v. Nemaha Brown Watershed Joint District No. 7, the defendant did not have control over the personal computers of its former members, employees, or staff; it did not have the legal right to obtain information from them “on demand.” Therefore, the court rejected the plaintiff’s motion to compel and refused to order the forensic examination of the personal computers of current or former members, employees, or staff.

Court Rejects Defendant’s “Ultra-Broad” Request, Denies Motion to Compel Production.  In NOLA Spice Designs, LLC v. Haydel Enters., Inc., Louisiana Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr. denied a motion to compel a plaintiff and its principal (a third-party defendant) to produce their passwords and usernames for all websites with potentially relevant information and to compel a forensic examination of its computers.

Plaintiff Needs More Than “Mere Hope” to Discover Defendant’s Personal Info.  In Salvato v. Miley, a wrongful death action, Florida Magistrate Judge Philip R. Lammens denied the plaintiff’s motion to compel the defendant’s responses to discovery requests “based on Plaintiff’s very limited showing as to the relevance of the requested discovery and the broadly drafted discovery requests”.

Court Compels Discovery of Plaintiff’s Facebook Posts as Relevant.  In Moore v. Miller, Colorado Senior District Judge John L. Kane ruled (over the plaintiff’s privacy objections) that the plaintiff’s Facebook posts and activity log must be produced because they related to his claims of physical injury and emotional distress and because the plaintiff put his posts directly at issue by discussing the incident giving rise to the lawsuit online.

Court Rules that Stored Communications Act Applies to Former Employee Emails.  In Lazette v. Kulmatycki, the Stored Communications Act (SCA) applied when a supervisor reviewed his former employee’s Gmails through her company-issued smartphone; it covered emails the former employee had not yet opened, but not emails she had read but not yet deleted.

Google Compelled to Produce Search Terms in Apple v. Samsung.  In Apple v. Samsung, California Magistrate Judge Paul S. Grewal granted Apple’s motion to compel third party Google to produce the search terms and custodians used to respond to discovery requests and ordered the parties to “meet and confer in person to discuss the lists and to attempt to resolve any remaining disputes regarding Google’s production.”

Plaintiff Granted Access to Defendant’s Database.  In Advanced Tactical Ordnance Systems, LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., Indiana Magistrate Judge Roger B. Cosbey took the unusual step of allowing the plaintiff direct access to a defendant company’s database under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 because the plaintiff made a specific showing that the information in the database was highly relevant to the plaintiff’s claims, the benefit of producing it substantially outweighed the burden of producing it, and there was no prejudice to the defendant.

Yet Another Request for Facebook Data Denied.  In Potts v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., Tennessee District Judge William Haynes ruled that the defendant “lacks any evidentiary showing that Plaintiff’s public Facebook profile contains information that will reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” and, therefore, denied the defendant’s motion to compel regarding same.

Stored Communications Act Limits Production of Google Emails.  In Optiver Australia Pty. Ltd. & Anor. v. Tibra Trading Pty. Ltd. & Ors., California Magistrate Judge Paul S. Grewal granted much of the defendant’s motion to quash subpoena of Google for electronic communications sent or received by certain Gmail accounts allegedly used by employees of the defendant because most of the request violated the terms of the Stored Communications Act.

Another Social Media Request Denied as a “Carte Blanche” Request.  In Keller v. National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co., the defendants filed a motion to compel the plaintiff’s to respond to various discovery requests. While Magistrate Judge Jeremiah Lynch granted their request to compel the plaintiffs to produce medical records, he denied the defendant’s request “to delve carte blanche into the nonpublic sections of Plaintiffs’ social networking accounts”.

EDISCOVERY COST REIMBURSEMENT

As usual, eDiscovery cost reimbursement was a “mixed bag” as the cases where the prevailing party was awarded reimbursement of eDiscovery costs and the cases where requests for reimbursement of eDiscovery costs was denied (or only partially granted) was about even.  Here are six cases, including one where the losing plaintiff was ordered to pay $2.8 million for predictive coding of one million documents(!):

Cost-Shifting Inappropriate when Data is Kept in an Accessible Format.  In Novick v. AXA Network, New York Magistrate Judge Kevin Nathaniel Fox ruled that cost-shifting was inappropriate where data was kept in an accessible format.

Apple Wins Case, But Loses its Bid to Have Most of its Costs Covered.  In Ancora Technologies, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., California District Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers granted in part and denied in part Ancora’s Motion for Review of Clerks’ Order on the Bill of Costs of prevailing party Apple, reducing the awarded amount from $111,158.23 down to $20,875.48, including disallowing over $71,000 in storage and hosting costs.

Another Case where Reimbursement of eDiscovery Costs are Denied.  In The Country Vintner of North Carolina, LLC v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, Inc., when deciding which costs are taxable, the Fourth Circuit chose to follow the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Race Tires America, Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., which read 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) narrowly. Specifically, the court approved taxation of file conversion and transferring files onto CDs as “[f]ees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case” but no other tasks related to electronically stored information (ESI).

In False Claims Act Case, Reimbursement of eDiscovery Costs Awarded to Plaintiff.  In United States ex rel. Becker v. Tools & Metals, Inc., a qui tam False Claims Act litigation, the plaintiffs sought, and the court awarded, costs for, among other things, uploading ESI, creating a Relativity index, and processing data over the objection that expenses should be limited to “reasonable out-of-pocket expenses which are part of the costs normally charged to a fee-paying client.” The court also approved electronic hosting costs, rejecting a defendant’s claim that “reasonableness is determined based on the number of documents used in the litigation.” However, the court refused to award costs for project management and for extracting data from hard drives where the plaintiff could have used better means to conduct a “targeted extraction of information.”

Court Says Scanning Documents to TIFF and Loading into Database is Taxable.  In Amana Society, Inc. v. Excel Engineering, Inc., Iowa District Judge Linda R. Reade found that “scanning [to TIFF format] for Summation purposes qualifies as ‘making copies of materials’ and that these costs are recoverable”.

Must Losing Plaintiff Pay Defendant $2.8 Million for Predictive Coding of One Million Documents? Court Says Yes.  In Gabriel Technologies Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., District Judge Anthony J. Battaglia awarded the defendant over $12.4 million in attorneys’ fees to be paid by the losing plaintiff in the case. The amount included over $2.8 million for “computer-assisted, algorithm-driven document review” and nearly $392,000 for contract attorneys to review documents identified by the algorithm as responsive.

We’re just getting started!  Tomorrow, we will cover cases related to production format disputes, search disputes and technology assisted review.  Stay tuned!

So, what do you think?  Did you miss any of these?  Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.

Plaintiff Sanctioned After its "Failure to Take the Most Basic Document Preservation Steps" – eDiscovery Case Law

In SJS Distribution Systems, Inc. v. Sam’s East, Inc., No. 11 CV 1229 (WFK)(RML), 2013 U.S. Dist. (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2013), New York Magistrate Judge Robert M. Levy found the plaintiff’s failure to take “the most basic document preservation steps”, including issuing a litigation hold – “even after it discovered the packaging nonconformities and filed this action” – constituted gross negligence. As a result, an adverse inference instruction sanction was issued against the plaintiff and the defendant was awarded its costs and attorney’s fees associated with its motion to compel.

This breach of contract dispute arose out of the plaintiff’s purchase of almost $3 million worth of diapers from the defendant where the plaintiff contended that it discovered a discrepancy between the packaging of the diapers that it ordered and some of the diaper shipments defendant delivered in the fall of 2010 and claimed that it was unable to resell those diapers to the intended buyer and incurred damages as a result.

During discovery, the defendant asked for documents from the plaintiff relating to the purchase, sale, delivery, and attempts to resell the diapers. When the plaintiff certified that it had produced all responsive documents, the defendant advised the plaintiff of deficiencies in its document production, but the plaintiff reaffirmed that it had produced all responsive documents in its possession. After an additional document request, the plaintiff produced three additional pages along with amended responses and objections. The plaintiff’s president also asserted that his company “does not normally save copies of all emails sent or received, that it ‘did not anticipate’ litigation with defendant or the need to save all email communication with defendant, and that plaintiff has no internal emails since it is primarily a one-person entity”.

Judge Levy asked the parties to meet and confer in an attempt to resolve the dispute after the defendant asked for permission to file a motion to compel. Plaintiff’s counsel then announced it had discovered 181 additional hard-copy documents addressing the sale and storage of the diapers, which it turned over to the defendant, which, nonetheless, continued to claim that the plaintiff had still not produced all relevant electronically stored information (ESI).  When the defendant subsequently obtained discovery from a third-party, it included 334 pages of emails from the plaintiff to third parties that the plaintiff had not produced, leading to the defendant eventually filing a motion for spoliation sanctions.

Judge Levy used the Zubulake test to determine the applicability of sanctions, as follows:

(1) the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it at the time it was destroyed; (2) the records were destroyed with a culpable state of mind; and (3) the destroyed evidence was relevant to the party’s claim or defense such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it would support that claim or defense.

Judge Levy found that all three components of the test were applicable, noting “the facts here establish that SJS’s failure to take the most basic document preservation steps, even after it discovered the packaging nonconformities and filed this action, constitutes gross negligence.”  As a result, the defendant’s motion was granted in part and denied in part, with an adverse inference sanction imposed as well as awarding the defendant its costs and attorney’s fees associated with its motion to compel.  Judge Levy refused to preclude the plaintiff from offering evidence from mid-November 2010 forward, refusing to apply such a “drastic remedy” because there was no evidence of bad faith and other evidence was still available to the defendant.

So, what do you think?  Should sanctions have been issued?   Please share any comments you might have or if you’d like to know more about a particular topic.

Disclaimer: The views represented herein are exclusively the views of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views held by CloudNine Discovery. eDiscoveryDaily is made available by CloudNine Discovery solely for educational purposes to provide general information about general eDiscovery principles and not to provide specific legal advice applicable to any particular circumstance. eDiscoveryDaily should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.